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http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175520
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Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
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dc.contributor.author | Brandts, Jordi | es_ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-07T13:27:48Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-07T13:27:48Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2017-09-06 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | ESA European Meeting (2017) | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175520 | - |
dc.description | Trabajo presentado en el Economic Science Association European Meeting, celebrado en la Universidad de Viena los días del 6 al 9 de septiembre de 2017 | es_ES |
dc.description.abstract | In the context of supply function competition with private information, we test in the laboratory whether - as predicted in Bayesian equilibrium - costs that are positively correlated lead to steeper supply functions and less competitive outcomes than do uncorrelated costs. We find that the majority of subjects bid in accordance with the equilibrium prediction when the environment is simple (uncorrelated costs treatment) but fail to do so in a more complex environment (positively correlated costs treatment). Although we find no statistically significant differences between treatments in average behaviour and outcomes, there are significant differences in the distribution of supply functions. Our results are consistent with the presence of sophisticated agents that on average best respond to a large proportion of subjects who ignore the correlation among costs. Even though we do not find evidence of greater market power on average, experimental welfare losses are higher than the equilibrium prediction owing to a substantial degree of productive inefficiency. | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
dc.rights | closedAccess | es_ES |
dc.title | Supply function competition, private information and market power: a laboratory study | es_ES |
dc.type | comunicación de congreso | es_ES |
dc.description.peerreviewed | No | es_ES |
dc.relation.csic | Sí | es_ES |
oprm.item.hasRevision | no ko 0 false | * |
dc.type.coar | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794 | es_ES |
item.openairecristype | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18cf | - |
item.fulltext | No Fulltext | - |
item.cerifentitytype | Publications | - |
item.openairetype | comunicación de congreso | - |
item.languageiso639-1 | en | - |
item.grantfulltext | none | - |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Comunicaciones congresos |
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