Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar a este item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125594
COMPARTIR / EXPORTAR:
SHARE CORE BASE | |
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL | DATACITE | |
Título: | Dynamic Contracts when Agent's Quality is Unknown |
Autor: | Prat, Julien CSIC ; Jovanovic, Boyan | Palabras clave: | Principal–agent model optimal contract Learning Private information Reputation career |
Fecha de publicación: | 2014 | Editor: | Econometric Society | Citación: | Theoretical Economics 9: 865-914 (2014) | Resumen: | We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent’s quality and a hidden action of the agent. As information about quality accumulates, incentives become easier to provide because the agent has less room to manipulate the principal’s beliefs. This result is opposite to that in the literature on “career concerns” in which incentives via short-term contracts become harder to provide as the agent’s quality is revealed over time | Descripción: | Previous versions circulated under the title “Dynamic incentive contracts under parameter uncertainty.” | Versión del editor: | http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE1439 | URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/125594 | DOI: | 10.3982/TE1439 | Identificadores: | doi: 10.3982/TE1439 issn: 1555-7561 |
Aparece en las colecciones: | (IAE) Artículos |
Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Prat-Theoretical_Economics-2014-v9-p865.pdf | 668,17 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizar/Abrir |
CORE Recommender
SCOPUSTM
Citations
36
checked on 12-abr-2024
WEB OF SCIENCETM
Citations
31
checked on 26-feb-2024
Page view(s)
248
checked on 22-abr-2024
Download(s)
175
checked on 22-abr-2024
Google ScholarTM
Check
Altmetric
Altmetric
Este item está licenciado bajo una Licencia Creative Commons