Euromarriages in Spain: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Context of European Integration

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ABSTRACT

This article examines recent trends and patterns in binational marriages between European citizens in Spain over a 20-year period and the sociodemographic profile and nationality composition of these binational marriages. The analysis relies on aggregate marriage statistics and on marriage register microdata for 2008–2009. We use odds ratios to monitor trends and characteristics of binational marriages and multinomial regression to further examine the sociodemographic profile of these couples. The analysis of marriage records reveals only a modest rise in Euromarriages over the 1990–2009 period. This moderate increase in Euromarriages points towards a weak social impact of the European single market. Moreover, the analysis also suggests that binational marriages more often involve less-educated than more-educated individuals. Finally, findings on the social and nationality compositions of binational marriages conform to theoretical predictions drawn from the literatures of marriage markets, endogamy, and social hypergamy. They show that the affinity between Spaniards and European Union (EU-15) citizens is lesser than that between Spaniards and non-Europeans (i.e. Latin Americans). They also show that patterns of binational marriages are highly gender specific. Whereas the affinity between Spanish women and EU-15 men is higher than the affinity between Spanish women and ‘new’ European men, the affinity between Spanish men and ‘new’ European women is higher than the affinity between Spanish men and EU-15 women.

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INTRODUCTION

This article focuses on the impact of European integration on the transnationalisation of life trajectories, social interaction, and personal relationships, by examining recent trends in binational marriages between European citizens in Spain and the sociodemographic characteristics of partners to these marriages. The literature on intermarriage has dealt primarily with intermarriage between
lower-class immigrants (or ethnic and racial minority groups) and members of host societies (or dominant ethnic and racial groups). Studies in this tradition have generally assessed the level of integration of immigrants and their descendents and measured social distance between ethnic groups in a given society (Qian and Lichter, 2007). Research in Europe is no exception (Varro, 1995). The majority of studies have focused on marriage between European Union (EU) and non-EU citizens and have lacked a European-wide dimension (e.g. González-Ferrer, 2006; Schrödter, 2006; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen, 2007; Braun and Recchi, 2008; Cortina et al., 2008). When they have encompassed Europeans, the usual target of study has been the cohorts of low-skilled labour migrants that left Southern Europe in the 1950s and early 1960s and their offspring. It is only very recently that researchers have started to pay attention to binational marriages between Europeans as an emerging social phenomenon that reflects the intensification of social group ties throughout Europe (Braun and Recchi, 2008; Gaspar, 2009; Koelet et al., 2011; Lanzieri, 2011), but empirical studies are still lacking. This article, like the rest of articles in this volume, is a first step toward filling this research gap.

The freedom of movement and residence within a large number of European countries since the early 1990s, the EU policies promoting cross-border mobility to study and work, the increasing interconnectivity, and the globalisation of lifestyles and behaviours lead to the expectation of a concomitant rise in the number of binational marriages between Europeans. Spain became a member of the EU in 1985, and since the late 1990s, it has been a prime destination for migrants from all over the world (Arango and Finotelli, 2009), including Central and Eastern Europe (Stanek, 2009). Spain is also one of the world’s leading tourist destinations (World Tourism Organisation, 2011). Last but not least, Spain has been a top choice for Erasmus/Socrates students over the years: in the academic year 2009/2010, Spain received more than 27,000 students from other EU countries, slightly more than the next two countries, France and Germany. Spain is thus an interesting case study for the analysis of the impact of European integration on trends in European intramarriage (Gaspar, 2008) or Euromarriages. This article’s main objective is to assess whether the process of social integration that is taking place in Europe has indeed translated into a significant rise in the number of Euromarriages in Spain.

The recent literature on the sociological impact of European integration has also emphasised that European integration benefits mainly the better-educated segments of the population, through expanding their mobility patterns and their connectivity opportunities (Gabel, 1998; Favell, 2008; Fligstein, 2008). The better-educated segments of the population also tend to have a more cosmopolitan outlook and should be more open to romantic partnerships with individuals from other nationalities. One would thus expect the number of European binational marriages in the last two decades to have increased more among the better-educated segments of the population than among the lesser-educated ones. Therefore, this article’s second objective is to examine the sociodemographic profile of these Euromarriages and test empirically the validity of this expectation.

Finally, the sociological literature on European integration is interested in the impact that it may have on the formation and social and cultural characteristics of transnational social groups (Díez Medrano, 2010, 2011). Families resulting from binational marriages are both an expression of and a vehicle towards the formation of these social groups, whose social and cultural characteristics are surely influenced by the nationalities that come together to form them. Within the limits of the available data, this article thus examines and explains the relative prevalence of different nationality combinations in Spain’s binational marriages. We examine these contrasts under the light of theoretical expectations drawn from the literature.

The article is structured as follows: first, we review the literature on the expected implications of the creation of the European single market in the early 1990s and lay out hypotheses on the prevalence and characteristics of binational marriages between Europeans; second, we present the Spanish data sources and methods used for the analysis; third, we contrast the different hypotheses sketched through descriptive and statistical analysis of the sociodemographic characteristics of these Euromarriages in recent years. Finally, the article’s last section summarises the results and draws implications for the study of the social dimension of European integration.
BACKGROUND: INTRA-EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION AND THE DIVERSIFICATION OF THE MARRIAGE MARKET

The main non-economic reason for the creation of the EU single market in 1993 and the Schengen Area in 1995 was the promotion of mobility among Europeans. In particular, both the European Commission and the scholarly community assumed that a borderless Europe would encourage well-educated European professionals to move across Europe in search of the best available opportunities (Recchi and Favell, 2009). The European Commission’s hope was that mass mobility would translate into stronger cross-border bonds and supranational forms of identification. Similar motives underlie the creation of the Erasmus programme for student exchange across Europe. The European Commission’s ultimate expectation was that cross-border bonds and supranational forms of identification would in turn create ‘diffuse’ support for further European integration among the population (Favell, 2008; Calligaro, 2011; Favell and Guiraudon, 2011).

