Peace and Conflict Studies has its origins in the moral reflection of leading politicians, such as Woodrow Wilson, Georges Clemenceau, and David Lloyd George, on the massive human and social costs of World War I. An estimated eight million soldiers died in combat, while another two million went missing. The awareness that humankind should never again engage in this type of industrial warfare led to the foundation of the League of Nations in 1919 and the simultaneous development of Peace Studies as the multidisciplinary study of peace by social and political scientists, in contrast to the field of War Studies, which was dominated by military scholars. Almost a century later, this book is a first effort at putting together the different perspectives of scholars working in the last few years within the EDEN European network, with the intention of exploring transversal themes, analytical frameworks and methodological dilemmas, as well as to suggest and develop potentially productive common grounds. Papers range from the critical analysis of international law implementation, to the defence of new global concepts of security, to historical, ethnographic and culturalist perspectives on different kinds of conflicts and violences. That is, they move back and forth from international institutions and globalised legal and political frameworks, to the military industry, to everyday life and culturally-bound experiences and emotions. They have been organized in such way as to ‘rollercoast’ the reader around the different theoretical and methodological points of view available in the network. The editors of this volume asked the members of the network to contribute texts that could achieve precisely this multidisciplinary effect, providing both an inflection point in our internal discussions and as a necessary exposure to a broader audience.
The essays in this book demonstrate what has become of the 1919 initiative, and how Peace Studies has evolved into the complex field of Peace and Conflict Studies that is no longer narrowly concerned with war and peace between states, but has branched out into areas such as human rights, human security, transitional justice, violence prevention, peace building, reconciliation, identity formation and cultural trauma.

In *Human Rights and Human Security: Challenges and Prospects*, Wolfgang Benedek examines the ways in which the expanding discourses and practices of Human Rights have infiltrated the most recent debates regarding development and security in the last decades. Thus, according to the author, human rights, human development and the recent model of ‘human security’ cannot be considered any more as separate or loosely related concepts but, rather, as interdependent and mutually reinforced areas of diagnosis and action, requiring the articulation of a ‘holistic approach,’ one which is in tune with this book’s proposal. Theoretical work on the limits, content and intersection of these concepts is absolutely crucial if they are going to be of use for international law, international institutions and policy-making. In his essay, Benedek particularly explores the cross-fertilization between ‘human rights’ and ‘human security.’ These conceptual debates are necessarily controversial, for the stakes are high, the international actors and institutions are of growing complexity, and the kinds of conflicts that the international, national and local communities have to face are evolving very fast. Although the conceptual tide seems to be going its way and has in Benedek an articulate supporter, the author points out that some critics still question the adequacy of the concept of ‘human security’ —for some a ‘paradigm shift’ or a ‘new organizing principle for international relations and international law,’ for others just ‘hot air’— preferring instead to continue using older ones like ‘comprehensive security,’ which would refer to violent threats directly derived from conflicts but would not accommodate the ‘non-violent threats, related to the violation of economic and social rights.’

For Benedek, ‘human security’ has a certain ‘European flavour’ (vs. North American mainstream conceptions of ‘security’), as it tilts its agenda towards prevention instead of repression. ‘Human security’ incorporates notions from human rights and has a firm potential for redefining the meaning and nature of ‘threats’ towards the freedom from fear (civil and political rights) and the freedom from want (economic, social and cultural rights), as a necessary companion to the evolution of conflicts, to an undeferable emphasis on the ‘responsibility to prevent’ in humanitarian intervention, and to the consequent factoring in of issues such as the sources of insecurity, sustainability, people-centered development,
infant mortality, disease, hunger, poverty, land mines or light weapons in the domain of ‘security.’ Increasing security, on the other hand, is at odds with the curtailing of liberties or human rights, as the result of the many political and legal initiatives put into practice in the US after 11 September 2001 vividly show. On the contrary, Benedek maintains that there is as clear a direct correlation between human security and increased democratisation as there is between economic dependence and the risk of war. Through the initiative of international institutions as the UN (and its Human Security ‘Branch’ and ‘Unit’), international groups such as the Human Security Network or well-known scholars such as Amartya Sen, the human security model has started to produce a ‘human security agenda’ including the revitalization of old and the promotion of new legal measures and protocols, an emphasis on Human Rights education, the empowerment of local populations, and the parallel participation of non-state actors, particularly those operating in the ‘global civil society,’ in the establishment of ‘security’ agendas.

The essay An Anthropological View of Violences by the anthropologists Francisco Ferrándiz Martín and Carles Feixa Pampols is a reflexive examination of the anthropology of violence. Instead of providing a run-of-the-mill review of the major literature in this field, they have opted for a much more innovative approach by focusing on the complex relations between violence and culture, regarding the anthropological study of violence and the anthropology of peace as interrelated, and by paying dual attention to manifestations of violence (violences of culture) and constructions of violence (cultures of violence). This approach allows them to address the epistemological, conceptual, representational, methodological, and ethical concerns of the anthropology of violence.

