2024-03-28T13:06:40Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/1752512019-03-25T14:08:04Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_311
Brandts, Jordi
Cooper, David J.
Fatás, Enrique
Qi, Shi
2019-02-05T10:07:17Z
2019-02-05T10:07:17Z
2016-10
Management Science 62(10): 2916-2936 (2016)
0025-1909
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175251
10.1287/mnsc.2015.2269.
1526-5501
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/100000001
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100002809
http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003329
We present experiments studying how high-ability individuals use help to foster efficient coordination. After an initial phase that traps groups in a low-productivity equilibrium, incentives to coordinate are increased, making it possible to escape this performance trap. The design varies whether high-ability individuals can offer help and, if so, whether they must commit to help for an extended period. If help is chosen on a round-by-round basis, the probability of escaping the performance trap is slightly reduced by allowing for help. The likelihood of success significantly improves if high-ability individuals must commit to help for an extended time. We develop and estimate a structural model of sophisticated learning that provides an explanation for why commitment is necessary. The key insight is that potential leaders who are overly optimistic about their ability to teach their followers are too fast to eliminate help in the absence of commitment.
eng
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
openAccess
Incentives
Coordination
Experiments
Organizations
Heterogeneous work teams
Stand by me experiments on help and commitment in coordination games
artículo