Almost 20 years after the creation of the single market, these expectations remain largely unfulfilled. Although the single market and EU programmes such as Erasmus expanded considerably the mobility opportunities for workers and students, intra-EU migration increased only moderately before the end of the millennium, and migration from non-EU countries outpaced migration from EU countries. Data compiled by Recchi (2005) for the period 1990–2000 show indeed that whereas the percentage of non-EU migrants to the EU increased by 33%, the percentage of EU migrants merely increased by 10%. In fact, most intra-European migration in Western Europe took place before the single market and Schengen, during the 1950s and 1960s, as workers from Southern Europe migrated to the prosperous north in search of better economic opportunities. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe, however, have somewhat contributed to redress the situation. Despite long transition periods for the free mobility of citizens from the new member states as part of the EU enlargement treaties, the waiving of these transition periods by some countries and the early lifting of barriers in others have contributed, directly and indirectly, to facilitate a large east–west flow of migrants in recent years. This east–west flow has significantly increased the copresence of young Europeans from different nationalities. In all, the EU-27 population with foreign nationality reached 6.5% in 2010, and the share of citizens from another EU country represented 38% of the total foreign population (Eurostat Statistics Database). The corresponding figures for Spain were 12% and 41%, respectively. Although long-term residential intra-EU mobility has not met the European Commission’s expectations, a growing number of Europeans now live in a different country from the one in which they were born. Furthermore, the increased affordability of travel across borders that has resulted from the liberalisation of the air transportation industry has fostered new forms of trans-European mobility (short term, circular, and seasonal) and has thus led to an exponential increase in the opportunities for contact between citizens of different European states.

Partner Availability and Binational Marriages

This article focuses on Spain, to examine the impact of the single market and rising international mobility on binational marriages between Europeans. The article’s first and main hypothesis is that the European single market has translated into a gradual increase in the frequency of binational marriages and cohabiting unions between Europeans (H1). Indeed, as the literature on intermarriage emphasises, individual preferences about spouse selection only become activated within a specific mating opportunity context, such that the number and characteristics of potential male and female spouses in a defined area strongly determine partner choices and the resulting couples (Blau, 1977; Blau and Schwartz, 1984). Although the Internet facilitates a decoupling of interpersonal contact and place (Niedomysl et al., 2010; Glowsky, 2011), the vast majority of couples still follow from a face-to-face interaction (Haandrikman and Hutter, 2012). We thus expect that the elimination of barriers to movement through the creation of the single market has translated into greater mobility across Europe, which has in turn propitiated an increase in the number of binational marriages between Europeans.
Skills, Migration, and Trends in the Relative Incidence of Binational Marriage among Highly Educated and Lesser-educated Population Segments

The sociological literature on intra-European mobility has predominantly featured highly educated migrants. Whether we think of the mobility of professionals within transnational corporations (Salt, 1992), the job and career opportunities opened for the EU elites at the European Commission (Georgakakis, 2012), the mobility of young, unattached professionals drawn by the cosmopolitan character of cities such as London, Brussels, or Amsterdam (Favell, 2008), the mobility of scientists across EU academic institutions (Ackers, 2004), or finally, the short-term mobility and transnational personal networks of Erasmus students (Fligstein, 2008), the focus is always on those with high cultural capital (also Recchi, 2005; Recchi and Favell, 2009). This focus is in part justified by the relative novelty of this type of mobility and implicitly draws on pre-EU enlargement human capital economic models that conclude that the highly skilled are those who benefit most from the European single market (e.g. Gabel, 1998). The reasoning is simple: if it is the highly skilled that benefit the most, it is they who should move most often. The second-order sociological prediction that follows from this expectation is that in Spain, just like in other EU states, the EU single market has led to a greater increase in Euromarriages among highly educated individuals than among lesser-educated ones (H2a). Further theoretical backing for this empirical prediction comes from the literatures on cosmopolitanism, European identity, and ethnic prejudice, which argue and empirically demonstrate that highly educated individuals are more open to other cultures and to other identifications than are lesser-educated ones (e.g. Gordon, 1964; Inglehart, 1977; Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Kalmijn, 1998). The endogamy observed and documented for national and ethnic groups should therefore be less strong among the more-educated than among the lesser-educated segments of society.

The economic logic that underlies the expectation of greater geographic mobility among the highly skilled than among the lesser-skilled segments of the population has been partly contradicted by the evidence of very low intra-European mobility in the 10 years that followed the creation of the European single market and the evidence of much greater east-west intra-European mobility since the enlargement processes to Central and Eastern Europe. Because of the wealth and socio-economic gulf that exists between Western and Eastern Europe, especially when one considers the newest members, Romania and Bulgaria, these geographical trans-European mobility patterns suggest that it is the lesser-educated and not the more-educated workers who have taken advantage of the greater opportunities for mobility opened by the single market. Although greater mobility by the lesser educated than by the more educated may not compensate for the greater openness to others expected among the latter and for the greater opportunities for short-term mobility and international contact that the latter enjoy because of their greater economic resources, it opens up the possibility that increases in the frequency of binational marriage between Europeans have been greater among the lesser than among the more educated (H2b).

Nationality Combinations in Binational Marriages

The recent literature on the sociological impact of European integration (e.g. Recchi, 2005; Recchi and Favell, 2009) has prioritised the study of transnational mobility per se and, consequently, does not provide further insights as to other aspects of marriage between Europeans than the ones discussed in the earlier paragraphs. If one is seriously interested in social group formation in Europe, however, and more specifically, in the potential development of transnational bonds of solidarity that could eventually lead to the division of national social groups into cosmopolitan and local segments (Díez Medrano, 2008, 2010), one must empirically examine these binational marriages up close. In particular and within the limitations of the data available, this article examines prevalent nationality combinations in binational marriages. The combination of specific nationalities ought to translate into specific processes of cultural hybridisation susceptible of being transmitted intergenerationally (at least in part), which would in turn shape the lifestyles, values, and identifications of the cosmopolitan segments of national social groups across Europe. In this article, we focus mainly on the distinction between marriages.
between Spaniards and EU-15 nationals and Spaniards and nationals from the states that entered the EU in the recent 2004 and 2007 enlargement processes. We also assess the prevalence of these marriages compared with those between Spaniards and non-European citizens.

**Marriage markets**

Various factors lead to the predominance of particular nationality combinations in binational marriages. A major one is the structure of the marriage market. Marriage theory states that dominant choices are largely driven by partner availability (Blau, 1977; Blau and Schwartz, 1984). This includes the relative presence of various nationalities, their sex ratios, and their marital status composition. The population register data for Spain in the 1991–2009 period show a spectacular rise in the percentage of foreign nationals in Spain. Although there has been a large influx of Europeans, the majority of whom came from Romania, it pales in comparison with the number of migrants from outside Europe. Also, although the sex ratio among the different immigrant groups tends to be the same (about 20% more men than women), according to the 2007 Spanish Immigrant Survey (Reher and Requena, 2009), Europeans have partners upon arrival (43.7%) much more often than have non-Europeans (39.8%) and new Europeans (i.e. from Central and Eastern EU member states) much more so than EU-15 Europeans (51.9% vs 31.9%). This demographic information, together with the demonstrated significant role of copresence in determining partner choices, leads to the prediction that binational marriages between Spaniards and non-Europeans are more frequent than those between Spaniards and Europeans and that marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 citizens are more frequent than marriages between Spaniards and new Europeans.