The authors indicate that violence is too vague of a term to be useful for scientific analysis and empirical research because violence is enmeshed in heterogeneous contexts, in fleeting, short, and long historical currents, multiple social levels and realities, enduring structures, and psychodynamic processes. Therefore, they suggest an analytical differentiation of violence into types, modes, classes or categories. Ferrándiz and Feixa distinguish between political, structural, symbolic, and quotidian violence as four distinct but partially connected modes of violence, and emphasize that violence is experienced differently by three types of actors: perpetrators, victims, and witnesses or bystanders. They also call attention to the study of conceptual dichotomies, such as physical vs. symbolic, experienced vs. imagined, visible vs. invisible, and macro vs. micro violence.

Ferrándiz and Feixa propose a reconceptualization of the anthropological study of violence which emphasizes that violence is processual,
pluriform, polysemic, a fact of life, part of a continuum from non-peaceful to peaceful conflict resolutions, and characterized by asymmetrical power relations. Thus, they reject the older Durkheimean view that violence is contained in exceptional, extraordinary, dysfunctional, and discrete events which puncture the social contract and therefore do not represent the normal state of society. This functionalist view of violence as a social pathology impeded the systematic anthropological study of violence until the 1960s and 1970s when symbolic, interactionist, and reflexive anthropology took flight. Anthropologists began to conduct ethnographic fieldwork in many conflict-ridden settings that ranged from post-colonial societies to states victimized by predatory capitalism, from prisons to war zones, and from drug addicts to guerrillas.

Field research into the multiple manifestations of violence spurred also a search for methodologies that could account for the unique research circumstances and ethnographic relations of trouble spots. Wisely, the authors caution against facile methodological solutions to highly complex epistemologies. Aside from the practical problem of facing life-threatening situations, ethnographers have become emotionally and sometimes politically implicated in their research topics, while field relations with research participants are seldom neutral. Such field immersion requires data-gathering methods that are adjusted to each unique situation, and in the awareness that fear, silence, and the threat of death alter field relations and realities.

The epistemological implications of such altered research circumstances can make scholars in other disciplines question the ethnographic emphasis of the anthropological study of violence altogether. If participant observation often becomes impossible, if interviews are riddled with seduction, partisanship, and self-interest—including the awareness that an uncensored sharing of knowledge may endanger the informant's life—if social surveys and quantitative data gathering are impossible, if key informants have hidden political agendas, and if life histories are polished, self-justifying narratives, then what remains of the anthropological enterprise? Whatever the difficulties of employing ethnographic field techniques, and they are many, the enduring merits of the anthropological approach to violence have been its holistic study of the human condition, its multi-layered analysis, and its ability to read the whole in the parts and map the bonds and interconnections.

Ferrándiz and Feixa are aware that these merits may be regarded as liabilities by scholars from other disciplines who find ethnographic studies of violence engaging literature but of little use to their comparative endeavors. The subjectivist, interpretive, and actor-oriented approaches, in particular, have contributed to such suspicion. Some anthropologists are
therefore proposing more analytical, explanatory, and observer-oriented approaches that facilitate interdisciplinary dialogue.

The argument over subjectivist versus analytical approaches is not just a methodological debate but involves an ethical discussion about the position of the ethnographer as an agent of knowledge and power in treacherous field locations. To what extent should ethnographers become advocates, critics, opinion makers, policy makers, and agents of social change? Some argue that anthropologists should speak against power, write against terror, and give the powerless a voice through their ethnographies. Such political commitment is said to emerge naturally from the professional ethical code which emphasizes the obligation of researchers “to consult actively with the affected individuals or group(s), with the goal of establishing a working relationship that can be beneficial to all parties involved” and to do “everything in their power to ensure that their research does not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research, or perform other professional activities” (American Anthropological Association Code of Ethics). Whether or not anthropologists should be politically active on behalf of their research participants continues to be a controversial issue, but growing numbers of anthropologists feel that they should at least show compassion in their writings for the subjugated and downtrodden.

The deeply engrained sense of responsibility of ethnographers towards the people they study, which is reflected in the passage from the Code of Ethics quoted above, has made anthropologists reluctant to conceive of a culture of violence. They acknowledge that violence is a cultural construction—whereas aggression is a biological given—but the idea that cultures may be violent is rejected as reeking of essentialism, as denying agency, and is thus close to blaming the victim. The study of cultures of violence was therefore restricted to youth gangs, hooligans, and crime syndicates like the mafia, tribal warfare, and cannibalism where violence was endemic and had a dynamic of its own. However, the concept was seldom extended to domestic violence, guerrilla insurgencies or economic exploitation.

Ferrándiz and Feixa are much more open to the notion of a culture of violence, which follows logically from their embracing the classification of violence into modes, among which they include structural, symbolic, and quotidian violence. Once violence is observed as a dimension of social structures, symbolic imaginations, and everyday behaviour, then the notion of a culture of violence is not too far away. The two authors therefore encourage the study of structures of domination and interpersonal habitues embedded in social institutions, the delineation of cultural
codes, scenarios, practices, and images that inform people’s decisions and actions, and especially the uncovering of the micro practices and microphysics of power, an approach pioneered by Foucault.

