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Title

Is Reasoning the Same as Relevant Inference?

AuthorsPeña, Lorenzo
KeywordsTeoría de la racionalidad
Lógica del entrañamiento
Lógica relevante
Theory of rationality
Entailment logic
Relevant logic
Issue DateJan-1993
AbstractThe negative approach to a theory of rationality is primarily concerned with rejecting what is irrational, which usually is equated with what is inconsistent. The positive approach tries to enhance patterns of reasoning practice. Different sorts of consistency and inconsistency are by no means equivalent. What is anyway required is positive reasoning. So, I espouse the positive view: to reason is to infer, and since inference is relative, so is reasoning. As an approximation to deductive reasoning, I sketch a system of logic close enough to the most widely publicized relevant system of entailment logic. Reasoning as thus implemented is of course somehow artificial. Some part of the remaining task can be afforded by a pragmatic rounding out of purely inferential logic.
DescriptionPonencia sobre el razonamiento y la lógica relevante. 15 paginas.
URIhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/14105
Appears in Collections:(CCHS-IFS) Comunicaciones congresos
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