Moroccan associationism in ethnical and sexual vindications: women and feminisms, Amazighs and social visibility

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the vitality of Moroccan associationism in two identity vindications - sexual (women) and ethnical (Amazigh). These vindications have clearly materialized in the politics of the State at the beginning of the 21st century: women obtained a Family Code reform and the Amazighs some measures aimed at protecting their culture.

Keywords: associationism, women, feminism, Amazigh, Morocco.

Introduction

In Moroccan society, as in other Maghreb countries, there have been areas where associative movements concerning sexual (women) and ethnical (Amazigh) identity have appeared and crystallized, especially after the arrival of colonial Independence. The objective of this paper is to describe the vitality and dynamism of this country and also to analyze how the collective vindications have materialized politically in the Moroccan State.

In the case of women, they used the associations to favour their legal vindications (Daoud 1993). The difference in opinion regarding the changes to be made in the law during the 80s and 90s, and the coverage given by the mass media openly siding with one option or the other, propitiated the appearance of two kinds of feminism: Islamicizing feminism and emancipatory feminism. The former obtained a clear victory with the recent reform of the


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Mudawana (Family Code) in 2004.

In the case of the Amazighs, they have become more socially visible in recent years (Goodman 2004, Venema and Mguild 2003). The State has recently recognized their ethnic specificity, and this recognition has resulted in promotion of the Amazigh language, which is now being used in a few schools, the support of some of the media and the creation of an institution to preserve and promote this culture, the *Institut Royale de la Culture Amazighe* (Aixelà and Giralt 2005). As we will see, this strong Amazigh movement is sowing the seeds of small cultural associations in urban and rural areas throughout the country.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the vindications of both types of associations have been influenced and strengthened by such elements as:
- The associative vitality of the postcolonial period,
- The influence of other Maghrebian networks,
- The influence of small social networks and associations established in Europe, and
- The international pressure of different organizations.

**Women and feminisms**

The historical invisibility of women in the politic arena

The presence and visibility of many women in the associative and sociopolitical Moroccan sphere nowadays illustrates the important transformation that the country has undergone in the 20th century.

Their historical invisibility in the political sphere had been wrongly related to women’s incapacity to take part in the decisions of the family group and, by extension, of society as a whole. In fact, this perception and interpretation of the nonexistent mobility and social influence of Moroccan women, assumed also by some Moroccans and Europeans, was perceivable at the end of the 19th century and has continued up to the present day.

On the one hand, for travelers in the 19th century and colonizers of the 20th

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3 See the list of associations at the end of this paper.
century, the situation of inferiority and subordination of women in Morocco was proof of the cultural backwardness of the country, and this opinion is still held by numerous Europeans nowadays\(^4\). In the opinion of the majority this situation was provoked by an Islam that was characterized by patriarchal values (discourse influenced by the precursory work of Robertson-Smith). On the other hand, for the political leaders and Moroccans that fought for Independence (and also for different political parties in the postcolonial period), women were one of the triggers that could activate the socioeconomic take off of the country\(^5\), an idea that would be accompanied by sociopolitical reforms but that, in reality, was only partially fulfilled\(^6\).

Despite these historical positions on women’s status in Morocco, the feminine and feminist associations have recently obtained changes in the law that ameliorates their legal situation (obviously with the help of the population and some political parties).

The Moroccan Law: the aim of Feminine and Feminist Associations

Initially, in the 50s, the associative women’s movements were more feminine than feminist: their objectives were to do charity work, guarantee education for girls, and control early marriage (for example, the association *Ijwan as-Safa*).

Then, in the late 60s, a part of the feminine associationism declared itself

\(^4\) For example, travellers of the XIX century such as Domènec Badia i Leblich (1803-5), Estébanez Calderón (1844), Joaquin Gatell (1862), Cristóbal Benítez (1878) and Enrique D’Almonte (1906). Also, some ethnologists of French legal sociology at the end of the XIX century and beginning of the XX century such as C. Sabatier, M. E. Mercier, A. Hanoteau, A. Letourneux, G. Salmon, L. Milliot, A. M. Goichon, M. Morand, M. Gaudry, R. Vigier, and G. Laoust-Chartréaux. All of them repeated constantly the backwardness discourse of the Maghreb centered on women's status. For more information, see Martín Corrales (2002) and Aixelà (2000).

