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Title

Inequity Version and Team Incentives

AuthorsRey-Biel, Pedro
KeywordsInequity aversion
Team incentives
Behavioral contract theory
Issue Date15-Jan-2007
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
677.07
AbstractWe study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1723
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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