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dc.contributor.authorBrandts, Jordies_ES
dc.contributor.authorCooper, David J.es_ES
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-05T13:06:34Z-
dc.date.available2019-02-05T13:06:34Z-
dc.date.issued2016-04-01-
dc.identifier.citationMicro Seminars EUR (2016)es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/175294-
dc.descriptionTrabajo presentado en el Micro Seminars EUR organizado por el Tinbergen Institute y celebrado en Rotterdam el 1 de abril de 2016es_ES
dc.description.abstractWe introduce a new game to the experimental literature and use it to study how behavioral phenomena affect the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized management. Our game models an organization with two divisions and one central manager. Each division must choose or be assigned a product. Ignoring asymmetric information, the underlying game is an asymmetric coordination game related to the Battle of the Sexes. In equilibrium, the divisions coordinate on identical products. Each division prefers an equilibrium where the selected products are closest to its local tastes while central management prefers the efficient equilibrium, determined by a randomly state of the world, which maximizes total payoffs. The state of the world is known to the divisions, but the central manager only learns about it through messages from the divisions who have incentives to lie. Contrary to the theory, overall performance is higher under centralization, where the central manager assigns products to divisions after receiving messages from the divisions, than under decentralization where the divisions choose their own products. Underlying this, mis-coordination is common under decentralization and divisions fail to use their information when they do coordinate. Mis-coordination is non-existent under centralization and there is a high degree of truth-telling by divisions as well. Performance under centralization is depressed by persistent sub-optimal use of information by central managers.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipThe authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (Grant: ECO2014-59302-P) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2014 SGR 510).es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.relationMINECO/ICTI2013-2016/ECO2014-59302-Pes_ES
dc.rightsopenAccesses_ES
dc.titleCentralized vs. decentralized management: an experimental studyes_ES
dc.typecomunicación de congresoes_ES
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer reviewedes_ES
dc.contributor.funderNational Science Foundation (US)es_ES
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es_ES
dc.contributor.funderGeneralitat de Catalunyaes_ES
dc.relation.csices_ES
oprm.item.hasRevisionno ko 0 false*
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000001es_ES
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
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