\(^5\) Lalla Aisha, daughter of Mohamed V and sister of Hassan II (Mohamed VI’s father), became the symbol of Muslim women in the colonial period. During a protest speech of her father’s in Tangier on 11 April 1947 she removed her veil and addressed the audience in three different languages on the necessity of educating women for the rebirth of Morocco. This made a great impression throughout the Arab world: “our sultan, *may God bless him*...*hopes that all women will persevere in their education. They are the proof of our rebirth and the driving force behind our reform programme* “ (Daoud, 1993:250).

\(^6\) Proof of this was the fact that the Family Code, Mudawana, was passed between 1957 and 1858. Despite the proposals put forward by various feminine associations, the code maintained the dependence of women within the family sphere. Timid reforms were made to the Mudawana in 1993 during Hassan II’s reign, but it was not until 2004 when greater amendments were made to equate the rights of men and women within the family sphere.
feminist and claimed that the priority was to transform the Family Code, Mudawana. This code bound women within the family sphere where they were dependent upon their masculine relatives. This demand for changes in the law opened the debate on the limits of feminine liberation, and this led to the breakdown of the previous associative consensus. The split in feminine associationism provoked the emergence of feminist associative movements. Thus, emerged the Progressist Union of Moroccan Women (1962), an organization that defended feminine emancipation with a renewed message, less identified with the Islamic conception of women. To compensate for the important influence of this association, another organization was created, closely related to the monarchy and the State, called the National Union of Moroccan Women (1969). This second association also defended the need for some changes to be made in the feminine reality, but based on different kinds of concepts such as authenticity or difference. This association's intention was to define the limits of the legal transformations (Waterbury, 1975).

At this point, the discourses on the feminine question in Morocco split into two major feminist sections, with divergent social aims: on the one hand, Islamicizing feminism and, on the other, emancipatory feminism. There were important differences in their contents but both converged in the kind of structures used to carry on their work (associations), the methodology (meetings and debates) and the element that should be preserved or transformed (the legal frame).

The vindications of the two types of feminists, apparently either in favor or against the Islamic sociolegal system, proposed the affirmation of women within the place reserved for them in the family structure (Islamicizing feminism) or renunciation of those priority tasks reserved for them in the family (emancipatory feminism). This was the reason why their vindications never tried to affirm or negate their respect for Islam (despite the difference in their ideological construction) but accepts or rejects an authenticity given by kinship and transmitted by gender (Aixelà 2000).

The associationism of Islamicizing feminism and emancipatory
feminism

Islamicizing feminists constructed a discourse on their feminine identity affirmation with the support of two criteria: the difference between the sexes and cultural authenticity, a fact that allowed them to defend women as wives and mothers. These movements, like a great part of Moroccan society, considered that the changes in the feminine status would profoundly change the cultural specificity of Islam. In their opinion, Islam gave society: 1) a sex identity with a sexual division of activities based on complementariness; 2) a solid religious basis; 3) a complete socio-legal code. The objective of Islamicizing feminism was the affirmation of women in Islam and it used the feminist vindication to defend a femininity established within the private and family sphere. The main objective was to preserve Muslim society (Aixelà 2002b).

The veil would have a special symbolism: it made Islam visible, it manifested a political opinion, it was a social strategy of vindication, and it implied a specific socialization mode. The veil was the symbol of sociopolitical liberation, the way to express the affirmation of one's own identity7.

On the contrary, the emancipatory feminists assumed that Moroccan women had to be liberated from the “patriarchal society”. Their vindications were based on the concept of equality that allowed them to discuss all the aspects that potentially discriminated women in the labor market, in the political sphere or in family life. This type of feminism founded their vindications in the well-known universal women rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The main objective of emancipatory feminism was to review and change the daily life of Moroccan women and to liberate them from their historical subordination. For this, they took as their base “sexual equality”, a concept that rejected feminine discrimination, and based their emancipatory discourse on the concepts “democracy” and “citizenship”. The proposal brought them into conflict with the State and also with the other feminist sectors. The emancipatory sector considered that the State had broken its post colonial promise of feminine emancipation, and that the other feminist movements had wrongly interpreted

Islam. Emancipatory feminism also lacked the complicity of society as a whole because a great part of the population considered that some transformations in women’s status would imply social changes in the Islamic model. This explains why these associations fought alone, without the support of the State or the society (Aixelà 2002b).