Paradoxically, this promising development in the anthropology of violence is threatened by the very object of its study. Ferrándiz and Feixa point at the new political reality of the global war on terror at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York and 11 March 2004 in Madrid, and similar ones in other parts of the world, the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq by American and European troops, and ongoing violent conflicts in Chechnya, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestine territories, the Congo, Sudan, and other hot spots in the world, have made it increasingly more difficult to conduct ethnographic fieldwork. The anthropology of violence is looking for innovative methodologies to continue empirical research. The two authors are showing one possibility to derive data from inaccessible places. They draw attention to the media, globalizing flows of information, debate spaces, advocacy groups, and the centers of world power to understand the fallout on the lives of ordinary people, their humble dwellings, refugee camps, and secret prisons. Their postscript is an exemplary sketch of a new epistemology and ethnography of violence that draws creatively on other disciplines and the media to forge an insightful interpretation of the multi-layered ramifications of the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004.

In Critical Edge and Legitimisation in Peace Studies, José Manuel Pureza and Teresa Cravo defend the crucial importance of rescuing the critical diagnosis that Peace Studies originally contained in the field of International Relations before the concept was coopted, ‘regulated,’ and partially neutralized through its (mis)use by international institutions in post-war reconstruction processes in a context of ‘international disorder.’ Here we again face the slippery and often controversial relationship between critical academic reflections and proposals and the ‘reality call’ of their ideological and practical implementation. If academics intend to prevent the steady demolition of promising and elastic models and concepts in International Relations (as well as in other related fields) for the sake of the status quo, as might be the case with the crude militarization of Human Rights or even medical discourses with notions such as ‘humanitarian intervention,’ ‘surgical strike,’ or ‘collateral damage,’ then we must remain vigilant and be ready to produce sustained and fast-response critiques to de-stabilize and reassess these deactivating re-appropriations —in concept and in practice. In an effort to refresh the debate, as well as the memory, Pureza and Cravo trace back the genealogy of the heterogeneous field of ‘Peace Studies’ as a critical paradigm.
confronting the hegemonic ‘positivist’ commonsense —or ‘realist canon’— in International Relations since the 1960s. In a second moment, so the authors sustain, the concept was mainstreamed and normalized, only to enter a third phase of ‘retreat’ in the early 21st Century.

For Pureza and Cravo, Peace Studies, as expressed in the pioneering work of Johan Galtung, initially intended to bring ‘peace’ to the forefront of the international agenda and had as a result the birth of an alternative and interdisciplinary paradigm with a potential to displace the hegemony of the conservative ‘realistic school’ in the understanding of International relations, an effort that former attempts at scientifically establish the field had declined or being incapable of overcome. For Galtung, who established a distinctive European perspective in the field, Peace Studies should be understood as a socially ‘productive’ discipline only feasible in terms of investigation-action, thus breaking the barrier between theory and practice. The authors stress the importance of Galtung’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, one which discriminates between the mere absence of war and the unravelling of social justice and freedom in integrated societies. With his scheme, Galtung proved that Peace Studies could depart analytically from mainstream power structures and academic paradigms and that ‘peace’ was a far more complex concept that initially thought. With the end of the cold war and the advent of the ‘new wars,’ Peace Studies confronted a new opportunity to provide critical and sophisticated analysis and show its relevance for policy making. In 1992, Pureza and Cravo continue, the UN introduced in its ‘Agenda for Peace’ concepts taken straight from Galtung’s thinking such as ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘peacemaking,’ ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘peacebuilding.’ Coming back to their Kuhnian analysis of the evolution of the field, the authors consider that this entry of Peace Studies into mainstream policy pushed the field into a process of ‘scientific normalisation.’ As the authors have it, once its position was consolidated, Peace Studies lost its critical edge, as its concepts and proposals circulated widely as new and legitimate commonsense and transformed into ‘social norms’ and ‘universal’ procedures —with an emphasis on representative democracy and market economy—, implemented in different conflict situations regardless of the local context. This political and cultural blindness overlooked the crucial role of local agency, establishing peace operations as largely external interventions following a well-known and repetitive formula, one which obstructs long term and locally ingrained strategies like ‘peacebuilding from below.’ For Pureza and Cravo, at this point, Peace Studies had lost its former ability to incorporate new critical proposals into its theoretical and methodological pool, failing also in its quality of social and political practice. It has be-
come still one more instrument of power. Along the way, it has also lost some of its ‘rhetorical attraction.’ The authors conclude that, to retrieve its original and crucial critical edge, lost along the way, Peace Studies needs to profoundly ‘decolonise’ and disengage from ‘institutional prescriptions, power relations and the codes of social relations that neoliberalism carries with it.’ Only through this ‘emancipation’ can it confront the renewed strength of the realistic paradigm, reborn after 11 September, and the advent of the ‘War on Terror.’

