English   español  
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/112336
logo share SHARE   Add this article to your Mendeley library MendeleyBASE
Visualizar otros formatos: MARC | Dublin Core | RDF | ORE | MODS | METS | DIDL
Exportar a otros formatos:


Stand By Me. Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games

AuthorsBrandts, Jordi ; Cooper, David J.; Fatás, Enrique; Qi, Shi
Issue Date25-Oct-2013
CitationCESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics (2013)
AbstractWe present experiments studying how high ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round by round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time period. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment
DescriptionComunicación presentada en la CESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics, celebrada los días 25 y 26 de octubre de 2013 en Munich (Alemania)
Appears in Collections:(IAE) Comunicaciones congresos
Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Brandts-CESifo-2013.pdf674,56 kBAdobe PDFThumbnail
Show full item record
Review this work

WARNING: Items in Digital.CSIC are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.