BAECULA. AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LOCATION OF A BATTLE OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 1

JUAN P. BELLÓN, FRANCISCO GÓMEZ Cabeza, ARTURO RUIZ, MANUEL MOLINOS, ALBERTO SÁNCHEZ, LUIS GUTIÉRREZ, CARMEN RUEDA, LAURA WIÑA, Mª ANTONIA GARCÍA, ANA L. MARTÍNEZ, CARMEN ORTEGA, GEMA LOZANO & ROSA FERNÁNDEZ

The Andalusian Centre for Iberian Archaeology (Centro Andaluz de Arqueología Ibérica) carried out the Project: Batallas, Acciones, Escenarios: el desarrollo de la Segunda Guerra Púnica en el Alto Guadalquivir in 2001–2003 in the framework of the Research Support Programme of the University of Jaén (Plan de Ayuda para el Fomento de la Investigación de la Universidad de Jaén). The project was intended as a revision of the locations where this war took place, specifically the sieges of Iliturgi, Biguerra, Munda and Auringis (214 AD), the battles of Castulo and Ilorci (212–211 BC), the battle of Baecula (208 BC), the battle of Orongis (207 BC), the destruction of Iliturgi, and the fall of Castulo (206 BC).

The approach consisted of a thorough review of the Roman sources (mainly Polybius and Livy2), and a complex strategy of selective surface surveying according to the elements which are mentioned in the sources and which could help identify the major locations. This approach overcomes old interpretation patterns based on toponymic similarity which are not supported by archaeological evidence and which noticeably disagree with the Roman sources as regards the descriptions of the locations mentioned.

The results obtained can be classified as two major groups: one being the broad confrontation strategy of the powers involved in two distinct stages, the other being the location of the battle of Baecula, near the town of Santo Tomé (Jaén). The archaeological indicators match, topographically, Polybius’3 and Livy’s4 descriptions. These indicators also yield an amount of undeniable evidence: pottery, arrowheads, sling bullets, lead bars... (Fig. 1)

1 A Spanish version is available at www.ujaen.es/centros/caai/produccion_bibliografica.htm
2 Specifically, cf. Polybius (10, 38, 7 to 49) and Livy (27, 18, 1 to 20).
3 10, 38, 7 to 49.
4 27, 18, 1 to 20.
Research is still in progress and is being funded by the Town Hall of Santo Tomé and the Regional Council (Proyecto General de Investigación de la Dirección General de Bienes Culturales de la Junta de Andalucía) as the 2006–2011 project named Baecula. This project started with an analysis of the territory in the area of the battle. The analysis brings together archaeological surface microsurveying, surface sampling and archaeological surface surveys, all intended to retrieve data from the military camp and the battlefield. The data thus obtained confirm the existence of a military camp as attested by a number of excavations. Research of the battlefield supplies further confirmation that the battle could have taken place in the last decade of the 3rd century BC.
BAECLUA IN THE CLASSICAL SOURCES

Research started, amongst others, with the collection of major written sources. The classical texts have been virtually the only source of information for the majority of the history of the research on the Iberian world and the Punic Wars. A number of social, economic, political and military aspects were reconstructed based on these sources. In varying degrees, the historians of that time were influenced by their personal circumstances, specifically by their ideology, their views on the description of history, and by the socio-political framework of the state in which they belonged. It should be mentioned that the available accounts of the Punic Wars are those of the Roman version. This means that only one side of those events, namely the one intended to safeguard Rome's prestige and to justify Rome's deeds, has reached us. This does not mean that the data contained in the Greek and Latin sources are not faithful to real facts, but they are representative of only one of the sides, so their data should be approached accordingly (Gracia, 2003).

The development of archaeological research has meant a significant decrease in the importance of the classical texts as a research tool. Even so, they remain a relevant starting point for archaeological research. In the case of the Second Punic War in the High Guadalquivir, Polibyus and Livy are acknowledged as the research milestones. The essential references on the Second Punic War, like Lazenby (1978), or on Scipio Africanus, like Scullard (1970), are based on these author's writings, so their importance goes beyond the above geographical setting. Apianus of Alexandria is another relevant reference, even though of secondary importance in comparison.

