DECENTRALISATION IN BRITAIN AND SPAIN: THE CASES OF
SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA

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I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that this work is my own.

Luis Moreno Fernández
To Maglli and Jorge

"Quién pudiera como tú, 
a la vez quieto y en marcha, 
cantar siempre el mismo verso 
pero con distinta agua"

(Gerardo Diego, from "Romance del Duero" in Soria)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>.................XI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>.................1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>.................2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Previews and premises</td>
<td>.................2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Scotland and Catalonia: affinities and differences</td>
<td>.................2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. Research objectives and structure of the thesis</td>
<td>.................9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>.................12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>.................13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Introduction</td>
<td>.................13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Epistemological assumptions</td>
<td>.................14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. State and society</td>
<td>.................17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Territory and power</td>
<td>.................24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Peripheral nationalism, the malintegration in the multinational nation-state</td>
<td>.................33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Centre and periphery: the relations of interdependence</td>
<td>.................41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Internal colonialism and the reactive ethnic change .......... 46

- Core areas, ethnic competition and ethnocentrism .......... 50

2.7. Decentralisation in multinational states ............... 54

- The choice of self-government ..................... 57

- National/regional consciousness and the "dual rationality" .......... 60

- Government and public accountability .................. 71

2.8. Conclusion ..................................... 74

Notes .................................................. 78

3. THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNMENT.

- Introduction ........................................ 82

3.1. THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR SCOTLAND ..................... 83

- A trio of distinctive and representative voices .......... 84

- A centre-periphery "tour de force" ..................... 86

3.1.1. Tam Dalyell, the "status quo" option ................. 89

- The "slippery-slope" argument ........................ 92

- The West Lothian question ........................... 95

- Some proposals .................................... 98

- The outcome of the 1979 Referendum .................... 101

3.1.2. Stephen Maxwell, the case for an independent Scotland .......... 102
-Old myths, new nationalism
-The Radical approach
-Class divisions
-Oil and financial policies
-The electoral débâcle of the SNP

3.1.3. John Mackintosh and the devolution of power

-Public accountability
-Regionalisation and nationalism
-An outline of Devolution
-The Scottish political class, a key element
-Labour Governments' indecisiveness

3.1.4. The three alternatives: an assessment

-Tam Dalyell's "undemocratic" option
-Stephen Maxwell, a portion of "idealism"
-John Mackintosh, a deepening of democracy

3.2. SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CATALONIA: THE OUTCOME OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS

3.2.1. Recent historical background

3.2.2. The conceptual inter-relation democracy-decentralisation

3.2.3. The formulation of the Statute of Autonomy

3.2.4. Home-Rule, expression of the Catalan identity
4. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

4.1. Introduction ........................................... 184
   - Historical background ................................... 191

4.2. Main divergences and similarities ......................... 193
   - Legislative supremacy .................................. 194
   - Power to raise revenue ................................ 198
   - Financial arrangements ................................ 201
   - Electoral proportional representation ................. 207
   - Secretary of State and Delegate of Government ............ 212

4.3. Devolved matters and transfer of powers .................. 218

4.4. List of legislative and executive powers .................. 224

4.5. Devolved powers: an assessment .......................... 234

Notes .................................................................. 245

5. ECONOMIC DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONAL POLICIES

- Introduction ............................................... 247
  - Unitary states, regional inequalities and market forces ........... 249
  - A framework of regional development .......................... 252
5.2. THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY DIMENSION

5.1.1. Historical background ............................................ 255

5.1.2. Resources and potentialities .................................... 259

5.1.3. The perception of relative deprivation "vis-à-vis" England
- Unemployment .......................................................... 264
- Health ................................................................. 265
- Housing ............................................................... 267
- North Sea oil revenue and public spending ...................... 268
- ................................................................. 270

5.1.4. The public sector in Scotland .................................... 275
- Planning of Public Expenditure and decision-making .............. 277
- Local authorities finances .......................................... 282
- Nationalised industries ............................................ 286

5.1.5. SDA, instrument of regional development ...................... 289
- The need for a Scottish regional policy .......................... 291
- Organisation, function and performance .......................... 298
- "Locate in Scotland" .................................................. 300
- SDA: An assessment .................................................. 301

5.2. THE REGIONAL ECONOMY OF CATALONIA

5.2.1. Historical background ............................................ 303

5.2.2. Resources and potentialities ................................. 309
- Catalonia and the EEC .............................................. 316

5.2.3. Catalonia's financial autonomy and the inter-territorial equalisation in Spain
- Fiscal autonomy and equalising solidarity: the sense of comparative grievance .................. 318
- ................................................................. 322

VIII
5.2.4. The economic policy of the Generalitat ........................................330
   -Prospect of an autonomous economic policy ..................................344

Notes ..................................................................................349

6. SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA:A SPECULATIVE EXERCISE OF
   PROSPECTIVE INSIGHTS.

   -Introduction: visions of the future ............................................355

6.1. THE PRESSURE FOR A SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT .............................357

   -The Conservative Party .........................................................358
   -The Labour Party ................................................................358
   -The Alliance ........................................................................367
   -The Scottish National Party ..................................................374

6.1.1. Future variables and the quest for Scottish self-government .........379

   -Endogenous variables ................................................................386
   1) SNP electoral revival .........................................................387
   2) The "conversion" of Scottish Labour to self-government ...............387
   3) The transformation of the British State ....................................392

   -An exogenous variable: the European context ............................396

6.1.2 A constitutional convention for the achievement of Scottish self-government .................................................399

   -The proceedings of a Scottish Convention ..................................403

   -The proceedings of a Scottish Convention ..................................403
6.2. TOWARDS A FEDERAL-LIKE "ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMÍAS"

6.2.1. The shaping of Autonomical Spain

- Future scenarios of the autonomical model

6.2.1. The deepening of autonomy in Catalonia

Notes

APPENDICES

Appendix 2: Survey polls in Scotland and Catalonia on national identification

- Scotland

- Catalonia

Appendix 3: Chronology of Scottish and Catalan processes of Home-Rule

Appendix 3.2.i: Chronology of political inter-party coordination and political unification in Catalonia after the Spanish Civil War

Appendix 3.2.ii: Political parties and Trade Unions in post-Franco Catalonia

Appendix 3.2.iii: Parties' positions in the drawing up of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia

Appendix 3.2.iv: Modifications in the draft of the Statute of Autonomy during the debate of the Bill in the Spanish Parliament

Appendix 4: Scottish Home Rule attempts in Westminster Parliament

X
Appendix 5.1.i: The Scottish Rate Support Grant System (1981-82) ..................488

Appendix 5.1.ii: Sources of Scottish Local Authority Income .........................490

Appendix 5.1.iii: Nationalised industries and public corporations in Scotland ..................491

Appendix 5.1.iv: Structure and functions of the Scottish Development Agency ..................493

Appendix 5.1.v: SDA's financial summary in 1983 and 1984 ...............................495

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES ...............................497
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XII
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This thesis undertakes a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia with respect to the politics of decentralisation and ethnic nationalism within their respective British and Spanish frameworks. The subjects of this comparative study share a somewhat similar configuration as sub-state peripheral nations with analogous perceptions, interpretations and aspirations for home rule. Nonetheless, Scotland and Catalonia have not followed parallel processes over the last decades, as far as the achievement of institutional forms of self-government is concerned.

During the last decades, the revival of ethnoterritorial political movements in Western Europe has coincided with an increasing challenge to the legitimisation of the centralist model of the unitary state. Not surprisingly, both elements of decentralisation and ethnic pluralism have been, and still are, major sources of political conflict in the national-multinational United Kingdom and Spain.

This thesis aims at identifying the trends and circumstances underlying the political developments towards the achievement of decentralised forms of self-government in Scotland and Catalonia. The prospective work carried out in the final part of this piece of research contributes to the findings of optimal alternatives for the political futures of both British Scotland and Spanish Catalonia.
1. **INTRODUCTION.**

1.1. **Previews and premises.**

This thesis produces a comparative analysis of Scotland and Catalonia, although it does not exhaustively review the historical background of either nationality. It concentrates mainly on recent events and the present situation which, with the assumptions drawn from historical analysis, provide the framework for prospective political insights and the propositions put forward in the final part of this work.

This thesis focuses principally on the individual elements of space and ethnicity which, together with class, are responsible for most of the division and cohesion in the contemporary world (1). The thesis acknowledges the decisive importance of the functional dimension in all aspects of human organisation and also assumes class stratification to be a necessary element in the analysis of any social formation. However, this thesis contends, against the views of other political scientists and sociologists, that ethnical and spatial differences are necessary, at least as much as class cleavages, for an understanding of the functioning of the modern state and for the processes of social mobilization and social change which can take place in human societies. Accordingly, special emphasis will be placed on the ethnoterritorial aspects of the two countries examined in this comparative study.

1.2. **Scotland and Catalonia: affinities and differences.**

In order to set out the framework within which this thesis undertakes its comparative study, it is first necessary to focus on the main affinities and differences between Scotland and Catalonia.
Such affinities and differences, which are later discussed and substantiated in subsequent sections, can be outlined following a basic four-fold criterion:

A) Historical (2).

A,1) Affinities. In pre-capitalist Europe, Scotland and Catalonia exercised significant political independence as ethnically structured territories. This continued until their personal dynastic unions with England and Castile, respectively (ie. James I-VI in 1603 and the Catholic Kings in 1469). Nevertheless, both nations continued to preserve institutional forms of self-government until the coercive imposition of political standardization which occurred in the aftermath of military defeat (ie. the failure of the Jacobites to reinstate the Stuarts in 1745 and the Catalans setback in their support for Archiduke Charles in the Spanish War of Succession in 1714). These events inserted themselves in the origins of the processes of national integration and state-building occurring in the United Kingdom and Spain during the 18th and 19th centuries.

In Scotland and Catalonia, during the second and first half of the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a progressive re-assertion of nationalist values with unfulfilled economic and social expectations, caused by the decline of the British Empire and the inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to achieve its revolution nationwide. These political movements eventually forced concessions from the centre which, in order to accommodate them, granted a degree of administrative devolution: eg. The Secretaryship for Scotland in 1885 and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya in 1914. The creation of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh in 1939, and the achievement of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, although different in political and institutional content, can be seen as outcomes of a similar political
struggle for the gain of larger degrees of home rule.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with the progressive obsolescence of the centralist state apparatus in liberal Britain and despotic Spain, the peripheral nationalisms of Scotland and Catalonia challenged the political legitimation of the corporatist forms of uniformization imposed on them from the centre of their respective polities. With the 1979 Referenda in Scotland and Catalonia, the desire for self-government of a majority of Scots and Catalans was expressed.

A.2) Differences. While throughout the Middle Ages the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation was one of the leading Mediterranean powers, Scotland continually struggled to overcome the "natural" expansionist interests of England in the Wars of Independence (3). Both the out-looking Catalan and defensive Scottish psycho-social attitudes have somehow moulded the ancestral national character of the Catalans and Scots. More important for the purposes of this thesis is the fact that, when the nationalist movements emerged defiantly in the 1960s and 1970s, the ancestral detachment of their respective compound identities -ie. Scottish and Catalan, but at the same time British and Spanish too- reflected the assertive and reactive nature of their similar political aspirations for self-government.

The main historical dissimilarity between both political processes in Scotland and Catalonia in contemporary times is that, during the II Spanish Republic, the Catalans achieved democratic institutions of self-government. The Statute of Autonomy and the Generalitat were later abolished by Franco in 1939 at the end of the Civil War. The Scots have not had any analogous experience.

These divergent realities undoubtedly conditioned not only social mobilisation in Scotland and Catalonia prior to the 1979 Referenda but, more importantly, the form and content of the political response from the centre of both centralist states.
It is, however, important to note that if the "memory" of the Republican Catalan Government and Parliament has counted as an extraordinary asset in the centre-periphery negotiation in the transitional period after the demise of Franco's dictatorship, the mere existence of an administrative Scottish Office since WWII, in combination with the civil institutions preserved by the 1707 Treaty of Union, has also enhanced the subsequent salience of the Scottish dimension in British politics.

B) Political.

B,1) Affinities. Scotland and Catalonia have, in recent times, seen the rise of strong nationalist parties -the Scottish National Party and the coalition Convergència i Unió- which have brought not only an element of heterogeneity to the British and Spanish electoral scenarios but have also tested the adaptability of both liberal and post-despotic state apparatuses to profound institutional changes.

During the 1970s a majority of Scots and Catalans were mobilised by similar political perceptions, interpretations and aspirations regarding home rule. Subsequently, and despite a diverse degree of intensity, both communities voted positively for the creation of self-governed institutions in the 1979 Referenda (ie. according to the provisions of the 1978 Scotland Act and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy).

The lack of major political violence in these two nationalities is moreover highly significant. It indicates the absence both of strong intra-communal social cleavages, as is the case in Northern Ireland, and of a considerable section of the population being ready to support the fight, by whatever means possible, for self-determination as in the Basque Country. In any case, both forms of
political nationalism shared the perception that political violence would undoubtedly jeopardise social mobilisation and popular support for the cause of self-government. Moreover, the reformist character of such nationalisms is antagonistic to radical change. Neither have the policies of repression by their centralised states or the internal social climate reached the level of suffocating oppression or civil war as happened in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s.

B,2) Differences. Setting aside electoral and institutional traditions, the stark difference between the Scottish and Catalan processes for the gain of home rule rests upon their antithetical strategic approaches. The Scottish political class has tended to defend, in an inert manner, a political territorial pattern which did not exist in post-Franco Catalonia and which has also been greatly influenced by the dialectics of partisan competition and self-interest characteristic of English-British politics. Thus, the achievement of home rule, which has been the concern of a majority of Scots, has always been subordinated to the priorities of each party.

The Catalan forces, on the contrary, not having to break a territorial pattern of institutional power in post-Franco Catalonia, have sought and negotiated the articulation of a common strategy to make the re-establishment of institutions of self-government after the demise of Francoist dictatorship possible. This pattern has followed the traditional inclination of the Catalan seny ("common sense") for negotiation and compromise, or "pactism" (4).

C) Social and cultural.

C,1) Affinities. The concept of dual nationality, or compound
nationality, is a common element of identification for a majority of Scots and Catalans. Both peripheral nations have preserved a national identity, or quasi-nationhood, from pre-Union times and have also assimilated a post-Union identity, a product of the process of malintegration in the British and Spanish state-building.

A consequence of such pre-Union collective consciousness is the employment of both Scottish mythology and the Catalan language as the main socio-cultural instruments in the forging of ethnical cohesiveness.

C,2) The diverse nature of socio-cultural instruments has reinforced the assertive and reactive character of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. Not surprisingly, many of the Scottish myths for popular consumption deal with heroes like William Wallace or Robert the Bruce, or events like the battle of Bannockburn, rather than the egalitarian values developed in Scottish civil society since the Union with England. The former emphasise Scotland's successful defense against the external English adversary and contribute to feed, in turn, a certain sense of defensive "hopelessness" in national Scottish values vis-à-vis the "powerfulness" of the English ones (5).

The Catalan language, on the other hand, provides the means for a permanent re-assertion of Catalan ethno-cultural distinctiveness. External adversary theory has also played, and continues to play, an important role in the articulation of political mobilization in Catalonia. However, the emergence in the last decades of new outward-looking cultural forms, not exclusively tied to pre-Union signs of identity, has brought about an active socio-cultural Catalan role in concurrence with other Spanish values.

D) Economic.
D.1) **Affinities.** The regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia have similar economic indicators as regards population (5.15 and 5.96 million, respectively), location (peripheral regions) and production (EU GDP: 1.6% and 1.3%). They have traditionally perceived themselves as discriminated by the core areas and political elites of their respective unitary states: i.e. The Scottish perception of relative deprivation and the Catalan sense of comparative grievance. In other words, while a large sector of Scottish society is of the opinion that the English, -especially those living in the South-East- are economically better off than the Scots, the Catalans' comparative grievance is based upon a feeling of being treated unfavourably by the centre, or receiving less than they have given. These two popular perceptions have greatly fuelled the rise of modern political nationalism in both peripheral nations.

D.2) **Differences.** In relative terms, and taking into account both the British and the Spanish contexts, Scotland can be seen to be poorer and Catalonia richer. Growth of population, the simplest economic indicator of the well-being of a country, illustrates this point. Whereas in 1931 the population of Scotland accounted for 12.1% of the UK total figures, in 1971 the percentage fell to 10.7%. Catalonia's population, by contrast, climbed from 11.2% of the Spanish total in 1940 to 15.6% in 1974.

However, as far as natural resources are concerned, the contrast is spectacular. North Sea oil, for example, provided £16 bn of the gross revenue of the UK Treasury in 1982, while the very few natural resources in Catalonia account to no more than some salt mines, lignite mines and a very small oil extraction off the cost of Tarragona.

Although both countries have shared the recent experience of an increased penetration of multinational companies, their regional
economies show dissimilarities with respect to their economic structures: specialised, in the case of Scotland, with large "uncompetitive" heavy industries which are in the gradual process of closure; and diversified in the case of Catalonia with production based on small firms and businesses. Paradoxically, the financial sector based in Edinburgh is very strong in comparison with the feebleness of Catalan local finances.

In general terms, the "productive" sector of the Scottish regional economy relies greatly upon the implementation of policies from above, basically through the provision of jobs and the creation of economic activities via British public expenditure. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial vocation developed by a petit bourgeois mentality makes the Catalan industrialists more likely to develop initiatives from below. These are on a smaller scale and are very adaptable to changing economic scenarios.

1.3. Research Objectives and Structure of the Thesis.

The objective of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the approaches to political decentralisation in Britain and Spain, more specifically in Scotland and Catalonia, and to postulate future scenarios according to their political desirability.

This comparative study is divided into six parts. Part I introduces the premises which provide the framework for the scope and field research of this thesis. It also outlines the main affinities and differences between the subjects of this comparative work.

Part II, which deals with theoretical concepts, models and ideas, provides epistemological assumptions for the framework of decentralisation in Britain and Spain. The concepts of state, society, territory and power are reviewed through criticisms of the
liberal-democratic, Marxist and social-democratic schools of thought. Peripheral nationalism, the centre-periphery dichotomy and the concept of dual nationality are also examined critically and are systematically referred to the cases of Britain-Scotland and Spain-Catalonia.