Moroccan feminism since the profound reform of Mudawana in 2004. The Islamist silence

The expansion of Islamism in the 70s influenced the proposals made by the feminist associative organizations (Zeghal 2006, Charrad 2001, Daoud 1993, Garon 2004). The Islamists had included women in their discourses of Islamic authenticity, and made clear their position on the controversy surrounding whether or not the Family Codes should be amended. This attitude provoked the emergence of a socio-cultural discourse that was impossible to dissociate from a specific gender construction. We can see this in other countries like Saudi Arabia or Algeria. Khalidi and Tucker (1996:12) pointed out that “The Quran, hadith, and shari’a, then, provide a textual basis for understanding the Islamic view of gender... There is no one orthodox version of gender in Islam, a reality well reflected in the debates of the Arab world today about what, exactly, Islam prescribes as far as gender difference is concerned. Further complicating the discourse about gender in recent years has been the emergence of Islamist movements in the political scene of the region... they tend to subscribe to a restrictive view of women’s activities”. In fact, an Islamist agenda existed centered on women’s reality as Haddad and Smith (1996:137) pointed out: “Islamism, often called political Islam, has clearly placed the issue of the roles and rights of women at the center of its agenda. The rhetoric of Islamist teaching, speaking, and writing makes it abundantly clear that the ways in which women act, dress and comport themselves are crucial in the reconstitution of a

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8 The Saudi Arabian case is well synthesized by M. Yamani (2000) and Raphaeli (2005). For the Algerian case, Turshen (2004:130) said that “With the end of the worst of the violence and as the Islamist threat subsides, Algerian women are emerging from a difficult period and feminists are again mobilizing to reform the Family Code”. For more Algerian information, read also Pérez Beltrán (2004, 2006), Seperdjeli (2004), and Imache and Nour (1994).
new and authentically Islamic society… Secularist and liberal Muslims tend to agree with the Western perception that Islamist positions in regard to women are regressive and represent a significant loss of rights gains for women through the hard-fought battles of the twentieth century”.

With these antecedents, the 2004 Reform of the Mudawana, although endorsed by all the political parties, took four years to materialize (López Enamorado 2004). When it was finally approved, king Mohamed VI obtained the agreement of all the political forces in an effort to share the political risks and seek a global engagement with Moroccan society. In this way, he counteracted the strong social pressure and mobilization of the population in 2001 (the two big public demonstrations held in Rabat and Casablanca)9.

This controversy allows us to observe some of the keys that explain the historical difficulties of Moroccans in making a profound reform of the Mudawana -and also of other Family Codes in the Arabic-Muslim world-: historically there existed an identification between “Muslim women” and “Muslim culture”.

Undoubtedly, the political identifications established in cultural identity terms had put the continuity of Islam in the hands of a nationalistic and conservative politician who defended the relation between the sexual complement (women as wives and mothers, and men as family protectors) and preservation of Islamic values (especially as regards religion and law). This discourse disapproved of sexual equality because it did not appear to be incorporated in the Koranic text (Aixelà 2000, 2006). In any case, the 2004 reform of the Mudawana gave women more extensive legal rights based on sexual co-responsibility10. This was a success for the historical feminine and feminist associationisms.

At the same time, analysis of the amendments being made nowadays to the

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10 However, it must be said that some problems have arisen in the application of the new law because the judges sometimes construe it conservatively and do not apply the amendments. This question was brought up by various intellectuals and politicians in the meeting “Femme et future” organized by Al-Andalus Centre of Martil in April 2006, in which Latifa Benani (Istiqlal Party), Mohamed Sasi (Unified Socialist Party) and Basima Hakkaoui (Justice and Development Party) participated. Regarding the treatment of women in Islamic law, Z. Yamani (2002) and Tohidi (2003) are recommended.
Family Codes by the different Arab-Muslim countries is of great interest, because they can be understood in two ways:
- as the decline of a gender construction based on Islamic parameters (Moors 1999), or
- as the dissociation of women from the affirmation of a collective Arab-Muslim identity (Aixelà 2006).

