PHILOSOPHY and ARCHAEOLOGICAL PRACTICE

Perspectives for the 21st Century

With a comment by Julian Thomas reply by John Bintliff - Per Corneliussen
A comment by Cornelius Holtorf - Håkon Glørstadt Freedom of speech in Pierre Bourdieu and archaeology, with a comment by Evert Baudouin, a comment by Per Cornell & Fredrik Fahlander - Chain of a Southern United States Plantation Archaeology, with comments by Kathrina Sjöberg and Per Cornell - Alternations for an Archaeology of Alterity.

PHILOSOPHY AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL PRACTICE
Perspectives for the 21st Century

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Walking about Lévi-Strauss.
Contributions to an Archaeology of Thought

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Abstract
In this text I intend to apply fully the thinking of Claude Lévi-Strauss (LS) to archaeology and the study of prehistory. In doing so, I use LS' structural anthropology to consider certain topics traditionally 'forbidden' to prehistoric research (in particular an archaeology of mind, rationality or thought) and employ the archaeological record to complete an anthropology of 'pensée', which would remain unfinished if based only on anthropological data without a historical perspective. The text consists of four stages: first I remember LS' proposals useful to such a purpose; then I develop his statements further to create a history of thinking; I then move on to archaeologise and prehistorise such a history; finally ending with some critical remarks on LS and, in general, the text itself. A major topic of the paper is a discussion on certain main concepts used by LS (thought, thinking and mind) and their translation into English and Spanish.

From structural archaeology to archaeological interpretation

The thinking of Claude Lévi-Strauss (LS) has barely had any influence on archaeology, nor has it deserved revisions which may have integrated it into this discipline. The theoretical fashions of the last 20 years have paid little attention to his work, something which is difficult to comprehend when we consider that the intellectual habits of the 1980s clutched at any author to be found on the shelves of the cultural supermarket who could be used as theoretical flavouring. Although it is the theme of my paper, this oversight is partly due to the inadequacies of the actual thinking of LS, and partly to erroneous interpretations, ideological prejudices and, particularly among Anglo-Saxon authors, an inability, of functionalist origin, to understand rationalist thinking. There have been exceptions, such as Tilley (1990), although these have not had any greater repercussions. I published, in 1989, an article which had a certain degree of influence in megalithic studies and the symbolic dimension of social landscapes (Criado 1989). From there on, different studies have dealt with these subjects and widened our understanding of them (Thomas 1991, Bender 1993, Bradley

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1993, Parker Pearson and Richards 1994, Tilley 1994). However, what has been forgotten in all these lines of research were my suggestions, explicitly based on LS, which proposed that the emergence of monumentality did not only represent the domestication of nature and the artificialisation of the landscape, but also the domestication of pensée sauvage: megalithism would never have been the product of a savage rationality, but instead an expression of domesticated thought. I therefore finally proposed the need for pre-historisising LS' project, and creating an archaeology of ways of thinking, complementary to more developed social archaeology.

I was therefore attempting to contribute to finalising the unfinished elements of LS' project, and to complete in my own way a history of systems of thought which LS makes possible by arriving upon a positive definition of non-Western types of rationality. However, he himself renounces the creation of a history of thought and limits himself to a study of thought. Thus, on one occasion he was asked

Where does pensée sauvage begin? That is a great problem, although I do not see why I am expected to answer that, as it is a problem which refers to the origins of mankind, which physical anthropologists call 'hominization'. From what moment were there thinking beings? I know nothing, and doubt that our colleagues of physical anthropology have clear ideas about the subject. (LS 1967: 176)

This negative cannot disguise the importance of the question nor, continuing with other methods LS' investigation, the possibility of answering it.

Furthermore, the question is of a profoundly archaeological nature, as it may only be dealt with from an archaeological perspective. A history of thought is, above all, a pre-history of thought, not only because [i] the majority of it belongs to the silent domain of pre-history, but also because [ii] whereas the last 4000 years of thought may be known by different methods (through linguistic expression and written representation), history prior to then may only be discovered through archaeology as [iii] this 'shadowland' contains its origins, and because [iv] it is from the darkness of prehistory that the great questions arise: When did thought appear? Did 'pensée sauvage' ever exist? Were there other ways of thinking prior to this?

All this makes it even more surprising that the work of LS has not been given more consideration within the world of archaeology. Because, and this is the basic premise of this study, structural anthropology does not only offer a theoretical-methodological framework for archaeology and prehistory, but also presents problems which are worthy of consideration, and makes it possible to establish a prehistory of thought as an archaeological research programme (i.e. a coherent integration of subject and study objectives with a particular theory, method, interpretation and critical intention). These would allow archaeology to contribute significantly to the history of the culture and self-consciousness of mankind. This is the forgotten point, which I tried to cover in 1988. However, 37 years after the issue was raised by LS (1967: 176; first published in 1963), we still know little about the subject.
The research programme inspired by LS which I propose here, radically questions archaeology, and pushes forward its frontiers. It should not been forgotten that structural anthropology is above all an anthropology of speaking. Given that in archaeology, once the subjects who produced prehistory have died, we no longer have linguistic subjects, and we could never implement the structuralist project, nor aim for a reliable reconstruction of the systems of thought, nor (in disagreement with Hodder 1982) formulate a structural archaeology. The challenge is to decide if systems of thought could be observed through non-linguistic forms of representation (i.e. the archaeological record) and then contrast our interpretations.

The problem of archaeological interpretation lies essentially in that it needs a subjective horizon as a point of reference. This horizon is, above all, the linguistic horizon of Gadamer (1977), an original horizon formed by the pattern of rationality which gives meaning to the events which later come to be archaeological phenomena. The interpretation of these phenomena becomes a game of four players, with the interaction of the archaeological record which represents them, the subject who interprets, the subjective (or cultural) context of the interpreter, and, finally, the cultural (and also subjective) horizon of that record. Although an objective interpretation would be that which enables the correspondence between this original context and the archaeological record to be evaluated, the absence of the former pushes interpretation towards subjectivity, as its reconstruction may only be dealt with as a speculative action which tends to reify the interpreter’s subjective context. The alternative to the excess of subjective hermeneutics must be to base interpretative practice on specific contextual horizons: contextualised subjectivity vs. missing subjectivity.

Structuralism provides those horizons of reference, thus offering an alternative based on a model of alternative subjectivity. But I am not going to undertake a complete revision of LS’ theory and work. An attempt to do so would go beyond the possibilities and objectives of this text. Nevertheless, there are still more reasons to deal with LS. His proposals make it possible to: [i] formulate a theory, [ii] define a method, [iii] establish a methodology as a basis for archaeological knowledge and, going even further, [iv] found a specific research programme in archaeology and prehistory.