Part III is devoted to the analysis of the political processes which have taken place in Scotland and Catalonia during the last decades and the different courses which such processes followed both in form and content. Chapter 3.1 analyses and assesses the three alternatives of "status quo", "secession" and "devolution" as represented by the ideas of Tam Dalyell, Stephen Maxwell and John Mackintosh. Chapter 3.2. is concerned with the consensual process developed in post-Franco Catalonia and the negotiations which have taken place between the political parties involved in the programme of re-establishment of Catalan home rule.

Part IV examines and evaluates the constitutional provisions of the 1978 Scotland Act and the 1979 Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia. After analysing the main divergences and similarities, this thesis contends that the arrangements of the never implemented Scotland Act barely disguised a tight central control whereas the constitutional provisions of Catalonia's Statute has made the achievement of a meaningful level of self-government possible for the Catalan institutions.

Part V analyses the Scottish and Catalan regional economies. The resources and potential of both economies are analysed in Chapters 5.1. and 5.2. The perception of relative deprivation and the sense of comparative grievance are presented as two powerful elements which have fuelled political nationalism in both peripheral sub-state nations. It is contended, after analysis of the implementation of regional policies by the SDA and the CiU-ERC Governments of the
Generalitat, that only the planning of industrial policies by regionally accountable bodies can develop "genuine" economic strategies which will have a real impact at such sub-state level.

Part VI explores hypotheses about future trends in decentralised forms of self-government in Scotland and Catalonia. This thesis adopts the project-building approach which formulates the choice of desirable futures on the basis of the possible and probable. Finally, a Scottish inter-party constitutional convention, for the establishment of an institutional form of home rule, and the deepening of self-government in Catalonia, in the framework of a federal-like Estado de las Autonomías, are identified as the desirable scenarios to be achieved in the future.

Appendices related to matters examined in the different chapters of this thesis are reproduced at the end of this work together with bibliographical references.

The sources of information for the writing of this thesis have largely been provided in three different languages - English, Castilian and Catalan. Since it is written in English, the criteria followed for editing have been to reproduce most expressions in their arglicised form, wherever possible or whenever the existence of such an English form has been available. Otherwise, the names and nouns are written in their toponimical form. Quotations and other references not taken from English sources, and which have been translated from Castilian and Catalan, are the entire responsibility of the author of this thesis.
NOTES

1. According to Giddens, A. (1979, p. 227), each of such divisions of class, ethnic differentiation and territorial claims tends to be regionalised in time-space. Moreover, "regions within societies also often have cultural and ethnic significance, that can either cut accross or can act to further class divisions".

2. For a chronological account of both Scottish and Catalan contemporary processes of home rule see Appendix 3.

3. Catalans fought Castilian/Spanish assimilation in revolts and wars of independence from 1640 to 1714: i.e. "War of Reapers" 1640-1652 with the result of Catalonia's lost of Roselló and Cerdanya to France in 1659 (Peace of the Pyrenees) and War of Succession which ended with the surrender of the Catalans after the forces of Philip V entered Barcelona on September 11, 1714.

4. Sery, a word without an English or Castilian equivalent, is similar to the French sagesse. It implies common sense, prudence and wisdom rather than intelligence. The opposite of sery is arrauxament, an ecstasy of violence. According to Alba, V. (1975, pp. 10-11), these two words express the extremism of the Catalans: "The step from good sense to violence is taken when there is no way to defend sensibly what has been agreed on".

5. Authors like Paterson, L (1981, p. 71) argues that Tartan's principal legacy is a "cancerous national inferiority complex: the quite unmistakable psychological end-product of two centuries of tawdry palliatives -of escaping from social problems into wishful fantasy".
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.

2.1. Introduction.

This Part II will examine some theoretical concepts, models and ideas about the epistemological assumptions which will serve as a framework for the study of decentralisation in Britain and Spain in the particular cases of Scotland and Catalonia. The necessity for such epistemological assumptions and theoretical framework will be explained and justified in section 2.2.

The concepts of state, society, territory and power will be analysed in sections 2.3 and 2.4, in the review of the liberal-democratic, Marxist and social-democratic paradigms. The constant reference of these concepts to Britain-Scotland and Spain-Catalonia serves to frame the body of knowledge put forward in this dissertation.

Peripheral nationalism, as a consequence of the malintegration in multinational states like Britain and Spain, will be examined in section 2.5. A criticism of the shortcomings of functionalist/diffusionist and Marxist approaches to the concepts of national integration and nationalism gives perspective to the centre-periphery dichotomy which is formulated in section 2.6. Here, a critical analysis of the models of internal colonialism/reactive ethnic change, core areas, ethnic competition and ethnocentrism will define the nature and characteristics through which Scottish and Catalan peripheral nationalisms can be asserted and comprehended.

In section 2.7, the concept of decentralisation, as opposed to deconcentration, will be formulated. Three main requirements will be detected in the framing of the decentralist paradigm applied to Britain-Scotland and Spain-Catalonia: the demand for self-government,
regional/national consciousness or identity, and public accountability.

The reference to the concept of dual nationality, a feature which this thesis maintains is common to both Scots and Catalans, is advanced as the cornerstone for understanding the reality and aspirations of both countries. The "dual nationality" concept is presented as a paramount standpoint in this thesis in order to explain not only past political events, but also to introspect on future trends in British Scotland and Spanish Catalonia.

2.2. Epistemological assumptions.

A theoretical framework of reference has two purposes. First, to provide observations, experiences and facts, through the classification and grading of data, and subsequently put the results, findings and interpretations of these into perspective; second, to facilitate the elaboration of specific hypotheses. A wider range of objectives for the use of a body of knowledge includes typologies (ie. methods of categorizing information and social phenomenology), speculations and explanations of future and past events, respectively (1). The importance, in short, of the concepts used in a piece of research is that they highlight the observed phenomena and indicate not only the characteristics but also the significance of the data being handled.

This thesis, consequently, intends to respond to the following three basic criteria:

1) To examine the basic concepts and formulations found in the literature as regards territorial politics in general and their applicability to the cases of Scotland and Catalonia.

2) To criticise these formulations.

3) To articulate explanatory theories of both the Scottish and
Catalan political developments in order to provide a sound basis for the understanding and the prospective insight sought in this thesis.

As far as the last point is concerned, many plausible theories have been developed by academics which offer a coherent understanding of these phenomena. Social scientists have put forward their interpretations according to their particular perspectives: political science, sociology, economics, anthropology, history, political theory, and social psychology or social administration. As a result, the emphasis in their interpretations has been affected by the disciplines which they are most accustomed to handle: political variables, psychological attitudes, economic deprivation, ethnic consciousness, historical trends and so forth. This point having been made, it is necessary to underline the axiomatic fact that every scientist or even school of thought tends to observe a situation through certain "paradigms" (2)

The comensurability, therefore, of the explanations sought by social scientists remains attached to the scope and nature of their own epistemological assumptions. Paradigms usually suggest new methodological procedures for collecting empirical evidence, new problems for solution and sometimes, but not necessarily, explain phenomena which other paradigms are unable to explain. The existence of a diversity of explanations does not entail that the different theories are incompatible. They will be often be found to be complementary. In fact, social phenomena, far from being "coherent" and uniform, are not only diverse but generally develop in mutually interdependent and interacting structures possessing a spatiotemporal nature.

This thesis does not share as an absolute principle the Cartesia-Newtonian reductionist view that "all" aspects of complex phenomena can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. It
will rather apply a holicist conception of reality which also takes into account values of intuition born in the substratum of information and perceptions accumulated in the Weltanschauung of the author of this dissertation (3).

As will be later substantiated, the cases of British Scotland and Spanish Catalonia constitute two examples with a degree of similarity which makes the so-called "concomitant variation" of this cross-national comparative study highly optimal. This dissertation will also aim to solve—in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia—the recurrent problems in both "structural-functionalism" and "systems analysis" approaches to comparative politics by trying to decipher the transformation of "inputs" (e.g. historical patterns and social/economic/value systems) into "outputs" (e.g. political performance and social change). In other words, to examine how inputs, in the form of demands and supports influencing a political system/process, are transformed into policy decisions and actions (outputs) (4).

In the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, a number of theories can be explored—either individually or complementarily—in order to explain the upsurge of their respective peripheral nationalist movements: deligitimacy and transformation of the nation-state, relative deprivation, internal colonialism, strategic and protest voting, economic decline and international dependency, anticroorporatist reactions, corporatist political mobilisation, collective voluntarism, and either pre-revolutionary situation or supra-rational realignments (5).

This dissertation will explore some concepts—such as malintegration in multinational states, dual-nationality and the quest for self-government—with the purpose of providing a better understanding of the phenomena involved. Likewise, the review of
theories and formulations concerned with the field of this research will define the body of knowledge on which this work stands as well as, by contrast, those which are not explicitly referred to.

2.3. State and society.

Any approach to the subject of territorial politics and the political structures through which the state exercises its power - over and within society - should begin with a review of the concepts of state and society. Two main currents of thought have been traditionally identified with respect to these: the "liberal-democratic" and the "Marxist". A social-democratic via media, which incorporates parts of the other two, is also widely considered (6). Let us, in brief, analyse these three paradigms:

1) Traditional democratic liberalism regards the state as a neutral network of political institutions which can enforce ultimate control over the citizens of a territory (7). Thus, elected regimes would capture and use the state machinery in order to achieve their own subjective ends. One salient feature of this theory is the separation of the institutional political dimension of the state from the economic one. The extent of state intervention in the citizens' community should therefore be restricted and social conflicts should consequently be resolved by the laissez-faire of the market forces. Modern state intervention is an outcome of the political process with the aim of promoting general welfare to ameliorate the "problems" created by the market economy. The "pluralistic" variant of this liberal approach emphasizes this state's promotional vocation for general welfare, mainly as a consequence of the conflicting interests within society. It is also "pluralistic", if only because the economic and political powers are institutionally separated.
Considered politically as an institutional system of power, the state is structurally and internally differentiated not only in terms of the functions carried out by the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, but also because of the action of diverse interest groups and political parties within the territory involved.

The "liberal-democratic" state, in summary, acts as a neutral supplier of goods, providing and preserving the framework for the market economic forces to operate "freely" within its spatial boundaries.

2) For mainstream Marxist theory the state is the "bearer" of the interests of capital and links the content of state activity with the interests of the ruling class. Neomarxists consider it as a capitalist state which "instrumentalizes" and/or "structurally" develops the economic and ideological nature of the bourgeois mode of production (8). A recent neo-Marxist contribution to the materialist theory of the capitalist state has systematically attempted to "derive" the state as a political form from the nature of capitalist relations of production. Accordingly, the structure and function of the state can only adequately be explained with reference to the global requirements of capital. Hence, the understanding of the state has to be based on the form and content of class struggle (9).

In any case, the consideration that the state in any capitalist country must provide conditions under which the capital accumulation process can take place is common to the "traditional" Marxist theory as well as to the "instrumentalist", "structuralist" and "derivationist" neo-Marxist variants.

3) The social-democratic approach considers the democratic-pluralistic state as an institutional form which can be "captured" or seized and subsequently used to reform the market economy and, eventually, transform the capitalist mode of production into a
socialist one on a gradual long-term basis.

The "reformist" alternative is mainly represented by the social-democrat/socialist parties in Western Europe and their "Eurosocialist" strategy. For the social-democratic reformists the state in "operational" rather than neutral. However, many of the "reformist" yardsticks (e.g. "democratic socialism", the "welfare state", etc.) owe more to the liberal tradition than to the Marxist principles which some of these parties embraced in their origins.

In practice, these social-democrat/socialist parties tend to be "statist" if only in giving to the state a central role both in the realization of the general welfare and in redressing the conflicting consequences of uneven capitalist growth. A consequence of this is its wholehearted commitment to economic planning monitored by the state.

However, the actual uses made by social-democrats of the state institutions clarify little about the nature of the state in this social-democratic paradigm. Within this perspective, governments holding a social-democratic view of the state may match the short-term "reformist" interest of the dominated classes. Nevertheless, these uses of state apparatuses by social-democratic governments can be instrumental in the crises which occur in the accumulation process and can actually bring about new and different corporatist and state capitalist structures.

In Britain, for example, the emphasis on corporatism by the Labour government since 1976 and the further decline of Parliament coincided with a "statist" centralisation of government and the paramount role given to the Cabinet in the British state. The "costs" of Labour policies which improved the material circumstances of the British workers clashed with the long-term reproduction problems of British capital, especially after the 1973 economic crisis. Labour
Governments (Wilson–Callaghan), when facing the challenge of combining the reformist demands of the workers with the need of British capital, implemented corporatist strategies (eg. the Social Contract) only at central state level. Eventually, these corporatist practices clashed with other corporatist interests; eg. the conflict with the Trade Unions which provoked the "Winter of Discontent" in 1978–9. This issue counted as a main factor in the swing of votes to the Conservatives in the 1979 general election. Since then, new "Thatcherite" capitalist structures have been implemented increasing centralisation and the direct intervention of the state to "help" the reproduction of British capital (eg. "privatisation" of profitable public companies, deregulation in "loss-making" public economic sectors, etc.).

These three currents of thought tend to look at the state as a new reality in modern societies which structures itself and acts "upon" civil society, either as an autonomous "neutral" supplier of social goods (liberal-democratic), as a "bearer" of the interests of capital (Marxist) or as an "operational", rather than "neutral", provider of welfare (social-democratic). But they all play down or misunderstand the importance of historical backgrounds and/or the nature and typology of the formation of the modern state.

The historical analysis of the state-building and nation integration is, therefore, essential in order to realize the different range of state formations and models produced. Likewise, the changing pattern in the diverse outcomes of the interplay of state upon civil society, and vice versa, has to be analysed not only from the viewpoint of the economic structures involved, but also from that concerning the social-political-cultural attitudes of the classes and sectors within the territory to which the state confines itself.
It is broadly agreed that the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution created a clear differentiation between state and society. At present, it is necessary to detect the scenarios of greatest interaction between both civil society and state institutions to understand how and in what ways they affect each other.

Intervention, in the process of maintenance and reproduction of labour power, and homogenization, of individuals and social groups, are two characteristic trends followed by Western capitalist countries in this century. Such trends are not exclusive of each other and both are affected by an increasing corporatist "rationalisation" and centralisation.

State intervention has increased enormously in the areas of education, health and welfare in general. In Western Europe, Sweden, with a public sector amounting to 65 per cent of the "national cake", offers the starkest example. Britain's government programmes in social security, health and personal social services, education and housing accounts for 26 per cent of the GDP. Since 1945 the number of state employees has grown to 30 per cent of the total workforce. In Spain, for example, welfare expenditure accounts for 22% of the GDP.

State intervention has also become more engaged in the provision of economic resources in the production process as regards both labour power (eg. occupational and industrial retraining) and capital investment (eg. loans, incentives and direct subsidies to industrial projects).

Homogenization within the Western state rests upon the expanded corporatist practices of both state institutions and all political, social, economic and cultural agents which operate within the boundaries of the state. A common feature of these practices is the pyramidal-type structures for action and the reinforcement of
decision-making in organisational cores. Homogenization also occurs because of state officials' objectives of perpetuating and safeguarding their own interests. Only the ultimate control by force of the citizenship—disregarding indirect sources of social control—, together with a uniformization in the treatment of state subjects explain the shift of initiatives and resources from the local to central/state level. In Britain, for example, although local authority expenditure reaches a quarter of the total public expenditure, the political decision-making remains at the central/state level by means of "cash limits" and other financial restrictions. Consequently, local government can only perform de facto hardly more than merely administrative functions. In Spain although the local authorities enjoy constitutional guarantees for political autonomy, their financial scope of action is still low (i.e. around 7 per cent of the total state public expenditure).

Homogenization, on top of the social "massage" brought about by the modern mass media, is closely linked to the growth of bureaucratic institutions in the so-called "post/industrial" societies of Western Europe (10). Both state intervention and homogenization are achieved by the instrumentalisation of "rational" centralisation—concentration of power—in an attempt to avoid conflicts among social units within the state (11). This has also been coupled with the principle of "utility maximization" which provides the state institutions and plutocratic class with the "conditional" rather than "relative" autonomy to perform functions and to increase social control. Hence, state officials—politicians and bureaucrats—follow, under "supervision", their own subjective interests which are, essentially, of a two-fold nature: a) Short-term: Public choice commitment in order to maximise tenure of office and budgetary resources; b) Long-term: Attainment of programmatic goals and, with
this, perpetuation of state institutions (12).

These two commitments of state officials in state institutions have to be seen in the context of the economic and political framework of the Western States—the field of our work. But it is paramount to realize that this Western state model is not simply a tool of ruling-class interests, functionally instrumentalised by state officials but is also an institutional outcome—territorially patterned—of class struggle and social mobilization (13).

As was said above, there has been in recent times a trend towards increasing central state intervention in the economy to correct the failures of the capitalist mode of production—ie. the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. The territorial allocation of power and resources within the boundaries of the state decisively affects, therefore, the outcome of its institutional form. Conversely, the model of such an institutional outcome—centralised or "fragmented"—also imposes on civil society the constraints under which the continuum of social transformation takes place and, ultimately, indicates the different scenarios and types of political mobilisation.

The centralisation/decentralisation debate has usually remained isolated on the political fringe of the discussion of the efficiency versus inefficiency of state institutions in the provision of public goods. Such marginal treatment minimises the comprehensive study of the formation (state building and national integration) of the modern states, the intergovernmental relations within its boundaries, the crisis in the legitimacy of its political institutions (eg. Parliament and representative democracy) and the impact of the internationalisation of capital in the "post-industrial" state. This thesis deals principally with the first three of these four elements.
2.4. Territory and power.

For our discussion, power can be defined as the means by which one party is able to make actively or by default—another party do something according to the wishes of the former. Territory, on the other hand, is the arena where the exercise of power between the different political interests and institutions takes place. Thus, the distribution/dispersion of power can be observed from two perspectives: who wields power and where the power is located within a territory.

