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dc.contributor.authorKlaus, Bettinaes_ES
dc.contributor.authorKlijn, Flipes_ES
dc.date.accessioned2018-07-05T07:46:29Z-
dc.date.available2018-07-05T07:46:29Z-
dc.date.issued2017-07-
dc.identifier.citationGames and Economic Behavior 104: 222-229 (2017)es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380-
dc.description.abstractWe study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.es_ES
dc.description.sponsorshipB. Klaus gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) for Project 100018_156201. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya (2014-SGR-1064), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Plan Estatal de Investigación Científica y Técnica 2013–2016 (ECO2014-59302-P), and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563).es_ES
dc.language.isoenges_ES
dc.publisherElsevieres_ES
dc.relationMINECO/ICTI2013-2016/ECO2014-59302-Pes_ES
dc.relationMINECO/ICTI2013-2016/SEV-2015-0563es_ES
dc.relation.isversionofPostprintes_ES
dc.rightsopenAccessen_EN
dc.subjectImplementationes_ES
dc.subjectMatchinges_ES
dc.subjectMechanismses_ES
dc.subjectStabilityes_ES
dc.subjectSubstitutabilityes_ES
dc.titleNon-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stabilityes_ES
dc.typeartículoes_ES
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001-
dc.description.peerreviewedPeer reviewedes_ES
dc.relation.publisherversionhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001es_ES
dc.embargo.terms2019-07-01es_ES
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.contributor.funderSwiss National Science Foundationes_ES
dc.contributor.funderGeneralitat de Catalunyaes_ES
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es_ES
dc.relation.csices_ES
oprm.item.hasRevisionno ko 0 false*
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329es_ES
dc.identifier.funderhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809es_ES
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