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Title

Weighted Approval Voting

AuthorsMassó, Jordi; Vorsatz, Marc
KeywordsApproval Voting
Neutrality
Issue Date4-Sep-2006
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
668.06
AbstractTo allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1730
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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