**Amazighs and social visibility**

**Some characteristics of Amazigh people**

The Amazighs (Berbers) are an ethnic group originating from North Africa. In Morocco there are around 12 million Amazighs. The cultural distance between Arabs and Amazighs is not so very great. Basically it could be said to be centered on questions of linguistics, law, gender and space.

The linguistic diversity of Amazighs is notable, which makes standardization of the language difficult. Tamazight is a language of Camitic Semitic origin, which has never been written down systematically but transmitted orally. Nonetheless, there is proof of the existence of this language in the form of Tifinagh writing dating back approximately 6,000 years. Today the different dialects spoken in the Amazigh area include Tarifit, Tashelhit, Kabyle, Chaoui, Mozabi and Tuareg (Aixelà and Giralt, 2005).

The Amazigh common law, urf, was transmitted orally from generation to generation and perpetuated in most of the tribes. It was a kind of justice imparted by the jama’a or tribal assembly represented by a group of men, usually elders. This local legislative body, which varied within the Amazigh groups of the same country, coexisted with the fiqh or Islamic Law in the Amazigh social system until the legal homogenisation carried out by the independent state in the middle of the 20th century.

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11 There are almost 20 million Amazighs in North Africa and the territory they occupy embraces Egypt to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to the borders of Sub-Saharan Africa. For more information, see Aixelà and Giralt (2005).
12 More information on this relation may be found in the book by Gellner and Micaud (1973).
13 This paper rejected other bases used to explain the difference between Arabs and Amazighs such as religion (the differentiation between orthodox and heterodox Islam) or politics (bilas assiba and bilad al-majzem). Nowadays these grounds are not applicable (Aixelà 2000).
The Amazigh gender share similarities with the Arab gender, since, in both, the priority activities for women are marriage and motherhood. Nevertheless, Amazigh women have greater social visibility and greater mobility outside the domestic sphere. This difference is less when Amazigh women migrate to urban areas: there they are more restricted due to the public space and make use of the veil (hijab) as a means of going unnoticed. As Mernissi explained (1975:122-123): "...this phenomenon [the voluntary use of the veil by Amazigh women] may be easily understood if one remembers that for women from a rural society who are newcomers to a town, the veil is a sign of mobility, the expression of their new status as town dwellers".

Finally, it should be mentioned that most Moroccan Amazighs lived in the Rif, the Middle Atlas, the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas and Sous, while the cities were occupied basically by Arabs (Rosen, 1984). The migration that took place after Independence¹⁴ has meant that nowadays there is a high degree of coexistence of the two ethnic groups in towns and cities¹⁵.

The Arabization process: the homogenization of the Amazigh in the postcolonial period

After Independence in 1956, the national identity of Morocco was founded in the Arabic identity and in Islam. The preamble to the Moroccan Constitution of 4 September 1992 states that "Le Royaume du Maroc, Etat musulman souverain, dont la langue officielle est l'arabe, constitue une partie du Grand Maghreb Arabe".

The politics of the government propitiated a cultural homogenization that affected the Amazigh group. It was a process whose objective was to reduce, and if this was not possible disregard, the cultural differences between the major groups, Arabs and Amazighs. This Arabization was also possible because the percentage of Amazigh population in Morocco was less than that

¹⁴ A specific example of Amazigh migrations in the postcolonial period is that of Sefrou where, in 1960, 56.2% of the population were Muslims who had been born in the city. In 1971, the percentage had fallen to 52.8%, of which over half were Amazighs from the Middle Atlas and the Rif (Rosen, 1984:15).

¹⁵ Chaker (1989) denounced the systematic invisibility of the Berbers in Maghrebian towns and cities to the benefit of the Arab majority.
of the Arab population: in the late 1950s it was almost 35%, a figure that did not change until the late 1990s (33%) according to official data.

This Arabization was carried out in different ways. First, the urf was eliminated from social practice. When Morocco gained its Independence, the State approved a Family Code, the Mudawana, inspired by Arab-Muslim sources (Koran and fiqh), that would replace the Amazigh common law that Amazigh people used in the past. The changes that this new legislation imposed on the Amazighs were, for example, that the polygynous marriage was envisaged (originally they were monogamous) and that women were denied certain grounds for divorce (for example, incompatibility). Second, the State imposed the Arabic language, which was used in all public spheres (administration, media, etc.), as the official language throughout the country, and forbade the use of any of the three Amazigh languages: Tarifit, Tamazight, and Tashilhit. Third, schooling was carried out in Arabic, not in Amazigh. In fact, as was explained by F. Valderrama (1948a, 1948b), access to schooling, even before colonial occupation, was limited to those who started Islamic studies. This consisted in teaching basic literacy based on memorising the Koran in classic Arabic (fusha), without considering whether the students were Arabs or Amazighs and whether they understood what they were learning. The invisibility of the Amazigh tongue in education continued throughout the 20th century.

