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Título: | Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding |
Autor: | Ellman, Matthew CSIC ORCID ; Hurkens, Sjaak CSIC ORCID | Palabras clave: | Crowdfunding Mechanism design Moral hazard Private information |
Fecha de publicación: | abr-2019 | Editor: | Elsevier | Citación: | Economics Letters 181: 11-16 (2019) | Resumen: | Reward-based crowdfunding enables credit-constrained entrepreneurs to raise money to develop and create innovative products. Crowdfunders' low monitoring incentives open the door to fraud. In practice, fraud is surprisingly rare. Strausz (2017) proves that crowdfunding implements the optimal ex post individually ratio- nal mechanism design outcome in an environment with entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information. However, ex post individual rationality precludes all crowdfunding unless fraud can be prevented with certainty. Actual crowdfunding tolerates some fraud. We show this (i) generates strictly higher pro ts and welfare, but (ii) cannot implement the optimal ex interim individually rational outcome. | Versión del editor: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.015 | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/180923 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.015 | ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
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Fraud tolerance_Ellman.pdf | 359,02 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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