

## “Back to Europe”, a migration metaphor

Juan A. Cebrián ([juanantonio.cebrian@cchs.csic.es](mailto:juanantonio.cebrian@cchs.csic.es)). 2011.

Instituto de Economía, Geografía y Demografía

CCHS-CSIC

c/Albasanz 26-28

28037 Madrid, España.

**Summary:** In 1995, the countries of the European Union (EU15)<sup>1</sup> were populated by 379.5 million inhabitants; out of them 22.8 million were foreigners –6% of the total population. On January 1, 2008, the number of foreigners living within EU15’s borders surpassed 29 millions, roughly 7.4% of the total population of the fifteen EU-core countries. In absolute terms, the countries with the greatest number of foreign residents were Germany (7.3 millions), Spain (5.3 millions), the United Kingdom (4.0 millions), France (3.7 millions), and Italy (3.4 millions). More than 75% of the foreign citizens in the EU27 (see figure 1) lived in these member states<sup>2</sup>.

In no country of the European Union, with the exception of Latvia, has the number of foreign residents decreased during the 1995-2008 period. In some countries the growth of the number of foreign residents has been spectacular. The rise in Spain has been outstanding: it started in ninth place and is now second only to Germany in absolute numbers. In relative terms, Spain’s immigrant population is much more significant –all of the countries having an greater immigrant density than Spain are small countries, region size, with populations less than 10 million..

This article describes, *grosso modo*, this immigration process and analyses its causes, as well as its effects in the European culture and civilization.


Keywords: **Current international migrations, Immigration demographics in Europe, Economic migrations, Labor markets, Immigration policies.**

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<sup>1</sup> Building on the European Community, the Maastricht treaty (1992/93) established The European Union, **EU12**: Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal (figure 1.a). By 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the European Union, becoming **EU15** (figure 1.b). The second extension of the European Union, **EU25**, took place in 2004, incorporating Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Greek Cyprus (figure 1.b). Finally, in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria entered the European Union, **EU27** (figure 1.b).

<sup>2</sup>Graphic design: Jesús Monge Sánchez and Andrés Rodríguez Blanco.

Figure 1. The European Union



## 1. Introduction

It is impossible to cover in just one article, in the space normally allotted by the publishers of the current academic journals, even a significant part of the many and complex aspects that relate to the title of this essay. However, we believe that the title of this article sets an appropriate framework for the reflections that follow. Besides, the title itself, “Back to Europe”, may catch the attention of social scientists that will soon realize that we are referring to the recent arrival in Europe of great numbers of immigrants who, coming from around the world, are mirroring the historical expansion of Europe in colonial times. **The age-old outbound migrations from Europe have reversed their course during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.**

In fact, this process of migration reversal (Cebrián et al. 2008a) is among the most important social events to happen in Europe since the end of the Second World War until today. It was made possible by the revolution in transportation and communications, in conjunction with the socio-economic collapse of much of Africa and Latin America and, more recently, the crumbling of the Soviet Block.

In previous centuries, European emigration had a tremendous impact on the indigenous populations of colonized spaces, causing their almost complete extinction in Australia and North America. In Latin America, the European stock was mixed with aboriginals, as well as with African slaves and Asian laborers, that Europeans redistributed throughout the world, from the Caribbean Sea to islands on the Pacific Ocean.

In the second half of the 20th century, however, European populations have withdrawn from many of those areas, leaving behind a set of more homogenous populations. A number of countries outside of Europe, and historically cosmopolitan cities such as Alexandria or Istanbul, have evolved towards positions that are culturally and racially more homogenous since the departure of British, French, Greek, Jewish, and other groups. Meanwhile, a reverse process of diversification has taken place with the arrival of new immigrants who are transforming Berlin, London, Madrid, Barcelona, etc. Migration towards Europe from peripheral countries has brought about a racial and ethnic variety that had not existed before.

Going **back to Europe** is not the same for the people who have some roots in the European country where they are coming to settle now. Those groups may have mixed feelings about the migration process that affect their behaviour in the country of destination. Going back to Europe may mean to these persons something like going **back home**, which always makes the adventure less striking. On the other hand, it may prove hard

for them to accept that their future is to be found in the land their ancestors left behind to look for a better life somewhere else.

When many European populations stopped to grow several decades ago, immigrants from neighboring areas and former European colonies were welcomed. Programs were established to recruit temporary workers to fill job offers that were not taken by nationals. Eventually, many among these immigrants settled down and claimed to reunify their families left behind.

In the EU and in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, with few exceptions, foreign immigration contributes more to population growth than natural growth (figures 2–4). Indeed, the map of the natural population growth rates by country in Europe (figure 3) is the opposite map of net migration therein (figure 4). Since the March 2000 publication of the much-heralded report by the Population Division of the United Nations on the necessity for a massive immigration to Europe, there has been much talk about ‘replacement migration’ as the only way out of the current European demographic crisis (i.e. population ageing and, eventually, depopulation).

However, according to Coleman (2002) and others, while immigration can prevent the decrease in population, only an unprecedented and unsustainable immigration regime would unleash a significant growth, displacing the original population from its former majority position (Saczuk, 2003). For these authors, the solution to the problem of an ageing European population does not necessarily follow the promotion of immigration.

The truth is that immigrants are filling a demographic void. They fill the streets and employment offices. They are found at work, especially in jobs that require very little training. Immigrants come to fill a position that is more advantageous for them than remaining in their countries of origin.

## **2. The causes**

In order to understand the current migration towards Europe, it is necessary to keep in mind the global trends in international migration and its most important factors, such as a growing economic integration. Integration has a vertical component that, in principle, facilitates the concentration of people and activities. Economic integration is responsible for the appearance, and later growth, of important clusters of immigrants.

Globalization, however, has an horizontal dimension, demonstrating the widening of economic and social relations, through greater reach of the

Figure 2. The two components of population growth / decline in EU and some neighboring countries.  
Top 9 and bottom 9 population growth rates. 2004




Figure 3. Natural population growth rates in Europe circa 2004.





Figure 4. Net migration rates in Europe circa 2004.



media and transportation. Economic integration and globalization favor the movement of people while, in turn, are affected by them.