Three different approaches or paradigms have been widely considered in the study of power: pluralist, elitist and Marxist. While the first argues that power is scattered among diverse individuals, groups or agencies, and that an ample range of interests exists within different policy-making processes, the other two contend that power is concentrated. In an elitist-dominated society, the power deployed by the political machine seeks to perpetuate the privileges of the elite; Marxists also support the idea of political power monopolised by a "few", but objectively structured to favour the interests of the capitalist/dominant class (14).

Power is distributed in functional terms. The emerging industrial state in the 19th century created diverse functional units to accomplish its main economic goals of expansion and accumulation. This progressive functional division of the state and growth of government has brought about an increasing trend towards étatisation, bureaucratization, judicialization (15) and central planning. Following this emphasis on functionally distributed power, some sociologists and political scientists have argued—
mistakenly- that spatial differences do not count as much as other functional cleavages in the running of the modern state (16).

In fact, power has an inherent territorial dimension. It cannot be abstracted from its geographical component. The development of industrial society inevitably involved a reallocation of the spatial division of power. Since the Industrial Revolution, and due mainly to a marked increase in the volume and scope of government activity, power has been progressively allocated according to meaningful geographical criteria. As a consequence, the issues "dispersion-concentration", "central-local relations" and "state homogenization-regional diversity" have become crucial for both the configuration of the state institutions and the social transformations which can take place within the state.

According to this process of state building, two broad models can be detected: a) centralised, with a process of decision-making mainly concentrated in one core and, b) decentralised, with a dispersion of power throughout distinct layers of government.

Viewed from the angle of the social transformations, the existence of either of the two models of political systems critically conditions the ways and means of the interplay of state-civil society and its institutional outcome. The contrast in strict political terms between the British and the Spanish cases is very illustrative. In the United Kingdom, for example, the British political parties devote themselves to the aim of gaining power in Westminster-Whitehall by means of winning general elections. They view the "unlimited sovereignty" of Westminster as providing the "exclusive" source of power and legitimation to implement state policies. This approach not only conditions political mobilisation but also favours the development of wide-scale corporatist practices. As a result of these state-corporatist practices of political parties or trade unions, the
territorial dimension of the British multinational state is simply neglected, as the "misunderstanding" about the devolution process, which will be examined in Part III, in the 1970s clearly shows.

Furthermore, the absence of political autonomy for the sub-state democratically elected governmental units (ie. local authorities), fixes the central state level as the arena for political contention and all political agents deploy their strategies with the sole aim of gaining institutional power at the centre. This political process not only brings about political apathy but also de-mobilises citizens. Popular confidence in the Westminster Parliament ranked only 40 per cent of British citizenship in 1984 (17). Moreover, and as concerns the specific field of this dissertation, this centralist political model fails to realize the multi-national nature of the British state.

Among British political parties, there is a widespread belief that social transformation can only occur by seizing institutional power at the central state level. A result of this is the "statist"-prone practices of the main social agents which paradoxically strengthens -directly or indirectly- the centralist British state machinery.

In the case of post-Franco Spain, however, the social and political transformation has achieved a decentralised form of the state which provides a greater variety of institutional contacts and interplay of civil society-state institutions. Consequently, the gaining of power at the central state level by one state-wide party does not imply its having the exclusive control over institutions and the political process. Social mobilization at sub-state level can exert greater pressure on the configuration and strength of the state. On September 11, 1977, for example, over one million Catalans gathered in Barcelona to demand self-government. This "regional"
political demonstration highly conditioned the whole process of political negotiation in the wording of the 1979 Spanish Constitution. Finally this Magna Carta adopted the federal-like form of the Estado de las Autonomías.

As has already been said, one of the tasks of this thesis is to analyse the territorial component of the machinery of the state in Britain and in Spain, focussing specifically on the case of two sub-state spatial entities and minority nations: Scotland and Catalonia. The intimate relationship between the state structure and the geographical distribution of power will be substantiated throughout the different sections of this thesis. Attention will be drawn to the fact that social change in Western States can only be realized in the context of the territorial dimension of social, economic and political conflicts.

In the last decades there has been, indeed, a growing distrust of centralised planning and creation of new values by the state, as a solution to the crisis of government and the exercise of power. Anti-corporatist or non-corporatist reactions of local/regional communities—e.g. Scotland and Catalonia—against such a growing étatisation have posed a political challenge to the nature and legitimacy of the industrial state. Corporate or mass society has tended to deny the past of these communities. This trend for uniformization has however provoked an intensification in the search for collective identities by territorial sub-state communities like Scotland and Catalonia during the last three decades.

Britain and Spain share the view that they have arrived at this stage of a so-called "post-modern" society with some degree of their ancestral communal and regional/national consciousness undamaged. Coupled with this, the factor of supra-state mentality brought about
by the existence of European-wide institutions (e.g. European Parliament, EEC Commission, etc) also affects territorially the dimension of social, economic and political conflicts within the state.

This thesis does not intend to explore in depth any other aspects related to the "functional" dimension of power conflicts which can affect the territorial distribution of power within the state. In Britain, for instance, the loss of power by working class organizations in recent years has also had an impact on the territorial configuration of state institutions bringing about an increase in the centralisation of decision-making in the South-East of England, where the political-economic capitalist class is concentrated. Likewise, the also increasing semi-peripherality of the British and Spanish economies with respect to USA transnational companies has also affected the territorial policies developed in both states. In any case, our principal concern lies mainly with the territorial dimension of power within the state. Let us, accordingly, review the basic concepts concerning the distribution of territorial power and its institutional outcome.

Any attempt to classify the form of the state into three distinct models, -i.e. confederal, federal and unitary- necessarily fails to take into account the peculiarities and changing patterns of each of them.

Although both Britain and Spain might be included in the group of "unitary" states their political and constitutional arrangements show considerable dissimilarity. In fact, the paramount role of the British Prime Minister, primus inter pares in the Cabinet supported by one parliamentary group in a legislative body holding "unlimited" sovereignty, clearly underlines the absolute supremacy of one central source of political power in unitary Britain. In turn, the
institutional safeguards for territorial autonomy and the role as arbitrator of the Constitutional Court in conflicts between central, regional and local governments in Spain confers the Spanish "unitary" system with a distinctive quasi-federal qualification.

Other cases of state models, which do not completely fit in with any of the three types mentioned, demand the analysis of territorial power distribution with a greater degree of precision (18). However, the main characteristics of the three "universal" types of state models can be described as follows:

Confederations

(a) Independent constituent territorial units agree to establish a state system of government. The previously constituent territories can withdraw from the confederation. Thus, ultimate control over amendments to the constitution rests upon the constituent territories.

(b) State central authorities govern according to a set of powers (e.g. defence or foreign relations) delegated by the constituent units.

Federations

(a) Territorial power distribution is established in a constitution by consent of the territories involved. A constitutional court guarantees the distribution of power and solves the conflict between the different layers of government.

(b) Central, intermediate and local governments can implement policies autonomously in relation to the set of powers allocated to each of them.

Unitary states

(a) Sovereign political power is undivided and rests upon an organic core of governmental functions. Intermediate and local governments can be established by the central authorities with powers
that are delegated to them.

(b) Executive, legislative and judiciary operate on a state basis with some delegation of administrative functions to sub-state entities.

The confederal-federal-unitary typology can be determined, even more concisely, in the following terms:

1. Where the local-intermediate units of government are called sovereign, the system is said to be confederal.

2. Where neither central or intermediate-local units of government is sovereign, the model can be labelled federal.

3. Where the central government is called sovereign, the system is said to be unitary (19).

The main features referred to and the actual configuration of the states involved reflect some interesting peculiarities. For instance, although nominally confederal, Switzerland can be considered as a federal republic since the inception of the 1848 Constitution after the Sonderbundeskrieg and, with this, the factual disappearance of the myth of the canton sovereignty.

"Jacobin" France has steadily been cited as the foremost example of a unitary and centralised system. Nonetheless, functional regionalism put forward by the départements and prefectural system has been transformed into political regionalism with the establishment of directly elected regional councils.

The British case, on the contrary, has swung towards a pattern of local submission to the policies of the centre. In Scotland, for example, the Secretary of State (member of the central government) can order any district or regional council to cut its level of spending and reduce the rates (local taxes) if he considers its budget "excessive and unreasonable" (sic). Even more illustrative is
the case of the Thatcher Government's abolition of the six metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council in England—all Labour controlled. The stated purpose of the "reform" is not the shifting of minor powers to metropolitan districts in their areas, but rather the transferring of big-spending functions (e.g. police, fire and public transport) to newly created "quangos" under Whitehall control (20).

The casuistry is much wider as far as the federal models are concerned. In general, a minimal definition of federalism will take into account the recognition of two levels of government which are constitutionally equals (i.e. the "dual federal model"). Modern federalism has put the emphasis on the mutual political interdependence between the two central and intermediate levels of government (i.e. "the co-operative federal model"). A third "permissive federalism", also labelled as the "organic federal model", stresses the growing tendency in some states to use the constituent intermediate units of government as administrative agencies for central policies, besides the development of their own constitutional political powers (21).

As far as both Britain and Spain are concerned, the socio-spatial dimension of federalism is highly important in understanding the shortcomings of their respective unitary states and the late emergence of peripheral nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia.

Viewed through this paradigm, federalism is a response to the stimuli of the diversity or plurality of society, comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, religion, history or traditions which can also be reflected in the party system (22). Thus, states and societies like Britain and Spain with marked territorial cleavages incorporate plural qualities, even though their political systems are not constitutionally federal.
Furthermore, the existence of well defined sub-state nations, as in the case of Scotland and Catalonia, bring into the discussion the issue of stateless (peripheral) minority nationalism which will be analysed in depth later on in this chapter.

Finally, it will be convenient to analyse briefly a hybrid type which lies between the federal and the unitary polities: the compound unitary state (23). This refers to unitary states like Britain and Spain which have decentralised powers to sub-state units of governments. This type of state is seen to adopt federal-like practices with the transfer of legislative powers and/or administrative functions to regional/intermediate governments. Insofar as "autonomical" Spain is concerned, this "quasi-federal" denomination of compound unitary is applicable if only because of the rule-making vested in the diverse Spanish regions and nationalities by the Constitution. The same cannot be said of the British case because the administrative decentralization -deconcentration- brought about by the 1972 local government reform was basically aimed at reducing the forces of nationalism in Scotland and, furthermore, at enforcing uniformity in local decision-making. In fact, local government reform was about modernising the state machine and had nothing whatever to do with the territorial distribution of power. As will be substantiated later on, the outcome of the process of territorialization of politics in Britain is a tighter centralization and concentration of decision-making in the centre, whereas in Spain the process has developed from a regional model of state (24) to federal-like political practices.

2.5. Peripheral nationalism, the malintegration in the multinational nation-state.
Britain and Spain are two multinational polities with similar state-building experiences in the form of united, rather than unitary, states (25). In both cases the "incorporation" of Scotland and Catalonia through personal dynastic union (James I-VI and the Catholic Kings, respectively) left their early integration in Britain and Spain rather imperfect. Moreover, the consequences of the coercive imposition of such political unity and standardization (Scotland 1745, Catalonia 1714) entailed the survival of pre-union identities. It ought, nevertheless, to be underlined that the ways and means through which the "dormant" identities have emerged in the form of cultural and political nationalism are closely related to the perception of the union state experienced by these minority nations throughout their respective historical processes. This psychological approach fully applies to the cases of British Scotland and Spanish Catalonia.

During the second half of the 18th and most of the 19th century, the feeling in Scotland of being part of the British Empire necessarily played down the most salient features of the pre-union national identity because of the economic advantages and benefits involved. Consequently, the process of state legitimacy and assimilation was deep and prolonged. This is not to say that Scottish civil society was "depersonalised". Indeed the survival of the Kirk, the local government and law institutions maintained the perception of a distinctive Scottish national consciousness.

Spain, on the contrary, offered a different picture to the eyes of Catalonia. Thus, the 18th and 19th centuries saw the rapid expansion of the Catalan economy and its industrialisation. The population of Barcelona alone increased from 88,000 inhabitants in 1818 to more than half a million by 1897 (26). The industrial backwardness of the Spanish hinterland contrasted dramatically with
the economic prosperity and cultural renaissance in Catalonia.

Types of nationalism.

The idea of nationalism as one form of politics or, rather, as mere politicised ethnicity is widely accepted. However, two main types of nationalism can be distinguished: an "all-embracing" nationalism forged by the process of modernisation and industrialisation in the state-building which can integrate either homogeneous societies, such as Germany or China, or ethnically heterogeneous societies, such as the USA "melting pot"; and, secondly, a "stateless" nationalism of ethnic/cultural communities such as the Scots and Catalans who have come to reassert their pre-union identities in the form of political mobilization.

The latter, also known as peripheral nationalism, is to be associated with demands for either home-rule and political autonomy or secessionist independence. It is crucial to understand at this point that both forms of nationalism are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the concept of "dual nationality" is a cornerstone to fully comprehend the nature of the political situation and future developments in Scotland and Catalonia. Such a concept is a basic element in explaining the rise, fall and expectations of "modern" Scottish nationalism and the rise, success and objectives of nationalism in Catalonia.

The term "peripheral nationalism" is usually made synonymous with "regionalism". The key element of distinction between the two of them will be later examined (see also Fig. 2.1.). However, this thesis puts forward three elements which can be identified as providing the basis of both peripheral nationalist and regionalist movements:

1) National-regional consciousness, indispensable for the linking of the following two.

34
2) Centre-periphery conflict, by means of cultural, economic and/or political differences.

3) Social mobilization and political organisation, aimed at achieving their objectives.

Peripheral nationalist and regionalist movements are not comparable to those "all-embracing" nationalisms which sought their own state apparatuses in the last century (eg. Germany and Italy) and which incorporated diverse territories in a wider polity. Peripheral nationalism/regionalism, on the contrary, seeks political autonomy for territories within an existing state.

The objectives of both peripheral nationalism/regionalism can range from minimal deconcentration (administrative devolution) to total political independence. Thus, in Britain, after the results of the 1979 Referenda, the case of Wales would be situated in the lower strata of this referred to spectrum of objectives, whereas Scotland's demand would be situated in the upper zone. In Spain, Referenda in the three "old" nationalities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, plus Andalusia, positively demanded a high degree of Home-Rule (see Table 2.1.). Other "newly" created regions (eg. Cantabria, La Rioja or Madrid which did not hold referenda) conformed to a lesser degree of regional autonomy.

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Table 2.1.: Referendum Results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Majority</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank-Null votes</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WALES</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

35
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Blank-Null votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>11.8%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CATALONIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Majority</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Blank-Null votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Electorate</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**BASQUE COUNTRY**

<table>
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<th>% Majority</th>
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<th>6%</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Blank-Null votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Electorate</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ANDALUSIA**

<table>
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<th>% Majority</th>
<th>88%</th>
<th>8%</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Blank-Null votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Electorate</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This thesis makes a distinction between peripheral nationalism, as applied to Scotland and Catalonia, and regionalism because of their pre-Union identities as self-governed territories prior to the configuration of both British and Spanish states. Territories where such nationalist movements occur are not in the political core areas of the state but in its periphery.

Accordingly, and in a wider context, movements in, for example, the North East of England or Extremadura in Spain are in the regionalist category while those in Western Europe, Bavaria, Brittany, Occitanie, Flanders or Friuli can be included in the group of peripheral nationalisms. As part of a more polemical proposition, territories like Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica can also be included in this group although they have not enjoyed in the past formal
political independence or autonomy due to their continuous domination by foreign powers. In any case, the changing nature of such external political domination (Arabic, Catalan-Aragonese, Spanish, French, Vatican, Italian) has fostered pre-Union elements of sociocultural territorial identification.

The task of distinguishing between regionalist and peripheral nationalist movements is, notwithstanding, rather difficult and sometimes purely "academic". The two types of movements can share the same long-term aims and both need the sequence expressed in Fig. 2.1.: ie. (a) Territorial differences (centre-periphery dichotomy); (b) Regional/national consciousness or identity and, (c) Social mobilisation and political organisation.

The case of Occitanie offers an interesting instance of the distinction between regionalism and peripheral nationalism. Although Occitanie could not have been considered as forming one single "political" territory in the early Middle Ages, the "political"/cultural solidarity between the different Occitan cities and areas was beyond any doubt, in the wake of the Albigensian Crusades (French occupation) in the 13th century. Furthermore, the culture of the troubadours and the written language undoubtedly fostered a powerful Occitan territorial identity before its assimilation by the Kingdom of France. Occitanie, nevertheless, is considered by some to have a politically less significant peripheral nationalism, whereas others argue it is an example of regionalism. This thesis sustains the view that Occitanie offers an example of peripheral nationalism according to distinction already made. Another matter is that the Occitan nationalist movement of the last twenty years can be labelled as a political failure (27).

As a general principle, this thesis considers that the earlier the occupation/assimilation of a peripheral territory by the forces
which, later on, constituted the core areas in the subsequent industrial state is, the less politically salient the sense of its pre-Union identity is and, therefore, the more problematic it is to implement social mobilisation by the peripheral nationalist movement involved.

The relatively recent historic loss of their political autonomy/self-governance by Scotland and Catalonia (i.e. 1707-1714), together with the preservation of elements fostering their respective pre-Union identities (e.g. Scottish Kirk, law and education, and Catalan language), have provided sound bases for the political "revival" of peripheral nationalism in the last decades.

This sense of pre-Union identity needs to be based on two main characteristics:

1) **Ethnic/cultural identification** in a given territory which has enjoyed some degree of political independence in the past. Alsace or Friesland, for instance, have had areas within their respective territories with some tradition of political autonomy and independence, but the same cannot be said of the whole of those territories.

2) **Exercise of political autonomy.** In the Middle Ages, the Basque Country, for instance, came to an agreement with the Castile Crown that it would collect all taxes produced in its territory and would, subsequently, transfer a stipulated share to the Castile Treasury. This **fuero** has been maintained as regards the Spanish Treasury except during some absolutist/dictatorial historical periods.