**Values and endogamy**

Interrmarriage theory leads to the expectation that endogamous preferences in mate selection, more pronounced among the lesser-educated than among the more-educated segments of the population, lead to Spaniards getting married to people from countries whose cultures are similar to Spain’s (e.g. because they share a language, a religion, or a particular world outlook) more often than to people from countries whose cultures strongly differ from Spain’s (e.g. Sánchez-Domínguez et al., 2011; Kalmijn, 1998). For instance, Spaniards, EU-15 citizens, new Europeans, and Latin Americans share a Christian religion, despite denominational differences. Religious affinity is of course greater with Catholic Latin Americans and with citizens from predominantly Catholic EU-15 countries (e.g. Italy, France, and Portugal) than with citizens from Protestant (e.g. Britain) or Orthodox European countries (e.g. Romania and Bulgaria). Also, Spaniards share the same language with the majority of Latin American immigrants, and they share a Latin language with Southern European countries and with Romania. Finally, according to the World Values Study, the average Spaniards’ values are slightly closer to those prevalent in the EU-15 countries (especially those well represented in Spain, e.g. Italy, France, Great Britain, and Germany) than to those prevalent in the new EU member states (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania) and in non-European countries (including Latin America, with the exception of Argentina). Because overall cultural proximity in the end depends on several cultural dimensions, predictions about the most prevalent nationality combinations in binational marriages are risky. Nonetheless, on the basis of the aforementioned descriptive information, it would seem that Latin Americans and Southern Europeans are culturally closer (e.g. religion, language, and values) than are new Europeans and, especially, North Africans. The marriage affinity between Spaniards and Latin Americans and between Spaniards and EU-15 Europeans should thus be greater than that between Spaniards and other groups of immigrants (on endogamy in Spanish binational marriages, see Sánchez-Domínguez et al., 2011).

**Homogamy and hypergamy**

The marriage theory also states that partner choice is generally driven by homogamy (Schoen and Wooldredge, 1989; Mare, 1991; Blackwell, 1998), with women showing a slight tendency to move up socially through marriage – hypergamy (Burchinal, 1964; Zelditch, 1964). The extent of homogamy and hypergamy depends on the measures one uses (e.g. class of origin, individual socio-economic achievement, and educational attainment). Homogamy is usually explained with reference to contact opportunities between people with the same social background, interest in social reproduction among privileged groups.

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in society, social pressures from significant others, and a human tendency for people who are similar to like one another (Schoen and Woolardge, 1989). Meanwhile, hypergamy in women’s marriage choices stems from a combination of factors, whose relative importance varies across time and space. One such factor is the stratification system: if one measures social position through individual characteristics and women’s access to higher education or to well-paid occupations is more restricted than men’s, it is to be expected that many men of higher socio-economic position will either remain single or else find partners among women of a lower socio-economic status. Another factor is patriarchy, which at the level of marriage expresses itself in men striving to be the dominant partner in the couple.

In recent years, scholars have noted two related developments in advanced economies, with implications for assortative matching: the equalisation of men’s and women’s individual social achievement and challenges to traditional gender roles, with women striving for more equality in interpersonal relations with men. Female educational attainment now exceeds that of men’s (Esping-Andersen, 2009), and this means that hypogamous assortative matching, where women have more education than their male partners, has become a widespread phenomenon (Esteve and Cortina, 2006). Men, however, are still overrepresented in better-paid and more prestigious occupations. This leads to the expectation that, viewed from this structural dimension, hypergamous assortative matching is still prevalent. This social context has implications for the development of predictions concerning gender differences in the combination of nationalities in binational marriages. The nationality groups that ground our empirical analysis can be ranked from higher to lower average levels in terms of educational and occupational attainment: EU-15, Spaniards, new Europeans, non-Europeans (with the latter two groups at comparable levels and with educational contrasts narrower than occupational ones). Regardless of internal group diversity, this fact, combined with the general stigma attached to immigrants, especially if they are of low socio-economic status, results in a ranking of immigrant nationality categories, from higher-status EU-15 citizens to lower-status new Europeans and non-Europeans.

Higher educational attainment among women than among men in advanced economies leads to the expectation that women display a greater propensity to get married to partners with lower educational attainment (hypogamy) than do men and, through aggregation, with partners from nationality groups with lower average educational levels. In Spain, this leads to the following hypotheses: (i) EU-15 women’s propensity to get married to Spanish, new European, and non-European men is greater than EU-15 men’s propensity to be married to Spanish, new European, and non-European women, (ii) Spanish women’s propensity to get married to new European and non-European men is greater than Spanish men’s propensity to be married to new European and non-European women.

As we pointed out earlier, however, educational outperformance has not led women to catch up with men in terms of career opportunities and salaries. This means that a pure structural marriage market logic, focused on career and income, leads to predictions that are just the opposite to those in the previous paragraph: (i) EU-15 men’s propensity to get married to Spanish, new European, and non-European women is greater than EU-15 women’s propensity to be married to Spanish, new European, and non-European men; (ii) Spanish men’s propensity to get married to new European and non-European women is greater than Spanish women’s propensity to be married to new European and non-European men. Which of the two logics – the educational or economic logic – in the end prevails, thus driving observed gender differences in nationality combinations, depends on the relative magnitude of gender inequalities in education and career/income opportunities and on men’s and women’s relative priority attached to education and income when making partner choices.

A consideration of patriarchy and its implications for assortative matching, however, tilts the balance towards the second set of the previous predictions. There is a vast literature that demonstrates the existence of a positive association between women’s educational attainment and their assertiveness vis-à-vis men, which includes a challenge to traditional gender roles. Traditional men in advanced economies, where women’s average level of educational attainment is highest, may thus find it increasingly difficult to find women in their own group who are supportive of traditional gender roles. The opportunity to find women who value traditional gender roles
is greater among nationality groups where these values are more prevalent. Similarly, it is conceivable that many women in lower-status nationality groups, especially those with higher levels of education, will show a greater preference for men from higher-status nationality groups than from their own group, partly for material reasons but also because men in these higher-status nationality groups hold, on average, more egalitarian values regarding gender roles than do men in their own nationality group. From our ranking of different immigrant groups by status and comparative literature based on the World Values Survey (Inglehart and Norris, 2003), which shows that gender equality values are more prevalent in EU-15 countries than in new European and non-European countries, one would thus predict the following: (i) EU-15 men’s propensity to be married to Spanish, new European, and non-European women is greater than EU-15 women’s propensity to be married to Spanish, new European, and non-European men; (ii) Spanish men’s propensity to be married to new European and non-European women is greater than Spanish women’s propensity to be married to new European and non-European men. Because this cultural prediction overlaps with the structural prediction that results from the analysis of gender differences in career/income opportunities, we view this as the most promising hypothesis concerning gender differences in nationality combinations in binational marriages.