In the current system of production we are witnessing a spectacular concentration in the financial sector, which is represented by the merge of larger and larger companies. Manufacturing plants, however, tend to be located in the periphery where it is possible to find low-cost labor and less stringent environmental regulations. One of the reasons why Europe is so interested in international migrations is that this injection of low-cost labor allows it to maintain competitiveness in some production lines (that, usually, would only be found in developing countries), without losing its comparative advantage on investment safety; since capital owners or managers are sometimes willing to pay a little more in salaries if social order is guaranteed. This greater remuneration for work will be incorporated into the price of the final product.

Economic integration and globalization are often responsible for the attraction of foreign labor towards certain enclaves, and the removal of the native population from others. In Europe and Latin America there are numerous recent examples of each case.

In addition, current geopolitical tendencies have led to major changes in the nature of international migration. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has shifted westwards many Central and Eastern Europeans, who formerly gravitated towards Moscow. Fortunately, this new migration flow has not become the great and uncontrolled flight that many predicted. In the Balkan region, the demise of the Soviet Union unleashed a smoldering war of an ethnic-territorial nature. Other armed conflicts, in Africa and Asia, primarily, induced waves of millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees in neighboring countries, and movements of refugees in the free world, especially in Western Europe<sup>3</sup>. To neutralize those moves, the developed countries have undertaken humanitarian and military actions for post-war recovery and development.

At the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002, a period of great economic growth and immigration reached its peak in countries of the West<sup>4</sup>. Thereafter, in 2002 there was a change in economic conditions

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<sup>3</sup> Although the arrival of massive numbers of refugees reached a peak at the beginning of the 90s with the crisis of Yugoslavia, many European countries (such as France, Germany, UK, etc.) continue to receive refugees in great numbers. Most refugees are coming from Afghanistan, China, Iraq and Turkey. The UN High Commission on Refugees published in 2004 that the number of asylum petitions received by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK (339,500) were more than those individual and collective petitions received by Canada and the USA combined (70,800).

<sup>4</sup> Active recruitment of skilled workers in Ireland, Korea, New Zealand, UK and USA 1990-2002; movement of workers for multinationals (USA 300,000/year, the next country was UK with 18,000/year); movement of unqualified workers to France, Spain, UK, USA, etc.

(decreasing, or stabilizing, GDP and increasing unemployment) in these countries. Nonetheless, even in these circumstances, immigration did not become stagnant. It seems as if the international economic recession was not able of shutting off immigrants. In our opinion, this fact has at least two explanations. In the first place, the inertia of the call signal, which is similar to any other process of dissemination of information, leading to frequent mismatches between supply and demand for work. Family reunification, which can represent 50% of immigrants to countries such as Canada, France, USA, and the Scandinavian countries, is a kind of a lagged migration effect. The other explanation is that the economic and social situation that prevails in many countries of the world is so extreme, that is not going to stop the departure of individuals towards Europe, North America and other “islands of development” regardless of the conditions of the receiving countries, which will almost always be better than the conditions in the countries of origin. During this period, some countries continue to receive many immigrants, like most Western European countries, USA, Canada and New Zealand.

In developed countries, there has also been a “human rights revolution”, which attracts people from countries less-favored in economic and humanitarian terms. The governments of developed countries have imposed upon themselves and their citizens almost limitless human rights, like those found in the European Convention on Human Rights (1948) and the Geneva Convention (1951 and 1967) as well as guarantees that are applicable to citizens of other countries. In several international agreements, the balance of competencies has gradually shifted in favor of the judicial power and to the detriment of the executive, indirectly questioning the principle of national sovereignty. Within the European Union, this process has been accelerated by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997-99), which brought immigration issues closer to the Commission in Brussels, and away from intergovernmental agreements, likening the rights of future immigrants and those of citizens of the European Union. The right to family reunification, which we mentioned above, is now a universally accepted fact and is now responsible for nearly half of the immigrants entering developed countries.

However, European labor markets have shown themselves enormously rigid in adapting to the new conditions of uninterrupted economic growth in the West over more than a decade. Native-born workers (who are protected by the institutions and culture of the welfare state, including unemployment subsidies and EU Convergence Program Funds) have seen the growth of low-pay and low-qualification jobs filled by immigrants who have largely had to pay the price of being illegal for a certain time. Coleman (2003), quoting Salt (2001) argues that there exists a vast consortium of institutions with an interest in international migration:

governments and the private sector, including multinational companies, as well as the informal and irregular sectors.

### **3. Current migrations into Europe**

The evolution of net immigration to the entirety of the EU15 shows a cyclical behavior with peaks in 1962, 1980, 1992 and 2003, and lows in 1970 and 1982. In theory there should exist a time lag between the economic cycle and the immigration cycle. However, in recent years, it is to be noted that, regardless of the fluctuations of the economy, immigration continued to increase until the end of the year 2008.

According to the European Statistical Agency (EUROSTAT, 2005), immigration to the EU maintained high quotas at the beginning of the 1990s, reaching the level of 1.3 million immigrants per year in 1993, while falling to 378,687 yearly immigrants in 1998. Reasons for this massive immigration at the beginning of the 1990s were the fall of the Berlin Wall and the war in the Balkans. Nonetheless, a much more important wave of refugees from Central and Eastern Europe was expected since the break-up of the Soviet Union; fortunately, this did not occur. In Germany, as of 1989, many people of German ancestry (*Aussiedler*) came from the East, claiming their rights to German nationality, at a rate that varied from 220,000 in 1993 to 135,000 in 1997. As far as applicants for asylum are concerned (EUROSTAT1999, ACNUR1999), numbers were large until 1993 (672,381 in 1992, during the war in the Balkans), with a spike in 1999 (430,000, from Kosovo). In 1995, according to Eurostat statistics, the EU15 had a total population of 379.5 million inhabitants, while 22.8 million of these were foreigners – a 6% of the total population.