Theory, or rather the theoretic-interpretative framework, offers a systematic explicatory model which enables reality to be understood, a theme which I will deal with first, literally following LS, before moving on to the boundaries of his proposals, and finally widening this from outside. This model establishes, as I have argued, an interpretative framework based on the history of ways of thinking, and gives a new paradigm to formulate hypotheses and understand prehistory and the world which offers an alternative to resolve the shortcomings of archaeological interpretation. The method defines the possibilities of proposing and verifying these hypotheses. LS’ work and structural theory in general similarly offer the foundations of a method of contrasting hypotheses which is neither hypothetical-deductive nor hermeneutic, neither based upon
explanatory particularisation nor speculative generalisations, but which instead opens up a third way between the two dominant alternatives of modern system of thought with the confrontation of objectivism–subjectivism, positivism–phenomenology.

Finally, methodology brings a procedure of formal analysis to the archaeological record, i.e. an analysis of the specific material forms which understands them without introducing a meaning which is strange to them (Criado 1999: 20-8). In this text I will mainly concentrate on the first theme, briefly touch upon the second and will not in any way deal with the third.

Remembering Lévi-Strauss

Following a proposal by Gómez (1981), many different levels within the work of LS can be recognised, in a successive order: a structuralist ontology (which some would define as metaphysical), a structuralist epistemology (which some would call philosophy) and finally the structuralist theory, method and methodology to which I have already referred. Although it would be possible to accept separately these different offerings, when one delves into the work of LS in depth, it may be seen that it is criss-crossed by a profound coherence between all the orders it contains, and if does not accept them en masse, it at least recognises their integrity.

In reality, throughout these levels the following questions are connected: what do human beings think with? (an ontological question); how do they do it? (an epistemological question); what do they think about? (a theoretical question); how that thought is discovered (a methodological question); and how do we check the objectivity of our knowledge about it? (a methodical question). In the rest of the text, I will focus upon these questions (except the last two which will not be considered), in order to establish the foundations for a research programme into the Prehistory of Thought.

Ontology: structure, thinking, mind

I will start with the first question, discussing in detail the notions of structure, esprit and pensée. I will then return to the chain of remaining questions, and will test an integral exposition of LS' thinking, making use of personal systematics.

For LS, the objective of the structuralist programme would be to define the structures of culture which are also the structures of the human mind, understanding this both in a neurological sense as well as a philosophical sense, which form the unconscious determinations which constrict human understanding and action, and which (as a commentator of LS once said) "make our liberty an illusion fed by our ignorance" (see LS 1967: 159). Despite having been rejected by critics as a negation of the individual and history, these cultural structures form the mechanisms which permit reflexive action. The function of structures is to impose a form on the occurrences of life. Yet
meaning itself is never a given phenomenon; there is no social or super-
individual awareness, a group of predetermined contents in human nature
which would form the 'human spirit' in either a traditional or Jungian sense
(and not in the sense of Lévi-Strauss). Accepting that meaning is what is given
instead of what is produced is maintaining the classic metaphysics and reifying
the subject's modern philosophy. LS escapes these risks by postulating that
meaning, like understanding, depends on previous structures. This also weighs
down the subjects of modern philosophy or traditional humanism. The
structuralist proposal of the death of man is the reverse of a different way of
considering culture and humanity. Despite the rejection of this philosophy by
so many liberal critics (if they lose individuals, then they lose voters) or simply
theists (if they lose individuals, they lose God), this proposal does not really kill
off human beings, but instead merely the model of Man created by Western
philosophy and transformed by our culture into the universal prototype of all
human beings, into the subject and object of all reflection, into the pattern of
all knowledge. Beyond this model, however, there emerges a different type of
human being conscious of his/her overdeterminations and the contextual social
relationships which make him/her as individual: the twilight of mankind, after
that of the Gods, "should allow for the advent of a content and liberated
humanity" (LS 1976a: 627, cf. 621-2). These positions attempt to complete the
analysis about the superstructural which Marx had left incomplete.

The fundamental function of structures is to organise the world. Through
them, the "unconscious activity of the spirit...imposes forms on a content",
and organises reality; this unconscious activity is such that "these forms are
fundamentally the same for all spirits, ancient and modern, primitive and
civilised" (LS 1973: 22). This identity is what constitutes the Human Spirit, an
often-questioned notion, although one which synthesises the total of internal
constraints which regulate human action (LS 1967: 159).

The notion of pensée, in turn, appears in the work of LS as an empirical
concretion of the Spirit. It should be remembered that this notion is always
used by LS within expressions such as savage or mythical pensée and, in
opposition to this, domesticated pensée (see LS 1967: 163-4 or Sperber 1985:
70). Finally, the three concepts are in relation to succession and successive
complementarity: the human spirit possesses a structure which is manifested in

When talking about structural pensée, LS uses a lexical distinction made
possible by the French language which enables these concepts to be clarified: he
talks intentionally about pensée structurale and not about pensée structurelle; his
most well-known work is entitled Anthropologie Structurale. As revealed by
Pouillon and Eco, this distinction well represents LS' intended meaning.
Structurelle alludes to "the real configuration which analysis discovers within
the object", whereas structurale refers to "the law of variability of structurelle
realities, to the general syntax which allows to predict homologies of diverse
objects which may be related" (Eco 1978: 417). In this way, a relationship is
structurelle when it is determinant within a given organisation or code, whereas it is structurale when it is determinant in several organisations or different codes (Pouillon 1966).

For some authors (particularly Ricoeur 1967), LS' positions place too much emphasis on reflections on syntax. According to them, the previous definitions deal with human pensée as a grammar or syntax, a group of empty rules which configure mental activity. They suggest that pensée should above all be considered as a semantic, a group or repertory of values used to think out the world and, consequently, postulate the need to place the emphasis on a reflection about the lexicon. Finally, they argue that while LS' position is excessively generalist and leads to immobility, the recovery of semantics would lead to a more human and enriching vision of the phenomena being studied. This suggestion is essentially correct (LS 1973: 85). In fact, the possibility of interpreting thinking as grammar or thinking as semantics offers a highly profitable alternative for organising cultural studies and undertaking a project inspired by Lévi-Strauss to historise types of thought. Yet its application must accept as a theoretical principal and practical caution that, structurally speaking, syntax comes before semantics, in the same way that in linguistics first come phonemes, elements of articulation which have been stripped clean of meaning, and then morphemes, elements of meaning (as seen in LS 1968: 29, quoting Benveniste 1952: 7, to underline the randomness of linguistic sign). To think the opposite would mean recovering the metaphysics of meaning or logocentricity which from that point on were so criticised by Derrida and post-structuralism; it would be reconstructing the esprit as awareness (LS 1967: 166).

