2024-03-28T19:47:31Zhttp://digital.csic.es/dspace-oai/requestoai:digital.csic.es:10261/18432016-02-16T02:03:07Zcom_10261_58com_10261_7col_10261_689
2007-11-05T14:39:03Z
urn:hdl:10261/1843
Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints
Casari, Marco
Bounded rationality
Genetic algorithms
Individual heterogeneity
In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.
2007-11-05T14:39:03Z
2007-11-05T14:39:03Z
2003-03-29
documento de trabajo
http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1843
eng
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
583.03
openAccess