The result of the cultural homogenization was that the postcolonial Moroccan state rejected the possibility of constructing a nation-state capable of integrating the ethnical diversity, and thus missed an historical opportunity to integrate all the population in a common social project.

This social map of the position of Amazigh culture in the Moroccan State allows us to see religious Islam as the true axis on which a more global Moroccan identity was constructed. Islam “solved” the difficult problem of the recognition of “others”, the Amazighs: it is the main source of social cohesion in Moroccan society.

17 For information on the religions professed by Moroccan youth, see El Ayadi (2000).
18 For Rosen (1984:26), the cultural differences between Arabs and Amazighs are less important than other social scientists said: "earlier it was noted that Moroccans distinguish
Amazigh associationism nowadays: Amazighs and their political visibility

In the last five years, the Amazigh vindication has taken on great significance in some Maghreb countries, especially Morocco and Algeria. The term “Amazigh” is being used to express their social vindications and try to consolidate a “pan-Amazigh” identity, with historical, cultural and linguistic basis throughout North Africa.

The elements that gave rise to the Amazigh vindications are diverse but the most relevant reasons are probably the State's attitude forcing the Arabization of Morocco, relegating the Amazigh language and culture to territory outside the kingdom, and denying Amazighs their visibility in the social sphere (Chaker, 1998; Goodman, 2004; Aixelà, 2002a)\(^\text{19}\). The rebound effect has been the revitalization of Amazigh self-consciousness that favored the emergence of numerous Amazigh associations\(^\text{20}\) within and outside the Maghreb frontiers. Algeria showed a relevant dynamism more notorious than the Moroccan in the 80s and 90s.

The external influence, especially of associations that are established in foreign countries, is important. Kastoryano (2000:307-8) pointed out that: “International migration has given rise to emerging communities which may be described as ‘transnational’. This term refers to communities made up of individuals or groups, settled in different national societies, sharing common interests and references –territorial, religious, linguistic- and using transnational networks to consolidate solidarity beyond national boundaries (Faist, 1998). The emergence of transnational communities is a ‘global phenomenon’, principally concerning post-colonial immigration. Immigrants are involved in

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\(^\text{19}\) There were different social tensions in Morocco and Algeria with Amazigh people between April and May 2001 that could be explained by the attitude in the postcolonial period of ignoring them. But the tensions on this matter are recent. The social invisibility of Amazigh people was not problematic in the past. K. Brown (1976:5) described the peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Jews, Arabs and Berbers in his study on the city of Salé: "the city acted as a focal point of integration. Even when ethnic identities began to assume some importance with the increased immigration that followed the establishment of the protectorate, social fragmentation and conflict remained minimal".

\(^\text{20}\) See the list of associations at the end of this paper.
networks based on economic interests, cultural exchanges, social relations and political affiliations. Their actions are de-territorialized...”. At the same time, other external support received should be mentioned such as, on the one hand, that given by the European and especially the French press, with examples such as Le Monde or the France-Press Agency, and on the other, the support of human rights associations such as Amnesty International or the International League of Human Rights21.

Finally, new voices demanded a revision of the percentage of the Amazigh population, thinking that a higher percentage22 could legitimize two vindications: protection of the Amazigh language and culture, and reconstruction of the national identity using both ethnic identities, Arab and Amazigh.