The preceding discussion thus allows for the formulation of the third, fourth, and fifth hypotheses guiding this research article, which concern the relative prevalence of marriages between men and women of different nationalities and the relative marriage affinity observed between nationalities. The partner availability and the endogamy theses, combined with the demographic, socio-economic, and cultural profiles of foreigners in Spain, lead to the prediction that binational marriages between Spaniards and Latin Americans are more frequent than binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 nationals and that binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 nationals are slightly more frequent than marriages between Spaniards and new Europeans (H3). Also, the endogamy thesis applied to the Spanish socio-economic and demographic reality leads to the prediction that the affinity between Spaniards and Latin Americans is greater than the affinity between Spaniards and EU-15 citizens, whereas the affinity between Spaniards and EU-15 members is greater than the affinity between Spaniards and new Europeans (H4). Finally, in the Spanish context, the hypergamy thesis and a cultural argument focused on gender roles lead to the prediction that there is greater marriage affinity (i) between Spanish women and EU-15 nationals than between Spanish men and EU-15 women, (ii) between new European women and Spanish men than between new European men and Spanish women, and (iii) between non-European women and Spanish men than between non-European men and Spanish women (H5).

Summary of the main research interests and hypotheses

The single market, geographical mobility, and Euromarriages
H.1. The single market has led to a significant increase in Euromarriages.

Contrasts in geographical mobility by education and incidence of Euromarriages
H.2.a. The incidence of Euromarriages is greater among higher-educated than among lesser-educated individuals.
H.2.b. The incidence of Euromarriages is greater among lesser-educated than among higher-educated individuals.

Context: the combined roles of the marriage market and endogamy on the nationality combination of Euromarriages
H.3. Binational marriages between Spaniards and Latin Americans are more frequent than binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 nationals, and binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 nationals are slightly more frequent than marriages between Spaniards and new Europeans.
H.4. After the sizes of different nationality groupings have been controlled for, the marriage affinity between Spaniards and Latin Americans is greater than the marriage affinity between Spaniards and EU-15 citizens, whereas the marriage affinity between Spaniards and EU-15 members is greater than the marriage affinity between Spaniards and new Europeans.

Hypergamy, endogamy, and Euromarriages
H.5. There is greater marriage affinity (i) between Spanish women and EU-15 nationals than between Spanish men and EU-15 women, (ii) between new European women and Spanish men than between new European men and Spanish women, and (iii) between non-European women and Spanish men than between non-European men and Spanish women.
DATA AND METHODS

Data

To examine trends in intermarriage between Europeans, we rely on official marriage records centralised at the Spanish Statistical Institute. One limitation of restricting our analysis to marriages registered only in Spain is that by design, we exclude binational marriages between Spaniards and other Europeans that have been registered in other countries. This may underestimate the incidence of binational marriages. We assume, however, that the propensity to marry abroad has not changed in recent decades and that, consequently, the trend estimates remain unaffected. The analysis is also restricted to heterosexual couples, mainly because same-sex marriages have only been legal since 2005.

The period under study runs from 1989 to 2009. Although a rigorous test of the impact of the EU single market on binational marriages demands pre-1989 data, it is only since 1989 that information allowing for the analysis of intermarriage was collected. Because records of the nationality of the spouses only go back to 1989 whereas information on the country of birth is only available from 2008 onwards, we restrict our definition of binational marriages to the former. Needless to say, the use of nationality is somewhat problematic because of the association between marriage and changes in the nationality status of the partners. In EU states, however, this is less of a problem because the rate of naturalisation of European citizens is relatively low (OECD, 2010). Indeed, European citizens living in EU states other than their own have little to gain in terms of civil, social, and political rights from the adoption of the nationality of the country where they reside. The use of country of birth in the analysis of binational marriages would in fact raise another sort of problem: many residents in Spain born in Germany and France are the offspring of return Spanish migrants and have spent most of their lives in Spain. It would not be appropriate to treat marriages between them and Spanish citizens born in Spain as binational marriages.

To examine patterns in the frequency of binational marriages among people with different levels of education, we use information on the spouses’ nationality and educational level from the marriage register microdata for the period 2008–2009. This source of information shows that EU-15 spouses display higher average levels of educational attainment than do Spaniards, whereas Spaniards display higher average levels of educational attainment than do other Europeans and non-Europeans. One can thus use information on trends in binational marriages between Spaniards and different nationality groups as indirect evidence on the relative frequency of binational marriages across levels of educational attainment. To analyse the relative incidence of different nationality combinations in binational marriages, to examine gender differences in these combinations, and to analyse the role of homogamy and hypergamy in binational marriages, we use again microdata on binational marriages for 2008 and 2009.

Methods

We classify marriages in different categories so as to distinguish international marriages (one or two foreign spouses), binational marriages (spouses with different nationalities), and binational European marriages (marriages between two EU citizens of different nationalities, whether they involve a Spanish partner or not). Because of our interest in the educational and occupational profiles of European mixed marriages and from the information reported earlier on average levels of education for different nationalities, we distinguish two categories of Europeans: ‘EU-15’ and ‘new EU’.

Citizens in the first group have enjoyed freedom of movement and residence for a longer period, and they often fall into the category of ‘free movers’ – that is, citizens who migrate for professional or personal reasons instead of out of sheer economic necessity. Conversely, low-skilled labour migration of a traditional sort is largely represented in the second group. The distinction between EU-15 and new EU migrants becomes especially useful when testing the aforementioned hypergamy hypotheses.

To monitor trends in the incidence of Euromarriages, the analysis uses absolute numbers and percentages relative to all marriages registered in a given year, by sex and nationality group of the foreign spouse. To analyse the relative marriage affinity between nationality groups and to control for group size, marital status composition, and sex ratios across nationalities,
we compute odds ratios as recommended by Kalmijn (1998). Finally, we compute odds ratios on the basis of microdata from the 2008–2009 marriage registers to examine assortative matching by education within and across nationality groups. We also use the 2008–2009 microdata to estimate multinomial logit models for the analysis of the net association between sociodemographic variables and the Spaniards’ odds of marrying members of specific nationality groups. The analysis is restricted to the age group 20–49 years where most marriages take place. The variables included in the statistical models are those collected on marriage certificates, namely age, marriage order, educational level, and occupational status (recoded into two categories: high-skill and low-skill occupations). The models also include an indicator of educational homogamy to further examine assortative mating patterns.