For more than a decade, two large groups of countries receiving immigrants to Western Europe can still be distinguished: Southern Europe and North-Central Europe. Between the two groups there exists an immigration time lag of several decades. Immigrants living in Southern Europe tend to be younger and with a greater disequilibrium as to sex than those of North-Central Europe. Immigration from Latin America and Africa is much greater in Southern Europe, while immigration from East Europe is less important. However, this fact has changed in recent years. For instance, the Romanian community in Spain has become the second largest in Spain (524,995) since January 2007, and the Bulgarians moved to 10<sup>th</sup> place (121,611), ahead of Chinese and Peruvians (Spanish Statistical Bureau-INE). Spain was leading the nations of Europe in terms of annual net immigration rates as of 2003. The rate was remarkably high: 1.76%. Only Cyprus (1.72%) and Italy (1.04%) were close.

In several statistical publications on EU25 countries, covering the period 2002-2004, the percentage of foreign residents with respect to the total population varies widely from 0.6% in Slovakia to 39% in Luxembourg. Nonetheless, the majority of the countries are placed in the 2-8% interval (table 1). Among those over 8% are Latvia, Estonia, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Belgium, and Greece. The situation in Latvia and Estonia can be explained by the large number of former Soviet Union citizens (referred to as 'recognized non-citizens' of these two countries) who are permanently resident in these countries but have not acquired Latvian/Estonian citizenship or any other citizenship. The natives of Cyprus are ethnic Turks or Greeks, and communities of Greek or Turkish nationality are quite numerous. Austria and Greece have been, and continue to be, interface countries between Eastern and Western Europe; therefore, they have always had notable foreign communities throughout their history. Finally, Belgium and Germany are two examples of intense post-colonial and post-war (World War II) immigration. On the other hand, we find Hungary, Lithuania and Poland below 2%. These are very low figures, due to the fact that these countries only register permanent residents.

If we look at the column 'Most numerous foreign community', in the same table, we come to the conclusion that migrations between EU countries are not as important as migration flows across the outer border of the European Union. Only in Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Slovakia, which are smaller countries, immigrants from EU countries are greater than those coming from other areas. However, most recent figures (EUROSTAT, 2009a) for the period 2001-2008, show that despite the absolute increase of non-EU foreigners in the countries of the European Union, their share in the total EU foreign population has fallen from 66.1% to 63%. This change in sharing does not necessarily mean that, strictly speaking, intra-EU flows are becoming more important in recent years. On the one hand the naturalization process alters the proportion non-EU nationals/EU nationals within the immigration stock. For instance, Germany granted citizenship to 260,000 Turks over the period 2001-2008. On the other hand, most significantly, the two EU enlargements that took place in 2004 and 2007 changed the category of those immigrants coming out of a dozen of European countries. The 2007 enlargement had a stronger impact along this line.



On January 1, 2008, approximately 30.7 million foreigners lived in the European Union (EUROSTAT, 2009b), which meant approximately 6.2% of the total population of the area in question (figures 5, 6 and 7). In absolute terms, the countries with the largest number of foreign residents were: Germany (7.3 millions), Spain (5.3 millions), United Kingdom (4.0 millions) France (3.7 millions), and Italy (3.4 millions).

Table 1: National and Foreign Population in European Union countries: 1990 and 2004.

	Year	Nationals x1000	Foreigners x1000	Total pop. x1000	Foreigners % Total pop.	Most numerous foreign community	Year	Nationals x1000	Foreigners x1000	Total pop. x1000	Foreigners % Total pop.
Belgium	2004	9536	860	10396	8,27241247	Italian	1990	9067	881	9948	8,85605147
Netherlands	2004	15556	702	16258	4,31787428	Turkish	1990	14251	642	14893	4,31075002
Luxembourg	2004	277	174	451	38,5809313	Portuguese	1990	270	109	379	28,7598945
France	1999	55258	3263	58521	5,57577622	Portuguese	1990	53055	3597	56652	6,3492904
Germany	2004	75190	7342	82532	8,89594339	Turkish	1990	74267	4846	79113	6,12541554
Italy	2004	55898	1990	57888	3,43767275	Albanian	1990	56338	356	56694	0,62793241
Denmark	2004	5126	271	5397	5,02130813	Turkish	1990	4985	151	5136	2,94003115
Ireland	2002	3585	274	3859	7,10028505	British	1990	3426	81	3507	2,30966638
UK	2003	55636	2760	58396	4,72635112	Irish	1990	55043	2416	57459	4,20473729
Greece	2004	10149	891	11040	8,07065217	Albanian	1990	9979	142	10121	1,40302342
Portugal	2003	10169	239	10408	2,29631053	Cape Verdean	1990	9819	101	9920	1,01814516
Spain	2004	39426	2772	42198	6,56903171	Ecuadorian	1990	38428	398	38826	1,02508628
EU12 (1986)	2004	335806	21538	357344	6,02724546		1990	328928	13720	342648	4,00410917
Austria	2004	7375	765	8140	9,3980344	Serb-Montenegrin	1990	7211	434	7645	5,67691302
Finland	2004	5113	107	5220	2,04980843	Russian	1990	4953	21	4974	0,42219542
Sweden	2004	8500	476	8976	5,3030303	Finnish	1990	8071	456	8527	5,34771901
EU15 (1995)	2004	356794	22886	379680	6,02770754		1990	349163	14631	363794	4,02178156
Cyprus	2002	625	65	690	9,42028986	Greek	1992	577	26	603	4,31177446
Czech Republic	2004	10016	195	10211	1,90970522	Ukrainian	1990	10327	36	10363	0,34738975
Estonia	2000	1096	274	1370	20	Russian	1990				
Hungary	2004	9987	130	10117	1,2849659	Romanian	1995	10199	138	10337	1,33501016
Latvia	2004	1804	515	2319	22,2078482	Russian	1998	1788	671	2459	27,2875153
Lithuania	2001	3450	34	3484	0,97588978	Russian	1990				
Malta	2004	389	11	400	2,75	British	1990	352	6	358	1,67597765
Poland	2002	37530	700	38230	1,83102276	German	1990				
Slovenia	2004	1951	45	1996	2,25450902	Bosnian	1995	1942	48	1990	2,4120603
Slovakia	2004	5350	30	5380	0,55762082	Czech	1990				
EU25	2004	428992	24885	453877	5,48276295		1990				



Source. EUROSTAT 2004.