Polybius is universally acknowledged as one of the most reliable sources of the study of the Roman republic. As pointed out by Walbank, one of his major researchers,

“Yo diría que Polibio no estaba interesado en la narración bella en el sentido en que Livio sí lo estaba en su elaboración del material; y al contrario que Livio, sí sabía lo que era una batalla” 5.

Polybius lived between 200 and 118 BC and was closely connected with the Scipios. He was the tutor of Scipio Aemilianus, and accompanied him to Hispania several times. This made him knowledgeable in military issues. First-hand knowledge of the art of war and his view of history qualify Polybius as a most reliable source in these matters. As a way of an example, his description of the Roman army is among the most thorough ones in the history of Antiquity.

Polybius' Histories reached us incomplete, but even with missing material it is the best source on the Second Punic War and also on the early stage of the Roman conquest of Hispania. Polybius' writings are particularly useful in respect of tactics, weaponry and the mercenaries who joined the Carthaginian army (Quesada, 1997).

Livy is the other major historian. Only 35 of the 142 books of his History of Rome from its Foundation remain complete. They are a substantial source of information on the Roman military effort in Hispania as well as on the war actions by the peninsula peoples, the latter from the Roman point of view. Livy cites his sources only when the data are doubtful or disputed, but he seems to have been faithful to them, according to what the comparison with Polybius reveals. The frequent inconsistencies and divergences result from uncritical acceptance of written data or data

5 “I would say that Polybius was not interested in a stylish account in the sense in which Livy was with respect to the elaboration of his writings; and unlike Livy, he (Polybius) knew what a battle was” (cited in Quesada, 1997).
which hardly accord with other information. Both Walsh (1961) and Toynbee (1965) agree that Livy makes two major mistakes: to accept the data of secondary sources without verifying their truthfulness when the original sources were available too, and to narrate in an ornate style for an increased literary effect.

Besides the difficulties created by the circumstances of the classical historians and writers, the translations of the texts under study also gave rise to wrong analyses and interpretations of a number of issues of the protohistory of the peninsula. This is particularly so in military matters, because the knowledge of archaeological research was limited at the time and therefore relied on classicist conventions for translations which did not correspond with the original texts and were later proved to be lacking in rigour. Many of the translations of Polybius or Livy thus attributed to those deeds or notions which were not in their originals. Acceptance of these translations without verification of their original source sanctioned those contents in historiographical interpretations (Gracia, 2003).

The first compilation and dissemination of the classical texts on the Iberian peninsula and, therefore, inclusive of events of the Second Punic War was undertaken by Bosch Gimpera and Schulten in the 1920s with the series *Fontes Hispaniae Antiquae*. Since then, they have been a milestone in historical and archaeological research for their exhaustive selection of data on the Iberian Peninsule from the earliest Greek historians to the Bizantine sources. While they remain a useful reference, Gracia (2003) believes that the *Fontes* have the translation flaws mentioned above; similarly, according to Quesada (1999), Schulten's historiographical approach in volume III, where the sources which inform of the wars between 237 and 154 BC are contained, is obsolete today.

**BAECULA = BAILEN?**

According to F. Quesada (1999), the battle of *Baecula* took place when the Punic presence in the Iberian peninsula started to decrease. After the fall of *Carthago Nova* (210 BC), the Carthaginian army was cut off from its supply sources of Northern Africa. Following the disaster of *Amtorgis* and *Ilorci*, Scipio regained the initiative and obtained the support of large native contingents (Ilergetes or Edetani). However, his victory at *Baecula* was later criticised by the Roman senate because Hasdrubal succeeded to escape to Italy (even if he failed to join Hannibal after the former's defeat in Metaurus (207 BC).

The critical review of the various settings of the Second Punic War in the High Guadalquivir, as identified by a number of specialists, set an initial speculative framework: while the location of sites like *Castulo* (Acedo, 1902), *Iliturgi* (Blanco, 1960) and *Orongis* (Serrano, 2005) were unquestionably acknowledged by the sources, by archaeology, numismatics and epigraphy, the location of others like *Amtorgis*, *Ilorci* or *Biguerra* remained an open question and relied on hypotheses based on the interpretation of the sources (Canto, 1999) rather than on actual archaeological research.