I will now spend some time discussing the terminology used in these themes, as the English translations of some terms have been badly selected and reduced the value of LS' proposals, as already indicated by Sperber (1985). The French term esprit (in Spanish, espíritu) is the ability to think in order to organise the world, and may be translated into English as mind. The structures are the organisational functions of the mind; the translation of this term into English offers no problems, although this language does not allow a distinction to be made, as in French, of the terms structurale and structurelle. Thinking is the grammar of these functions: in French it is denominated pensée, in English it has been incorrectly translated as mind, and in reality, if, as Sperber says, LS refers with this term "more to intellectual processes than their product", then the more correct translation would be thinking (1985: 70 – in my text from 1988 I translated it as thought; in Spanish this would be racionalidad). And X thinking, (where X is savage or domesticated) is a definition, neither historical nor cultural but instead formal, of the mind; in French the term is pensée sauvage, and in English Sperber proposed untamed thinking (in Spanish, racionalidad salvaje).
Towards an universal epistemology from a theory of thinking

I will next deal with the following radical question proposed by the work of LS: how does the human mind think? This question implies a systematic description of LS' theories.

As I have said, the mind is the innate and universal capacity which human beings have to create order after facing an outside world which, before reflection and thought, appears to humans as chaotic and confusing. This order is produced through three fundamental mechanisms or procedures: the creation of dual conceptions or the principle of binary combination; the opposition or ability to compare dichotomies converting the two poles of a duality into contrary elements; and classification, or organisation according to conventional criteria of the different entities and values created in this way. These mechanisms constitute logical and universal qualities of the human mind. They form an unvarying part of the human being, meaning that they appear in all of mankind independently of its social and historical context. In reality they form part of human nature, and thus establish a relationship between the human mind and the natural. These would therefore be the instruments of the human mind. Yet the mind, in turn, may think in two ways. It may think using morphological relationships, analogies and metaphors; or also using metonymic relationships, homologies or metonymies. The first procedure is a solution in which congruent relationships are always paradigmatic. The second procedure is based on syntagmatic relationships; it is the syntagmatic axis.

In turn, each of these two modes of thinking may think about different things. We are therefore faced with the theoretical question: what does the human mind think about? The first mode thinks using a logic of specific and perceptible qualities: the best example of this is totemism which, in the reinterpretation of LS, is conceived of as a logical apparatus, or a logical system through which thought organises society and nature by classifying and permuting analogies between both orders (LS 1965). The second way would be a type of thought characterised by the logic of the abstract which manipulates intellectual qualities (LS 1964, 1979a). The finality of both ways of thinking is accordingly different, or even divergent. The objective of the first is to understand reality. The function of the other would, however, be to explain the world.

Evidently, this succession of oppositions reveals the existence of two different ways of thinking. The first configures mythical or savage thinking (untamed thinking, after Sperber), whereas the second constitutes scientific or domesticated thinking. As Sperber says (1985: 71), there is only an always-rational human mind, although this may receive two different types of training which thus configure two modes of rationality used to face the world. However, one of the essential points of LS' theory is that, from his point of view, savage thought and scientific thought are not in opposition (LS 1964: 35). In both of these cases, the function of thinking is not only to communicate, but also to accumulate knowledge (this function is more developed in wild thought, as in
illiterate societies there is no other possible way of recording information) and, above all, to organise the world, to express a model of organising the cosmos which reaches both nature and culture (LS 1964: 25, see also Leach 1970: 35-9 and Chomsky 1980: 133).

With this continuity between the two retained, each of the two ways of thinking are in turn applied to different objects, and in this way organise the world in two different ways. The savage thinks nature, the relationship between culture and nature; it definitively thinks about society within nature. The domesticated thinks culture, human existence and, finally, the domestication of nature by culture. Savage thinking in particular uses a series of resources in order to carry out this function, among which are included fundamentally: using analogies (LS 1964: 41); an emphasis on taxonomy and classification; the use of classifications taken from nature in order to organise culture and vice versa; the resulting permutation between those classifying order; and, at the roots of all this, the use of a system of binary oppositions, a truly universal feature of the mind (according to LS) previously referred to.

More specifically, savage thinking thinks from and about nature, using the resources and arguments offered by it, and with the purpose, as previously mentioned, of reducing natural chaos into a human order (LS 1964: 35). This is above all spatially deep thought, in some way ecological, which takes shape using hyperdeveloped spatial categories, whereas reflections about time within it remain in an embryonic state or are at best secondary. This feature is well represented in myths and rituals, which are not only "machines to suppress time" (LS 1968: 25) but also organise their reality, transforming into different (and parallel) spaces what Western thought would have represented as different phases or times: if our imagination talks about fantastic events as belonging to a long-distant past, mythical thought refers to them as another space, which is why mythical creatures may interact with human society. In myths, different times are converted into specific spaces. In savage thinking reflection about time is submitted to a reflection about space, whereas in scientific-modern thinking precisely the opposite occurs.

In savage thinking humans do not think about myths, "but instead myths are thought in humans without them noticing" (LS 1968: 21). The function of myths is to express thought: "myths think among themselves", as LS puts it, which once again underlines the autonomy of thinking and the constraints which the mind imposes upon individual and society. Particular individuals are not, however, relevant at this level, although they are so in order to constitute the specific versions of the myths which in reality constitute a specific adaptation of the structural code of each expression of thinking to specific circumstances and with specific strategic intentions. The versions are no more than 'versions' in our eyes, as in reality they are a specific manifestation of a generic prototype; the group of versions of one prototype form a group of transformations; and it is the integral analysis of this group, seeking structural relationships within it, which makes it possible to discover the structure. Critics
who have commented on the apparent immobility of LS' positions, have forgotten that the dialectics of structure-versions enable the social dynamics and the effects of history and conflict to be considered:

**Developing Lévi-Strauss: the historicity of thinking**

Several important consequences arise from these positions. In order to go into further detail, it would be necessary to revise the debate about *Structural Anthropology* and *History* and to examine the relationship between thinking and history. For lack of space, I will concentrate on the latter.

