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Title

Multimarket Contact in Pharmaceutical Markets

AuthorsCoronado, Javier; Jiménez-Martín, Sergi; Marín, Pedro L.
KeywordsPharmaceutical prices
Multimarket Contact
Regulation
Issue Date15-Jul-2007
SeriesUFAE and IAE Working Papers
698.07
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of multimarket contact on the behavior of pharmaceutical firms controlling for different levels of regulatory constraints using IMS MIDAS database. Theoretically, firms that meet in several markets are expected to be capable of sustaining implicitly more profitable out- comes, even if perfect monitoring is not possible. Firms may find it profitable to redistribute their market power among markets where they are operating. We present evidence for nine OECD countries with different degrees of regulation and show that regulation affects the importance of economic forces on firms' price setting behavior. Furthermore, our results confirms the presence of the predictions of the multimarket theory for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated ones (U.K., Germany, Netherlands), in contrast, for highly regulated countries (Japan, France, Italy and Spain) the results are less clear with some countries being consistent with the theory (France) while others contradicting it (Japan, Italy and Spain). A key result indicates that in the latter countries, price constraints are so intense, that there is little room for allocating market power. Thus equilibrium prices are expected in general to be lower in regulated countries.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1703
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Informes y documentos de trabajo
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