Figure 5. Foreign residents in EU15 countries (absolute numbers and percents of the countries populations). 1990




Source : EUROSTAT, 2007

Figure 6. Foreign residents in EU25 countries (absolute numbers and percents of the countries populations). 2004



Source: EUROSTAT, 2007

**Figure 7. Foreign residents in EU27 countries (absolute numbers and percents of the countries populations). 2007**



Source: EUROSTAT, 2007

### 3.1. Latin American immigration to Southern Europe

The influx of Latin American immigrants towards Spain in the first place, and to Italy and Portugal to a lesser extent, has certain specific characteristics on which we must comment.

In Latin America, there have been other outflows of migrants before the late 1980s, and towards other destinations. The changes in destination of migrants have to do with the selective closing of certain American borders. Most important of all, the 1986 United States Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) determined much stricter controls that favored Asians over Latin Americans.

Years of economic crisis in Latin America created impressive pockets of poverty (marginal population which had ceased to be unnoticed) and edged towards national bankruptcy in some cases, bringing about the precipitated departure of great numbers of migrants. The last three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in Latin America proved to be a period of political tension, civil war, and dictatorship that ignited a flight towards Europe, a region of political stability and economic growth, where some Mediterranean countries provided a friendlier entry point.



A set of cultural ties, coming from a common history, which result in the use of a common language helped the population transfer. Latin Americans capitalized on their ability to speak Spanish, Portuguese or, some of them, little Italian, when reaching Southern Europe with the intention of staying there or looking for a foothold to take another leap.

Table 2 and figure 8, gather some recent data distributed by Eurostat on the six most-represented nationalities among Latin American residents in the countries of the EU.

#### 3.1. Other significant 'Back-to-Europe' immigration flows.

Although Latin American people, settling mostly in Southern Europe, have been the fastest growing immigrant community in Europe for the last decade, other very remarkable inflows of people, coming recently from different areas worldwide, are worth noting here. According to Eurostat figures, the **North African community**, which still is the non-European largest immigrant community in Europe, has grown by 851,000 individuals, approximately, between 1998 and 2009, second only to 1,936,000 incoming South Americans. The North African flow has both traditional (France, Germany and the Low Countries) and new destinations (Spain and Italy). The latest ones are responsible for the current enlargement of this immigrant community.

Figure 8. Latin American immigration. Main countries of origin. 2007



Source : EUROSTAT, 2007

Table 2: Latin American immigration to the EU

	Belgium (2003)	Germany (2007)	Spain (2007)	France (1999)	Italy (2005)	Netherlands (2007)	Portugal (2003)	Sweden (2007)	UK (2005)	Total
Ecuador	1276	4830	433032	780	53220	730	158	631		494657
Colombia	1280	10577	265878	5028	15843	2063	340	1750	22444	325203
Brazil	2025	32273	91955	7234	25823	4209	24864	1854	24628	214865
Bolivia	329	1979	204264	435	3637	226	36	767		211673
Peru	878	9498	105318	3135	53378	986	222	1701		175116
Argentina	367	4991	143573	2537	13720	571	517	466	2523	169265
Chile	1275	6300	41598	4206	3320	1068	226	8144	874	67011
Uruguay	81	667	46963	491	1575	88	89	283	0	50237
Paraguay	82	1123	47124	143	580	36	24	38		49150
Suriname	81	36	25	60	7	7561	4	3		7777
Guyana	26	104	22	35	23	191	24	25	2061	2511
<b>Total</b>	<b>7700</b>	<b>72378</b>	<b>1379752</b>	<b>24084</b>	<b>171126</b>	<b>17729</b>	<b>26504</b>	<b>15662</b>	<b>52530</b>	<b>1767465</b>

Source: EUROSTAT 2007.


**West Africans** are also to be considered, since they grew by more than half a million people during the same period, placing themselves as the third millionaire foreign community in Europe coming from another continent. West Africans are keeping their traditional destinations (France and the UK), but, recently, they are also moving to Spain and Italy. Eurostat (2009b) reports about 2,800,000 North Africans, 2,300,000 South Americans and 1,006,000 West Africans established in Germany, France, UK, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Greece, Sweden and Portugal.

Asians contributed to the outstanding growth of the foreign population in Europe in the last decade as well. **East Asians** (Chinese for the most part) arrived to Europe in big numbers (over 700,000 in 1998-2009). The same can be stated about **South Asians** (mostly Indians, Pakistanis and Sri Lankans), whose increment from 1998 till 2009, in the twelve above-mentioned countries, was close to 400,000 people, taking this foreign group over the one million mark.

Figures 9.1 to 9.6 illustrate the relative importance of the most current immigration flows in Europe (**Source: EUROSTAT, 2011**). The database on citizenship of foreign residents kept by Eurostat does not include yet information on France and the United Kingdom after 2005. This is the reason why the line corresponding to their series was not extended till 2009 in the following line charts.

When dealing with citizenship data (instead of country-of-birth information) we have to be aware of the significance of naturalization in Europe for the last ten years or so. It happens that more than 5.5 million people were naturalized in all EU member states in the 2001-2008 period (Eurostat, 2010). Normally, naturalization has a greater impact in the class of former foreign residents. Therefore, in figures 9.1

Figure 9.1. SOUTH AMERICAN RESIDENTS



**FIGURE 9.2. CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN RESIDENTS**




FIGURE 9.3. NORTH AFRICAN RESIDENTS




FIGURE 9.4. WEST AFRICAN RESIDENTS




FIGURE 9.5. EAST ASIAN RESIDENTS





FIGURE 9.6. SOUTH ASIAN RESIDENTS



to 9.6, the older migration currents appear somewhat underrepresented.

#### 4. Demographic and gender issues

There are important demographic and gender features that characterize current immigration to European countries. Such is the case of high demographic pressures in developing countries, as a result of high fertility rates, war and/or natural disasters. This situation coincides with the decline of birthrates in wealthy countries.

In addition, due to the progressive liberation of women, it is increasingly common to find women who migrate independently. The rights of immigrant women are very often seriously violated with impunity. Migrant women are subjects to much greater risks than men. Addressing this problem requires strict and uncompromised determination.