The supposed structuralist negation of history, which in reality postulates its necessary relativisation as a condition in order to re-establish its true being (i.e. a category of thinking in a specific society), puts all the emphasis on the need to fully analyse the historicity of thinking. It is imperative to make a contextual analysis of the object studied (something vindicated by LS: 1968: 14, 1973: 218, and 1972):

> However respectful of history and disposed that structural analysis may be to take advantage of all the lessons, it refuses to let itself be enclosed within the parameters already circumscribed by historical investigation. On the contrary, demonstrating that myths with very diverse origins objectively form a group offers a problem for history, and invites it to seek a solution. We have constructed a group and hope to have offered proofs that it is a group. *It is the duty of the ethnographers, the historians and the archaeologists to say how and why.* (LS 1968: 17)

The study of the historicity of thinking is part of the unfinished part of LS' project. Although it may be carried out using LS, to do so it is necessary to complete his work and re-think some of his proposals. Four essential themes must be dealt with: the synchronicity or successivity of savage and domesticated thinking, the transition from one to the other, the correspondence of domesticated thinking with the Neolithic, and the correlation between the two ways of thinking and specific types of society in which they would have materialised.

- Regarding the synchronicity or successivity of wild thinking and domesticated thinking. According to LS' suggestions, savage and domesticated thinking are not, in principle, two phases or ways of thinking which may have characterised different stages or types of societies; nor, for the same reason, may savage thinking be considered as a 'primitive' way of thinking, which preceded scientific thinking and only represents an evolutionary stage leading up to it (LS 1964: 30, 43). They are two ways of thinking which may occur synchronously. And although it is true that for most of the history of mankind savage thinking has been the dominant way of thinking, some types of domesticated thought were present in every context, albeit subtly. This said, when savage thinking is considered not as an operation of the powers of the mind, but instead as a
system of thinking incorporated within specific societies or as the particular product of 'savage' societies, when it is understood not as a grammar but instead as the result of grammar united with semantics, when it is definitively seen not as thinking but as thought, then evidence emerges that the savage form of thought is a historical reality or, indeed, a phase. Of course, I am not referring to pensée sauvage, but instead to a specific objectification of this within particular contextual coordinates. This savage or, better still, ‘wild’ context made use of a way of thinking which was pensée sauvage, but with it did more than represent the Mind: it also produced a particular socio-cultural reality.

- Regarding the relationship between ways of thinking and types of society. The historicity of the types of pensée requires specifying their relationship with particular types of society. There is therefore a need to complete the study of this relationship. As P. Clastres said, LS' anthropology of thinking lacks society: “it is a sociology without society” (Clastres 1981: 170), “a correct analysis of the systems of thinking which coexist with an imperfect interpretation of society” (Clastres 1981: 191). This author then goes on to complete the task in a way which has opened up considerable perspectives for social anthropology as well as archaeology (Criado 1989; see also Vicent 1991, 1998, Barrett 1994, Méndez 1994, and Díaz del Río 1995, 1998). For Clastres, the society which lies behind savage thinking is a primitive society, which he defines as a human culture which is a 'total social fact', indicating that it is not possible to differentiate in them specific levels of social activity, and that accordingly neither is it possible to postulate any kind of determinism among the different sectors of the social unit (see the definition of 'primitive society' given by Lizot 1978). The most universal and characteristic feature of primitive societies is the absence of the State, which Clastres understands as an organ of political power which is 'divided' from society. These proposals make savage thinking correspond with a primitive sociology, and suggest that the move towards a divided society should be redoubled in an inflection similar to that in the system of thought which would even lead to overcoming the savage as a way of thinking. The congruence between savage thinking and primitive society may be seen in how both arrive, by different paths and through fundamentally similar needs, to a rejection of history and time. Both are realities whose extension is spatial before being temporal. The fundamental aspect of their being is being-in-space, and not being-in-time.

- Regarding the transition from savage thinking to domesticated thinking, i.e. dealing with the historical problem of the transition between types of thinking and thought. Despite what was said previously about the coincidence of savage and domesticated thinking, not even the work of LS
is clear on this point. On the one hand he argues that when each society is considered in detail, the differences between the two types of thinking are diluted, become difficult to define, and their importance is diminished (LS 1973: xlv). But he then suggests that, before the threshold of our modernity, situations developed in which the progressive advance of particular thinking became increasingly abstract, situating mythical thinking at a point where it 'exceeds itself' and arrives at the threshold of that transition (as happened in some mythical complexes from the American continent), or arrives at a point beyond this threshold (as was the case of Greece with the transition from the myth to philosophy; LS 1979a: 393-5).

• Regarding the Neolithic as a transition. The problem of the transition from savage to domesticated thinking has provoked a lamentable mistake: believing that this transition corresponds to the Neolithic period. This is an erroneous interpretation which has led to much confusion, and which must be clarified as it directly affects prehistory and archaeology. The confusion partly derives from the semantic weight of the terms used by LS (domesticated compared to savage); partly from the deeply rooted significance of what the Neolithic represents (identified after G. Childe with domestication); and partly from LS himself, who deals with this theme with particular ambiguity. At times he proposes that, grossso modo, the discontinuity between primitive and non-primitive societies took shape during the Neolithic revolution (LS 1964: 33, 1973: xlv, 1979b: 325-6), and at other times alleges that all savage thinking is Neolithic, and that in the temporal space which separates the beginning of 'Neolithic' types of thought from the modern world, no change would have been produced in the mind. He thus refers to this period as a 'break', alleging that in it the tremendous 'paradox' develops that, after pensée having progressed to the point where it makes possible all the observations and rationalisations which underlay the implementation of agriculture, an impasse would have come about for several millennia until finally an increasingly abstract pensée led to the Industrial Revolution and the sciences and techniques of modernity (LS 1964: 30-6).

Going beyond Lévi-Strauss: the archaeology of thinking

The previous considerations, still deriving from within the work of L.S, lead the text to the point at which it is possible (or necessary) to move beyond LS' proposals, assuming them and applying them to objectives which are different from his. I will start by developing LS' conceptual apparatus in order to think about thought in historical and contextualised terms. I will then apply these
concepts in order to contextualise thinking and to generate models of reference and a working hypothesis for prehistoric research.

Notes on structural theory: Mind, Thinking and Knowledge

In order to contribute to the historisation (or pre-historisation) of ways of thinking, I use the scheme presented above to shed light upon the concepts implied, in particular *Mind* and *pensée*. This scheme displays a chain of intellectual mechanisms which range from the most natural and universal to the most social and specific. In this sense, it is possible to define three close concepts which progressively include each other, each of them appearing as the subgroup of the previous one.