The location of the battle of *Baecula* (208 BC) is a special case: based on the similarity between the actual name of a town (Bailén) and the ancient toponym (*Baecula*), statements were made even on the battlefield situation and the amount of troops of each of the sides. That proposal relied mainly on Brewitz (1914) and was accepted by Schulten and Lammerer (in Bosch & Aguayo, 1955) and was confirmed by other specialists, like Kromayer & Veith (1903–1931 and 1922) or Scullard (1970).
These authors’ view of the military strategy was not verified. The location was researched for topographic and strategic evidence rather than for archaeological field work and research. This favored a consolidated local tradition which generated a process of identification and appropriation of this battle of the Second Punic War.

The opposite tendency appeared later: Corzo (1975) questioned that location and argued that the battle took place in the Campiña de Jaén, in the Roman province Baetica; Quesada (1999) pointed out a number of inconsistencies in the arrangement of the armies and the data found in Polybius and Livy; finally, this location was also questioned in the latest edition of Tabula Imperii Romani (VVAA, 2001: 97).

All these records were the subject of a preliminary research paper which concluded that Bailén must not be identified as Baecula, and that such an association became an accepted hypothesis in the 20th century as a result of its uncritical acknowledgment. The sustained historiographical debate on that association seemed relevant to us. The debate was recorded by Ruiz Giménez (1870) in his work on the province of Jaén and shows the various hypotheses on the location of Baecula (Vilches, Baezuela, Baeza, Úbeda la Vieja) in comparison with those which support its location in Bailén.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lafuente Alcántara</td>
<td>Betula or Baecula</td>
<td>Úbeda la Vieja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Babyla</td>
<td>Vilches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernández Guerra</td>
<td>Betulon, Betula, Becula, Beturia or Beturia</td>
<td>Vilches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceán Bermúdez</td>
<td>Betunia, Betulon, Beturia</td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Becila</td>
<td>Baezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beattia, Biazia, Becula and Baetica</td>
<td>Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gimena Xurado</td>
<td>Betuna</td>
<td>Úbeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Becila, Betila, Besula and Betula</td>
<td>Baezuela and Úbeda la Vieja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambrosio de Morales</td>
<td>Betulo or Betuna</td>
<td>Regions of Úbeda and Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padre Ruano</td>
<td>Becula, Betula, Beturia</td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guichot</td>
<td>Betuna</td>
<td>Castulon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chao</td>
<td>Caecila, Baecila, Baecla, Bética</td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mariana</td>
<td>Betulon</td>
<td>Between Úbeda and Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferreras</td>
<td>Becula</td>
<td>Baeza or Beas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Betulona</td>
<td>Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masdeu</td>
<td>Becula</td>
<td>Near Castulo, in Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vadillos</td>
<td>Betuna</td>
<td>Úbeda la Vieja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bessul</td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argote de Molina</td>
<td>Betulo</td>
<td>Baeza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muñoz Garnica</td>
<td>Betulo</td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arc. Juliano and Deán Mazas</td>
<td>Betula</td>
<td>Úbeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodríguez Gálvez</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bailén</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concluding evidence can also be invoked on the issue:

1. There is not an Iberian oppidum in Bailén. If the battle is linked to a nearby Iberian settlement, the oppidum could not be in Bailén because no archaeological stratigraphy of that time has ever been recorded in that town. The sequences of nearby settlements, like Cerro de la Plaza de Armas de Sevilleja (Contreras et alii, 1987), are later than the Second Punic War. Archaeological surface surveys thus far have not recorded any fortified Iberian settlement (oppidum) within the administrative limits of Bailén.

2. Inconsistencies in the setting were described in the written sources. Both Polybius and Livy state that the Carthaginian military camp had a river on its back. Scullard (1970) and Kromayer & Veith's (1903–1931 and 1922) hypotheses place the river (Guadiel) between the opposing armies, that is to say, clearly going against the data contained in the sources and arranged according to a questionable strategy. Other features mentioned in the texts, such as the terrain of the battlefield, fail to match too.

3. There are strategic difficulties. It is not logical that, as the hypothesis cited argues, the Roman army pierced through the Carthaginian front of the oppida of Castulo and Iliturgi and then fought Hasdrubal Barca west of the enemy line. R. Corzo (1975) viewed as impossible the traditional account that the Roman army came in through Mentesa Oretana and the Valley of river Guadalimar and put forward a sound alternative route through Carthago Nova-Eliococra and Basti.