In explaining the phenomena of regionalist/peripheral nationalism in Western Europe, an analysis of the process of the national (state) integration is crucial. Let us, subsequently, review the two main conceptual approaches to this issue: diffusionist/functionalism and Marxism.
The diffusionist/functionalist paradigm (also reviewed later in the centre-periphery discussion) has been accepted by many academics as explaining the processes of national integration and state-building in the last two centuries. It holds the view that the diffusion of cultural and social structural values, together with modernisation and economic development, necessarily provoked a progressive cultural, political and economic integration and so territorial cleavages came to be replaced by a set of functional and economic conflicts, namely conflicts between classes. The upsurge of peripheral nationalism and regionalism in the 1960s, however, invalidated the interpretation of emergency given by the functionalists who considered it a merely transitional issue.

"Classical" marxism agreed that nation and nation state are essentially bourgeois phenomena indissolubly linked with the rise of modern capitalism. Academic Marxism in the Western world tends to take, more or less explicitly, a "functionalist" view of nationalism. Both the American School of Comparative Politics and academic Marxists stress the fact that, with the spread of a money economy a movement from the rural (peripheral) communities to urban environments (core) produced a blurring of the ascriptive identities in favour of associative ties which cut across traditional castes and ethnic divisions (28).

The Marxist paradigm has tended, in general, to confuse nation and nationalist movements with state and state-building. Engels, following the Hegelian distinction between "historic" and "non-historic" nations, dismissed the peripheral nationalism of Scots and Catalans as remnants of nations representative of counter-revolution which should be exterminated or de-nationalized.

Only Otto Bauer, the main representative of the "centrist" Austromarxists, developed a general Marxist analysis of the national
question that was historical, psychological and sociological. He argued that socialism, far from aiming to produce an international socialist culture, would enhance the differentiations and diversities between national cultural communities. Bauer's approach rejected a separate statehood for each nation and asserted a cultural autonomy and constitutional arrangements to secure such autonomy (29).

In recent Marxist discussions, the theory of nationalism has been criticised as Marxism's great historical failure (30). Borrowing the Gramscian idea of a cultural alternative of civil "hegemony" to break the oppressive nationalist bourgeois power, this neonationalism—or peripheral nationalism—is seen, by some Marxists, as a consequence of the uneven development of civil societies within the state and, in the case of Scotland, as a reaction to the decline of Britain. However, this latest Marxist paradigm which interpreted the upsurge of peripheral nationalism as an attempt to break-up the British State (and which also includes the concept of "internal colonialism", later discussed) is rebuked by other "orthodox" voices for the supposed subordination of socialism to nationalism (31).

In any case, and in contrast with the views of functionalists and "mainstream" Marxists, the unquestionable point is that the persistence of peripheral nationalism in Britain and Spain constitutes evidence of the malintegration of their respective states. In a broader context, too, in the last decades a rise in the number of nationalist/regionalist movements, under the epithet of "peripheral", has developed in a wide variety of circumstances: in liberal unitary states (Scotland, Wales and Brittany), in despotic unitary states (the Basque Country and Catalonia), poor and wealthy areas (Corsica and South Tyrol, respectively), as well as federal states (Québec).

Consequently, three theoretical propositions can be derived as
follows:

1) Western peripheral nationalism (regionalism) is linked to cultural factors (ie. language, religion, tradition and customs).

2) Western peripheral nationalism (regionalism) is linked to economic factors (ie. uneven development, internal colonialism or sense of relative deprivation)

3) Western peripheral nationalism (regionalism) is linked to a political mobilisation against dependency from the centre or centralisation.

Obviously, this third category is not independent of the first two. Let us, accordingly, explore the commensurability of the centre-periphery paradigm and its full application to the cases of Scotland and Catalonia.

2.6. Centre and periphery: the relations of interdependence.

Centre-periphery analysis is essential to the comprehension of territorial politics in Britain and Spain. Many social scientists (32) have used this formulation which not only refers to single societies but extends to the international level too. An early "diffusionist" definition of "societal centre" can be reproduced as follows:

"Society has a center. There is a central zone in the structure of society. This central zone impinges in various ways on those who live within the ecological domain in which the society exists. Membership in the society, in more than the ecological sense of being located in a bounded territory and of adapting to an environment affected or made up by other persons located in the same territory, is constituted by relationship to this central zone" (Shils, E, 1975, p. 3) (33).

Centre and periphery have also been considered in terms of subordination of the latter to the former at the same time that a double dimension between horizontal and vertical relationships has been drawn when referring either to the strict geographical relationship or to a system of functional interaction. In the latter,
the centre is formed by a set of key decision-making powers and the periphery is composed of that set of participants in the interaction system, "who have the least influence upon the central group and upon the making of decisions" (34). Consequently, the relations of dominance and dependence are not restricted to their political forms, but can also affect economic and social dimensions.

The critique of this formulation of centre-periphery dichotomy concerning the development of the nation-state is essential in order to gain perspective in the cases of Britain and Spain.

In the process of modernisation and nation-building two sets of cleavages can be distinguished: the territorial, a product of the National Revolution, and the functional, a result of the Industrial Revolution (35). As far as the former is concerned, the conflict between the centre and the periphery is a direct consequence of the National Revolution. The process of nation-building undoubtedly engendered the opposition of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious minorities in the periphery of the British and Spanish territories which also suffered the control and pressure exerted from the centre by virtue of its military superiority and economic-cultural uniformity. According to this "diffusionist model", the centre-periphery dichotomy was destined to decline as society became "modernised" by means of centre-initiated policies aimed at achieving cultural and social standardization (e.g., a common language and citizenship). It is precisely at this point where the model crumbles as the "sporadic" upsurge of peripheral nationalism in the post-Second World War has clearly shown.

The diffusionist paradigm predicted that regional differences would generally decline as a consequence of centre-periphery interaction and inter-regional relationships. As communication of political, economic and cultural matters increased, the people of
different regions would develop a new common identity which would transcend their differences. Likewise, the process of industrialisation would replace the cultural identities of ethnic groups with a set of class-orientated conflicts. Conversely, and as subsequent discussion of other paradigms will demonstrate, there has been a direct relationship between modernisation and the maintenance of regional consciousness which has eventually led to a "revival" of peripheral nationalism.

The functionalists/diffusionists, -including "mainstream" Marxists-, thought that the centre-periphery antagonism would diminish once the process of state-building was completed, as was said before. Indeed, it has been argued that the *conditio sine-qua-non* for the development of functional oppositions was the consolidation of the national territory. An empirical refutation of this is that modernisation rather than diluting national aspirations in the periphery can, actually, exacerbate them. In Spain, for example, the process of modernisation first took place in peripheral Catalonia and the Basque Country. Such a process developed their sense of national/regional entities more acutely and, consequently, this element of differentiation prevailed upon that of state homogenization. At this point, a further review of the concept of "state-building" and "national integration" is subsequently carried out for the comprehension of such theoretical miscalculation in the case of Spain and Britain.

The process of state-building, accelerated by the development of industrial capitalism in Europe in the 19th century, meant the enforcement of central authority upon the peripheral regions or subordinated political groups, often socially and culturally different (36). National integration, on the other hand, has been referred to as the process by which communities, which are socially
and culturally different, transfer their loyalty to a wider state political system (37). The development of industrialisation, urbanisation and social communication characterised the process of national integration, which is also associated with the label "modernisation". However, the cornerstone of national integration is the creation of a common national identity throughout the territory which is under the central state authority.

In the case of Britain and Spain, the lack of a wholeheartedly shared common national identity, by minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia, or rather their dual and overlapping identities, shows that the problem of national integration is not only exclusive to the countries which have recently achieved independence but has rather been a feature fluctuating in its salience throughout their respective historical processes. This "unstable" sharing of a common (state) national identity exposes the failure in the process of national integration, in Britain and Spain, and provides a key element in understanding the nature of state-building experiences in both countries. In brief, the state-building process has not been encompassed by a successful national (state) integration of the territories -nations- within the domain of these states. State institutions have at times enforced their authority adopting dictatorial and despotic practices (Primo de Rivera and Franco in Spain) or political, economic and social assimilation (ethnocentrism and internal colonialism in Britain). This unsuccessful national (state) integration allows the rise of political "neo"-nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia.

This recent tide of peripheral nationalism in some Western countries has operated more in the realm of the nation than that of the state (ie. a non-anarchist nationalism). However, the element of supra-state unification being brought about by the political
integration of the EEC, is one which will enhance the sub- and supra-state territorial identities in detriment to the states themselves as we know them at present.

Returning to the concepts of national integration and state-building, two divergent features can be detected in the Scottish and Catalan cases. While in Scotland some of the characteristics of a "positive" national integration within the British state were present throughout the second half of the 18th and most of the 19th centuries (ie. Scottish junior membership of the British Empire), Catalonia experienced and fought against subordination to the central authority, a result of the specific Spanish state-building process hastened by the Bourbon monarchs.

In Scotland the civil institutions of church, law and local government provided an element which partially preserved the Scottish identity against the homogenizing effects of being a beneficiary part of the imperial British nation-state. In any case, the ethnic-cultural values of pre-Union Scotland were in retreat chiefly due to the rapid assimilation of the English language by the Scots. In Catalonia, however, the centre was never able to erradicate the use of Catalan, in spite of constant pressure to "popularise" the official language Castilian.

After the de facto refutation of the diffusionist/functionalist theory -more plausible in the case of the "melting pot" integration in the USA- by the re-emergence of peripheral nationalism in, for instance, Scotland and Catalonia, other theories and models have tried to explain the centre-periphery dichotomy. Let us, briefly, review the most relevant ones.

**Internal colonialism and the reactive ethnic change.**

"Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous,
distinct groups" (González Casanova, P, 1965, p. 33) (38).

The theory of reactive ethnic change and the internal colonial model contrasts with the diffusion and functional approaches whose shortcomings have been discussed above. It also deals predominantly with the centre-periphery dichotomy.

Internal colonialism notes that the centre exploits and dominates the periphery both economically and politically. Therefore, such a relationship of dependency cannot reduce the economic differences between them as the diffusionist/functionalist model sustains.

"There is crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilise and monopolise its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalisation of the existing stratification system...This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labour, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups" (Hechter, M, 1975, p. 9).

According to this argument, industries in the periphery are highly specialized and basically perform an export function. Compared to the core area with its diversified industrial structure, the periphery is sensitive to price fluctuation and, principally, to international penetration and competition. Hence, when the national or international economy is in crisis, the periphery is affected the most.

Likewise, the existence in this relationship of dependency and dominance produces a "reactive nationalism", heightening cultural/ethnic distinctiveness in both core and periphery. The prototype for the discussion of the internal colonial development is Ireland:

"The origins of the southern Irish cultural division of labour were to be found in the Cromwellian Settlement of 1642, which expropriated all Catholic landowners and distributed their property to Protestant Englishmen. Had enterprising Catholics any ideas of reclaiming their lands, the Dublin government enacted a set of Penal Laws making such Catholic competition with the Protestants illegal; these were not repealed until 1828. Essentially, this strategy was a precursor of apartheid" (Hechter, M, 1983,p. 31).

The internal colonial thesis is also applicable to the case of
Scotland, and explains convincingly, albeit only partially, the presence of peripheral nationalism in Britain despite the strong structural differentiation—or modernisation— which has taken place in the last two centuries. However, Hechter himself has noted that the Scottish case corresponded least well to the internal colonial model:

"I had failed to draw the proper conclusion from this observation. If anything, Lowland Scotland had been an overdeveloped peripheral region, not an underdeveloped one. The Scots had long been innovators in the British context—in education, finance, technology, and the physical and social sciences. These are hardly the accomplishments of colonies—whether internal or external...Lest Scotland be considered unique, Catalonia could be offered as an example of an economically advanced peripheral region which none the less had developed strong nationalist sentiments" (Hechter, M, 1983, p. 33)

Critics of this model identify methodological shortcomings mainly in the lack of comprehensive empirical indicators as well as a tendency to use ad hoc data. Whatever truth lies in this assessment, their main theoretical criticism fails to take into account the pre-Union identities present in peripheral nationalism. This criticism of the internal colonial theoretical thesis is mistakenly formulated as follows:

"...we have an implicit assumption that some form of national self-consciousness existed from the sixteenth century. This is dubious since scholars would date the birth of nationalism much later,...and also in view of the fact that at least in the Scottish case no such 'ethnic identification' can be said to have existed until very much later" (Page, E, 1978, p. 298) (40).

Probably, the most interesting criticism of internal colonialism is that it fails to consider that both ethnic mobilisation and peripheral nationalism are based not only on cultural factors (i.e. cultural division of labour), but also on the conflicts of social classes. As can be argued in the case of Catalonia during the second half of the 19th century, it is precisely class struggle in the periphery which is the element that forced the local-bourgeoisie to use and stimulate the creation of a cultural opposition to the dominant centre, in an attempt to dilute the intraregional emnity of
the working-class (41).

Inherent to the premise of uneven development put forward by the internal colonial model is the concept of relative deprivation which accounts decisively for the explanation of the fuelling of regional consciousness and political nationalism. The perception and belief that centralisation and central control is against the peripheral region's economic well-being, underlies the feelings a majority of the population have of relative deprivation, as compared with "better-off" core areas.

In section 5.1.3, the sense of economic relative deprivation and the debate in Scotland on the mismatch between revenues raised from the region and the amount returned from the central exchequer, together with the controversy around which party subsidises which, will be specifically analysed. However, it is essential at this point to realise the fact that, due to the revenues from North Sea oil, a completely independent Scotland would potentially be a more affluent country than it is at present. Putting aside the quantitative aspects of this issue, the factor which truly accounts for the sense of relative deprivation felt in Scotland is the psychosocial attitude of a majority of Scots of being not well-off as compared with other areas of Britain (42) (See Table 2.2.).

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| Table 2.2. Figures concerning sense of relative deprivation in Britain. |
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Question A: "Compared with other parts of Britain, would you describe (region) as well-off financially?"

Question B: "In comparison to other parts of Britain, would you say that the government understands the need of (region) ...worse?"

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48
N=North; Y=Yorkshire; NW=North West; WM=West Midlands; EM=East Midlands; EA=East Anglia; SE=South East; GL=Greater London; S=South; SW=South West; W=Wales.

(Source: Commission on the Constitution, 1973c (Tables 36 and 37).

As far as Catalonia is concerned, the paradigm of relative economic deprivation does not apply. Neither is the internal colonialism paradigm applicable because if it could be argued that Catalonia has been "exploited" politically by the Spanish core, the economic exploitation could in no way be deduced. A different matter is the sense of comparative grievance in relation to other areas—principally, plutocratic Madrid—, as a result of the disproportion of public revenue raised in Catalonia and the public expenditure allocated there.

Comparative grievance is based upon a sense of being treated unfavourably or of receiving less than one has given. The crucial difference between this concept and that of relative deprivation lies in the fact that the sub-state area involved can, in fact, be economically better-off than the rest of the sub-state territories (i.e. Catalonia). However, the "waste" in the past of a large part of Catalan taxes by inefficient state machinery and other regional oligarchies in the political core spurred the Catalan sense of comparative grievance and enhanced, therefore, their national/regional aspirations.

A different, but no less important, point concerns the financial destination of private savings, generated in the poorer regions of
Spain, and their use by the financial sector to inject capital into industrial projects in profitable areas like Catalonia (43). In any case, this last element does much to explain the rise of regionalist feelings and regional senses of relative deprivation in other territories in Spain which have been systematically pauperized by the oligarchic classes. Obviously, this issue transcends the scope of our dissertation.

Core areas, ethnic competition and ethnocentrism.

If both internal colonial and relative deprivation theses can fit the Scottish case, Catalonia, as said above, offers a stark difference as regards the Spanish context. A partial—although essential—explanation of the "peripheralism" of the Catalan case has to be found in the character of the spatial variations in the distribution of political and economic powers within the Spanish state. In general, some propositions have tended to categorize the salience of peripheral nationalism in relation to a core area in the state. These can be formulated as follows:

"(1) Where both political leadership and economic dynamism take place in the same region (i.e. where the two types of "core" coincide) peripheral nationalism is weak.Ethnically distinct regions that occupy peripheral positions politically and economically in relation to the center acquiesce in the national union in it.

(2) Where the above activities take place in different regions, one of which has ethnic potential, the latter region is likely to develop strong, politically relevant, nationalism. This may occur if the original economic or political core falters; that is, if it stops promoting economic growth or providing political leadership for the whole country. Or the noncongruence may occur if the peripheral region improves its economic position relative to the original center through the development or the plausible prospect of the development of some resource of newly acquired geographical advantage.

(3) If there is no "ethnic potential" in the region, even noncongruence of this type will not produce ethnically based politics, though it may produce regional politics" (Gouveritch, P.A, 1979, p. 306) (44).

If the first proposition, reproduced above, clearly fits pre-
1945 Britain, the second "noncongruence" has remained a fixed pattern in Spain since the political union of the Catholic Kings. Thus, Catalonia and the Basque Country, the two peripheral territories with full "ethnic/cultural potential", were the first to industrialise and remain as two of the three economically dynamic areas of the state, together with "Greater" Madrid.

However, if it is undeniable that peripheral nationalism has maintained its salience in Catalonia since the industrialisation and cultural "Reinaixença" (renascence) due basically to the noncongruence between political leadership and economic puissance within the Spanish state, the "reductionist" view of considering the vast and heterogeneous Castile as the political core area of Spain is mistaken. The capital in Madrid should be referred to as the "instrumental" expression of a political core made up of diverse interests representative too of other Spanish territorial oligarchies often in confrontation with the industrial objectives of peripheral Catalonia and the Basque Country (i.e. 'Andalusian landowners, Old-Castilian agrarian producers, etc.).

The theory of "ethnic competition", can fit in with the realization of peripheral nationalism and regional movements in Spain (45). It views ethnic mobilization as a consequence of competition between the diverse ethnic/cultural groups and interests within the state all objectively pursuing the share of political, economic and social power. The ethnic conflict can also appear in the centre-periphery dichotomy when the economic and political yields are not subjectively considered as "equitable" by the groups involved. According to this paradigm, the process of modernisation offers new opportunities in competing for occupational roles without following the strict pattern of merely geographical ascriptive criteria. Having said this, activities of production and cultural differences ought to
come together (NB. with the blurring of the "cultural division of labour" characteristic of the internal colonial paradigm). Consequently, different ethnic groups compete for the same occupational roles and, as a prerequisite, the peripheral ethnic groups need to organise themselves politically to be able to compete with core areas.