First of all, there is the concept of the human spirit. Given the sense which LS bestows upon this concept, I would prefer to call it the *Mind* or the *Universal Mind*. Of course it is not Hegelian *Reason*, the conscience which acquires an absolute Mind from itself. On this level, Eco’s Ur-structures or meta-codes are generated (1978: 423). From the Mind, specific modes of rationality or thinking are configured (after Sperber 1985: 70). This is what LS calls *pensée*. This term is preferable to ‘thought’, as it better fits the concept of thinking as *grammar* which LS uses. This level is composed of the structures through which a culture understands and builds up its relationship with the world. Savage or domesticated thinking are conceived of first as main patterns of rationality rather than empirical and historical realities. *Savage* or *domesticated rationality* are, before being phases, different intellectual apparatuses to understand reality.

Next, a horizon appears which did not concern LS and which he accordingly did not develop. It is the horizon in which thinking extends as semantics, when the models of rationality are materialised in particular conditions. *Pensée sauvage*, as well as being a type of rationality, cannot be anything less than a system of thinking, a *form of thought*, characteristic of primitive society, which contributes to reproducing that society, and which disappears when it is dissolved. As well as this, there are other forms which we must historise, among which is found the historical materialisation of domesticated thinking. This level could be called *thought*, now understood as the particular historical form adopted by a particular pattern of rationality. It is the intersubjective horizon, the smallest common denominator in all of the individuals and segments of a society, something which in consequence makes possible intercommunication and the establishment of super-individual consensus. Subjectivisation or individualisation, or the social production of subjects, is formed at this level. All thinking is redoubled into a certain *pattern of subjectivity* which, as a pattern, produces the subjects of that society and brings about the model through which those subjects see themselves and their position in the world. A change in the system of thought provokes a parallel change in the pattern of subjectivity, which in turn implies a change in the first. The mechanisms of subjectivisation are one of the main practical resources of
the pattern of thought. This may work positively only because it is reproduced
in particular individuals, as it is embodied in subjects who are its agents.

Some authors (reductionist materialists and functionals) prefer to
ignore this level and move on directly to talk about ideology. But this occupies
an even lower, more specific level. All of these things are in turn actualisations
of a particular way of thinking about specific circumstances and strategies.
Thought provides the vocabulary and intellectual apparatus to think the world,
and next the social agents, armed with that toolbox, think, fight, construct and
modify the world according to their specific determinations. As LS himself
anticipated (the idea was later much-repeated and is one of the fundamental
principles of the type of materialism to which I am affiliated, which takes shape
in the materialism of incorporeal of Foucault 1980b), before things are applied,
they have to be thought (LS 1964). In a wider sense, this level is what
constitutes culture. However, given the ambiguities of this term, it may also be
denominated with Foucaultian concepts, as thought conceived in this is way is
the system of knowledge (Foucault 1980a) or the episteme of an epoch (Foucault
1979). It is finally what Bermejo (1990) conceptualised as symbolic forms.

It is within this level where the singular symbolic forms of each culture
appear (myth, religion, ritual, ideology, art, technology, etc.): actualisations of
thought directed towards practical matters and generally linked with segments
and individual spheres. For LS, this level is formed by the different codes from
one system of thought, understood as a particular grammar from each
phenomenic field within the same socio-cultural formation. This final level
connects with what LS identified with the version or variations of a structure.
As I previously mentioned, it has been said that his work was far removed from
the vicissitudes of history, social contingencies and individual action. However,
this problem was resolved in the structuralism of LS by the theorisation of the
versions. This proposal resolves the previous theoretical conflict by calling on a
structure which, instead of remaining unchanged, is actualised in empirical
reality as versions whose particular form actually represents a balanced solution
between the underlying structure and the contradictions of the context within
which it appears.

It is through the mechanism of versions that an interrelationship is
produced between knowledge, society and individual, between structures, codes
and social agents; it is the production of the social adaptations and consensus
which accompany the daily process.

Applications of structural theory: anthropological models of rationality for
archaeological interpretation

This ‘archaeological revision’ of LS’ structuralism offers a series of frameworks
and models on which to base archaeological interpretation. Here it is necessary
to refer to the discussion of the concept of interpretation which I have dealt
with in other points, and the need to overcome the post-processual and
hermeneutic concept of interpretation and replace it with an objectifiable

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interpretation (Criado 1999: 7-16). (I will return to this subject later.) Even if these are not the original models, they are at least closer to prehistoric alienness than to modern Western rationality. Similarly, although LS’ models of rationality do not correspond to prehistoric empirical reality, the use of these models is legitimate as a theoretic-interpretative framework for archaeological practice. Another point is deciding the real scope of these models, as their validity is forcibly generic, limited to a very elemental or general level of prehistoric sociocultural formations.

The application of LS’ proposals to prehistoric archaeology brings with it three different fundamental elements. Firstly there is the model of spirit understood as universal Mind; secondly savage thinking and domesticated thinking understood as modes of rationality; and thirdly the models brought about by the succession of forms of thought understood as particular systems of knowledge. I will briefly consider each of these.

The human spirit as universal mind. Above all, if the definition of the spirit and the characterisation of its basic ways of functioning are accepted, there will be a genuine background within which the different practices and socio-cultural formations may be contextualised, independently of their differences. Some caution is needed to avoid falling back on a reification of Modern Universal Reason or extrapolating a Western philosophy of conscience. However, with that difficulty overcome, it is true what U. Eco once said: “The constant functioning of the human mind is a very fruitful proposal for all kinds of semiotic investigations” (Eco 1978: 466). And archaeological, I would add, particularly if we consider that archaeology cannot precisely observe the minds of prehistoric human beings. However, substituting this unknown with a model of constant functioning of the mind would offer an objective and positive starting point for archaeological investigation. This hypothesis is so obvious that it sounds incredible that archaeologists have not made efforts to explore its application in prehistory.