4. Archaeological surface surveys of the settings proposed by the authors mentioned in above do not find surface evidence. Magnetic sampling does not find any indicators.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD. METHODOLOGY

With the data available, we set out to examine the possibility that Baecula lies east of the line set by the Carthaginian front consisting of the oppida of Castulo, Iliturgi and Oromís, mainly limited to the Valley of river Guadalquivir. This valley hosts several Iberian oppida whose sequence progresses towards the late 3rd century BC. They do not correspond with any of those cited in the sources and a link to the surroundings of Baecula is thus out of the question.

Among them are the oppida of Gil de Olid, Úbeda la Vieja or Salaria, once the Roman colony had been settled. El Molar, Turruñuelos, Mogón and Loma del Perro, for example, were researched within a 5 km radius of the topographical landmarks which might meet the profile described in the sources. Selective archaeological surface surveying and magnetic sampling were used for metallic items associated with war events in the framework of the Second Punic War.

After several months of archaeological surface surveying, remains of a battlefield were found on a hill close to the oppidum of Turruñuelos known as Cerro de las Albahacas. It met all the criteria established for selective surface survey, such as extension, location of the river with respect to the attack area, a steep bank limited by its inclines, and the existence of archaeological surface evidence (late Iberian ceramics) and metallic items like sling bullets, projectile ends or Carthaginian coins.
THE BATTLEFIELD. CERRO DE LAS ALBAHACAS

The battlefield lies in Cerro de las Albahacas, between the administrative limits of Santo Tomé and Cazorla (Jaén), in the High Guadalquivir. It is a considerably large topographical unit encircled by the Río de la Vega on its northern, northeastern and eastern sides, by the Guadalquivir on its northern, northwestern and western sides, and by Arroyo de Las Arcas on its southern side. The longest length of this area measures 6 km north to south and 8 km east to west at the base of this triangle-shaped area.

Cerro de las Albahacas lies on the southern bank of Río Guadalquivir, in an area where the first wide lowlands of the river begin to appear. Structurally, it belongs in a transitional fraction, because it lies at the foot of the eastern end of the area known as Comarca de la Loma de Úbeda and on the foothills of Sierra de Cazorla. A major feature is that it is notably high compared to the river lowlands (278 m from the peak to the river) and therefore stands as a strategically exceptional position in control of the axis of the Valley of Guadalquivir (viewed north to south) and of a large part of the southwestern slope of Loma de Úbeda.

Thanks to the Research Project *Baecula* (2006–2011) funded by the Regional Council (*Dirección General de Bienes Culturales de la Junta de Andalucía*), a preliminary research campaign has been launched for archaeological surface microsurvey sampling and magnetic microsurveying of this battlefield of the Second Punic War. The aims at this stage are to assess the extension of the battlefield and an approximate date.

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESEARCH OF THE BATTLEFIELD. METHODOLOGY

The strategy of this first surface survey campaign aims at the identification of the battlefield, that is to say, at an appraisal of its surface and an interpretation of the results obtained in relation with the development of the fight between the opposing armies.

A transect system was therefore designed which allowed archaeological records of 6 ha. This is only 1.3% of the total surface of the battlefield in an estimated range limited to the centre of the battlefield. These records include over 2000 metallic items to be studied in 2007. This sampling system is supported by GPS records of all the materials and is completed with a digitalized terrain model (.mdt) of the battlefield on a scale 1:10000, due to its large surface.

Design of an integrated system for interrelation of various archaeological record systems with a digitalized terrain model fitting the scale of the surface survey is currently under way. Several work scales have thus been set with various associated databases ultimately aiming at the GIS *Baecula*.

At present, a database system is under development which comprehends three record systems: microsurvey (definition and characterization of archaeological sites, e.g. the battlefield), macrosurvey (implementation of the settlement systems or regional analysis) and archaeological surface survey (input of data retrieved by surface surveys in accordance with the Research Project). This record system is linked to several digital models of the area at various scale ranges, from 1:20000 for regional analysis to 1:20 for the data supplied by archaeological surface survey. The software used for the GIS design is Geomedia, and it is supported by the Department of Graphic Engineering, Design and Projects of the Higher Polytechnic School of the University of Jaén.
THE CARTHAGINIAN MILITARY CAMP

The military camp lies on the easternmost point of the peak of Cerro de las Albahacas, that is to say, on its highest point. It is in visual control of the Valley of Río de la Vega and of a large stretch of the lowlands near the Guadalquivir, mainly the one between Los Turruñuelos and the end of the valley of the river at Castellones de Mogón. It is also in control of all the natural passes of the southeastern part of Loma de Úbeda.