In his text *On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and International Humanitarian Law*, Hans-Joachim Heintze stresses the importance of considering the ways in which both bodies of law can operate in parallel, providing a framework for similar protections —especially in armed conflicts—, thus enhancing the operative efficacy of international humanitarian law in a framework of still insufficient implementation mechanisms. Heintze goes into meticulous detail in order to define the field in which these legal debates are taking shape. Starting with a critique of the so-called ‘separation theory’ in International Public Law —still present today in the thinking of some international lawyers and in influential readers like the *Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict* (1995), which argues that laws of peace and laws of war are different domains—, the author shows how this position has been consistently undermined since the very UN Charter of 1945, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other important legal bodies and initiatives, resulting into an effective and increasing legal ‘crossing of the border’ between situations of peace and war. Heintze shows how the expansion of the idea of the non-derogability of certain rights in war situations, expressed in different human rights bodies and instruments, has been a crucial trend in this necessary bordercrossing.

In exploring and trying to overcome what he terms the many and complex ‘legal gray areas’ of this true frontier zone of international jurisprudence, Heintze argues that the cumulative application of Human Rights Law and International Human Law, as opposed to some proposals that would privilege merging them into a single body of law (‘convergence theory’), can overcome the many obstacles encountered in the debates over legal competences in the different international legal bodies, unsatisfactory standards, or the noticeable deficits met when faced with implementation mechanisms, especially underdeveloped and ineffective in International Humanitarian Law. To show the complexity of these legal grey areas in action regarding the difficulties in the application of International Humanitarian Law, Heintze reviews specific controversial cases dealt with both by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights —La Tablada (Argentine), Las Palmeras (Colombia),
In comparative perspective and from an anthropological point of view, Glenn Bowman analyses in *Constitutive Violence and Rhetorics of Identity: A Comparative Study of Nationalist Movements in the Israeli-Ocupied Territories and the Former Yugoslavia* the importance of considering violence as a basic productive element in the unfolding of all nation-based ideologies, stressing specially the relevance of the social production of ‘antagonism’ as a fundamental base for what he calls ‘nationalist imaginaries.’ To correctly understand this process, it is basic to emphasize the historical formation of such national imaginaries beyond essentialist models. That is, as Bowman asserts, ‘national identity is an historical construct which emerges from a reformulation of one’s relation to a social field rather than something essential and non-contingent.’ It is the perceived violence inflicted by an ‘external other’ which fuels an equally perceived need to organize as an independent state as the only feasible defensive device. Bowman’s model runs against influential nation building models such as Anderson’s, where the development of national ‘imagined communities’ is mostly linked to the improvement of systems of communication and exchange. In fact, Anderson’s model does not apply to the two cases that Bowman explores: Palestine and the Former Yugoslavia, where it was the construction of antagonisms —used by the author as a synonym for ‘constitutive violence’— which was crucial in the shattering of the existing social fields and eventually polarized the development of such imaginaries. For the author, the advent of print capitalism and other communication technologies was no doubt fundamental in the constitution of extended communities, yet they do not account in themselves for the apparition and consolidation of nationalist consciousness. Thus, the crux lies not in the increasing sophistication of the medium, but in the content of the information and the knowledge circulated in it. When forced into diaspora after the creation of the state of Israel, why did not the Palestinians turn into Arab nationalist instead of becoming anti-Zionists? Why did Serbs and Croats never develop a
common imagined identity, and later become blood enemies, when they shared both a language and the Yugoslavian media?

For Bowman the answer is: the social and political construction of antagonism. Antagonism which is, indeed, a rather complex and polyhedral process, as his thorough analysis of the two above mentioned cases in historical perspective clearly show. Constitutive violence is the main process that eventually catalyses, in social fields characterized by both internal and external controversy, tension and power struggles, the necessary images, locations and landmarks, heroes, religious plots, styles of leadership, historical anchorages, stories of common suffering, political vocabularies and other sorts of symbolic, economic and political ammunition to anchor or ‘fix’ the emergence and development of senses of nationalist collective belonging. In these convoluted processes, collectives of people come to think of themselves as joint victims of certain violences at the hands of recognizable enemies and, through the development of a nationalist consciousness, as members of a soon-to-be, future, or utopian nation. Thus, we can think of the development of victimhood politics as a crucial ingredient in the imagining, and at times constitution, of nations. Bowman stresses that this might be a matter of Manichean collective perception, or even fantasy, but that it nonetheless funnels such processes in very blunt and concrete ways. As counterexamples to support his perspective, the author argues that the declining solidarity amongst Palestinians in the wake of the Oslo Accords or the ‘dissolution of the nationalist imaginary in the post-war Slovene’ are clear indicators that identity is always in flux and that it has an ample space for readjustment or metamorphosis, and that the weakening of the dynamics of antagonism would work against the permanence of the ‘nationalist imaginaries.’ In the case of Slovenia, according to Bowman, the overcoming of the antagonistic nation building game and the blurring of the former collective ‘enemy’ allows for an opportunity to build an ‘identity based on civil rights rather than on totalitarian xenophobia.’

