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Title

Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability

AuthorsKlaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
KeywordsImplementation
Matching
Mechanisms
Stability
Substitutability
Issue DateJul-2017
PublisherElsevier
CitationGames and Economic Behavior 104: 222-229 (2017)
AbstractWe study many-to-many matching markets in which agents from a set A are matched to agents from a disjoint set B through a two-stage non-revelation mechanism. In the first stage, A-agents, who are endowed with a quota that describes the maximal number of agents they can be matched to, simultaneously make proposals to the B-agents. In the second stage, B-agents sequentially, and respecting the quota, choose and match to available A-proposers. We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the induced game. We prove that stable matchings are equilibrium outcomes if all A-agents' preferences are substitutable. We also show that the implementation of the set of stable matchings is closely related to the quotas of the A-agents. In particular, implementation holds when A-agents' preferences are substitutable and their quotas are non-binding.
Publisher version (URL)https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/167380
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.001
ISSN0899-8256
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Artículos
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