Let us look first at the major demographic outcomes of current immigration. If we take into account all the present EU member states (EU27), differences in age and gender structure between EU27 and immigrant populations are highly visible (EUROSTAT, 2006b). Under 20 years old, age cohorts do not differ much: while 23% of the native population is under the age of 20, only 20% of the immigrant population is that old. The differences become noticeably among young adults cohorts. For instance, while only 14% of the EU27 population is between the ages of 24 and 34, 22% of the immigrant population falls into that group. Even more noticeable are the differences in the group '65 years and more' (17% for EU27 natives and 9% for immigrants). Immigration, without a doubt, has meant **a rejuvenation of the European population**; but without a continuous influx, the population will age again since the fertility behavior of immigrants tends to mimic that of the established population. Regarding gender composition, all evidence suggests that the immigrants' male-female ratio is significantly higher than the natives'.

With the exception of France and Ireland, which have already a positive demographic rate, near generation replacement level, immigrants are undoubtedly helping to maintain or increase population growth rates in all EU countries. The UN (United Nations, 2000) has projected that in the absence of immigration, the EU countries and Japan will lose between 10 and 14% of their population between 2000 and 2050.

"In many states, migration is the main component of population change. Consider for example the role of labor migration on the sustainability of healthcare and pension systems in aging societies. The statistics published by Eurostat on these topics are also useful to check the socio-

economic inclusion of immigrants and the success of policies to prevent discrimination." (EUROSTAT, 2005, p.73)

Seven population projections have been recently published (Coleman, 2006; EUROSTAT, 2006a) for the 2004-2050 period, corresponding to different hypotheses about the evolution of fertility, mortality and migration rates. Out of the seven population projections, only the two that assume high levels of fertility and immigration achieve sustained population growth for the 2004-2050 period. On the other hand, without immigration the EU population will decrease in 2008. The immigration that we are witnessing will only delay the collapse of the EU population, but not prevent its occurrence. At least, this is the message of Eurostat (EUROSTAT, 2006a).

The projections not only compute the total EU population, but some parameters of its structure as well. This is the case of the dependency rate of older people (those 65 and older/population aged 15-64). In 2050, Spain could have nearly one person older than 65 for each active person –a very discouraging prospect. But the actual situation may be less dramatic since the projection assumes an average net immigration, while it is the case that great numbers of foreigners are coming to Spain. For the total population of the EU this baseline projection represents a loss of 7 million people and, more importantly, a loss of 52 million working population. It is clear then that immigration, by itself, does not assure a promising demographic future for Europe. The baseline projection simulates the entry of approximately 40 million persons into Europe throughout the projection period. Only those projections that consider the entry of 60 million, or more, assure maintenance of the European population by the middle of the 21st century. The greater part of this immigration is directed towards the countries of the EU15, but as we step further into the current century the new countries of the EU27 will receive more and more immigrants.

## **5. Labor market**

Within the globalization process, the internationalization of labor markets has had a great impact with respect to prices and salaries. If workers in one state have suspicions that the workers from elsewhere can move to find work in that state, they will reduce their wage demands and therefore lower the costs of production and costs to consumers. Immigration serves to regulate the pressure of demand for labor, containing increases in salary levels. Globalization of labor markets have had a visible effect in Europe and in other industrialized areas, which have been able to contain inflationary pressures produced by increases in energy costs and other factors of production.

## 5.1. Supply and Demand for Immigrants

Let us consider countries A and B, where 'A' offers higher salaries than 'B' for workers of a certain professional category. Country A has a more advanced technology, more capital per person, more human capital, more natural resources per worker, and a political and legal system more favorable to economic growth. Let us suppose that the costs of migration and settlement – including information costs – are reduced, while the salaries in Country A increase and those in Country B decrease.<sup>5</sup> In this situation, if the rate of return for investing in emigration is greater than the interest that individuals have to pay on loans received, there clearly exists an incentive for emigration.

In a world without legal barriers, migration will continue until the rate of return is less than the discount rate, when there is no marginal benefit for migrating from Country B to Country A. In terms of supply and demand, the difference in salaries between 'A' and 'B' will correspond to the number of persons who are ready to emigrate. In figure 10, the equilibrium takes place at  $(m_0, d_0)$ , i.e. at a  $m_0$  level of migration, corresponding to a  $d_0$  difference in salaries between 'A' and 'B'.

If there are legal barriers to immigration ( $m_1 < m_0$ ), aside from the law, the attractiveness of migration and the outflow from Country B towards Country A is maintained, while the  $d_1 - d_0$  quantity is positive. Illegal migration is a response to international labor markets constraints that prevent the free movement of the factors of production, including work.

We consulted recent historical series from the United Nations' International Labor Organization in order to assess the current salary differential between Spain and Latin America. We identified the most relevant information, which happened to correspond to the year 2001, and performed some transformations of the data from this source. In the first place, we had to write down all of the salaries using the same unit of measurement: the price of one hour of work. Then, we had to translate all salaries into euros, since this agency always publishes its results in the unit of currency of each country in question (table 3).

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<sup>5</sup> The immediate costs of migration, for example the price of an airline ticket and the time spent in moving, do not constitute the most significant costs of international migration. The greatest cost arises from leaving behind familiar people and places, settlement costs, the cost of not knowing the language, market, information and social networks of the destination, and the cost of acquiring these. All things being equal, it can be shown that emigrants choose destinations that minimize these costs, by developing, for instance, ethnic enclaves that are concentrations of immigrants. It is not that immigrants are more gregarious than the native-born but that they are seeking a mechanism for minimizing the costs of settling into the receiving society. These intangible costs, along with a high discount rate due to low salaries, explain why notable salary differences at the international and inter-regional scale continue to endure.

We were not able to find another year of full coverage for these countries, but we assume that the reader knows that this disequilibrium did not decline for the last seven years.