In the chapter *Researching Violence Prevention and Peace Building*, Luc Reychler dissects the key components of peace building processes, and designs a comprehensive model to optimize the national and international efforts to achieve peace in conflict zones. Reychler’s extensive review of the many scientific studies of peace building, and their often contradictory analyses, explanations, and recommendations, make it tempting to the reader to mentally assess their value for policy with contemporary peace initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Congo, and southern Sudan, as well as gauge the relative successes in some older hot spots in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. Such intellectual exercise quickly reveals that peace building
is not a one-size-fits-all enterprise because the interaction of the larger context with the local situation makes each attempt at peace building a unique undertaking. The challenge to any scientist working in Peace and Conflict Studies is to isolate those variables which tend to matter most in many situations, and delineate those processes which have often shown to be most effective, in particular in peace building operations after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

The end of the Cold War and the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, and the attention to the so-called global war on terror have radically changed the world’s political landscape since 1989, and thus also the patterns of peace building. The struggle for world hegemony between the First and the Second World, and their economic domination of and indirect military engagement in the Third World, have taken other forms. The world powers compete now on an open global market, intervene militarily whenever they feel that their national interests are at threat, and undertake or support conflict prevention and peace building initiatives in many parts of the world. At the same time, violent interstate and intrastate conflicts have reduced drastically. The number of armed conflicts and genocides has declined rapidly, most democracies have survived the economic and political crises of the 1990s, and the repression and disenfranchisement of ethnic minorities have also diminished. All indicators point in the same positive direction of diminished national and international conflicts, even though Reychler questions the accuracy of the underlying statistics, the narrow definition of violence employed, and the arbitrariness of the assessment variables. The only dark cloud on the horizon is the expansion of international terrorism; a growing threat that is changing peace building efforts in important ways.

These changed circumstances are making a removal of the three principal obstacles to the improved monitoring and better evaluation of peace building initiatives urgent. Reychler identifies political, managerial, and conceptual impediments to greater knowledge and understanding of peace processes. Political impediments revolve around self-interested, politically biased, and violence-prone perceptions of conflict prevention rather than the pursuit of internationally beneficial, scientifically informed, and peace-driven initiatives. The conceptual impediments are threefold: 1) the absence of a comprehensive multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-time peace building model; 2) the poor communication about existing knowledge among politicians, policymakers, practitioners, scholars, and the ordinary people involved; and 3) the difficulties scientists face in rowing against political currents and making politically undesirable recommendations. Managerial impediments exist in the problems of ad-
equately supervising, planning and coordinating peace building efforts as well as the wanting professionalism and leadership of peace builders. Scholars have few possibilities to overcome political impediments because they seldom operate in the inner circles of national and international politics. Still, they can help reduce the conceptual and managerial impediments, as Reychler demonstrates clearly.

The managerial qualities and, in particular, the professionalism of peace builders can be enhanced by good academic practices in five areas of teaching and research. First, the theoretical and empirical knowledge, assessment and mediation skills, language proficiency, and cultural and humanitarian sensibilities of graduate students should be given more attention in M.A. and Ph.D. programs in Peace and Conflict Studies. Second, scholars must conduct more systematic comparative research on leadership qualities and strategies of both successful peace builders and effective peace destroyers. Third, students and researchers should draw more extensively on the experience of practitioners, and encourage a balance between personal commitment and a professional attitude in the pursuit of peace. Fourth, the concerns of students in Peace and Conflict Studies programs should be taken more seriously because these students are tomorrow’s practitioners. A survey among Belgian M.A. students raised concerns about commitment, knowledge, skills, ethics, health, personal talents, and psychological aptitude. The final area of improvement dovetails with the urgency of solving the conceptual impediments to improved peace building, namely the development of better evaluation criteria and analytical models to assess successful peace building processes.

Peace and Conflict Studies has been undergoing an expansive growth of academic publications, policy evaluations, popular books, newspaper articles, and reports by NGOs and IGOs that cover almost every aspect of the peace building process. Luc Reychler sums up the findings of more than thirty major academic approaches ranging from silver bullet explanations to elaborate models. He observes the need for a comprehensive model which analyzes the peace building architecture and assesses the success of specific peace process designs within a particular time frame. His comparative research has yielded an intricate model that suits many different peace building situations.

Reychler’s peace building architecture contains six key components: 1) the end state (realignment, reconstruction or transformation of the conflict zone towards peace and stability with due attention to security, international cooperation, leadership, communication, the political-psychological climate, and peace enhancing and supporting structures); 2) the base line (assessment of current conflicts, suitable areas of intervention, and future developments); 3) the peace building process (time
frames, differential pacing, priorities, synergies, and the synchronicity and sequentiality of the multi-stage peace building process; 4) the peace building regime (management of the peace building process through internal, unilateral or multilateral planning, cooperation, and involvement; 5) the context (difficulty of the conflict, expected outcome, time frame, preservation of existing practices, diversity of actors involved in peace building process, capability of peace workers, willingness of external actors to participate, power of stakeholders, availability of material and human resources); and 6) the criteria for evaluating peace building (conflict analysis, peace building deficiency, risk and opportunity assessment, relevance of interventions, conflict and peace evaluation, involvement of stakeholders and owners, and final evaluation and lessons learned).