The data supplied by the sources correspond closely with the terrain and location of the military camp. Its dimensions, as shown below, are close to the estimate made for the troops commanded by Carthaginian general Hasdrubal Barca. Even so, the military camp is a unique structure in the Peninsula and stands as an outstanding reference point for future research on ancient military archaeology, specifically, on the Second Punic War.

The spatial analysis scale dictated a two-fold documentation strategy: aerial orthophotography was used for documentation of the whole structure and supplied a georeferenced image and detailed topography (scale 1:1000); on a smaller scale, archaeological surface surveys supplied material for analysis of stratigraphic and structural components; stretches of a fence system with poles, remains of ager and lack of a defensive moat were recorded by the surveys.

The structure of the military camp faced north to south with respect to its longest axis and was shaped like a nearly perfect rectangle, although its sides and vertices are clearly curved. It was adapted to the terrain, and its east and west limits were set by topographical features: east by the terrain itself, with a steep slope which is especially noticeable in the highest end (northeast); west, by a small watercourse which sets the limit of the north-south axis, parallel to this side of the camp. Thus, three major features of the structure stand out:

1. Limits adapted to clear topographical features.
2. Remains of the structure which show an anthropic geomorphological landmark or, rather, abnormalities in the original terrain which are not attributable to orogenetic processes.
3. Remains-fossiles in the land plots. While no natural or anthropic topographic indicator (1 or 2) exists, the land plots retains the original morphology of the structure.

Aerial photography reveals the existence of a possible double enclosure, although the surface surveys thus far seem to deny this possibility. The major enclosure “A” would have an approximate minimum surface of 54 ha. Its longest north-south axis is 940 m long and its maximum east-west axis is approximately 667 m, with an average width of 599 m. Enclosure “B” would lie south. Its morphology does not differ from the former’s and, with a similar width, it could be just an extension of the former enclosure. Its central axis would increase the maximum axis of enclosure “A” by 483 m and the surface by 22 ha, to a total of approximately 76 ha.

The structure of the camp, according to the confirming archaeological surface surveys, is a unicum in the Iberian Peninsula (Morillo, 2002; 2003; Morillo & Aurrecochea, 2006). However, it should be noted that it is an extremely fragile one, because it is not a solid structure, on the contrary, it is weak. This confirms its temporary nature, associated with the development of the battle which, according to the sources cited above, did not last longer than 4 days, including the reoccupation of the camp by the army of Scipio Africanus.

6 This is apparent in the 1957 aerial photography by the Army Geographic Service (Servicio Geográfico del Ejército).
RESULTS

Confirmation of the battle location supplies a remarkable number of data to be discussed in a variety of debates. In the first place, it seems evident that the Roman army gained access via Cartagena-Baza-Valley of Guadiana Menor, and that the camp's location, in front of the oppidum of Turruñuelos (Baecula), marks the position of the Roman army south of Cerro de las Albahacas. This would also allow the Carthaginian army to escape northwards along the Valley of Guadalquivir-Sierra de Cazorla (“jumping over precipices and cliffs”, as Polybius wrote) or across Loma de Úbeda (Fig. 1). Intensive archaeological surface surveying has been planned for further items of the war location.

As noted in the introduction, two strategic stages can be considered for the study of the Roman campaign in southern Hispania. The first, until Cneus Scipio and Publius Scipio’s death, was marked by local conflicts and progressive extension of the war (Castulo, Illiturgi, Biguerra, Munda) as opposed to the second, Scipio Africanus’ system, which consolidated the advancing fronts (Carthago Nova, Baecula, Orongis, Ilipa) (Bellón et alii, 2004).