FINDINGS

Trends in International Marriages and Euromarriages in Spain

As stated earlier, migrant flows to Spain accelerated in the late 1990s, leading to a five million increase in the stock of foreigners. Spain is currently one of the countries with the largest foreign population in the EU, in both absolute and relative terms. In 2010, only Germany had a larger number of foreigners, and only Luxembourg, Latvia, and Estonia had a higher proportion of foreigners (Eurostat Statistics Database). Figure 1 shows that the number of Europeans residing in Spain is seven times larger than it was 10 years ago (it went from 371,000 in 1999 to 2,431,000 in 2009). A large part of this increase is due to the recent rise in immigration from Eastern European countries: whereas the foreign population from EU-15 increased by about 950,000 people, the foreign population from new EU member states increased by about 1,100,000 people. More than two-thirds of them are Romanian, despite the fact that Romania only joined the EU in 2007. Although the growth of the European population that resides in Spain has been significant, the most remarkable finding from Figure 1 is the spectacular increase in the number of non-Europeans, which added nearly three million to the Spanish population in only a decade. Clearly, much more powerful forces than the creation of the European single market in 1993 have driven migration flows to Spain. In 2009, the composition of the foreign population by region of origin was very heterogeneous and much more so than a decade earlier, with Latin Americans and North Africans (especially Moroccans) as the largest non-European groups.

The dramatic increase in the numbers of foreigners and the nationality composition of the foreign population have shaped Spain’s

Figure 1. Stock of foreigners according to nationality group. Spain, 1998–2009. EU, European Union.

Source: Population register, Spanish Statistical Institute.
marriage market. Indeed, whereas the percentage of all marriages involving at least one foreign spouse was 4.4% in the period 1990–1994, this figure increased to 17.2% in the period 2005–2009 (Table 1). The large majority of these international marriages were binational (i.e. they involved two persons of different nationalities) and included a Spaniard. The article’s first hypothesis is supported by the data: the implementation of the European single market has led to an increase in the number of Europeans who reside in Spain, which has run parallel to a rise in the total number of binational marriages where the two spouses are European (from 17,608 in 1995–1999 to 36,632 in 2005–2009). Increased copresence thus translates into more intermarriage. The rise in the number of Euronational marriages, however, stands well below expectations (Figure 2), which demands clarification. A partial answer to this puzzle is that the marriage register data do not fully capture the impact of recent migration on binational couple formation because of increasing non-marital cohabitation among recent cohorts (Timberlake and Heuveline, 2005; Domínguez and Castro-Martín, 2008). Indeed, the 2001 Spanish population census shows that in the age range 20–49 years, the proportion of consensual unions among international couples was about 20%. As of 2007, 27% of international couples were cohabiting, according to the Spanish Immigration Survey. Europeans from both EU-15 and new EU countries, as well as Latin Americans, are the foreign groups with the highest levels of non-marital cohabitation (Cortina et al., 2010).

Another potential explanation for the gap between the high volume of European migration and the relatively low frequency of binational marriages involving a European is that more than a third of the foreign EU-27 population that resides in Spain is of retirement age or too young to get married. Also, as stated earlier, although the bulk of new migrants coming from Europe were people in their 20s and in their 30s, a large proportion of them already had a partner upon arrival (about 44%).

Still, the most likely explanation for why the significant increase in the EU-15 population did not translate into a commensurate rise in binational marriages between Europeans is that the increase in the foreign population from other areas of the world in that same decade was much greater, and therefore, there was much more competition in the marriage market. In fact, the proportion of binational marriages involving a non-European partner over the total number of marriages rose from 2.6% in 1990–1994 to 11% in 2005–2009.

Geographical Mobility and Trends in Binational Marriages

In the last decade, the increase in the number of binational marriages between Europeans has been mainly driven by new Europeans, whose average level of education is significantly lower than that of EU-15 Europeans. The number of binational marriages involving a new European increased from 641 in 1990–1994 to 11,670 in 2005–2009, whereas the number of binational marriages involving an EU-15 European increased from 15,430 to 24,962 during the same period (Table 1). Since 2000, there have been more binational marriages involving Romanian citizens than binational marriages involving any other foreign nationality. In fact, if one

Table 1. Distribution of marriages according to spouses’ nationality (Spain, 1990–2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of marriages</td>
<td>1,057,360</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,006,441</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,064,479</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>981,262</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International marriages</td>
<td>46,310</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>49,050</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>101,360</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>169,163</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binational marriages</td>
<td>42,984</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>45,634</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>84,213</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>144,309</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binational EU-27 marriages</td>
<td>16,071</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>17,608</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>26,201</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>36,632</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binational EU-15 marriages</td>
<td>15,430</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15,873</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>19,906</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>24,962</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involving a native partner</td>
<td>14,569</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14,388</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>15,902</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>16,878</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binational new EU marriages</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>6,295</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>11,670</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involving a native partner</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9,225</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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considers the entire 1990–2009 period, Spanish men have married more Romanian women than women of any other European nationality, despite the fact that such marriages were uncommon before 2000. These findings support H2b and contradict H2a.

One explanation for the observed trends is that migration from workers from the new EU member states has exceeded expectations derived from economic arguments made before the EU enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe (Gabel, 1998). In the new context of a much more economically diverse EU, globalisation, and deregulated labour markets, the economic pay-offs to low-skilled migration within Europe are much higher than they were in the mid-1990s. Therefore, one would expect at least as much low-skilled as high-skilled intra-European mobility, with its resulting impact on marriage rates. Indeed, migration to Spain from the new EU states in the last two decades exceeded by about 150,000 people migrating from the EU-15 member states. In fact, much of this migration took place even before the official dates for enlargement and the lifting of barriers to movement to citizens from the new EU member states. Because of this, the increase in the number of binational marriages involving a new European was almost as high between 1995–1999 and 2000–2004 as that between 2000–2004 and 2005–2009.