Reychler’s conclusion is in tune with most other chapters in this book, namely that peace and war are complex social and cultural constructions that deserve systematic and comparative study to improve peace building efforts. At the same time, he suggests that these constructions are deeply invested with people’s emotions, and are therefore not as malleable and changeable as politicians, policymakers, practitioners, and scholars would wish.

Political reconciliation has become an explicit objective of many comprehensive peace building initiatives since the 1980s, in particular because of the emergence of truth commissions under the assumption that an honest examination and public acknowledgment of past atrocities will create mutual understanding among former adversaries. Kjell-Åke Nordquist explains in his essay Reconciliation as a Political Concept: Some Observations and Remarks that reconciliation became a key concept in political discourse because of three developments in the nature and context of armed conflicts.

One, the 1945 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1998 creation of the International Criminal Court made individuals accountable for their actions in armed conflicts. This individual accountability has given an identity to perpetrators and victims, and thus has opened the way for reactions that range from criminal prosecution to forgiveness. Two, there has been a shift from interstate to internal wars. This change has turned civilians rather than combatants into the principal casualties of armed conflict. Older post-war solutions that followed upon a military defeat on the battle field, such as the court-martial of commanding officers and the repatriation of prisoners-of-war, are no longer appropriate. The peace process must, aside from prosecuting human rights offenders, include the indemnification of the material and immaterial losses suffered by the civilian population, and the implementation of symbolic ways to repair the social fabric of societies torn by internal
violence. Three, comprehensive intra-state peace processes have since the late-1980s often included formal peace agreements, individual accountability, truth and reconciliation commissions, and public apologies by heads of state, and political and religious leaders. Such public and official acknowledgment of past wrongdoings enhances the chances for political reconciliation.

Nordquist defines political reconciliation as “a process where harm, resulting from political violence, is repaired in such a way that trust can again be established between victims, perpetrators, and the society at large.” This conceptually rich definition clarifies some of the complicating factors in achieving such outcome. Kjell-Ake Nordquist emphasizes that political reconciliation necessarily involves the re-establishment of broken social relations. Trust is a key ingredient of reconciliation and implies a reparation of, what Rousseau called, the social contract. People need to have faith again in society as a social construct and in the professed intention of former adversaries that they will not inflict future harm.

The restoration of social trust may be helped by undoing past injustices through legal prosecution, reparative justice or the abrogation of punishment through amnesty. Retributive justice is exacted by a court of law which punishes the accused for his or her crimes. This approach may satisfy the feelings of victims and society at large that justice has been served, but may create resentment among the convicted and their political supporters. Retributive justice seems most appropriate in situations where the number of perpetrators is limited, as in cases such as Argentina, El Salvador, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, but is less feasible when large numbers of victimizers participated in the collective violence, such as in Congo, Rwanda, and Cambodia. The latter’s inability to systematically prosecute all offenders is likely to embitter victimized groups, so other means must be found to appease them. Reparative justice can at least partially neutralize those emotions by compensating victims in material and symbolic ways for their losses. Amnesty is the third possibility towards political reconciliation. Governments and parliaments have in the past chosen this route in the hope that amnesty will prevent long-term political disruption or will help people concentrate on building a better future instead of being held hostage to the past. This quick-fix has proven to be ineffective in the last few decades, precisely because of the three developments in the nature and context of armed conflicts mentioned above. The overturning of amnesty legislation in several Latin American countries demonstrates that survivors of past abuses may insist on legal accountability decades after the end of hostilities.

Kjell-Ake Nordquist recognizes four structural dimensions in the process of political reconciliation: relational, attitudinal, legal, and moral.
Reconciliation is by definition a relational concept, unlike forgiveness. At least two former adversaries, and even better society at large, should acknowledge and trust the other as a legitimate interlocutor. This mutual relation should ideally be buttressed by a genuine attitudinal and behavioral change among former enemies or adversaries. The legal reckoning by perpetrators helps to convince the victims of the sincerity of their relational and attitudinal change. Finally, the importance of the moral dimension of political reconciliation is its transcendence on other social realms, thus strengthening and galvanizing the three other dimensions.

Nordquist’s detailed analysis of the form of political reconciliation helps much to further clarify its complexity. He delineates ten dimensions whose interconnections turn each reconciliation initiative into a unique process. One, political reconciliation is both a goal and a process because social trust is a cumulative and contingent condition rather than a fixed state of social interaction. The ingredients of trust and reconciliation are culturally, socially, and politically specific and are influenced by the type of violence suffered.

Two, there can be intra-generational and also inter-generational reconciliation. People directly affected by violent conflicts may bury their differences but may also pass them on to future generations, as happened in the former Yugoslavia. This transgenerational process requires a different peace building approach than when the past can be overcome in the protagonists’ lifetime.

Three, the nature of the relationships between victims and perpetrators is important. Relations may be asymmetrical (victims are victims, and perpetrators remain perpetrators) or symmetrical (victims become perpetrators and vice versa).