A spatial pattern seems to appear in the distribution of this type of settings: as F. Chaves points out, they lie in strategic sites in visual control of large areas or in major route crossings. They are also easy to defend, sometimes close to a river and often near relatively important native towns which supported the Carthaginian side. This author remarks that they usually lie right of Guadalquivir, heading towards Castulo and towards the connection routes which lead to the west of the peninsula (Chaves, 1990: 618). In this regard, some examples of the possible configuration of this type of archaeological sites are well-known, as the mouth of river Ebro (Noguera, 2009) or El Gandul (Pliego, 2003).

Microsurvey confirms the data of the first research stage, when the battlefield was identified. Certainly, Cerro de las Albahacas hosts a wide range of archaeological materials which can undoubtedly be ascribed to the late Second Punic War. It also has a number of orographical and topographical features which match the ones given by Polybius and Livy. Its shape corresponds closely with these authors’ writings, when Hasdrubal is reported to have moved to “a height which had an esplanade on its top. Back of it there was a river and its front and side limits were set by a sort of steep difference in height”7.

Based on the location of the battlefield, the oppidum Los Turruñuelos is identified with the Baecula described in the written sources. This site has been researched (Ruiz, 1978; López et alii, 1993 and 1993b) and described as a native settlement which dates back originally to the 5th century BC and which grows considerably through the 3rd century BC to reach a surface of 25 ha. One of the project’s aims is to assess the nature of this growth and to confirm whether it can be linked up to a stage immediately preceding the battle, thus standing as a site of strategic value for control of the communications between the High Guadalquivir, the Valley of Guadalimar, the west coast of the peninsula and the southeast, towards Carthago Nova along the Guadiana Menor.

Relevant results of this microsurvey campaign are the retrieval of several Numidian javelin tips, pilum tips, arrowheads and lead projectiles (Fig. 2) which supply crucial evidence on the arrangement of the troops or on the development of the battle. This set of items can be dated without doubt in the late 3rd century BC, that is to say, in the Second Punic War 8.

---

7 Liv. 27, 18, 5 & 6.
8 We would like to thank Dr. Fernando Quesada Sanz (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid) for his help in establishing the date of these materials.
Among the coins found, it is worth mentioning several small Hispanic-Carthaginian coins and a drachma from *Arsē* (Sagunto) ⁹:

1. CNH 69, no. 46 (eighth). Issue 9th C (García-Bellido & Blázquez, 2002:161) (Transect 2; C341; nº inv. 512)

2. CNH 69, no. 45 (unit). Issue 9th C (García-Bellido & Blázquez, 2002:161) (Transect 2; C352; nº inv. 553)

3. CNH 70, no. 54 (unit, weight = 11 gr). Issue 12th (García-Bellido & Blázquez, 2002:162) (Transect 2; C304; inv. no. 357)

4. CNH 304, no. 2 (drachma). Second coin issue of the mint of Arse (García-Bellido & Blázquez, 2002:38). (Transect 2; C325; inv. no. 441).

⁹ We would like to thank Dr. Mª Paz García-Bellido and Ms. M. de los Santos Mozas for their comments and help in the identification and cataloguing of these items.
Overall, these reveal facts which support some of the statements made above: regarding the series, it seems evident that the context is that of a military camp where use of certain types of small coins is congruent (Alfaro, 1997; Chaves, 1990), especially in a time period limited to the last stage of the Second Punic War (212–206 BC) (Fig. 3) in view of the occurrence of two issues of that time, like coin CNH 70 no. 54 for García-Bellido & Blázquez (2001, II:162) and the Arse drachma (CNH 304 no. 2) for Villaronga (1998).

The amount of evidence currently available outlines a setting which cannot be associated with other events of the Second Punic War. It cannot be the battlefield of Amtorgis, which never involved actual fighting; and it could not be identified with other known locations like Ilorci, because the size and the structure of the military camp do not match the ones of that event. Both battles are of an earlier date in any case. Archaeologically, locations related with besieges of Iberian oppida like Orongis, Ilturgis or Castulo can be ruled out too. Finally, well-known sites like Ilturgis or Castulo can be excluded with certainty too.

Admittedly, no epigraphic documents are available, and this could be an unknown site, not recorded in the sources. However, the writings of the archaeological record supports the hypothesis of its identification as the location of the battle of Baecula.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


RUIZ GIMÉNEZ, J. (1879): Apuntes para la Historia de la provincia de Jaén, Jaén.