Nationality Combinations in Binational Marriages

The previous section has already discussed contrasts in the composition of binational marriages by nationality. We now move to directly examine the article’s hypotheses concerning the national composition of binational marriages. In agreement with our third hypothesis, the most frequent type of binational marriage involves Latin American foreign citizens. Latin Americans are the most numerous foreign population in Spain, they have a greater propensity than other nationality groups to lack a partner at the moment of migration and to speak Spanish. Also as expected, there are slightly more binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 Europeans than between Spaniards and new Europeans (Table 1). Not only is the foreign EU-15 population slightly more numerous than is the foreign population from the new EU member states, but they come more often without a partner, and they are more similar to Spaniards in their cultural outlook.

The fourth hypothesis refers to the role of cultural endogamy in binational marriage choices in determining the relative affinity between the different nationality groups that live in Spain. To contrast this hypothesis, we examine odds ratios for marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 citizens and between Spaniards and new Europeans corresponding to three periods:
1990–1991, 2000–2001, and 2008–2009 (Table 2). The odds ratio for the Spanish–EU-15 combination represents the odds of a marriage between a Spaniard and an EU-15 citizen relative to the odds of a marriage between a non-Spaniard and an EU-15 citizen. The odds ratio for the Spanish–new European combination represents the odds of a marriage between a Spaniard and a new European relative to the odds of a marriage between a non-Spaniard and a new European. For interpretation of the odds ratios, it is important to keep in mind that over time the population of foreigners living in Spain has changed in size and internal composition and that there is variation in the marriage affinity between the nationality groupings that form the non-Spaniard category (EU-15, new European, and non-European).

Generally speaking, the values for the odds ratio are well below 1, which indicates a great deal of endogamy across nationalities. Aside from this commonality, the odds ratio values change over time. In 1990–1991, half the foreign population residing in Spain included EU-15 citizens, and there were hardly any new Europeans. The odds ratio of a marriage between a Spaniard and an EU-15 citizen was similar for men and women, and so was the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spaniard and a new European compared with that of a marriage between a Spaniard and a non-European. Meanwhile, the odds ratio for a marriage between a Spaniard and an EU-15 citizen was higher than the odds ratio for a marriage between a Spaniard and a new European and a marriage between a Spaniard and a non-European. In 2000–2001, the foreign population residing in Spain had increased by about 250,000 non-Europeans and by a mere 75,000 EU-27 Europeans. Within the EU-27 population, there were still very few new Europeans (around 15,000). In this context, the odds ratios of a marriage between a Spaniard and an EU-15 citizen differed by gender: it was considerably higher for marriages between Spanish women and EU-15 men. The odds ratios of a marriage between a Spaniard and a non-European were slightly higher for Spanish men than for Spanish women, but they were both higher than the odds ratio for marriages between a Spaniard and a new European. Finally, in 2008–2009, the foreign population living in Spain had increased dramatically and its composition had changed significantly, with the number of new Europeans almost matching the number of EU-15 Europeans. In this new context, the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spanish woman and an EU-15 man was still higher than the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spanish man and an EU-15 woman. One novelty in 2008–2009 is that the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spanish man and a new European woman was also much higher than the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spanish woman and a new European man. In fact, the odds ratio of a marriage between a Spanish woman and an EU-15 man was about as high as the odds of a marriage between a Spanish man and a new European woman. Also, the odds ratios for marriages between Spanish men and women and non-Europeans had noticeably increased, with the Spanish men’s ratio reaching 0.25 and the Spanish women’s reaching 0.21.

On the whole, these findings support the endogamy hypothesis, H4. Spaniards marry predominantly among themselves and then with two nationality groups that are very close culturally, non-Europeans (which include a majority of Latin Americans) and EU-15 men.9 In fact, additional results not reported here show that the affinity between Spanish men and French women is greater than the affinity between Spanish men and Italian, British, and German women. They also show that the affinity between Spanish women and French and Italian men is greater than the

Table 2. Trends in odds ratios of European binational intermarriages by sex and nationality group of the foreign spouse (Spain, 1990–2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1991</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2001</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

affinity between Spanish women and British and German men. These findings are consistent with the endogamy hypothesis, for French and Italians are closer culturally to Spaniards than are Britons and Germans (e.g. World Values Study).\textsuperscript{10}

The exceptions to the endogamy hypothesis are the low odds ratio for marriages between Spanish men and EU-15 women and the high odds ratio for marriages between Spanish men and culturally more distant new Europeans. The two exceptions stem from the odds ratios for Spanish men and women being different from one another. A consideration of the last hypothesis, H5, offers light on what may be happening. Indeed, the odds ratios we observe for 2008–2009, when there were sizable populations of non-Europeans, EU-15 citizens, and new Europeans, are consistent with expectations grounded on homogamy and hypergamy. The marriage affinity between Spanish men and new European women is indeed greater than the marriage affinity between Spanish women and new European men. Also, the marriage affinity between Spanish men and non-Europeans is greater than the marriage affinity between Spanish women and non-European men. An inspection of the microdata on 2008–2009 marriages, by education and nationality, clarifies this finding.

Table 3 reveals that, regardless of nationality combination, the majority of marriages are homogamous with respect to education.\textsuperscript{11} Because the average level of education among the EU-15 population is significantly higher than among the population from the new EU member states, one also finds that the highest percentage of homogamous marriages in the Spanish–EU-15 category corresponds to couples where both have university education (46.4% for Spanish women and 32.3% for Spanish men). Meanwhile, the highest percentage of homogamous marriages in the Spanish–new EU category corresponds to couples with primary education or less (27.4% for Spanish women and 35.4% for Spanish men). Table 3 also shows that, contrary to traditional marriage patterns, hypogamous couples formed between a college-educated woman and a man with less than university studies are more prevalent than the hypergamous combination, among binational marriages involving both a European spouse and Spanish–Spanish couples. In other words, the odds that a

| Table 3. Educational composition of marriages by nationality group, 2008–2009 (%) |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Man university studies–woman less than university | Woman university studies–man less than university | Other combinations | Total |
| Both | Both | Both | Both | Both |
| Man university studies | Woman university studies | Man university studies | Woman university studies | Man university studies | Woman university studies | Man university studies | Woman university studies | Man university studies | Woman university studies | Man university studies | Woman university studies |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Spanish man–Spanish woman | 18.4 | 12.5 | 35.4 | 8.9 | 27.4 | | | | | | |
| Spanish man–EU15 woman | 12.5 | 15.4 | 32.3 | 9.6 | 17.3 | | | | | | |
| Spanish man–new EU woman | 35.4 | 13.6 | 9.6 | 5.3 | 19.9 | | | | | | |
| Spanish woman–EU-15 man | 8.9 | 12.6 | 46.4 | 7.2 | 100 | | | | | | |
| Spanish woman–new EU man | 27.4 | 17.3 | 7.2 | 5.3 | 100 | | | | | | |
man gets married to a more-educated woman relative to the odds that he gets married to a less-educated one are positive, whether we analyse marriages among Spaniards or between Spaniards and other nationality groupings. Therefore, the marriage microdata for 2008–2009 shed some light on our findings about the relative marriage affinity between different nationality groups by showing that marriage affinity between Spanish men and both new European and non-European women is greater than marriage affinity between Spanish women and both new European and non-European men despite the fact that there is in-group and out-group educational hypogamy in marriage.