From this constant mind, effective implications are derived for archaeological investigation. It appears that the universal Mind of LS offers a genuine basis, about which the following may be said: (i) that all human beings are equal; (ii) that, aware that they think the same way (as this is derived from the Mind) although they think about different things (as this is given by the context), this model makes it possible to understand the intellectual mind of the prehistoric beings whose physical products archaeology studies; and (iii) that the fundamental features of this generic way of thinking would have been order, duality, opposition and classification. So archaeologists could, at least partially, bridge the greatest void which characterises prehistoric knowledge: that of a linguistic subject which would make it possible to access the symbolical logic of the acts whose effects produce the archaeological record. Similarly, having checked its existence in anthropology, it is possible to prehistorise this model, and ask ourselves when, why, how, and in what conditions it appeared, as it is certain that it has not always existed. I suggest
going even further beyond this point, as the immediate question would be to resolve if this model characterises and accompanies *Homo sapiens sapiens*, certain phases of *sapiens sapiens*, or previous species of *sapiens*. I would suggest considering if the appearance and development of art in the Upper Palaeolithic period had anything to do with the development and origin of that model of rationality; was art the reflection that represents the dawn of the human Mind, or is the Mind constructed by controlling the representation that artistic technology allowed?

Savage and domesticated thinking as types of rationality. Having overcome the previous level, LS offers an exhaustive characterisation of the two main models of thinking which could be used as a contextual basis in archaeological investigation. Of the two, the first is the most usable in prehistory, as prehistoric humanity primarily thought using a savage rationality. This means that prehistoric societies, as well as sharing with the rest of humanity a generic model of the Mind, would have specifically possessed a way of thinking based on metaphorical and analogous correspondences, which made use of paradigmatic relationships and a logic of sensitive qualities, and was based on spatial categories, but which rejected time and history. I will not go any further down this path; for me (perhaps in contrast to LS) the importance of this second model really lies in opening up the possibilities of thinking about the following.

Ways of thinking as systems of knowledge. It is necessary and possible to overcome the dualistic model of LS which only differentiates between savage and domesticated thinking, to suggest instead (at least as a working hypothesis for investigation) a ‘chain’ of types of thought which would at least deal with (based on our previous proposals) a hunting thought, a savage or rather wild thought, a domestic thought and a ranked thought. What I here call ‘wild thought’ does not correspond to the ‘savage thinking’ (*pensée sauvage*) of LS, nor does ‘domesticated thought’ equate with scientific thinking. This said, the three last types of thinking are contained within savage rationality (within *pensée sauvage* as such).

I proposed that monumental architecture in general, and megalithism in particular, were the expression of a principal change in the order of thought (Criado 1989). Given the conceptualisation of space, time, the natural and the relationship between society and nature represented by the monuments, I suggested that the monumental presupposes a post-savage system of thought, which cannot be savage, and which opens the way for the formation of domestic thought, a knowledge which domesticated nature, and produced an artificial landscape for the first time in history. At the same time I proposed that, despite the topics dealing with the issue, the Neolithic period was not the expression of a domesticated thinking but instead the representation and climax of savage thinking, now understood with the double meaning of *pensée sauvage* and savage thought. What the actual practices of Neolithic societies demonstrate is that the Neolithic is not the *culturisation of nature* but instead the
naturalisation of culture. It is only thanks to this intellectual mechanism and way of thinking about the world, space and time, that technologies of intensive control of nature could be developed, which lead to agriculture and livestock farming. Today this hypothesis has been confirmed thanks to the empirical discovery of complex ways of managing nature in hunter-gatherer societies.

The formal analysis (with structuralist inspiration in its methodology) of Palaeolithic art and postglacial art (Criado and Penedo 1993) made it possible to observe that while the latter precisely demonstrated the values and technologies of the representation of the world in 'wild thought', the former presented a character which was not concordant with this form of thought, but was instead outside it. Using this observation, I suggested the possibility that pensée sauvage may not always have existed, but that instead it may be a historical product which represents a certain type of primitive society, and which had a beginning as well as an end. For lack of a better name, the form of thought represented in Palaeolithic art could be named 'hunting thought'.

Thus combining the results of LS with prehistoric investigation, I proposed constructing a theoretical model of successive forms of thought in prehistory which gives a different scheme of understanding prehistory, a framework to give meaning to the archaeological record. This model has to establish a correspondence between ways of thinking and social formations, as well as be represented in specific models of landscapes. Briefly, the general features of this model would be as follows (Criado 1993):

What was called hunting thought would correspond, in terms of traditional prehistoric periodisation, to the Late Upper Palaeolithic and Epipaleolithic; in social terms it would correspond to the formation of primitive society (Gilman 1984); and in imaginary terms would correspond to the threshold of savage thinking (pensée sauvage). At this precise moment I do not know when it came into existence (before, during, or after the transition to the Middle-Upper Palaeolithic) and which other types of thought existed before it.

In any case, at a given moment around the Mesolithic period it disappeared, opening the way for pensée sauvage in general, and savage thought in particular, which in social terms correspond with primitive society and segmentary societies, and in conventional archaeological terms with the Mesolithic and the part of the Neolithic that came before the formation of peasant societies. The investigations of A. Hernando have contributed to defining this model of thought, arguing in depth the conceptions of space, time, and subject (the individual) which accompany it (Hernando 1996, 1997a and 1997b).

In later phases of the Neolithic period or even the Bronze Age, a lengthy and complicated process began to dissolve primitive societies and constitute first complex peasant and segmentary societies (Méndez 1994, Vicent 1991, Díaz del Río 1995 and 1998, Díaz del Río et al. 1997) and then divided, hierarchical, and in particular tributarian societies (Gilman 1981 and 1995,
Vicent 1995 and 1998). This corresponds with the hegemony of a new way of being in the world, which I have denominated domesticated thought. This domesticated thinking hatched in protohistory and the Iron Age, corresponding to models of society which were fully tributarian and/or Germanic. It is ranked thought.

To a certain degree this model establishes new bases for a distinct periodisation of Prehistory. It could seem excessively aprioristic or idealistic. In other investigations I have tried to demonstrate that each of these types of thought correspond to a specific form of landscape with a particular planning system of the natural world and construction of social space (Criado 1993); that each of these pairs (thought + landscape) correspond to a system or code of representing the world, with a technology of representing space and time (Hernando 1997a and 1997b, Criado 1999); and that all this in turn corresponds with the formal characteristics of the archaeological record which is representative of each period according to which it reproduces and objectifies a series of strategies of visibilisation, a will-to-visibility, which are in turn coherent with a model of thought and landscape, and compatible with a particular model of society (Criado 1995). This final threshold is precisely what makes it possible to overcome the limitations of a mute record in order to create, through its form features contextualised upon the different forms of thought conceived as systems of knowledge, an innovative archaeological knowledge and to pre-historicise the march of Reason. Evidently, all of this formulation is quite daring, I would say that this provides a group of proposals which offer suggestive and legitimate working hypotheses about humanity and history, whose study is worth a special effort, and indeed risk.