The ethnic competition paradigm complements the psychosocial theory of "rank disequilibrium" (46). According to this, every individual in a society can be ranked within dimensions such as profession, education, race, ethnic affinity and so on. When a disequilibrium in an entire group such as an ethnic minority occurs, including high ranking in some dimensions and low ranking in others, the group will attempt to change prevailing conditions.

There is also an "ethnocentrist" paradigm which questions the cultural nature of uneven development in the internal colonialism model and replaces it by one of a purely material nature. According to this view, the capitalist class in the state's centre "inertially" disregards the economic development and possibilities which the periphery offers and invest mainly in the territorial core of the state. Accordingly, a purely economic model can explain the development of the railway in Victorian Britain in England, Scotland and Wales with a meaningful ethnocentrist capitalist criteria (47).

The latter paradigm "comfortably" fits the situation in Scotland, as the ratio of industrial density in Britain easily shows too. This ethnocentrist paradigm is coupled with the principal central use of the periphery for "resource extraction". In the last decades the fruits of North Sea oil provide -opportune- the most illustrative support for this ethnocentrist paradigm. In the Scottish case these extractive industries not only allow the British core -the South East of England- to maintain a diversified industrial
base, but also provide the moneys to cover the international trading deficits of the core's traditional manufacturing industries.

The theory of ethnic competition, however, is hardly applicable to Britain. Scotland, since the 1707 Union, has never articulated a collective response to compete ethnically with England in the sharing of occupational roles. This has rather been done on an individual basis or has simply not existed. Furthermore, the idea of a partnership in Imperial Britain did not require such ethnic competititon. Even when the relationship with the core has not developed as favourably as expected, the response of the Scots has been emigration (46). This trend has "overlapped" in the 60s and 70s with the "voice" option of political mobilization in the form of electoral support to the SNP. Future prospects will be discussed and explored in the last part of this dissertation.

As far as the models analysed in this section are concerned, their plausibility in the explanation of the upsurge of peripheral nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia is at times partial, contradictory or unconnected. Notwithstanding, and for the purposes of this research, their systematic reference to the cases of Britain and Spain have framed the nature and characteristics of the two nationalisms involved. It can be summarised that the centre-periphery dichotomy is a characteristic pattern of the territorial conflicts produced by cultural, economic and/or political differences in Scotland and Catalonia within the British and Spanish states.

The evidence brought about by the upsurge of peripheral nationalism/regionalisms occurring in the last decades in Western Europe refutes the functionalist/diffusionist theory that the centre-periphery dichotomy was destined to decline once the building of the modern states had been "completed".

Scotland and Catalonia offer examples of the problem of
malintegration in multinational states. Other theoretical models, apart from the functionalist/diffusionist paradigm, have tried to explain the nature of the centre-periphery dichotomy. This section has examined the suitability of the ethnocentrism thesis, together with the sense of relative deprivation, in the case of Scotland. The comparative grievance is the paradigm for understanding the centre-periphery dichotomy in the case of Catalonia, which has also been related to the existence of the "non-congruence" between political leadership and economic dynamism occurring in different territories within the Spanish state.

Ethnic competition in Spain and internal colonialism in Britain are theories which explain partially the nature of the centre-periphery in both states. As a consequence of this centre-periphery political interdependence, political decentralisation seeks to "accommodate" or, rather, to amend the malintegration in states like the British and the Spanish. Decentralisation, furthermore, brings about political "uncontrol" in the territorial dimension of the state which, together with the trend to supra-national institutionalisation of government in Western Europe, could result in the disappearance of the Western industrial state as we know it. This latter debate also surpasses the scope of this dissertation. Let us, subsequently, analyse the concept of decentralisation of what is relevant for the cases of British Scotland and Spanish Catalonia.

2.7. Decentralisation in multinational states.

The concept of decentralisation involves the creation of institutions in areas which are a result of the division of the territory of the state (49). This broad definition needs to be subdivided into two types: political decentralisation and administrative "deconcentration". While the former entails the exercise of
autonomous decision-making as regards a number of political powers by a sub-state governments, elected and accountable to the citizens under its jurisdiction, the latter refers to the implementation of decisions at a sub-state level by organs appointed by the central government.

Centralisation, on the other hand, is regarded as being the location and generation of political decision-making in and from a central point - normally the state capital.

The concept of "decentralisation" - or "devolution of power" in British terminology - is intimately linked to that of self-government, which also accepts equivalent terms such as "political autonomy" and "home-rule". Likewise, public accountability to the citizenship which elected the government involved is another conceptual distinction with that of administrative decentralisation.

Decentralisation in multinational states, like Britain and Spain, is also related to political demands from sub-state entities having a salient national/regional consciousness or identity.

The main concern in our political debate in this section deals with "political" rather than "administrative" decentralisation. The latter is concerned with the requirement for state efficiency in the provision of public goods and services. Nevertheless, the fact that, to a great extent, the Scottish Office was created and enlarged by nationalist pressures must be emphasized. However, it has fallen short of the Scots' political expectations (see Table 2.6).

The existence of "fragmented" or decentralised forms of state is not a simple political alternative for national integration within multinational states, but can also be the provider of an institutional model of participatory democracy to overcome the actual state constraints of uniformity and anonymity.

Although a decentralised form of state does not necessarily lead
to social and political transformation, its very existence in the liberal-centralist Britain and despotic-centralist Spain presupposed an element of "uncontrol" for these states. Certainly, the strong response given by the state in Britain in the 70s to cope with the "Scottish issue" has produced a continuation of the monopolistic practices and concentration of power characteristic of the British state.

In Spain, conversely, the transition from Franco's dictatorship with its hypercentralist state to the new liberal polity required both social mobilisation and the achievement of an institutional model in accordance with such a heterogeneous society. However, the consensual basis of the new polity, together with the local and regional intermingling that the structure of the state has brought about, make the exercise of state power more "conditional" if only due to the deeper penetration and involvement of civil society in the machinery of the polity.

One important political variable which has affected both political processes in Scotland and Catalonia has been the existing pattern of territorial representation prior to the development of home-rule movements in the last decades. Many Scottish MPs opposed devolution because they saw themselves as major means of connection between the Scottish sub-system and the total UK system, and because they thought that more was to be gained for Scotland through the existing arrangements that through such devolution:

"If a choice was to be made between an Assembly and the Secretary of State plus 71 MPs, most Scottish MPs would choose the latter...Among those Scottish MPs who spent the great bulk of their time on Scottish affairs and were content to do so, there was probably some concern about job security" (Keating, M, 1975, pp. 309 and p. 283)

Certainly, in post-Franco Spain there has not been an existing territorial representation to be broken. The hypercentralism of the Francoist regime did not allow the creation of territorial channels
of influence. This important factor made the political struggle for self-governance in Catalonia a struggle as well for the achievement of democracy in the whole Spain. Such an interrelation democracy/decentralisation is analysed in chapter 3.2.

The choice of self-governance.

Political decentralisation is based on an expressed desire for self-governance. Although the public-choice approach, which states that a diversity of individual preferences needs to be matched by a diversity of goods and services, could be applied to this pattern, its nature is closely related to the administrative needs and efficiency goals of modern government (50).

Decentralisation in the context of this dissertation has to be seen, therefore, from a political perspective. Common to both the Catalans and the Scots is their expressed desire for home-rule in the referenda most recently held in 1979 (see Table 2.1.).

The 1979 Referendum produced a positive response of the Scots for devolution, despite the intense political pressure put forward by the centralist state to "abort" the devolutionist scheme. However, the institutional reform of devolution was not implemented due largely to the "deterrence" of the 40 per cent rule. On the other hand, Catalonia's quest for self-governance inserted itself in the general post-Franco trend to break the old despotic-centralist state.

As examined in chapter 3, this positive demand for self-governance in Scotland and Catalonia made patent in the late 70s is no more than another "up" in their historical processes towards the achievement of political autonomy in this century. As well as the significance of the historical background, the fact that this expressed political will has remained steadily firm—despite the label of "provisional upsurge' given by many scholars to the case of
Scotland shows the nature of the movements involved. As Table 2.3 clearly shows, the Catalan and Scottish desire for self-government is still running high.

Table 2.3. Percentage of Scots and Catalans in favour of devolution self-government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March 79(1)</th>
<th>Feb 81(2)</th>
<th>March 82(3)</th>
<th>March 83(4)</th>
<th>Feb 84(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oct 79 (6)</th>
<th>March 85 (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>91.6%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Technical note: Percentages have been rounded. "Don't knows", "refusals" and "won't votes" have been ignored and discarded in the calculation of the "Yes" and "No" votes. Blank and Null votes are not taken into account either.

(1) Official results of the Scottish 1979 Referendum.
(3) MORI poll for The Scotsman reproduced Macartney, A, op. cit.
(4) and (5) MORI poll published in The Scotsman, March 8, 1984.
(6) Official results of Catalan 1979 Referendum.
(7) ECO-Cambio 16 polls published in Cambio 16, nos. 696, 698.

The Scottish and Catalan demand for self-government can also rank
for the secessionist option. In fact the figure in Table 2.3 is made up of all those voices in their demand for political autonomy. Thereafter, the question of which institutional outcome should correspond to such a national/regional wish can also be briefly explored. Let us, consequently, give in detail the proportion of those citizens demanding secessionist independence in contrast with those advocating home rule. The figures are shown in Table 2.4.

---

**Table 2.4.** Percentage (*) of Scots in favour of Home-Rule and total independence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feb 81 (2)</th>
<th>March 82 (3)</th>
<th>March 83 (4)</th>
<th>Feb 84 (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEVOLUTION</strong></td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDEPENDENCE</strong></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**CATALONIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March 85 (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTONOMY</strong> (according to Statute)</td>
<td>(83%)----------(65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDEPENDENCE</strong></td>
<td>(17%)---------(35%(**))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Technical note: For (2), (3), (4), (5) and (7) see Table 2.3.

(*) Percentages have been derived from those explicit responses to either devolution-autonomy or independence (NB. "Status quo" or anti-
home rule options have not been taken into consideration)

(**) This percentage includes those Catalans who at present formally accept the Statute of Autonomy although their aspirations were for total independence.

The quest for self-government is closely related to the psychosocial sense of being "particular" or distinct (51), a conceptual consequence of the national/regional identity which we shall now consider.

National/regional consciousness and the "dual nationality".

Collective consciousness derives from those perceptions, interpretations and aspirations which are shared by a group of people. This consciousness becomes national/regional when such an ethno-territorial dimension is involved.

Classical theory of social change, developed among others by Marx, Weber and Durkheim, has emphasized the importance of subjective psychosocial elements. One of these is, undoubtedly, the consciousness or sense of identity experienced by the people of a region or nation which can, moreover, assume in the scenario of territorial conflicts a similar role to that of "class consciousness" in the Marxist class-struggle paradigm (52).

Regional/national consciousness or identity is a stage in the political mobilisation of regionalism/peripheral nationalism based upon social, cultural and/or economic conflicts within the state.

How to classify the diverse levels of regional/national consciousness is a complex matter which must take into account the specific circumstances surrounding the national integration and state-building of the territories involved. However, and much in the same way as class consciousness casuistry, the task of classifying
regional/rational consciousness needs to consider the three elements of perceptions, interpretations and aspirations which define it (53): a) **Perceptions**, made up of a sense of distinctiveness as compared with other territories within the state. Two types of perceptions can be distinguished: first, those psychosocial attitudes and convictions concerning past or present circumstances which differentiate a region/nation from other state areas; and second, those psychosocial attitudes and convictions linked to inter-regional inequalities and disparities with respect to cultural, political and/or economic matters. According to this pattern, the lack of perceptions concerning differences and inequalities experienced in a region/nation would indicate a total absence of collective consciousness.

b) **Interpretations.** A higher degree of consciousness/identity is achieved when a set of reasons and causes, through which a region/nation realizes its differences with respect to other regions or nations, are collectively "explained" or interpreted by the members of such community. These interpretations are the product of a process of clarification of the perceptions previously referred to. Note that, whereas regionalism requires the sequence perceptions-interpretations in order to establish the subsequent aspirations, peripheral nationalism does not necessarily need to pass through these two stages. The reinforcement of pre-Union identities (see Figure 2.1.) can implicitly bring about the "perceptions" and "interpretations" of those differences which, as individual and self-governed territories (eg. Scotland and Catalonia before 1707 and 1714), they may have experienced in the past.

c) **Aspirations**, put forward in relation to those cultural, economic and political differences (eg. the overcoming of linguistic
discrimination or economic underdevelopment, the demand for self-governed political institutions, etc.)

As reproduced in Figure 2.1. (Elements of regionalism/peripheral nationalism), regional/national consciousness or identity provides the basis for social mobilization and political organization. Neither of these can take place without the self-realization of the aforementioned collective consciousness. The degree of concord between consciousness and political organization will much depend on the conditions (see Fig. 2.2.) and requisites for social mobilization. This transformation of consciousness into action is, at the same time, closely linked to the form of national identification.

When two ethnic/cultural state groups identify themselves exclusively one with respect to the other, their identities will be put into action more explicitly and the institutional outcome of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive (e.g. the process of Irish Home-Rule/total secession in the 1920s).

Thus, a key element in fully comprehending the psychopolitical nature of Scots and Catalans—and of other peripheral nationalisms—is the concept of dual nationality or compound nationality. A majority of people in both communities incorporate—in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted—the national identity, or quasi-nationhood preserved from pre-Union times (i.e. Scottish and Catalan), and the national identity produced by the post-Union integration, or malintegration, of the state-building process.
Note: Based on an idea of López Aranguren's, 1983, p. 59
The concept of dual nationality has a changing nature because of the constant interplay between both pre and post-Union integrated loyalties. In fact the reinforcement of one identity upon the other may well result in the complete disappearance of such compound nationality as it now stands.

Human beings identify with many groups. In any case, such loyalties are neither eternal nor immutable. Social classes have traditionally provided the most direct means of political identification. In the case of Scottish and Catalan peripheral nationalisms, class allegiances and dealignment overlap dramatically with the national identification of Scots and Catalans. However, as stated before, this thesis concentrates on those aspects surrounding the ethnic cleavages of the state and the spatial dimension of power.

An explanation of why Scots and Catalan can reinforce their pre-Union ethnic identification relates closely to a "negative" perception in their relationship with the British and Spanish states. Thus, relative deprivation and comparative grievance have certainly acted as powerful elements in the saliency of the Scottish and Catalan sense of identity, as well as the political centralisation exercised by their respective states. Nearly forty years of Francoist dictatorship were unable to destroy Catalan consciousness vis-à-vis the imposed uniformity of Spanish values. In turn, such a tight centralisation enhanced enormously the differential Catalan nationhood. Much in the same way, nationalism in Scotland during the last three decades has been greatly fuelled by a re-assertion of the Scottish identity against the hypercentralisation of British political, cultural and economic lives around London.

The figures of the polls reproduced in Table 2.5 (a/b) indicate a majority of Scots and Catalans expressing some degree of dual
nationality —ie. "more Scottish/Catalan than British/Spanish"; "equally Scottish/Catalan and British/Spanish" and "more British/Spanish than Scottish/Catalan".

However, the relatively high percentage of Scots —39%— who see themselves as exclusively "Scottish" contrasts sharply with the weakness of the Scottish political nationalism and the low-key programmes of social mobilisation in order to gain self-governed institutions. On the contrary, the strong Catalan political nationalism and the existence of the Generalitat have not increased the number of those in Catalonia who identify themselves as exclusively "Catalan".

These figures do not speak for themselves. Due to the lack of polls from twenty or thirty years ago, the task of interpreting the meaning of such figures is rather difficult. However, and for the purposes on the concept of dual nationality put forward by this thesis, two explanations/propositions are important:

a) The persistent political and economic centralisation implemented by the Thatcher Government (1979-1986), and its "negative" perception by the Scots (relative deprivation), correlates with the diminishing British loyalty of the Scottish compound nationality. The poll carried out in 1979 about the identification of the Scots —see Table 2.6— did not include the "dual nationality" categories. Nevertheless, as many as 35% of Scots considered themselves "British". In our 1986 survey poll, only 6% identified themselves exclusively "British" (ie. 10% after adding the 4% of those included in the category "British more than Scottish").

b) With the re-establishment of the Generalitat, the biggest percentage of Catalans (45.7% in 1984 and 47.1% in 1985) saw themselves as "equally Spanish and Catalan". The correlation between the exercise of self-government and the balancing of the Catalan
compound nationality seems to be apparent.

Table 2.5 a: National identification by Scots (1986).

Question: We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this card best describes how you regard yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Scottish, not British</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) More Scottish than British</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) More British than Scottish</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) British, not Scottish</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don’t know)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Those expressing a degree of "dual nationality".....54

(*) Those expressing exclusive "single nationality".....46

(*) Percentages have been rounded. "Don’t knows" have been ignored.

Source: System Three Scotland, July 1986 (see Appendix 2)

Table 2.5 b: National identification by Catalans (1984-85).
Question: In which of these five categories do you include yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) I consider myself only Catalan</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) I consider myself more Catalan than Spanish</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) I consider myself as much Spanish as Catalan</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) I consider myself more Spanish than Catalan</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) I consider myself only Spanish</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don't know)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Those expressing a degree of "dual nationality"...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>1984</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Don't know)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Don't know)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Percentages have been rounded. "Don't knows" have been ignored.

Source: ECO polls. Published in Cambio 16, nos, 697-698. See Appendix 2.

Table 2.5 c: National identification by Scots (1979)

Question: Do you consider yourself to be British or Scottish or English or Irish or something else?
Scottish..........................53
British.............................35
English..............................2
Irish.................................1
(Don't know).......................9

N=729


Indeed, the quest for self-government by such peripheral nationalisms is in full accordance with the variable manifestation of such duality: the more the primitive ethnic identity prevails upon modern state identification, the higher the demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterised the state-national identity is, the less likely would the appearance of ethnic/cultural conflicts in the region/nation involved be. At the extreme, exclusive identification—the Irish example, as referred to above— or complete absence of one of the two elements of dual nationality would lead to a sociopolitical fracture in the state, and demands for self-government would probably take the form of self-determination. In this situation, only the assimilation by force, through the state repressive system, could brake the trend towards total separation.