Four, violent conflicts between two enemies may end through negotiations or a military victory. There is a considerable power difference between these two situations, and a differential effect on the reconciliation process.

Five, forgiveness, when mutual, can give a powerful boost to the reconciliation process. However, forgiveness is a moral or religious concept which operates beyond the political realm, and can therefore not be included in a formal peace plan. The attempted imposition of forgiveness is ineffective and even counterproductive.

Six, political reconciliation is not only processual but also situational. It may be set in motion in parts of a conflict zone where the fighting has stopped, while other parts remain enwrapped in armed violence. Such differential reconciliation may spread like an ink blot across the land when the beneficial effects become visible.
Seven, political reconciliation may be constituted bottom-up, top-down, or preferably be combined. Top-down processes bring a political commitment to reconciliation by involving important political stakeholders in the process, while bottom-up processes involve victimized groups and the general population to create a well-functioning civil society.

Eight, truth-telling by perpetrators can have a beneficial effect on political reconciliation because it assumes wrongdoing and acknowledges the suffering of the victims; a suffering that had often been publicly denied by the responsible authorities. Complemented with the accounts by victims, such public disclosure and recognition can feed into historical narratives which assuage the intergenerational transmission of resentment and hatred.

Nine, the conviction that post-conflict justice has been served can contribute substantially to political reconciliation. Justice can be done by national, international, and indigenous legal systems. These systems may combine retributive and reparative justice with truth commissions to provide a wholesome accountability which involves all parties concerned.

Finally, political reconciliation can be nurtured in many symbolic ways through commemorations, memorials, literature, art, films, and so forth. The periodic national attention to past violent conflicts helps people mourn the losses, slowly relegate them to history, and make society as a whole look towards the future.

Political reconciliation is only possible when the people who were pitted against one another during an armed conflict are treated as fellow human beings by the peace enforcing force, and receive equal treatment after the fighting ceases. Robert C. Hudson, in his chapter Lessons from Kosovo: Cluster Bombs and their Impact upon Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, delineates a connection between the use of cluster bombs and the Western military response to the global war on terror, while analyzing the long-term health problems of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo, the discrimination of ethnic minorities in Kosovan hospitals, and its adverse effects on interethnic relations and lasting peace.

Robert Hudson argues that the military interventions by NATO troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo were neither the final spasms of the Cold War nor the concluding stages of the Yugoslav secession wars but the beginnings of a new type of war waged on self-proclaimed humanitarian grounds and in defiance of international laws, treaties, and conventions. The Balkan interventions, and the presence of peace enforcing troops in the late-1990s, foreshadowed the military occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan in the early-2000s. The Kosovo air strike campaign was
not conducted because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia posed a direct security threat to any of the NATO countries, but ostensibly because of humanitarian concern for Kosovo’s Albanian majority repressed by dominant Serbian powers. The humanitarian argument was also employed to justify the overthrow of Iraq’s brutal dictator Saddam Hussein once the weapons of mass destruction, that were the pretext for war, were not found.

This new kind of war has been called a post-modern war by Robert Cooper, a foreign affairs advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Reminiscent of nineteenth-century social evolution theories, Cooper classifies the world’s states into pre-modern (e.g. Somalia, and Afghanistan before the overthrow of the Taliban regime), modern (e.g. India, Pakistan, and China) and post-modern (e.g. the European Union). He argues that the post-modern Western world should carry out a civilizing mission in the failed, chaotic, pre-modern states through a benign colonization that will bring democracy and respect for human rights. This mission statement contains an intrinsic justification for unprovoked war which gives post-modern states the moral right to intervene militarily without approval from the United Nations or any other international body. Cooper makes a call for a “new military humanism” which reverts to the laws of the jungle when fighting in pre-modern states. The preemptive strike against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq is an example of such new kind of war, while the torture of Al-Qaeda suspects, their unmonitored detention at Guantánamo Bay, and their disappearance into secret CIA prisons on non-American soil, are disturbing manifestations of self-righteous attitudes in defiance of international laws and war conventions.

The use of cluster bombs in Kosovo and Iraq is another expression of the self-declared moral superiority, and disconcern for the civilian population, with which Western states carry out their military interventions in so-called pre-modern states. Clusters bombs are airborne dispensers with submunitions intended to destroy armored vehicles. Submunitions that reach the ground without exploding turn into de facto anti-personnel mines, and thus become a lethal hazard for civilians, children and, paradoxically, also the occupying ground forces. The dropping by NATO airplanes of nearly 1,400 cluster bombs (comprising almost 290,000 submunitions) on Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, and the unknown location of an estimated 35,000 live bomblets, have caused and continue to cause many deaths and wounded. One year after the 1999 Kosovo campaign, almost 500 civilians had been killed, of whom 151 by cluster bomblets. The cost of clearing the tens of thousands of unexploded ordnance is estimated at $1000 per bomblet, while the long-term health costs to treat the victims are many times higher.
Hudson raises the critical question of why NATO forces decided to drop cluster bombs on populated areas in Kosovo, knowing the risks to civilians of unexploded ordnance, and why they continued to employ these bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq. The inexcusable use of such injurious weapons betrays a worldview that regards the people in failed states as inferior, primitive even. Their casualties are ultimately seen as the necessary sacrifice for a better future. Pre-modern states are believed to be populated by pre-modern people who maintain inferior moral standards, fight in less civilized and more callous ways, do not have Christian values of empathy and compassion with suffering others, bear hardships more easily, and who will continue in age-old and deadly rivalries without outside intervention. What are a couple of hundred civilian deaths among an inferior people, when a better future is sure to lie ahead for all?