Hypogamy, however, cannot explain the observed nationality combinations in binational marriages, for if this were a strong and the only force underlying them, the marriage affinity between on average more-educated Spanish women and on average less-educated new Europeans and non-Europeans would be greater than the marriage affinity between Spanish women and on average better-educated EU-15 men. The observed gender differences in nationality combinations in binational marriages are more congruent with an interpretation that stresses the combined forces of occupational/income hypergamy and culture. The marriage affinity between Spanish men and new European women is stronger than the marriage affinity between Spanish women and new European men partly because new European women are overrepresented at the bottom of the occupational and income structure and Spanish men are overrepresented at higher occupational and income levels. The relative scarcity of women at higher occupational and income levels leads men at these levels to choose women at lower levels, which in turn moves the surplus of men at these lower levels to look for women at even lower levels until they get to the occupational and income positions where new European women are overrepresented (one could use an equivalent argument with women as the agents). Alternatively, or in combination with the structural argument, one could interpret the empirical findings by emphasising the role of cultural change in advanced societies with respect to gender roles. In countries where they have reached high average levels of education, women become more assertive and reject traditional gender roles. Although men’s values also change on the average and become more gender egalitarian, they remain conservative and more so than those of women from the same country. The marriage affinity of men from advanced economies and women from less-developed countries thus might reflect their comparative advantage in the marriage market in terms of income and occupation in relation to foreign women with lower social status and the fact that, on average, women from poorer societies comply with traditional gender roles more frequently than do women from the host society.

The cultural interpretation that we have just developed allows us to better evaluate the results concerning the endogamy hypothesis (H4). The endogamy hypothesis stresses the role of cultural similarity in marriage choice. Culture is a very broad concept that includes language, meaning systems, and values, among other dimensions. Endogamy certainly drives marriage choice: most marriages take place between members of the same nationality, which reflects the fact that, on average, people from the same country generally can communicate and share ways of interpreting the world to a greater extent than people from different countries. We also find that the marriage affinity between Spaniards and non-Europeans, who for a very large part come from Latin America, is highest, as one would expect. In the contemporary world, however, the overlap between nationality, world outlook, and values is no longer as great as it was in the past; furthermore, in an important dimension for marriage, which is that of values about gender roles, men and women in advanced societies have not changed at the same pace. In this context, international migration makes it possible for men and women from different countries who value traditional gender roles to meet and connect emotionally, even though they may differ in other aspects of their world outlook and may even experience difficulty in communicating. In this sense, the empirical findings in this paper uphold the role of culture in explaining both endogamy and gender departures from endogamy in contemporary advanced societies.

Overall, the preceding analysis confirms all our hypotheses, except for the one regarding trends in binational marriages by education.
Some of the conclusions reached earlier by looking at simple marriage frequencies and bivariate tables for different nationality combinations obtain further support through multivariate multinomial logit models with marriage register data for 2008–2009. These microdata also allow us to move beyond tests of hypotheses into a more exploratory analysis concerning other sociodemographic characteristics of binational marriages. The models displayed in Table 4 provide us with a sociodemographic profile of Spaniards who married a foreign spouse in 2008–2009 – distinguishing between EU-15, new EU, and non-EU spouses – compared with Spaniards who married another Spaniard. Because our main concern is with the characteristics of binational marriages to Europeans, we present the results related to EU-15 and new Europeans only. The results of separate models for men and women are presented in Table 4.12

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that the odds to marry a European spouse increase with age, especially for men. For instance, Spanish men aged 40–49 years are 86% more likely to have married an EU-15 woman and 2.5 times more likely to have married a new EU woman than those aged 30–34 years. This pattern might be partly linked to the higher incidence of non-marital cohabitation at younger ages, particularly among European binational couples. The statistical results also show that marriage order is not associated to the odds of marrying EU-15 nationals but is associated to the odds of marrying new Europeans. Indeed, the odds of marrying new Europeans increase markedly for Spanish men and women who have been previously married.13 Next, the statistical results offer insights into the socio-economic status of the Spaniards who get married to nationals from EU-15 and new EU member states. Generally speaking, the odds of marrying EU-15 nationals are higher among the better educated than among the lesser educated and among high-skilled than among low-skilled workers. This association is even stronger for Spanish women than for Spanish men. There is no association, however, between education and the odds of getting married to a new European among women, and the odds that a Spanish man marries a new European woman are higher among the least educated than among the more educated. Also, there is no association between the Spaniards’ job skills and the odds of getting married to new Europeans. These results for education and skills are consistent with the homogamy and hypergamy principles. Because EU-15 nationals have higher average levels of education and job skills, it is to be expected that Spaniards who marry them have higher than average levels of education and job skills. Also because new Europeans have lower than average levels of education and job skills, it is to be expected that high educational levels and high skills play less of a role. The last rows in Table 4 further clarify this interpretation of the results. They show that, holding the Spaniards’ levels of education and other variables constant, there is a positive association between being less educated than the EU-15 partner and the odds of getting married to one. This is certainly because the EU-15 nationals’ levels of education are on average higher than those of Spaniards. Meanwhile, there is a positive association for Spanish men between being more educated than the new European wife and the odds of getting married to one. This would be in line with the fact that the new Europeans’ levels of education are on average lower than the Spaniards’.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

In the context of the broad transformation brought about by the process of economic, social, and political European integration, this article has examined recent trends in what we have termed Euromarriages, marriages where one or two of the partners have a different European nationality from the one that corresponds to the country in which they get married. The evidence presented previously shows that the elimination of barriers to movement, residence, and work within the EU has not translated into a dramatic increase in mixed European marriages in Spain. The rise in Euromarriages can be regarded as relatively modest, although the upward trend has intensified in recent years, primarily driven by Spanish men marrying Eastern European women. The article has relied on the nationality of foreigners who marry Spaniards to indirectly assess the role of ‘free movers’ in recent trends in binational marriages in Spain. The analysis shows that traditional labour migrants are at least as relevant for these trends as ‘free movers’. The article has explored new territory in the study of binational marriages between Europeans by
Table 4. Results from the multinomial regression models of the probability of Spaniards married in 2008–2009 to have a foreign spouse instead of a native spouse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (years)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wife from EU-15 Exp(B)</td>
<td>Wife from new EU Exp(B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>1.07**</td>
<td>1.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>0.62**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–34 (ref.)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35–39</td>
<td>1.48**</td>
<td>1.80**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>1.86**</td>
<td>2.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage order</td>
<td>First marriage</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second + marriage (ref.)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>Less than primary</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary completed (ref.)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary completed</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>1.73**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Highly skilled</td>
<td>1.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-highly skilled (ref.)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational homogamy</td>
<td>Educational homogamy</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man lower education</td>
<td>1.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Man higher education (ref.)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: age range 20–49. EU, European Union.