All this led Morocco to initiate recently a new policy on Amazigh culture. It was a surprising change in the treatment given by the Moroccan state to the Amazigh specificity: King Mohamed VI reconsidered the question and decided to give more social visibility to this ethnic group. The government has implemented resources and has opened different lines of action. The most interesting ones are schooling in Amazigh in 367 schools23 and the creation of the Institut Royal de la Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) directed by Ahmed Boukouss. Although this institution may counteract the associative vitality of the Amazighs and even neutralize it, at the moment, it is doing some interesting work on the recuperation and promotion of Amazigh culture. It is possible that the policies activated by the Moroccan state will try to control the Amazigh movement, but it seems that consolidation of the Amazigh identity cannot be stopped, due in part to the Algerian influence, and also to the support received from transnational communities established in Europe. Kastoryano (2000:307-8) gave us a frame: The emergence of transnational communities is also a post-national phenomenon… It is the chosen identity –linguistic, religious, regional-that constitutes a basis for transnational organization. Transnational organization allows the immigrant populations to escape national policies, and

22 For Chaker (1980:9-10), the percentage of Moroccan Amazigh population was 40%, probably 50% in the 1980s.
23 Boukouss (2005).
generates a new space of socialization for immigrants involved in building networks beyond national borders (Appadurai 1996, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Hannerz 1996). The cultural and political specificities of national societies (host and home) are combined with emerging multilevel and multinational activities in a new space beyond territorially delimited nation-states, inevitably questioning the link between territory and nation-state”.

Conclusions: the vitality of sexual and ethnic associationism and achievement of social objectives

The objective of this paper was to show the dynamism of associationism in Moroccan societies. As we have seen, this associationism has amalgamated two of the most important social vindications of the population, the sexual and the ethnical, and has obtained clear results in Mohamed VI's reign.

In this success, the associative vitality of the postcolonial period, the influence of other Maghrebian networks and of the small social networks established in Europe, as well as the international pressure exerted by different organizations have all played a fundamental role.

However, we should also mention other factors that also contributed to the new position adopted by the Moroccan monarchy and government towards these vindications (changing the Mudawana or making the Amazigh collective more visible): international politics, the relation between terrorism and Islamism and the image of Islam in foreign countries. It seems that Morocco wants to present itself as a society capable of being Muslim, while at the same time respecting both women's rights and “minority” rights. However, there is no doubt that associationism has played an important role in the achievement of these goals.

Listing of Moroccan Associations

Feminine and Feminist Associations in Morocco, 2007 (Selection)

Action Femmes Juristes
AFZA pour le Dévelopement, l'Environnement et le Culture
Agrd ntqudar
Al Houda pour le Dévelopement, la Culture et la Solidarité
ALDOS
Aspirations féminines
Association Al-Misbah
Association Al-Mouassat
Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc
Association de la Renaissance Féminine
Association des Femmes de Carrières Juridiques
Association Marocaine des Femmes Progressistes
Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes
Association Marocaine de Planification Familiale
Association Marocaine pour la Promotion de l’Entreprise Féminine
Association Solidarité Féminine
Collectif Marocaine des Journalistes Professionnelles
Fédération des Femmes de Carrières Libérales et Commerciales
Ligue Démocratique des Droits de la Femme
Ligue Nationale des Femmes Fonctionnaires dans le Secteur Public et le Secteur Privé
Secteur Féminin de Al-Adl Wa-l-Ihsan
Union de l’Action Féminin
Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines

Amazigh Associations in Morocco, 2007 (Selection)
Tafsut Association
Recherche Culturelle et Educatif Association
Aourir Association
Tiwitza tagadirt aabadu Association
Culturelle Azekka Association
Tamesna Association
Culturelle Sous Association
Tizi Association
Bouya Association
Culturelle Nokour Association
Numidia Association
Tidukla Association
Asafar Association
Culturelle Asirem Association
Toudert Association
Tilelli Association
Fazaz Association
Culturelle Asenflul Association
Asid Association
Tamount Association
Tanukra Association
AMEJ Association
Al hiwar attakafi Association
Culturelle Ilmas Association
In Umazigh Association
Izuran Association
Azmez Association
Yugurtha Association
Izuran n Tamunt Association
AMREC Association
Tamaynut Association
Masinissa Association

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IMACHE, D.; NOUR, I.  

KASTORYANO, Riva  

KHALIDI, Ramla; TUCKER, Judith  

KASRIEL, Michèle  

KICH, Aziz (Dir.)  

LIE, Suzanne Stiver; VOGT, Kari  

LOPEZ ENAMORADO, Lola  

MARTÍN CORRALES, Eloy  

MOORS, Annelies  

MOTAHARI, Mortada  
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