*Table 3: Salaries in Spain and some Latin American countries*

Country	Hour of work
Spain	9.02€
Argentina	4.73€
Brazil	2.84€
Chile	2.66€
Peru	0.95€

*Source: ILO-UN, 2001.*

The supply of illegal immigrants is a growing function of salary differences. The higher the supply of illegal immigrants is, the lower its cost and lowers the chances of being arrested and fined. In neighboring countries, such as Morocco and Spain, salary differences are growing while the costs of illegal immigration have dropped. Thereafter incentives for illegal immigration have increased. The magnitude of illegal immigration, given a salary differential, depends on the permeability of the border and the acceptance by the receiving society. The flow of illegal immigration can be somewhat controlled by a system of arrests and fines, as well as deportation. Another way to control the flow of illegal immigrants into a country is to fine the employers who hire them. In this way, the cost of employing illegal immigrants is immediately increased because of the additional risk involved.

Even while every human being has a right to emigrate from his own country, no person has the right to settle in any other particular country. On the other hand, up to now, countries have the right to manage the number and the characteristics of foreign immigrants seeking to settle within their territory. Countries have tried to control the demographic and cultural features of their own people, at least up until a certain point. Many developed countries favor the entry of persons with a historical, cultural, and ancestral patrimony that is similar to that of the natives – which can favor the process of integration.

There exist, therefore, political and economic reasons for controlling immigrant entries to a country. From the political point of view immigrants, whether they may vote or not, can become aligned in such a way as to change to some degree the power that existed before their arrival. Immigrants can provoke tensions of an economic sort when they do not “mesh” perfectly with the system that receives them. They can cause congestion in some niches, taking more from the system than they produce and provoke negative external reaction, etc.

## 5.2. Native-born workers

Does the arrival of foreign workers affect the median salary level in Spain at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? Is it a positive or negative effect? The analysis by Martin (2005) on the economic consequences of immigration on the USA in the mid-1990s, based on a previous work by Smith and Edmonston (1997), seems relevant (Cebrián y Vázquez, 2008b).

From an economic point of view, Smith and Edmonston (1997) report that immigration affects:

1. Employment of native-born
2. Salaries of native-born
3. International markets for goods and services
4. Rate of economic growth
5. Price of goods and services in the receiving country.



By using a basic economic model, Smith and Edmonston (1997) conclude that immigration produces a net economic gain for the receiving country:

1. Immigration increases the labor supply, as well as the production of new goods and services
2. The salaries of immigrants are lower than the total of the sale of their production
3. Immigrants accept less-desirable jobs than native-born, who can then be promoted.

For example, the authors showed a drop of 1% to 2% in salaries in the USA during the 1980s in niches occupied by immigrants. During this period, the labor mass (labor supply) increased by 4%.

The influence of immigration upon employment and salaries of the native-born tends to be distributed throughout the country without observable significant increases in the regions receiving more than the median amount of immigrants.

Martin explained (2005) how the displacements towards the right of the labor supply curve defined two rectangles and one triangle (figure 11). The first of the two rectangles “C” represented the salary mass that native-born workers ceased to receive because of the descent of salaries that was brought about by the arrival of immigrant workers. However, this money does not “evaporate”: it is transferred to the owners of capital and land in the form of greater benefits and profits. The area of rectangle “D” corresponds to immigrants’ salaries. The area of triangle “B” is the surplus of the consumer that is not employed in the retribution of capital or land. Since it deals with a generic benefit, which has repercussions for all of the native-born population of the destination country, it can be called the “net benefit of immigration”.



In the case we mention, by calculating the area of Triangle B the participation of the net benefit of immigration to a nation's wealth can be known.  $\text{Area}_B = 1/2 (P_0 - P_1) (X_1 - X_0) = 1/2 (0.4\$) \times (15,000,000 \text{ workers})$ . In percentages,  $\text{Area}_B = 1/2 (3\% \text{ decrease in the price of labor due to immigration}) \times (11\% \text{ participation of immigrant labor in the total USA labor force}) \times (70\% \text{ participation of the salaries of the USA Gross Domestic Product}) = 0.5 \times 0.03 \times 0.11 \times 0.7 = 0.5 \times 0.002 = 0.001 = 0.1\% \text{ del United States' GDP in 1997} = 0.1\% (8,000 \text{ billion dollars})$ . Therefore, for that date the net immigration benefit for the USA was US\$8 billion – an important figure in absolute terms.

From that point of view, it is postulated that a liberalization of international migration should generate gains for the world economy that are much greater than those derived from liberalizing international trade. As proof, Martin (2005) mentions that while trade barriers that still hinder free trade between some regions of the world can duplicate, at the most, the prices of products exchanged, the salaries of workers of a given category in some countries can become as much as 10 times greater than elsewhere.

International migration creates positive economic consequences because it permits a better allocation of man labor and makes possible an increase in production on a worldwide scale. Which individuals benefit from the general economics gains produced by the arrival of immigrants in a country? According to the most accepted economic theory, the benefits are distributed among the immigrants (their net income), the owners of capital and land, and the buyers of goods and services produced by immigrants. On the other hand, local workers tend to lose: their salaries tend to decrease and unemployment may increase.

Migrations benefit the immigrants and the country of destination, not necessarily the country left behind. Of course, there are serious doubts about whether migration, by itself, is an important factor in socio-economic convergence on our planet. Current labor migrations coexist with the progressive distancing of developed economies with respect to those of poor countries. The agrarian sector is very important in most poor countries. From that rural world emerges the most numerous contingent of emigrants towards the more fortunate countries either directly, or by stopping off first at one of its shambling cities. Meanwhile, these countries find it difficult to sell their agricultural products in developed countries, principally Europe, where agriculture is protected by subsidies and tariff barriers.

Sooner or later, what is left for the poorer countries is to allow their people to leave – with the hope that they will send money home if they find work in wealthy countries – or negotiate concessions with multinational corporations to build factories, or extract natural

resources, while exploiting the labor force that is left behind by migrants or comes from even poorer countries.



Contrary to the situation in the USA described by Martin (2005), in Spain the price of labor is not a function of supply, since salaries have risen moderately while the volume of the employed work force has grown substantially, as the empirical curve that results from the crossing of these variables shows (figure 12).