In Catalonia, as in Scotland, the existence of this compound nationality requires the setting-up of political institutions which can not only preserve local identities but can also project the aspirations of such communities. The Scottish Office and the
Generalitat are institutions which provide an element of political identification—either positive or negative—for Scots and Catalans (see Table 2.6.). Nonetheless, while the former cannot be considered as a form of self-government due to its control by the state-centre and its merely administrative functions, the latter is made up of Parliament and Executive both elected by the Catalans and accountable to them. This distinctive factor is the last of the three-fold formulations discussed on the nature of decentralisation. Let us briefly examine it.

| Table 2.6. Opinions about the Scottish and Catalan Institutions of Government. |
| SCOTLAND |
| Question: Is there a special office or organisation which helps to run Scotland? |
| 1985 (1975) |
| YES | 36% (48%) |
| NO | 31% (34%) |
| Don't Know/ no answer | 33% (18%) |
| Question: Which do you think would serve better—The Scottish Office or an independent Parliament for Scotland? |
| Scottish Office | 33% |
| Independent Parliament | 52% |
| Neither | 6% |
| No opinion | 9% |

| CATALONIA |
| Do you think that a Catalan government would serve better Catalonia than the central government? |
1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** With which score (0-10) do you qualify the performance of these following governments?

1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generalitat</th>
<th>6.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Gov.</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona City Council</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** How do you think the Generalitat is governing?

1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Well, having few resources</th>
<th>60.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well, having many resources</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad, with few resources</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad, with many resources</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no opinion</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Government and public accountability.**

Self-government as the result of demands made explicit by the members of a community must necessarily be accountable to them. Such
a principle ought to vehicle the constitutional arrangements required for the implementation of political decentralisation.

The issue of inter-governmental relations within the state is usually analysed from the managerial perspective of administrative deconcentration and public choice criteria of efficiency. As far as multinational states like Britain and Spain are concerned, decentralisation needs to provide a deepening of democracy by means of a more effective access of civil society to political decision-making, something which in the case of minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia overlaps with their ethnic/cultural differential dimension.

There cannot be political decentralisation without forms of government at sub-state level which are not responsible to their respective electorate. Because, although it can be argued that ultimate accountability remains with the central government/parliament, the existence of regional forms of administration (eg. Scottish Office-, which institutionally recognises a spatial differentiation of the community involved with respect to the other state territories), needs political accountability to match the political choice for self-government. If this is not the case, the maintenance of a barely disguised centralist structure of government in the periphery not only intrinsically denies the democratic right in the demand for political autonomy by sub-state nations, but also questions the distinctiveness of the ethnic/cultural group involved. Not surprisingly, local government has a merely democratic façade of discretion rather than political autonomy in this situation (eg. Britain). Apparent local democracy and autonomy become illusory because the councils are integrated in the basic operations of the state and cannot diverge from central state requirements (54).
In any case, the need for public accountability is clearly expressed in the Scottish mistrust of the centralization of decision-making in Britain, and the large support given by the Catalans to the Spanish "State of Autonomies" (Table 2.7.)

---

Table 2.7. Opinions on the centralisation of government in London and the support of decentralisation in Catalonia

**BRITAIN**

**Question:** Some people think that government is too much centralized in London. What do you think?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland %</th>
<th>Wales %</th>
<th>London/SE England %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too centralised</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**SPAIN**

**Question:** Which do you think is the most appropriate political structure for Catalonia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) A centralist state</td>
<td>35% (1)</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Political autonomy according to the Statute</td>
<td>44% (2)</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Political autonomy aiming for independence</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Total independence</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Don't know</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(1) Percentage of Catalans in agreement with the centralist-Francoist state in Spain in 1975. 
(2) This percentage includes together both options in favour of autonomy or a federal solution.


2.8. Conclusion.

This chapter has examined concepts, models and theories in order to "frame" the research which is carried out in this dissertation.

The concepts of state and society (section 2.3.) in the three liberal-democratic, Marxist and social-democratic paradigms tend to play down or misunderstand the importance of the historical analysis of both state-building and national integration in the modern states and, consequently, fail to realize the changing pattern in the diverse outcomes of the interplay of state-civil society and vice versa.

Centralist state intervention and repressive homogenization of individual and social groups are the two characteristic trends followed by Western capitalist countries in this century. Accordingly, the territorial complexion of the state institutions -centralised or decentralised- not only imposes on civil society the constraints under which the continuum of social transformation takes place but indicates, ultimately, the different scenarios and types of political mobilisation.

As regards the concepts of power and territory (section 2.4.), the basic differentiation between who wields power and where the power is located within a territory has been established. Thus, power has a territorial dimension which is inherent to its own nature and cannot
be abstracted from its geographical component. Power is also functionally distributed but this dissertation refutes the functionalist assessment that spatial differences do not count as much as other functional cleavages in the functioning and contexture of the modern state.

In fact, anti-corporatist or non-corporatist reactions of sub-state nations like Scotland and Catalonia have challenged the nature and legitimacy of the centralist British and Spanish states in the last decades.

A general classification of state models includes 'Confederations', 'Federations' and 'Unitary states'. Britain and Spain, as multinational states and societies, incorporate federal-plural-qualities.

Catalan and Scottish peripheral nationalism (section 2.5.) is a consequence of the malintegration in the multinational British and Spanish states. These nation-states have experienced their state-building in the form of united rather than unitary processes (i.e. dynastic unions).

Peripheral nationalism is differentiated from regionalism because the former maintains the pre-Union identities of self-governed territories prior to the configuration of the subsequent nation state (e.g. Britain and Spain).

This pre-Union identity is a component of the dual-nationality felt by a majority of Scots and Catalans and which delimits the characteristics and political aims of these peripheral nationalisms.

This thesis identifies three elements—necessary and sufficient—to provide the basis for both peripheral nationalist and regionalist movements: a) National-regional consciousness, b) Centre-periphery dichotomy and c) Social mobilisation and political organisation.

After criticising the main shortcomings of both
diffusionist/functionalist and Marxist approaches to the concepts of state- building and national integration, the analysis of the centre- periphery dichotomy has been considered essential to the comprehension of territorial politics in Britain and Spain (section 2.6.).

This thesis finds the internal colonialism theses partially applicable to the case of Scotland. The sense of relative deprivation, inherent to the premise of uneven development put forward by the internal colonial model, is also asserted as a crucial element for such reactive ethnic change in Scotland. In the case of Catalonia this thesis has put forward the distinctive sense of comparative grievance—of being given less than one has given—as the paradigm for the understanding of this centre-periphery antagonism involved.

Catalonia, furthermore, offers the "non-congruence" of being an area of economic dynamism in Spain in contrast with Madrid as the "instrumental" expression of the political core.

The theory of ethnic competition which sustains the view that ethnic mobilisation is a consequence of competition between the diverse ethnic/cultural groups and interests within the state, is hardly applicable to Britain in contrast with the Spanish case. On the other hand, the ethnocentrist paradigm "comfortably" fits the situation in Scotland.

Political decentralisation (section 2.7) is intimately linked to an expressed desire for self-government (eg. Scottish and Catalan 1979 Referenda). However, the political mobilization for achieving home rule in Scotland and Catalonia in the 1970s was highly conditioned by the existence, or otherwise, of a territorial pattern which had to be broken.

Decentralisation in multinational states, like Britain and Spain,
is closely related to political demands from sub-state entities having a salient regional/national consciousness or identity.

The task of classifying regional/national consciousness needs to consider the three elements of perceptions, interpretations and aspirations which define it. A key element in fully comprehending the psychopolitical nature of Scots and Catalans is the concept of dual nationality. Thus, a majority of people in both communities incorporate—in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted—the national identity, or quasinationhood preserved from pre-Union times, and the national identity a product of the post-Union malintegration of the state-building. Accordingly, the more characterised the primitive ethnic identity prevails upon modern state identification, the higher would the demands for political autonomy be.

In Catalonia, as in Scotland, the existence of this double nationality requires the setting-up of accountable political institutions which can not only preserve local identities but can also project the aspirations of such communities.

In conclusion, decentralisation in Britain and Spain needs to provide a deepening of democracy by means of a more effective access of civil society to political decision-making, something which in the case of minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia overlaps with their ethnic/cultural differential dimension.

2. See Kuhn, T (1970). For the distinction between Kuhn paradigms ("scientific revolutions"), paradigms (lesser in degree) and paradigms variations see Reynolds, P.D (1971, pp. 21-43).


6. Democratic and gradual socialism respond to a loose Marxist background of some social-democrat/socialist parties in Western Europe (eg. Swedish, German and Spanish parties; also "Eurocommunist" PCI, PCE and British CP can be cited). For a summary of "liberal democratic" assumptions see Dahl, R.A. (1965) and Lipset, S (1960).

7. For Max Weber's stress on the unique position of the state as the institution having the legitimate monopoly of the instruments of force see his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1964).

8. For the "instrumentalist" versus "structuralist" debate compare the works of Miliband, R (1970, 1973) with those of Poulantzas, N (1976a) and Gold, Lo and Wright (1975).


10. On the study of bureaucracy and oligarchy formation see the works of Max Weber and Robert Michels.

11. For Toqueville's theory about the solidarity of social units and the necessity for conflict among them see his Democracy in America. On the organisation of modern industrial society according to corporatist principles and interests see, for example, Ciner, S & Perez Yruela, M (1979).


14. For the pluralist view see Dahl, R. A. (1957 and 1968). Elitist-dominated theory was pioneered by Floyd Hunter (1953). Useful neo-marxist approaches to the concept of power can be found in Poulantzas, N (1973), Castells, M (1978), Miliband, R (1973) and Habermas, J (1976).

15. On judicialization see Beyme, K von (1985, pp. 20-24)


18. The constitutional federal provisions in the case of the two "super powers" is very illustrative. While the Soviet constitution contemplates the possibility of secession of any of its constituent republics, the 1781 Articles of Confederation in the United States of America does not.


20. The term "quango" (quasi-autonomous non governmental organisation) is broadly used in Britain although sometimes inaccurately. It refers principally to "private-sector" bodies carrying out functions for government. In the case of non-elected public bodies the acronym QGA is more appropriate. For a study of central-local relations in Britain see Dunleavy, P & Rhodes, R.A.W (1984), "Beyond Whitehall" in Drucker, H. et al (1984), pp. 106-133.


25. For the fourfold classification of state-building in unitary state, union state, mechanical federalism and organic federalism, see Rokkan, S & Urwin, D. W (1982).


27. See, for example, Keating, M (1985).


34. Rokkan & Urwin (1983, p.3). On this see the works of the positivist-(neo) functionalist model put forward, among others, by Parsons, Lipset, Rokkan and Urwin.


36. See, for example, Weiner, M (1966)


38. Other authors who have used an "internal colonialism" paradigm, in line with the model developed by González Casanova, P (1965) and Hechter, M (1975, 1978), are Stavenhagen, R (1965, 1969) and Lafont, R (1971). Frank, A.G (1969, 1975), Dos Santos, T (1970) and Galtung, J (1971) works on dependency and "metropolis-satellite polarisation" are also valuable. An "updated" critique of the internal colonial thesis is provided by Wyn Williams, S (1983).

39. For a useful review of the usage and the criticism directed at the concept of 'internal colonialism' see Drakakis-Smith, D & Wyn Williams, S (eds) (1983).

40. Critics of Hechter's internal colonialism can also be found in Regin, C (1976) and Lowering, R (1978).


43. García Javaloyes, J (1978) has shown that the Spanish poorer regions are financing the richer ones. Guided only by profitability criteria, the financial intermediaries (banks, trusts companies, savings banks, etc.) transfer the savings accrued in the less developed Spanish areas to the industrial regions.
44. On the core area model see also Gouvericth, P.A (1980) model, Pounds, N.J.G & Ball, S (1964) and Friedmann's formulation of "downward" and "upward transitorial areas" (1966).


46. See Galtung, J (1964). For social-pyschosocial theories of groups relations, also applicable to ethnic groups, see Liebkine, K (1979).

47. See Cohn, S (1982). For a critique of the internal colonial model applied to Wales—which, however, does not take into account the mechanism of ethnocentrism—see Lovering, J (1978).


49. On the definition of decentralisation see, for example, Smith, B.C (1985, pp. 1-17). Also useful is Bulpitt's (1983) views "from" the centre.


52. Dahrendorf, R (1969) has attempted to synthesize functionalist and Marxist perspectives with respect to collective action. The collective consciousness of subordinate groups in both paradigms is a necessary condition—although not sufficient—for the emergence of group conflicts.


3. THE ROAD TO SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Introduction

Part III is devoted to the analysis of the political processes which took place, mainly in the 1970s, in Scotland and Catalonia with moves towards the achievement of institutional forms of self-government (for chronologies of Scottish and Catalan historical processes of home rule, see appendix 3). The fieldwork carried out in the two subsequent chapters serves the purpose of establishing the differential elements between the recent historical developments in both nations.

The pivotal point of reference in this comparative analysis is provided by the referenda held in Scotland and Catalonia in 1979 which, subsequently, brought about different political outcomes as regards the attainment of home rule in both nationalities.

During the 1970s although Scotland and Catalonia shared similar perceptions, interpretations and aspirations of collective consciousness and a common desire for self-government, the political processes developed in the two peripheral sub-state nations followed different courses both in form and content. The direct results, albeit non exclusive, of such divergent approaches have been on the one hand the unfulfilled political expectations of home rule for a majority of Scots and, on the other hand, the exercise of a considerable degree of political autonomy by the Catalans through the institutions of the Generalitat.

The two chapters of which Part III is composed -3.1 and 3.2- are structured differently, reflecting the contrasting approaches developed by the political actors in Scotland and Catalonia in such processes. In accordance with the competitive nature of British
politics, chapter 3.1 analyses separately the three alternatives for Scotland as a political entity which emerged during the debate on Devolution in the 1970s. As far as Catalonia is concerned, the consensual climate of post-Franco Spain and the negotiations between the political parties involved in the programme of the re-establishment of Catalan self-government are the main concern of section 3.2.

The analysis of both political processes seeks to set down the elements and interpretations which will provide the basis for the prospective formulation carried out later in the conclusion of this thesis. In a wider context, Part III intends to examine the aspects and circumstances which fall within the political realm of one of the main challenges of contemporary social sciences: the explanation of social mobilisation and social change. This thesis contends that the scrutiny of the political processes in both Scotland and Catalonia constitutes a necessary step for the understanding of future forms of social mobilisation and social change, and to the conceptualization of how such mobilisation and change can be assessed as politically accomplishable in respect to our two case studies.

3.1. THREE ALTERNATIVES FOR SCOTLAND.

First, it is necessary to clarify that the three alternatives indicated in the title do not exhaust the subject of the political and administrative models for Scotland. Certainly, the idea, consistently expressed by the Scottish Liberal Party, of a Federal United Kingdom, although not treated here specifically, is recurrently alluded to throughout the present chapter.

Secondly, it has to be borne in mind that this section mainly refers to past events which culminated with the results of the 1979
Referendum on the Scotland Act 1978. Although the three alternatives examined here must not be qualified as "old-fashioned", nor that the "Scottish debate" no longer exists, the "tempo" and "intermezzo", when and how the three proposals were formulated, have to be stressed.

A trio of distinctive and representative voices.

Tam Dalyell, Stephen Maxwell and John Mackintosh were undoubtedly leading political figures on the debate about Scottish self-government during the 1970s. They share universal recognition as being representative voices of the three main political currents involved in this issue; i.e. centralist "Status Quo", secessionist Independence and quasi-federal Devolution. They also performed distinctive and preeminent roles within each of these political schools of thought. Despite the fact that Tam Dalyell was and is a Labour Party MP, he projected his arguments more convincingly than the actual unionist positions of the Conservative Party. His "West Lothian Question" and the "slippery-slope" argument drew the attention of the Scottish electorate as no other political issue did during the 1979 Referendum campaign. He was certainly the most powerful and indefatigable agitator of the "No" camp before the 1st of March, 1979.

Stephen Maxwell is representative of the radical nationalism within the SNP. He has articulated a distinctive formulation of the nationalist-separatist case for Scotland, breaking with the idea of a populist and non-ideological Scottish National Party. He provided the Scottish debate with an original approach. Although he did not succeed in gaining full support for his ideas within the SNP (1), his influence on the politics of Scottish nationalism remains considerable. He was director of the SNP Yes campaign which carried out the bulk of the work of the "Yes" side during the 1979 Referendum
campaign (2).

John Mackintosh can be considered to be the progenitor not only of the expression "Devolution", but also of the philosophy behind it. His ideas are comprehensively expressed in his book, *The Devolution of Power* (1968), although his early beliefs on this issue were formed in the late 1950s. His premature death on 30 July 1978 prevented Mackintosh, however, from having a decisive influence on the final stages of the 1979 Referendum debate. Mackintosh pushed forward his views about the setting up of a democratically elected Assembly in Scotland with great determination so overcoming, in the process, the reluctance of many of his own Labour colleagues. The lack of other leading politicians able to take over his role after his death handicapped the whole process of arguing for the scheme of devolution for Scotland in the closing period of 1978-79, when they were most needed.

Paradoxically, all the three proponents can be situated in the same region of the political spectrum, i.e. centre-left. Tam Dalyell is considered to be on the "right" of the Labour Party; Stephen Maxwell, on the "left" of the SNP and, finally, many of John Mackintosh's friends were of the opinion that he would probably have been one of the founding members of the SDP, had not his death occurred before the launching of the breakaway party from Labour (3).

Far from being an anecdotic feature, their common ideological ground contrasts with their different - sometimes fiercely opposed - alternatives to Scotland's political needs. The diverse attitudes and reactions to issues approached from similar ideological grounds and within the common Scottish framework is a remarkable characteristic of a competitive behaviour, very characteristic of British politics. Parochial self-interest over and above the identification and realization of wider political perspectives,
usually plays an important role in the conduct of British local élites.