Forgetting Lévi-Strauss?

Risks, in particular, may be minimised, and effort channelled in a productive manner. To do so I would have to take a further step in the revision of LS and move on to the definition of the theoretical-interpretative framework and the theoretical-methodological apparatus which is generally derived from LS’ structural anthropology, and which may be applied to other domains of experience, including archaeology and prehistory.

In order to develop this aspect of the theory, I would have to deal with two essential elements which I will briefly introduce now: the methodology of analysis or how new knowledge is produced in prehistory, and the method or how to contrast this knowledge and its objectivity. In relation to the first, structural anthropology offers a concise proposal (the mechanism of structural analysis as such) which offers a methodological model in order to align the formal and contextual analysis of the archaeological record, and which also avoids the risk of reifying a subjective meaning. This methodology of analysis forms to some extent a deconstructive practice or ‘deep description’ which describes the object
being studied from within itself. In relation to the second, the essential theoretical principles derived from structuralism for archaeology should be considered, as well as the verification method of the proposed interpretative hypotheses. As a whole, this theoretical-methodological apparatus has the paradoxical role of establishing the framework for a structural archaeology which, however, is an impossible project. For this reason I prefer to speak, in a self-limiting manner, about a research programme.

However, have I through Structural Anthropology really escaped from the risk of meaning, of conjuring up meaning with subjective strategies? Have I really put forward an alternative which owes more to post-structuralism than to hermeneutics? Perhaps in the end I have not. Let’s return to the debate on LS’ structuralism and phenomenology. For in a phenomenological reading of LS, it becomes clear that a hermeneutic principle does underlay his work. Once observed that structural anthropology postulates a radical homology between the cultural and natural orders, that the very possibility of structural analysis is grounded on this homology, and that the scientific pretensions of structural analysis presuppose the identity of the structures of the human spirit with nature, then must we not admit that to the extent that it goes beyond the subject/object division, it does so by recuperating the phenomenological Lebenswelt? Does this not acquire an ontological priority on which the configuration and explanation of reality must be based?

If we recognise that the work of LS is based on a form of radical objectivism which destroys the subject/object distinction on which the project of modern consciousness is built, and that as a result it dissolves humanity in nature; can we not accept that what differentiates it from both positivist objectivism and phenomenological subjectivism is the absolute refusal to base this new (post-modern) project on a founding subjectivity and to recuperate this subjectivity through the results of the analysis? When LS defines his work as neo-Kantianism without a transcendental subject (1976a: 576) he is referring precisely to this duality, one pole of which is absent. For while it tries to construct a theoretical model of transcendental objectivity which takes account of the relationship between nature and culture, it attempts to do this without elevating the notion of man as transcendental subject.

The death of man, as postulated by anthropological structuralism, is nothing more than a piece of a priori and a posteriori caution, designed to avoid the recuperation of the classical philosophy (metaphysics) of consciousness. Antisubjectivism becomes an ethical option which enables, at the last moment, to prevent the speaking subject from recuperating discourse. In the absence of any emerging new pattern of subjectivity I suggest resorting to nihilism in an attempt to exercise the snare of man. If the end nothing guarantees that our text will not have reproduced the pattern of subjectivity from which it originated and will not have been converted into a useful tool for the reproduction of the system. For me, the only option in this situation is the ethical position asserted above. Archaeologists must consciously or decon-
structively choose to remain outside discourse casting a philosophical smile (to quote Foucault) on discourse once it has been accomplished. At the same time they must exhaust the risks of basing archaeological practice on other patterns of subjectivity; because it is only in this way that archaeology can contribute to the urgent project (urgent in the present crisis situation) of constructing new patterns of subjectivity through which to contrast the adaptation of society to nature with the very bases of social reality.

Note

I thank the editors for inviting me to participate in this volume, thus giving me the opportunity to discuss subjects which have been on my mind for over ten years, but which due to the constraints of daily life I have not been able to voice until now. Once I dedicated myself to the task, I ended up writing a text of 35,000 words, which I had to edit down to the 8,000 demanded by the editors. I am afraid that this has not only led to a great many important arguments being left out of the text, but also that what remains is without foundation. I am grateful, as always, for the stimulus and enriching working environment provided by my colleagues from the Laboratory of Archaeology and Cultural Forms at the University of Santiago de Compostela. A final remark: the use of ‘man’ in the text is intentional: made with the critical purpose of opposing the hegemony of this nocive notion to the dawn (perhaps) of a new human being.
Comment

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Many texts by non-archaeological authors influence archaeological thinking without being 'adopted' clearly into the agenda. They become useful and needed references, but no more than that. Lévi-Strauss is probably a good example of this kind of influential invisibility. Felipe Criado Boado wants to revitalise Lévi-Strauss and, as he claims, start a further development. It is a grand project, in a way related to the total organisation of a field of knowledge, divided into periods and with a start in terms of origins, which we identify with the 19th century. It is seriously intended and focuses on how an archaeology of thought can provide a foundation for an explanation of different human lifeways.

The author is not very satisfied with his text, as it has become a piece of work not written directly but cut and put together within the limited space given by the editors. This is evident to the reader, and the condensed arguments are at times difficult to follow and agree with. It also raises questions about the foundations of structuralism, which are not yet solved only supposed, and which seem to be even more difficult in contemporary times, when it is not possible to maintain a duality of nature and culture. Nature is not there anymore to be used as an independent entity, acted upon by people. It is a cultural composition which accompanies all human movement and activity, and it is in that cultural milieu that humans must dwell. Landscapes in archaeology seem to be much more of a product of the viewer, a gazebo position, which creates a distance relation to what is being investigated instead of approaching the locale, where work and thinking is carried out simultaneously. There is a similarity here to the notion of humans experiencing a chaotic world, establishing strategies to turn chaos into the viewable, into the known and understandable. But chaos does not exist as a totality; the only exception would be the Holocaust, where thinking structures are used in vain to try to reach an understanding, as there is probably no understanding to be found.

One of the main questions within the suggested project would be why human beings think at all. But the emphasis in this text is on when and how. It
is not enough anymore to refer to thinking and thought as a way of creating order from chaos, as hinted at above.