*p < 0.01,

**p < 0.001

focusing on the nationality composition of these marriages. This composition is relevant for the analysis of the emergence of new social groups in Europe resulting from the increase in the proportion of transnational ties. We find that in Spain, the most frequent type of binational marriage does not involve Europeans but, rather, non-Europeans (mainly Latin Americans). When it comes to European binational marriages, the number of marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 citizens slightly exceeds that between Spaniards and new Europeans. We find, however, significant gender contrasts, for binational marriages between Spaniards and EU-15 generally involve Spanish women whereas binational marriages between Spaniards and new Europeans generally involve Spanish men. These findings are quite consistent with explanations of intermarriage that consider the role of stratified marriage markets, endogamy, and values.

Finally, the article has explored the sociodemographic profile of binational marriages. The educational profile of Spaniards marrying an EU-15 spouse differs significantly from that of Spaniards marrying a new EU spouse. Whereas highly educated Spaniards marry EU-15 citizens, it is lesser-educated ones who tend to marry new EU citizens. This pattern is partly linked to the importance of homogamy in marriage decisions and to the fact that EU-15 citizens display higher educational attainment than new EU citizens. Again, the high frequency of recent marriages between Spaniards and new EU citizens shows that although the effect of the single market on Euromarriages has been moderate, it has been felt among all Spanish social groups and not only among the highly educated ones, as the middle-class bias of the recent sociology of European integration would lead one to expect.

In his introduction to Social Transnationalism, Mau (2007) stressed that before examining the consequences of the transnationalisation of experience, we need to systematically collect empirical evidence and describe the characteristics of this transformation. This article advances in this direction. The trend analysis of Euromarriages in Spain reveals that the single market has contributed less to foster European intermarriage than has the enlargement to the poorer countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Our findings highlight the crucial role of migration and hence local marriage market availability compared with that of increased interconnectivity or broadening of the marriage market limits. When Romanians came to Spain by the thousands, the number of marriages between Spaniards and Romanians increased considerably. A relatively equivalent growth in the number of migrants from EU-15 countries has in turn translated into a less important increase in the number of binational marriages between Spaniards and citizens from this group of countries.

Because opportunities of social contact are a major determinant of the frequency of binational marriages, one may ask about the indirect role played by membership in the EU, the single market, and Schengen in determining flows of people across borders and therefore the incidence of binational marriages. The demographic data presented earlier suggest that they are neither a necessary cause nor a sufficient one. There have been large flows of immigrants from North Africa and Latin America and a resulting increase in the number of binational marriages involving these nationalities. At the same time, neither membership in the EU nor the single market and Schengen have induced a dramatic increase in the settlement of EU-15 citizens in Spain and a concomitant rise in the number of binational marriages involving these nationalities. Meanwhile, the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe has triggered a large flow of traditional labour migrants from these countries to Spain, which has been followed by an immediate increase in the number of binational marriages between Spaniards and citizens from these countries. In this case, membership in the EU has actually been a major contributing factor to growing migration across EU borders and to the recent increase in European intermarriage. The previous analysis has also shown that the average level of education of Spaniards who marry Central and Eastern Europeans is lower than that of Spaniards marrying EU-15 citizens. Binational marriages in Spain therefore involve both lower-class and middle-class segments of the population. The literature suggests that the implications of lower-class and middle-class binational marriages for lifestyle and identification with Europe are different (Díez Medrano, 2008; Favell, 2008), just as the impact of travelling and migration varies according to the motivation for mobility and the social groups involved. This calls for further empirical research and also for a reassessment of
the assumption that globalisation impacts mainly on the lives of middle-class educated Europeans.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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NOTES

(1) http://ec.europa.eu/education/erasmus/doc920_en.htm#1

(2) The creation of the single market in 1993 was aimed at eliminating all remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people across EU member states.

(3) http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database

(4) This is especially true among men. The proportion of men with a university degree is 43% for EU-15, 27% for Spaniards, 14% for new EU, and 15% for non-EU. Among women, the proportion with a university degree is 39% for both EU-15 and Spaniards, 19% for new EU, and 20% for non-EU.

(5) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and UK.

(6) Cyprus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This group includes mainly Romanians and Bulgarians, who joined the EU in 2007.

(7) The proportion of foreign citizens in Latvia (17%) and Estonia (16%) is particularly large because of the high number of ‘recognised non-citizens’, mainly former Soviet Union citizens, who are permanently residents in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship or any other citizenship.

(8) It is worth noting that the proportion of EU-15 citizens who already had a partner when they arrived in Spain would be much higher were we not restricting our analysis to migrants between the ages of 20 and 49 years. Indeed, many EU-15 migrants were retirees who came with their spouses (Esteve and Cortina, 2011).

(9) We computed the odds ratio for Latin Americans separately from the rest of non-Europeans, and the results confirm the results reported in the text. Because they are a very large group, their behaviour drives the value for the odds ratio computed for non-Europeans.

(10) We lack information to adequately interpret the greater affinity that one finds between Spaniards and French compared with Spaniards and Italians. We can guess that, because of geographic proximity, French immigrants are a more socially diverse group of immigrants than are Italian immigrants, which would create more opportunities for inter-marriage. Another possible explanation is that many French citizens who marry Spaniards are descendants of Spaniards.

(11) The educational composition of marriages has been calculated by excluding cases where educational level is missing for one or both spouses. The large number of missing cases, around 30%, might bias the results if their distribution across educational categories is not random.

(12) Missing values (26%) are included in the models as a separate category for each independent variable, but the obtained coefficients are not shown in the table. We have re-estimated the regression models, this time excluding cases with missing values in the variable educational attainment. The coefficients do not differ significantly.

(13) When we run the same models without the variable age, the odds of marrying EU-15 nationals increase also. There is indeed a small and statistically significant correlation between age and marriage order.

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