However, not only is the future less shiny than promised, but precisely the use of cluster bombs is postponing the much desired peace because the unexploded ordnance has an effect on the safety of the resident population, the return of refugees, the ability to work the contaminated land, and ultimately the success of the much-publicized reconstruction efforts. Hudson documents the severe injuries inflicted by exploding submunitions touched off by a man, woman or child on foot. Add poor local health facilities and the preferential treatment of certain ethnic groups to this situation, then the political reconciliation will be a long way off. Ethnic minorities in Kosovo, such as Serbs, Roma, and Gorani, have had considerable difficulties in obtaining proper medical care when injured. Ethnic Albanian doctors have refused them treatment on the charge of collaborating with the repressive Serbian authorities, obliging them to travel long distances under armed escort to medical facilities willing to accept them. Furthermore, the presence of unexploded bomblets has made refugees reluctant to return home, and prevented farmers from working their fields. Economic reconstruction and social reconciliation become impossible under such adverse circumstances.

Hudson’s conclusion is unequivocal: ban cluster bombs. They are an inhuman means to pursue armed conflicts, inflict lasting human suffering on civilians, and therefore will hinder rather than hasten people’s willingness to develop peaceful relations. His research demonstrates that the peace building process does not begin when the fighting stops but already when the fighting begins.

Antonius C.G.M. Robben’s paper, Mourning and Mistrust in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Dirty War Argentina, stresses the importance of considering and analysing in careful context, but also in comparative perspective, the long-term consequences of carefully designed policies of fear and terror, such as those which came under the auspices of the
so-called ‘dirty war’ in Argentine, a paradigmatic example of the kind of State terrorism that has characterised many military dictatorships in Latin America, direct heir of repressive strategies already tested in the French colonial wars and in US counterinsurgency operations. Each dictatorship had its preferences and modulated the repressive training acquired in Panama and North Carolina according to internal necessity, and in Argentina ‘disappearance’ came to be the method of choice in the explicit aspiration to annihilate and, through indeterminacy about the fate of those captured and of their corpses, paralyse the ‘enemy.’ The fact that a good many of the disappeared were abducted from their homes was a clear indicator of how deep the repression went into the social fabric in its itinerary from military headquarters and detention centres to the private spaces of everyday life. However, according to Robben, the effect was the opposite to that intended by the military. Instead of nurturing political disbanding and depression, the tense presence/absence of the disappeared and the breach of trusts between the political and the domestic arenas came to be powerful anchoring points for further and long-term political action. The uncertainty about those disappeared, a generalised sense of guilt transferred from the perpetrators to the surviving victims, and the absence of a public and legitimate social space for proper mourning and burial, fuelled Human Rights organisations and relatives to mobilise against the military (with a crucial role for the mothers).

The military-civil distrust generated in the dirty war started in many cases in the bed, dining and living rooms (‘home’) where many abductions took place, where a major transgression of the limits between the political and private spheres, expressed first in repressive actions and later elaborated in symbolic terms, took place. This transgression was, following Robben’s argument, important in the mobilisation and politisation, even in situations of torture, of ‘parental feelings of trust and protection’ that usually remain in the private domain: a process of politicisation that would eventually become a major transformative force in the country. This was an extraordinarily courageous act, in the face of fear, threats, and merciless accusations that parents were guilty —through improper rearing— of making their children into dangerous activists threatening the stability of the State. The public exposure of maternal feelings by the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo “transgressed the division between public and domestic in the reverse direction to the one used by the military assault teams.” After the dictatorship, during the tenure of Raúl Alfonsín, a Commission to research the fate of the disappeared was installed (CONADEP), and new and very disturbing elements entered the emotional landscapes and the political debates. It was time to confront the still unknown details of the horror, the mass graves, and the public and private management of the corpses.
Exhumations are no doubt extremely complex and emotionally charged events, and the tide went from favouring them to growing misgivings, as the expected identifications did not come through. A controversy grew between those who favoured dignified reburials and those, mostly the madres, who valued more the vindication of the disappeared’s political ideas, and came to think of exhumations as a form of political deactivation of their struggle. The latter decided to “keep their emotional wounds open” and “socialise their maternity” so as to resist the social stream of forgetting associated, in their view, with the opening of the mass graves. The complex debates about exhumations and reburials in Argentina and other countries, such as contemporary Spain, speak of the enormous difficulties that societies which have endured wars, military coups, repression and violence have in facing the past in ways which are legally convincing, politically meaningful, socially productive, symbolically satisfying and emotionally healing.