Also relevant is the fact that all three politicians completed at least some part of their education either at Oxford or Cambridge. This "Oxbridge" footprint also reveals the tremendous centripetal force towards standardized uniformity, also very characteristic of the British political classes. In the case of Dalyell, Maxwell and Mackintosh this common factor contrasts dramatically with the picture of these three Scots making proposals dealing essentially with Scottish matters.

A centre-periphery "tour de force"

After the Second World War, and until the startling victory by the SNP candidate Winnie Ewing in the Hamilton by-election in 1967 and the subsequent electoral threat posed by the SNP in October 1974 (30.6 per cent of the popular vote), the two main political parties in Scotland (Labour and Conservative/Unionist Parties) were able to ignore the issue of the national sentiments of the Scottish people. Those national sentiments were made explicit in 1947-49 when the Scottish Convention Movement ("Self-government or Ruin"), under the chairmanship of John MacCormick, launched a campaign for a Scottish Parliament which attracted a million signatures in Scotland.

It is true that between 1941 and 1959 most of the Scottish Conferences of the Labour Party carried resolutions for enquiries into the demands of self-government in Scotland. But such concerns had no priority in the political agenda of the "British" Labour Party. The structure of the Party itself contributed greatly to giving the Scottish "issue" a marginal place. Moreover, the Trade Unions - and significantly the STUC - were reluctant to accept an approach which they viewed simply as being against the unity, or
rather spatial homogeneity, of the Labour movement. In 1959 the Scottish Conference of the Labour Party, following the views of the "1957 Report on Devolution" in the sense that a kind of a Scottish Parliament (i.e. the Scottish Grand Committee) was already sitting at Westminster, decided to put an end to the devolutionist proposals. Later conferences returned to the same sort of previous tepid commitment.

The Conservative Party which reached its peak in Scotland in 1955 with a majority (50.1 per cent) of Scottish votes, developed policies coherent with its unionist views. It was not until its Scottish Conference in Perth in 1968 that the Party made a sudden conversion to devolution. The Home Commission, under the chairmanship of the ex-premier Alec Douglas Home, recommended some devolutionist proposals, although this was the exception to the rule of its long-standing favour of the maintenance of the "status quo".

Only the Scottish Liberal Party was consistent in its view of Scottish needs, remaining committed to the creation of a British Federation of the four United Kingdom nations (i.e. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) governed by a written constitution. In November 1966, the Liberal MP, Russell Johnston, presented the Scottish Self-Government Bill in Parliament. Its Welsh equivalent was presented by the Liberal MP, Emlyn Hooson, in March of the following year.

In the 1964 General Election the SNP obtained 2.4% of the popular vote, trebling its previous 1959 result, which was half the votes the Party received in 1966. In 1967 the SNP won the Hamilton by-election. This constituted the turning point in the acknowledgement by the two major British parties of a different Scottish (and Welsh) political dimension, which in turn was provoked by fears of this unforeseen and spectacularly growing electoral
support to the nationalists. 1972 and the profitability of the North
Sea oil brought about another key element in the development of a
changing situation in Scotland. In the General Election held in
October 1974, the SNP obtained 30.6 per cent of the popular votes and
became the second party in Scotland. In the 1966 General Election
the SNP ranked only fourth in electoral support in Scotland, with one-
tenth the support enjoyed by the Labour Party. Since then, and in
every single General Election held afterwards, the SNP successively
increased its popularity up to October 1974, when it came second,
only 5 points behind Labour (see Table 3.1.i).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>LIBERAL(*)</th>
<th>SNP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Feb)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Oct)</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The 1983 results correspond to the SDP-Liberal Alliance.

The message was very clear for both major British parties but,
especially, the then Labour Government. In the same year of 1974 the
first two White Papers dealing with devolution were published, and
the following year Our Changing Democracy, Devolution to Scotland and
Wales, the first solid attempt by the Government to implement the
scheme of Devolution in the "Celtic fringe" of Great Britain, also
appeared in print.
In summary, one can conclude that the centrifugal forces reflected in the growing electoral support enjoyed by the nationalist parties in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Britain were the main incentive for the idea of giving regional autonomy to Scotland and Wales, a view shared at that time by both major British parties. Nevertheless, and following the cases of other emerging nationalisms in Europe which were not based purely on ethnic or cultural grounds, a desire to democratize the highly centralised British state was also involved, as John Mackintosh pointed out early in the debate (4).

At first the London establishment was in disarray. Soon after it shaped an emergency response to face the attempts to "fragment" its interests. As was subsequently proved, its strategy was very effective.

3.1.1. Tam Dalyell, the "status quo" option.

The most persistent voice during the 1970s for the "status quo" option, concerning the political and administrative Scottish system, was Tam Dalyell. The fact that he was first elected to Parliament as an MP for West Lothian in May 1962 after a tough by-election against the then Chairman of the SNP, William Wolfe, explains a lot of Dalyell's subsequent convictions regarding the issues of nationalism and devolution. Between 1962 and 1977, Tam Dalyell contested no less than six elections against Billy Wolfe. His early active opposition to the SNP's objectives and leaders turned, later on, into a belligerent determination to resist the implementation of a devolution scheme in Scotland.

Tam Dalyell, son of an Indian Civil Servant, was born in India in 1932. He was educated at Eton, King's College (Cambridge) and Moray House, the Teachers' Training College in Edinburgh. Before entering Parliament, he worked as a teacher at Bo'ness Academy, a Scottish
comprehensive school, and spent almost two years at sea (1961–62) as Deputy Director of Studies on the British India ship-school, Dunera.

After his election as a Westminster MP, he became a member of the Public Accounts Committee (1962–66) and served as Parliamentary Private Secretary to Richard Crossman between 1964–65 and 1967–70. The Secretary of the Labour Party Standing Group on the Sciences (1963–64), he was also a member of the House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology (1967–69) and Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party Educational Group (1964–66).

In 1967, he started a column in the *New Scientist*. He was Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party Foreign Affairs Group (1974–76), and Chairman of the Scottish Group of Labour MPs (1973–75), and also served as Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Group (1974–75). Between 1975–79 he was one of the 4 Scots in the European Parliament in Strasbourg and was elected Vice-Chairman of the Control Committee on Budgets of the European Parliament in 1976. In the 1983 General Election, Tam Dalyell was returned to Westminster for Linlithgow.

A piece of writing which reflects Dalyell's tenacious fighting against devolution during the 1970s is the dedication-preface of his book, *Devolution: The End of Britain?* (1978), published at the peak of the debate prior to the 1979 Referendum, and in which he expressed his convictions and ideas on this subject. It reads as follows:

"For Kathleen and the forty-three Labour members of Parliament who by vote or abstention refused to support the Guillotine Motion on the 22nd February, 1977"(5).

Tam Dalyell's power of expression of his ideas gained support from a sector of "indecisive" Labour voters and Scottish middle-class for the anti-devolutionist camp. Furthermore, he was exposed to the use of old symbols and anecdotes (6) and used whatever means available to detain the apparently irresistible implementation of the
devolution proposals.

At Westminster he undoubtedly was the "uncrowned 'leader of opposition' to the Scottish Bill (and its predecessor)" (7). During the 1979 Referendum Campaign he was Vice-Chairman of the Labour Vote No group (LVN). Despite the fact that the Labour official party line was in favour of the Yes vote, Dalyell and his group addressed themselves to a sector of Labour supporters who "lacked" clear ideas about the Scotland Act 1978. Dalyell's target was not the public at large so much as the Labour voters and activists. He kept his distance from other No groups, although he maintained regular contacts with prominent Conservatives at Westminster, Margaret Thatcher included (8). However, the "organic" separation of the Conservative and Labour members on the No side strongly maximised the No vote or/and the abstention. From the very beginning of the Referendum Campaign he made the intention of the LVN clear:

"What we had to do was to make it clear that there was an authentic section of the Labour Party which believed that devolution would lead to separation. Our job was to get as much Labour support as possible". (9)

Tam Dalyell and the LVN worked indefatigably during the 1979 Referendum Campaign. Proof of this are the 208 letters published in the Scottish Local Weekly papers, which constituted 1,612 column-inches in total. Those figures, corresponding to percentages of 13.5 and 13.2 of the totals, were the highest for all the Yes and No groups involved in the Campaign (10). Dalyell alone had 140 letters published in 66 different papers during the campaign.

Having said all that, the fact that Tam Dalyell was "also" an early advocate of devolution causes no little perplexity. Soon after the Oct 1974 general elections were held, he declared that the Scottish Parliament could be working by autumn of 1976. Jim Sillars, later leader of the SLP and then Labour MP, offers an interesting account of such events:
"A Bill to create it would be presented to the Commons in the first session of the new Parliament. Tam went on to add: "Clearly the government and the Labour Party would be brought into disrepute if such a body was created 'with no teeth'. This latter reference to 'teeth' was spoken in the context of economic powers. All these gems are to be found in the Financial Times of Friday, 18 October 1974" (Sillars, J, 1986, p. 49).

Since the electoral débâcle of the Labour Party in 1979, and the subsequent repeal of the Scotland Act 1978 by the Thatcher Government, Tam Dalyell has remained silent about the renewed commitment of the Labour Party to implement a stronger version of devolution to Scotland in the future.

The "slippery-slope" argument

Dalyell was convinced that devolving powers to a Scottish legislative assembly could only be a temporary staging-post on the way to full independence. He believed that financial frustration on the part of the proposed Assembly in Edinburgh and resentment at Whitehall's remaining powers would inevitably lead to demands for total independence and the eventual disintegration of the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly, this theme of the possible disintegration of Britain was given first priority in the LVN press reports and releases during the Referendum Campaign (11). This argument became known popularly as the 'slippery-slope' path towards a Scottish state separate from the rest of the United Kingdom.

He believed that the British political system should preserve a rough uniformity in the relationship between political and administrative authorities throughout the United Kingdom. For him, the Wheatley Commission Report's recommendations in 1969 concerning Scotland provided a more than satisfactory framework of regional and local decentralisation. This Royal Commission, chaired by his father-in-law, Lord Wheatley, recommended that the old authorities be reduced in number and that they be divided into two tiers, a regional
tier and a district tier. The most important powers, such as water, roads, transport and economic planning should go to the regional authorities, while the districts should be in charge of housing, physical (town and country) planning, and environmental services. He emphasized the need to establish Community Councils, which would form the bottom layer of the governmental pyramid (12).

In dealing with the concept of the Scottish national identity, Dalyell recognised the distinctiveness that Scotland had preserved throughout 270 years of, in his own words, "...a fruitful and mutually rewarding union with England (and so) we must not barter away centuries of experience in the hope of recovering a land that never was" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.294)

In his view, the electoral rise of the SNP was basically the result of the 'protest vote' against the two major British parties. As a consequence of the existence of a third party in Scotland, the nationalists benefitted most by this 'protest vote'.

Another boost to the popularity of Scottish nationalism during the 1970s was what he described as the 'myth of the Scottish oil'. With respect to this he makes inevitable reference to the success of the Norway secession from Sweden in 1905. He admitted some essential similarities such as size of population, national identity and economic viability (ie. oil revenues) in both countries. Nevertheless, he rejected the 'political' viability of an independent Scottish state intimately tied to the rest of the United Kingdom. He simply considered that the setting up of a Scottish assembly would be the first step towards that final state of total separation.

In Dalyell's view, the original impulse in both the Labour and Conservative parties for a Scottish Assembly, was more a reaction to the electoral threats posed by the SNP than to a sincere desire to improve the government of Scotland or to bring decision-making nearer
to the people. He believed that the devolution debate was being haunted by the spectre of Ireland. Moreover, such political discussion was taking place against a background of near civil war in Northern Ireland (13).

For him there was no 'realistic' third alternative between unionism and separatism. With respect to the idea of a British Federal state, his criticism showed a resemblance to that of John Mackintosh on the same issue. A federation in which the English made up 83 per cent of the population and the Scots a mere 11 per cent was not workable. Furthermore, the greater share by Scotland of United Kingdom expenditure made complex horizontal reallocation, a characteristic of the federal systems, "unnecessary" (14).

The administrative devolution enjoyed by Scotland made, according to Dalyell's beliefs, the claim supported by the devolutionists that the Scots ought to have more say in their own affairs deceptive and vague:

"The very existence of the Scottish Grand Committee (15) is proof that the views of Scotland already receive closer attention than those of the regions of England, many of which have very similar needs and problems" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.12)

The 'status quo', consequently, was the better stance for the government of Scotland. There was no need to set up new institutions which could not be understood 'correctly' by a majority of Scottish public opinion. He insisted, once again, that the mere creation of a 'new' elected Assembly in Edinburgh would in itself carry the germ of separatism. Certainly a large sector of unionist Scots who voted 'No' in the Referendum of 1979 did so with the conviction that they were rejecting independence, - quite regardless of the actual provisions contained in the Scotland Act 1978. The fact that the Yes campaigns were dominated by the SNP lent weight to Dalyell's hammering claim that devolution was just a "transitory"
step towards separation.

The West Lothian question.

Probably the single most persuasive issue in Dalyell's crusade was the "West Lothian question". Although there were diverse strata and angles within the 'question', the most powerful argument was formulated as follows: What would be the role of the Scottish MPs at Westminster with no power to debate Scottish matters previously devolved to the Edinburgh Assembly, but retaining the right to debate such matters for England?...

The issue was sharpened by the fact that the participation of these Scottish and Welsh MPs could well be decisive in deciding whether such Westminster legislation were introduced or not. Consequently, Scottish and Welsh MPs could furthermore decide the political complexion of the Parliament at Westminster.

This issue of the 'in-and-out' Members of Parliament had been strongly debated at the time when Gladstone's Liberal Government tried to implement the 1893 Home Rule Bill. John Mackintosh referred to it on handling the uneasy forging of a decentralised strate without generalising on self-government for all the regions (ie. including England in the case of the United Kingdom) (16).

In their Majority report the Kilbrandon Commission considered the scheme of legislative devolution for all English regions unsuitable. A proposal of representation in Westminster which contemplated the fact that Parliament would be legislating for England on matters for which in Scotland and Wales it had transferred legislative responsibility was also considered difficult to devise (17). Even if the representation of Scotland and Wales were reduced to parity with England, a serious injustice would be done to the people of England in their opinion.
The Labour governments in the 1970s stood firmly on two particular issues during the process of implementing devolution for Scotland. One was to maintain the Secretary of State for Scotland as a political and administrative institution and as a full member of the British cabinet. The second was to retain the number of Scottish MPs at Westminster despite the fact that the Scottish electorate was over-represented (i.e. 71 MPs instead of the more proportional number of 57, as the Kilbrandon Report suggested). As argued by Dalyell, the situation could reach its most paradoxical point when Scottish MPs representing a smaller proportion of the electorate than their English colleagues at Westminster, could decide purely English affairs, whose equivalent affecting the Scottish Assembly were "untouchable" for them: With a very illustrative example, Dalyell makes clear the peculiarities of the described situation in the following terms:

"I could vote (at Westminster) on policy and money for: Arts in Alnwick, but not in Armadale, West Lothian; Aerodromes at Heathrow and Gatwick, but not Edinburgh Turnhouse; Buildings in Bath, but not in Bathgate; Burial laws in Blackpool, but not in Blackridge; Betting, bookies and gaming in Blackburn, Lancashire, but not Blackburn, West Lothian; Building control in Bolton, but not in Broxburn; Bridge maintenance regulations in Bradford, but not in Bo'ness; Land use in Leicester, but not in Livingston New Town; Licensing laws in Liverpool, but not in Linlithgow; Severn Bridge at Bristol, but not the Forth Road Bridge, South Queensferry; Shop hours in Swindon, but not in Storeyburn; Water supply in Wolverhampton, but not in Whitburn; Waterways in Winchester, but not in Winchburgh" (Dalyell, 1977, p.248).

The 'final' resort for Scottish and Welsh MPs to vote only on those matters - the reserved areas - which had not been transferred to the Assemblies in Edinburgh and Cardiff was "indefensible". Once again the denomination of "second-class MPs" was used profusely by the anti-devolutionists. Nevertheless, Tam Dalyell pointed to the virtual impossibility, in a unitary state such as the United Kingdom, of distinguishing one set of topics from another. "Social topics - he stated - and overall economic policy are inextricably intertwined;
every Budget debate, for example, includes discussion of 'devolved' areas such as the level of housing subsidies, school meals and similar contentious social issues as well as 'rational' issues such as wages policy." (Dalyell, T., 1977, p.250)

The argument raised by Dalyell during the Committee stage of the Bill (NB. In that phase he spoke more often and longer than any other MP), provoked, in his own words: "...one of the turning points (of the debate in the House of Commons prior to the failure of the 'Guillotine Motion' on 22 Feb.,1977), when it dawned on the majority of Members that Scots MPs would be able to vote upon matters affecting England, which they could not vote upon as they affected their own backyards" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.130).

In the subsequent debate in the Commons the "West Lothian question" was "answered" in a rather curious manner. The House passed an amendment by a majority of only one vote and against the wishes of the Labour Government. The idea of the amendment moved by Lord Ferrers was that if any Commons vote on a UK matter on which the Scottish Assembly had authority in Scotland was approved by the votes of the Scottish MPs at Westminster, then a second vote on the matter would have to be taken two weeks after the first. In the meantime, there would be some sort of political pressure on the Scottish MPs to make them reconsider their manner of voting and "force" them to abstain during the second vote on the grounds that their constituents were not affected.

Considering that, normally, the Labour Party has a large number of Scottish seats (18), a Labour Government with a small majority could easily lose its majority if its Scottish MPs did not vote on non-devolved English affairs. Other combinations with Conservative or Alliance Governments could occur depending upon their respective Scottish MPs.
The 'West Lothian question' still spurs discussions, although its political "specific gravity" concerning the debate on devolution has certainly declined (19).

Some proposals.

Tam Dalyell believed in 1977 that there were only three 'credible' approaches when considering the political structure of the United Kingdom State: separate nations states (as favoured by the SNP and Plaid Cymru with respect to Scotland and Wales); federalism, impractical in his view because England would dominate the federation, and the 'status quo' with some improvements. He viewed devolution as a middle-of-the-road alternative between a federal and an unitary state which inevitably would lead to separate Scottish and Welsh nation-states.