Therefore, in Spain, instead of a reduction in the price of labor as a result of the employment of many immigrants (v. supra, figure 12), we witnessed until the end of 2008 a rising demand for workers that stabilizes the price of labor. In technical terms, the labor supply in the labor market of Spain since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, up to the current recession, shows an infinite elasticity because it does not strictly depend upon its price. The arrival of workers from foreign countries is not modulated by variations in the price of labor within Spain, but by the enormous difference in salaries between Spain and the countries of origin. In other words: for an immigrant, it is a job and not necessarily the salary that is important (figure 13).

## **6. Immigrant labor integration**

Work with dignity promotes not only the worker but also his surroundings. Work constitutes the principal place for the integration of immigrants. The insertion of immigrants into the job market is worth all of the effort of crossing one or more national borders. The society left behind by immigrants, and the receiving society as well as their family, need a job market that has the necessary conditions for the integration of immigrants without having to suffer excessive trauma. Recent immigrants should be protected against job offers that are in violation of labor laws of the countries where they find themselves.

International immigration is not merely a private contract between an employer and a foreign employee. Immigration has a social dimension: the integration of immigrants, which can be accomplished by means of laws that fight racism and discrimination in the receiving country. Education and training are critical elements of integration and can be evaluated by looking at the results of education of immigrants and their offspring (recognition and validation of foreign diplomas, etc.). Young immigrants find it more difficult to begin working than their native-born counterparts. However, native-borns enter the job market later in life than immigrants, because their average education period lasts longer. The length of time spent in the receiving country is a positive integration factor. At the same time, the country and culture of the country of origin do not appear to be indifferent.



With an ageing population, the native labor pool will stagnate or even shrink in OECD countries over the next three decades. Therefore, the capacity for mobilizing all human resources at hand has become an economic challenge of the first magnitude. For reasons of social cohesion as well, in many developed countries it is imperative to facilitate the entry of foreign workers into the labor market. Governments must then adequately inform their citizens of the true costs and benefits of immigration and the justification of the political measures that are adopted. In this way, many stereotypes and fears about immigration can be avoided.

Increasingly, regardless of their marital status, women emigrate to find work in foreign countries. In Spain, this phenomenon is clearly evident among women of Latin American origin. In other communities, such as Moroccans, women may accompany a husband or join him after a few years, to work in the home and raise her children. But, independent from these differences, immigrant women work more outside of the home than European women do.

Domestic work is one of the more frequent occupations for immigrants. In Europe and Japan, the demand for domestic workers is rooted on the rise of female employment in the receiving countries, on changes in family structure and on population ageing. Hiring domestic workers is a very common practice to provide care for children and the elderly at home. In Greece, Italy, and Spain some 10% of foreign workers labor in homes. This sector is prone to irregular employment, since, until very recently, the usual procedures for recruiting domestic workers relied on personal and national/ethnic networks.

The number of self-employed immigrants is steadily growing. Sometimes, self-employment is a solution to a lack of employment by others. Whatever the cause, the truth is that this phenomenon is considered very positive. With few exceptions, self-employment – ethnic entrepreneurship – refers to the property of a small family business that fulfils the needs of an immigrant population. If the business prospers, family members can be substituted by fellow countrymen or nationals. There are many kinds of ethnic businesses, some of which require a sizeable initial investment. Restaurants and specialized or very economical shops attract compatriots and tourists since they are usually located in central areas that are more or less abandoned. According to OECD (2004) data, immigrant self employment has increased over the last five years in all member-states, with the exception of Belgium and France. Self employment among women is also growing among immigrants.

## 7. Migration Policies

As in so many other aspects, the EU is leading efforts to create a truly international migration policy. In a gathering of the Council of Europe in Tampere (1999), four fundamental points related to asylum and immigration policy in Europe were laid down: 1) treaties with countries of origin; 2) fair treatment of citizens of third countries; 3) the management of migration flows; and 4) a common platform for the treatment of refugees. Moreover, Article 13 of the Cotonou Treaty, signed in Benin with 77 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), summarizes the characteristics of sustainable migration policies: a) guaranteeing fundamental rights to legal immigrants and avoid all discrimination; b) supporting economic and social development of less-favored partners, including training of ACP professionals in the EU and the teaching of ACP students in the EU; c) establishing a common front against irregular immigration and exploitation, while articulating the re-admission of repatriated irregular immigrants. At Seville in 2002, the Council of Europe issued recommendations for the integration of political asylum policies in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951.

While the supra-national organizations, such as the EU, get involved even more in the management of migration, regional and municipal governments are playing a fundamental role in the processes of immigrant integration. European regional parliaments are investing millions of euros in funding the integration of foreigners: the Autonomous Community of Madrid, for example, approved the spending of 4.5 million euros on integration projects for the 2004-2008 period). It is a fact too, that regions want to decide upon the admission of foreigners. Some governments want to channel international migration, especially highly skilled immigrants towards regions other than the larger urban centers, and thereby stimulate local development. It is debated whether or not the excessive concentration of immigrants in large urban areas is a cause of excessive ethnic segregation. It can be affirmed that the concentration of immigrants in large urban zones generates undesired pressures upon the public social services while creating negative external reaction (OECD 2005).

Migration towards Europe is an unstoppable process that relates to profound socioeconomic and demographic dynamics. When the demographic vacuum can only be filled with persons of a different mentality, it can be understood that it is necessary to establish certain principles of cooperation between all the states, regions, and individuals involved. For instance, if there are groups of immigrants who, without abandoning any element of their identity or customs of their country of origin, are trying to negotiate their presence in the receiving society as ethnic, racial, or religious minorities, it is urgent to set into place political measures and popular consciousness that would secure the

harmonious integration of the immigrant population, beyond those merely opposing the evils of racism and xenophobia.

It is necessary to issue integration policies, but not the ones that are totally rigid and inflexible. The freedom of people and the creativity of future generations will find solutions that, for us, are impossible to imagine.