Structuralist writing still repeats several of the main assumptions, which need reevaluating. The relation between acting and thinking is not a universal, linear phenomenon, and thinking may hence precede acting as well as the reverse. Thinking and acting are probably rather simultaneous, every-day occurrences, which influence each other incessantly. Probably we come across the shortcomings of the learned world in bringing craft and work together with thinking, on an equal level. The same concerns the relationship between phonem and morphem. These constructions are purely academic and analytical, not natural. Even the statement of the 'randomness of linguistic signs' is doubtful, when signs within the same category are noted. Signs, collectively observed, seem to have a compositional influence on each other and randomness becomes much more restricted. We can reflect here that context is reserved for interpretation and meaning, not for giving form.

However, the main objective of the structuralist programme, the correspondence between the structures of the human mind and the structures of culture, is still an axiom and to name, in this text, the constricting determinations of the 'unconscious' is misconceived, as we surely cannot become conscious of what is unconscious. Instead they are beyond the consciousness, impossible to reach or understand.

So much has happened in the last few years within the social and behavioural sciences concerning primates and early humans, that the foundations upon which structuralism used to build dichotomies are not so clear any longer. Humans become more animal-like and animals are found to be more human in terms of the criteria we have traditionally used. Many structuralistic statements tend to be nice formulations of sentences, the value of which is not clear. When it is said that the savage thinks about society within nature, in contrast to the domesticated, who thinks of culture as domesticating nature, it is important to realise that even if the term 'nature' is the same, the contents are not.

Finally some notes on the monumental and its suggested meaning in relation to different lines of thinking and thought. The concept seems too traditional, as there are other important positions, such as the miniature and the normal size, which are just as intellectually complicated. In addition, the monumental is not an artificial, material phenomenon but lies also in the topography of land and in contexts related thereto, and not least in the human body itself. To apply monumentality or the invention of art and the art of writing to specific levels of thinking in relation to periods of human history is no longer a forceful argument, but rather a repetition of old properties from the wardrobe of history.

The way this project is looking, from this rather too short and abbreviated text, a new methodology further supports a periodisation which is already accepted by many. Is it the final remains of the grand programmes within
archaeology or a reestablishment of new comprehensive programmes, after an era of different, dazed excursions into the post-processual? Anyway, the scientific thinking and thought suggested here will provide new starting points also for savage thinking, which means that new bricolages of composed knowledge and visions are created from the scientific domain. The two types of thinking, savage and domesticated, however interesting they may be, are really difficult to keep separated in daily life. They belong to the archaeological laboratory.
Response

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It is quite complicated to reply to the comment by Jarl Nordbladh, partly because of the number, variety and depth of his arguments, but mostly because I quite agree with his statements and, from his comment, one gets the impression that we share a similar sensitivity vis-à-vis the problems raised in my text. But this remark is not intended to play down critical distance, which is as important as a certain proximity in allowing intellectual communication.

The comment quite clearly reflects Nordbladh’s understanding of my text as being a piece of modern (if not traditional) discourse, a grand project that reduplicates the classical grand theories of the 19th century. From this perspective, the text would support a periodisation accepted by many. But where are these many? Both in my immediate and other contexts the proposals pointed out in my text sound completely incomprehensible and unacceptable, like a mine under the walls of Modernity. Despite the fact that my own position is much closer to French post-modern thought than to Habermas-Giddens’ third way, I still think that we must reclaim grand theory as an intellectual intention rather than a scientific explanation. So I cannot accept this criticism of the text. By the way, nothing is further from the purpose of the text than “providing a foundation for an explanation of different human lifeways”. Explanation is out of the range of epistemology or even words which from my interpretive thinking could find a new knowledge of the world. The text used the term ‘explanation’ just once, at the very end and with an ironical sense, trying to cause a self-dissolution of the text (or in this case its writer).

My interpretive orientation is also far from a pure hermeneutical subjectivity. I thought that this option was quite clearly expressed by the text: accepting that reason is built up from subjectivity but subjectivity does not constitute the reason, the text intends to contextualise subjectivity looking at its materialisation instead of losing subjectivity in a subjective labyrinth of verbiage. However it is possible that the intention was clearer to the writer than it is in the actual project itself, and the text is a better account of the latter than the former. This is where nihilism becomes a critical counterpoint in my project (it is also deeply combined with structural thought).
Perhaps I can clarify the text if I say that grand projects such as periodisation or any other of the categories in the text criticised by the comment (including above all the typical structuralist dichotomies), do belong to the archaeological laboratory or, even better, to the mind laboratory. They do not exist as totalities, of course. They do not maintain any dualism. In fact LS greatly criticises Cartesian dualism and tries (I think successfully) to deconstruct its force in modern thought. My own feeling is that the whole work of LS treats ‘savage’, ‘domestication’, ‘nature’, ‘culture’ and so on, as resources to think about, instead of natural or empirical entities. I tried to do the same. For this reason, coming to the final question which summarises the critical comment, I would wish to locate my text on the side of any appeal for a new comprehensive programme for the world (not only archaeology) after years of dazed movements which were as enriching for us as individuals as they were impoverishing for the social.

This reply can be clarified if I go into concrete themes. For instance, I entirely agree with Nordbladh’s discussion on nature and culture. The text works very badly if it allows such confusion. Precisely because nature and culture are not independent entities, what changes (and moreover what is really important to examine how it changes) is the human conception, the social shape, of nature and therefore of culture. I thought that my work for an interpretive landscape archaeology would have contributed to showing how landscapes were produced by viewing (by the way, the metaphor of landscape as a gazebo position is superb) and what different forms of viewing meant. Perhaps we (the text and I) failed. Or perhaps the problem is that this research has been published in Spanish (although some of it is available in English).

The criticism about my concept of the monumental could be solved by indicating that for me a megalith, a petroglyph, a wooden palisade, invisible rock-art, a pot, a tree-painting, Ayers Rock, or even tattoos, place-names or a sacred geography are monuments. But they are different kinds of monuments, and their distinct formal features could in fact reflect distinct social intentions and meanings. Again this discussion has been published in Spanish. My proposal is to correlate these different forms of the monumental with diverse landscapes, with particular ways of viewing and then with specific meanings. If a LS-like conceptualisation of the histories of thinking is useful in any respect to such a project, so much the better. In any case, to finish with a politically incorrect quotation, using the words of G. K. Chesterton: “If a thing is worth doing, it is worth doing badly.”

It is so difficult to avoid an inflection of words which causes deflection of sense, to escape the narcissism of academic discussion which provokes a distance among the discussants that sometimes is mere representation. The only thing I am sure of at the end of this reply is that I would like to meet Jarl in person and discuss these points with him. But perhaps this is not of any great interest to the readers.
References


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