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Título: | Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint |
Autor: | Azacis, Helmuts | Palabras clave: | Indivisible goods Envy-Freeness Implementation Strong Nash Equilibrium |
Fecha de publicación: | 10-sep-2004 | Serie: | UFAE and IAE Working Papers 623.04 |
Resumen: | I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences. | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1787 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo |
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62304.pdf | 211,57 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
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