## **8. Spanish Coda**

Up to the current recession, immigration in Europe, and especially in Spain, has increased the size of the work force and has introduced a greater flexibility and dynamism in the labor market. As a result of immigration over six years Spain has increased its population by an amount equal to the entire population of Ireland. Spain has attracted immigrants because of its uninterrupted growth over more than 12 years. Foreign residents have been responsible for 100% of the growth of the active population of Spain between 2001 and 2006. In addition, the immigrant population has a higher rate of employment than that of the native-born. As a result of these two phenomena, affirmed the governor of the Bank of Spain (Fernández Ordóñez, 2007), immigration to Spain has been responsible for a third of GDP growth since the beginning of the century. This proportion would be even greater if there were taken into account certain indirect effects of the arrival of immigrants, which could be a greater participation of Spanish women in the labor market, resulting from the employment of immigrants in the care of the infants, the elderly and the sick.

The arrival of immigrants acts as a cushion for the rise in salaries that typically takes place in periods of economic growth. Besides, since immigrants move more easily than the native-born, they facilitate the adjustment of the labor force to changes in the structural conditions of the labor market. Periods of more intense and prolonged economic growth can be maintained, if proper migration policies are formulated. In the words used by Kofi Annan to the European Parliament, “If immigrants need to come to Europe, Europe needs these immigrants. If Europe closes itself off, it will be less caring, poorer, weaker, and older”. The right management of the phenomenon of migration favors social and economic stability and aids in controlling possible inflationary episodes.

In Spain, between 1996 and 2004, some 450,000 foreigners were “regularized” in several government campaigns. In 2005, some 600,000 people were “normalized” with the conditions of having an employment contract and registration into the social security system. In order to avoid these amnesties in the future, the Spanish government has decided upon contracting workers in their place of origin as a more common method of obtaining a residence permit for Spain. Some

200,000 obtained it by this method in 2007. For contracting workers, Spain has made agreements with Colombia, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Morocco, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, and Mauritania. It has also signed agreements on pilot programs with El Salvador, Honduras and Argentina, as well as Senegal and the Philippines.

Despite these initiatives towards establishing order, illegal immigration persists. In some cases, it has taken a dramatic turn such as the arrival of Sub-Saharan Africans in the Canary Islands in frail watercraft from the shores of Mauritania and Senegal. In 2006, more than 31,000 immigrants used this route. In 2007, the number dropped to 12,000 following the reinforcement of vigilance on the African shore provided by the FRONTEX forces of the European Union. With respect to the total number of “undocumented” residents in Spain, numbers ranging from 300,000 to 500,000 are estimated.

### **9. Epilogue. European unemployment during the current recession (2008-2011)**

To facilitate comparisons, four EU countries with the largest population and economic weight (Germany, France, UK and Italy) were selected, along with three other countries that, together with Spain, are part of the European periphery (Greece, Portugal and Ireland). The unemployment rates of these eight countries declined, with some exceptions, over the period 2001-2007, reaching during the final year the 8% figure, although some countries had rates well below this value (Ireland, less than half; Italy, 6% ; UK, just over 5%). After 2007, however, there were three very different groups: In countries with greater weight, unemployment rates hover around 8% (Germany 7.4%, France 9.3%, UK 7.7%, and Italy 8.5%); in Greece (10%), Portugal (10%), Ireland (11.8%) unemployment rates grew significantly and, finally, **in Spain, the unemployment rates soared (18%)**. The Spanish Statistical Bureau (INE) published 4.32 million people unemployed (1.12 million more than a year before) for the fourth quarter of **2009** –a **19% unemployment rate**. According to the same source, in 2009, the sector most affected by unemployment has been the construction sector, where the number of jobs falls by 378,100 people (-17.34%). In decreasing order appear the industrial sector (361,700 people: -11.89%), services (449,900 people: -3.25%) and agriculture (21,200 people: -2.64%).

Following the severe contraction of the European labor market, explicit (and implicit) policies have been made for discouraging the arrival of new foreign workers that, for the time being, would not find suitable employment in Europe: for instance, temporarily requiring the condition of having a job offer for those positions that currently don't require it. In other cases, governments have taken steps to present cyclical migrations more attractive to immigrants: that would allow workers to

return to their countries of origin in times of economic slowdown, while they would return to host countries in times of economic prosperity. Labor market controls have been established to help both low-skilled native workers, and immigrants already settled in the host country. Most EU countries, like UK, have also tightened the criteria for admission, revising and raising the point's admission system, especially for unskilled workers, thereby restricting their entry. In the case of highly skilled workers, a master's degree and a minimum £20,000 salary are required. Other European countries have taken more radical measures. Italy passed legislation criminalizing illegal immigration and preventing unauthorized migrants from accessing public services. In addition, civilian patrols assisting the police regarding illegal immigration were authorized. France, meanwhile, has conducted a series of raids against illegal employment, in order to move irregular jobs to unemployed legal workers.

The Czech Republic, like Spain, is offering a series of economic benefits to some foreign workers, in exchange for their promise of no returning for some period of time or even indefinitely. In an economic recession it is more than reasonable the effort of trying to counter the inertia of migration flows, that were set in a totally different situation. However, just the expulsion or forced return of immigrants already installed in Europe would be a disproportionate, arbitrary, and ultimately impoverishing measure. Europe needs most of the people who have moved into its territory in the last twenty years, contributing to its demographic, economic and sociocultural growth. Eventually, all these programs have had little success, because of the benefits and advantages of staying, despite being unemployed, are much higher than those found in their home countries.

For its part, the United Kingdom and France are experimenting with a variation of this concept: providing help to immigrants even before they arrive. Thus, both governments announced in July 2009 that would offer a plane ticket back home, 2,000 Euros in cash, and support and advice for relocation, to those immigrants who, being in Calais waiting to enter illegally in the United Kingdom, would desire so.

European immigration froze from the very moment the global recession affected the most dynamic countries in the sub-continent. It is likely that it will resume once the recession is over. Meanwhile, nobody wants to leave Europe, figuring out new strategies<sup>6</sup> to survive until the recovery from the crisis takes place.

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<sup>6</sup> Some foreign workers move from construction to agriculture, domestic service and services to face economic crisis, looking for new employment opportunities. Immigrant families went back to home-sharing, as is way to cut down expenses in the host country. There is evidence, too, that some immigrants are helped to stay by their family members in their country of origin (López-Sala and Ferrero-Turrión, 2011).

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