Nonetheless, Tam Dalyell, apart from his strong criticism of devolution, offered some proposals to improve the existing 'status quo'. Most of them were formulated on an "against" basis rather than in a "fresh and inspiring" manner, as Dalyell himself recognised:

(A) He was of the opinion that the SNP had benefitted from the uncertain policies about devolution of the Labour Government. The so-called 'flash-in-the-pan' effect of the SNP gains from the 'protest vote' was reactivated by the electoral fears of both major parties and, therefore, the promises of Scottish Assembly had only aroused a nationalist feeling which had been almost electorally imperceptible in the past. Consequently, a more belligerent treatment with respect to the SNP should be taken.

(B) He favoured a deepening of the regional reforms introduced in 1973 by the Conservative government, following the recommendations of the Wheatley Report. In Dalyell's opinion the Regional Councils could bring government closer to the people in a way that a Scottish
assembly could not. They could also be far more sensitive to the very different demands of the various parts of Scotland. Considerable powers to these local authorities regarding their relations with industry should be devolved and, consequently, there would be a better 'harmonisation' of political and administrative standards in Britain (20).

(C) He also proposed a frontal fight against corruption at the local-regional level as a means to fortify the two-tier system of government. "They (the local authorities) are likely to be self-perpetuating, complacent, insensitive and unimaginative. If we are going to build up the regions in Scotland and Wales, it is essential that we should try to build up trust again and to stamp out corruption in local government. Corruption made a lot of the rise of the SNP in some of its current electoral strongholds....The running saga of alleged Labour local government corruption in Dundee has done much to swell the SNP vote throughout Scotland" (Dalyell, 1977, 301).

(D) There should also be a more generous allocation of monies to Scottish local authorities for the specific purpose of increasing their house maintenance and repair capacity. Scotland had at that time the largest proportion of state-owned houses of any country in Western Europe (21).

(E) Community Councils ought to be created as well, following the Wheatley Report's recommendations and forming the bottom popular layer of the governmental pyramid. Such councils could bring decision-making closer to individuals.

(F) As the New Towns were a focal point of the growth of nationalism in Scotland, the New Town Development Corporations which, moreover, Dalyell denounced as undemocratic, should be abolished.

(G) He also believed that an Assembly in Edinburgh of the kind proposed in the Scotland Bill would do little or nothing to promote
industrial democracy; yet, the implementation of industrial democracy would do much to reduce a source of grievance in Scotland (22).

Dalyell considered that the then Labour Government had become obsessed with the Devolution issue, and that it feared that, unless the corresponding legislation were introduced, there would never be another Labour Government at Westminster. But there was a real need to clarify the 'supposed' Scottish claims for self-government and develop instead a more effective concern towards Scotland by 'British' politicians towards Scotland. "Devolution, with its disastrous implications, is far too important and fundamental an issue to become a mere bargaining counter in the political game" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.302).

In order to 'homogenize' the political life in Britain, the British Media should counteract -especially through TV- such 'weird' Scottish feelings of being remote from the centre where the important decisions were taken. For example, a televised recording of the House of Commons. Furthermore, "...a simple partial remedy would be to ask the broadcasting authorities to provide finance so that Scottish soccer matches could be filmed on BBC and ITV with the same standard of camera work as that employed in England" (Dalyell, 1977, p.302)

Finally, Tam Dalyell had no doubt in suggesting that the British government use all the available resorts of its publicity machine: "When the break-up of the United Kingdom is involved, I see no reason why Government Departments should not have the right - indeed the duty - to spell out exactly what would be involved in the event of a separate state being eventually established following the introduction of an Assembly in Edinburgh" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.303)
The outcome of the 1979 Referendum

The 77,435 'yes' majority in favour of the Scotland Act 1978 (see figures in Table 3.1.ii) was not considered enough by the then Labour Government to proceed with the creation of a Scottish Assembly into effect. The 'No' side, so ably led by Tam Dalyell, interpreted the 36 per cent abstention as being a pragmatic way of rejecting the proposed Devolution (ie. the named 'differential abstention'), given the requirement of the 40 per cent of affirmative registered votes (23).

Table 3.1.ii: 1979 Referendum results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eligible</th>
<th>YES(votes) (</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>NO(votes)</th>
<th>Spoiled</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>electorate</th>
<th>votes</th>
<th>votes (%)</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>3,747,112</td>
<td>1,230,937</td>
<td>1,153,502</td>
<td>3,133</td>
<td>1,359,540</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(32.9)</td>
<td>(30.8)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(36.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of YES votes of the turnout: 51.6 %
Percentage of NO votes of the turnout: 48.3%

As was said before, the Labour "No" campaign prior to the Referendum held on the 1st of March 1979 was conducted by Tam Dalyell plus Robin Cook MP and Brian Wilson, and incisive journalist. This 'schism' within the Labour Party in Scotland brought additional confusion to the Scottish Left-wing electorate. Even more, after that the "No" group did not hesitate to articulate their forces with those of the Tory side working in a solid "No" front. Such an 'unnatural' allegiance allowed the SNP the lead in carrying out the bulk of the "Yes" campaign. Probably, in an undesired "boomerang" effect, this major involvement of the SNP made some Scottish voters heed Tam Dalyell's warnings that devolution was about separation.

Many Scots were also highly influenced by other anti-
devolutionist arguments such as the refusal to pay extra taxes for extra bureaucrats or extra politicians in Edinburgh but, above all, by the issue of separation.

3.1.2. Stephen Maxwell, the case for an independent Scotland.

It would be wrong to claim that there is a simple definitive case for Scottish independence. Stephen Maxwell is one distinctive voice within the Scottish separatist movement. The originality of the formulation of his secessionist ideas makes his argument an important point of reference for any approach to the consideration of an independent Scotland.

Born in Edinburgh (1942), Stephen Maxwell grew up in Yorkshire. After graduating in Moral Sciences from Cambridge University in 1963, he worked first as a trainee journalist in Sheffield. Subsequently, he studied international politics at the London School of Economics where he graduated with an M.Sc. in 1964. Afterwards he spent a year as junior Research Associate of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

In 1967 he joined the London branch of the Scottish National Party. A year later he was appointed Lecturer in International Politics at Sussex University, but he resigned in 1970 to take up an appointment as Research Fellow of the Royal International Affairs at Edinburgh University. In 1973 he became full-time Press Officer for the SNP. He was elected a Regional Councillor in 1975, resigning his Party position to become a full-time Councillor. In 1977-79 he was vice-chairman (publicity) for the SNP and director of the SNP Yes Referendum campaign.

Afterwards, he promoted the SNP's 79 Group which advocated a fully independent republic Scotland. Mainly because of what many viewed as the factional activity of the 79 Group, he was expelled
from the SNP in 1982 but was allowed to rejoin some months later and, in the Party's 1983 Conference, he was elected member of the National Council.

He has worked as an organiser of the Scottish Education and Action for Development (SEAD). He is an Honorary Fellow in Politics Edinburgh University and works as a social policy officer of the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisation. As a political writer he has contributed articles to such magazines as Scottish International Review, Question, Political Quarterly, The Bulletin of Scottish Politics and Radical Scotland, and to such books as, The Age of Macdiarmid, Power and Maneuvrability and Radical Approach. He is also the author of The case for Leftwing Nationalism, editor of Scotland, Multinationals and the Third World and co-editor of The Nordic Model: Studies in Public Policy Innovation.

Old myths, new nationalism.

Sharing many of Tom Nairn's views about the possibility of a Nationalism liberated from the 'old' Scottish myths, Stephen Maxwell firmly advocated, from the early 1970s onwards the formation of an independent Scotland which owed nothing to any of the traditional Nationalist categories: "...where such a wealth of evidence of nationality, ranging from the Scottish legal system to the Scottish football league, from the STUC and the Scottish National Orchestra to Andy Stewart exists, such an elaboration of myths about Wallace and Bruce is superfluous" (24).

Maxwell tended to look into the future of Scotland paying less attention to the values of the Scottish 'historic nation'. His approach was, therefore, based on both the potential and the self-confidence of a Scottish community facing the latter part of the twentieth century.
On analysing the nationalist movement of the 19th century in Europe, he underlined the remarkable social cohesion of the forces which build up state-nations (eg. new educated elites eager for bureaucratic jobs, ambitious manufacturers seeking protected markets for their products, or peasants hungry for land). On the other hand, he played down the role of the exalted and rhetorical language of patriotism. He distrusted such nationalistic camouflage for the social and economic interests of powerful groups or ambitious individuals behind the scenes: "The sense of national identity can be a genuine bond between people of different social classes and economic interests and, once aroused, it can serve to crystallise social discontent into political action. But it is a mistake to think of the sense of a nationality as a fixed quantity evenly divided among the nations and simply waiting to be exploded into action by the right nationalist slogan in the mouth of the right Nationalist leader" (Maxwell, S, 1981, p.2).

Maxwell was aware of the insecure historical foundations of the Scottish political identity (ie. weakness of the early monarchies and the Scots' sensation of their 'inferiority' with respect to England). He considered that one consequence of the Union had been the virtual extinction of the Scottish sense of political identity as Scotland flourished a junior partner in Imperial Britain during the 18th and 19th centuries.

Comparing Scotland and Ireland, he concluded that social relations between the Scots and the English had presented none of the obstacles to Scotland's assimilation with their more powerful partner that Anglo-Irish social relations had presented during the 18th and 19th centuries. Moreover, the similar development of the Industrial Revolution in Scotland and England was another factor which had eroded the sense of a separate political entity.
For Maxwell, neither a cultural nor a linguistic revivalism could provide the base for a popular Scottish nationalism in the closing decades of the current century: "The motive force of radical change...(has).. to be sought in Scotland's political need rather than in her linguistic or cultural heritage" (Maxwell, S, 1980, p.219).

In summary, Maxwell conceived a 'new' Scotland not completely tied to its 'historic memory', but able to develop a new sense of national community and to transcend the constraints of the Caledonian Antisyzygy: "Wherever the reason lies, a cultural case for independence which owes nothing to traditional cultural nationalism remains to be made. It rests on the claim that the political institutions of independence are an essential part of a nation's cultural equipment" (25).

Hence, political separation from the rest of the United Kingdom would be the 'positive' result of the process of reasserting the common Scottish will.

The Radical approach

Before its major electoral achievement in the October 1974 General Election, Stephen Maxwell labelled the SNP as the distinctive Scottish way in politics with the myth of a Scottish Democracy which rejected class theories of politics as its point of departure. It was anti-bureaucratic and egalitarian with strong populist overtones placing great emphasis on the value of local and community identity - a legacy of Knox Calvinism, in Maxwell's view. It reflected, to some extent, the small-town ethos of the pioneers of the SNP.

After 1974 the SNP was publicly identified as a social democratic party resting on the five "classic" tenets: political liberalism, the mixed economy, the welfare state, Keynesian economics and a belief in equality.
Stephen Maxwell himself did not feel comfortable with such a definition: "Social democracy is consistent with SNP's non-ideological tradition only to the extent that in its contemporary meaning it implies a rejection of the ideological stereotypes of socialism and "laisser-faire" capitalism. Partly for that reason it carries a public relations gloss of moderation and even of conservatism."; "An examination of the problems which will face an independent Scotland confirms that social democracy, at least as conventionally practised and preached in the United Kingdom will prove an unreliable and even dangerous guide for Scottish legislators" (Maxwell, S, 1976, p.6 and p.10).

Moreover, the combination, in an independent Scotland, of a potentially overwhelming state power and a conspicuously weak private sector - a consequence, among other things, of the nationalisation of North Sea oil - would make the social democratic model of a mixed economy dangerously inappropriate and would challenge the SNP's commitment to the decentralisation of power. As far as the latter is concerned, Maxwell has always criticised the statism-centralism of the Left's strategy: "If the radical democratic ideas of G.D.H. Cole (ie. more power for local government, for political decentralisation, for electoral reform, direct democracy and so on) are enjoying a revival, the left-wing of the Labour party seems largely impervious to their influence...the Left's strategy is as unashamedly centralist in economic as in institutional matters. No more was expected from left-wingers like Neil Kinnock and Eric Heffer (26)" (Maxwell, S, 1980, pp 67-8).

The alternative for Maxwell is a radical scheme established in the following terms:

"A mix between state corporations on the existing model and a combination of public ownership and decentralised social or employee control and ownership"..."The basic requirement, however, is that a Scottish government should make it a normal, if not necessarily, an
invariable condition of any development grant, loan or tax concession, that the favoured enterprise should be organised on democratic principles with decision taking power lying either with employees or with employee representatives and representatives of public bodies, preferably local, acting together". "The radical model of economic decentralisation is built on the transformation of private ownership and control into employee control through the statutory transfer of the voting rights of shareholders to the employees" (according to the model of the Co-Operative Party proposals made in 1974). "The case for employee sovereignty has recently been advocated as part of a strategy to restore to the market the central role in the allocation of resources denied it by social democratic economic management. In this strategy, democratically organised units of production would compete for markets and investments in an economy in which expansion of the money supply would be as large as - and no larger than - the growth in productive capacity warranted. Increases in money wages would not automatically be covered by inflationary increases in the money supply as the politically expedient short-term alternative to unemployment, and workers' control and ownership would impose a new sense of economic responsibility on the labour force". "Decentralisation of industrial control (NB the centralised bargaining power of the trade unions would be broken-up) should be pursued in an independent Scotland in the first instance with the aim of limiting the growth of state power" (Maxwell, S, 1976, pp. 14-15).

Maxwell extended his proposals even further towards a libertarian and civilised society with the guarantee in an independent Scotland of a basic income to those who chose to opt out of the Labour market for no other reason than to "do their own thing". Nevertheless he made clear that the "radical measures of economic equalisation may have to wait on the outcome of efforts to inculcate in the competing interests a new sense of community and democratic responsibility" (Maxwell, S, 1976, p.17).

Among the radical elements of a revived Scottish democracy, there should be "a Bill of Rights embracing, among the familiar individual, religious and political rights, a Freedom of Press Act on the Swedish model; the introduction of proportional representation; provision for referenda including initiative referenda; a radical decentralisation of power within Scotland to all-purpose local authorities, possessing a wider and more elastic tax base..., as well as powers of industrial initiative; the development of a system of specialist committees in the Scottish legislature; the broadcasting of the Scottish
Parliament; measures facilitating the creation of new Scottish-based newspapers and journals organised on workers' control principles; public participation in the control of broadcasting media, perhaps through some version of the Dutch Television Foundation; and the establishment of a system of Neighbourhood Law Centres, with salaried staff, to extend the individual's ability to enjoy his statutory rights" (Maxwell, S, 1976, p.18).

Maxwell rejected the social democratic model, although his programme of radical democracy is consistent with the definition of social democracy as the pursuit of social justice in a liberal framework.

Class divisions

Maxwell believed that, given the persistence of class divisions in Scotland, a nationalist case, which concentrated on the promise of economic growth while ignoring the divisive issue of how the fruits of such growth should be distributed, would never win the trust of the largest block of Scottish voters, namely, the urban working class (27). The "left-wing" nationalist strategy Maxwell called for clashed noisily with the traditional or "fundamentalist" nationalism of the SNP who were very reluctant to adopt left-wing "proletarian" schemes. It appeared clear to Maxwell that, with the decline of the Scottish middle-class - a paradoxical situation in a country provided with affluent natural resources -, the Scottish working class offered the only possible social base for a Nationalist movement in Scotland. In his view, this did not entail any compromise of the Nationalist objectives but rather represented a way in which to increase active popular support for the separatist cause.

Maxwell accepted that the final aim of Scottish independence was established less because of political tactics than as the natural and
irreversible conclusion of the 'new' Scottish spirit. On the other hand, he was fully aware of the unlikelihood of a rapid movement towards an independent Scotland: "The time for an independence referendum has not yet come. Westminster will hold such a referendum in reserve as the Union's final line of defence. It will be deployed when the SNP wins a majority of Scotland's parliamentary seats on a minority of votes. Aficionados will have to seek consolation meantime in a referendum offering only the options of devolution and the "status quo", and the prospect of more challenging times to come" (28).

Maxwell sought a third electoral path for Scottish nationalism between the two major parties. "To be anti-Tory is not necessarily to be in favour of socialism (or to be a Labour voter). The survey evidence suggests that many of the individual socialist policies of the British Labour Left are only slightly less unpopular among Scottish than among English working class voters. While the SNP has the opportunity to develop a Left-wing programme for Scotland, free of the anti-democratic and centralist tendencies of the British Left, it certainly could not expect all of its policies to be popular" (Maxwell, S, 1981, p.16).

During the mid-1970s a sort of convergence and 'mutual understanding' between some Scottish 'radicals' and 'socialists' took place (29). The attempt in 1976 by the Scottish Labour Party to combine both socialism and nationalism within one political formation has to be seen in this context: "In the process of growing the SLP acquired active support from people who had no previous political affiliation as well as former SNP members, from two Trotskyist groups, and, most of all, from former members of the Labour Party...The new party sought to attract voters by emblazoning both "Socialism" and "Scotland" on its banner" (Drucker, H, 1978, pp.2-3).
However, the periodic Parliamentary alliances of Conservatives and Nationalists at Westminster in the late 70s, dramatically destroyed the credibility of the SNP as a third 'radical' alternative.

Later, the revival of old quarrels between nationalists and socialists over Scottish independence - the former wanting separation for its own sake, the latter looking towards the model of society afterwards -, has coincided with a return to traditional class-party voting patterns in the General Elections held in 1979 and 1983.

With respect to this issue, 'radical' nationalists confessed their incapacity to overcome other traditional approaches within the SNP and, according to their view, the SNP could not hold on to the electoral successes enjoyed by the party in 1974 as other parties with similar ideological grounds have done in a similar geographical context (eg. the Catalan CDR).

**Oil and financial policy**

Maxwell's economic predictions for an independent Scotland in the 1980s fell short of the actual figures. He estimated an average capital surplus cash year, after all Scottish domestic requirements had been met, of £1,500 million. The oil profits would even endow an independent Scotland with, "...some bargaining power in the creation of new credit through international financial institutions. That power could be deployed in an effort to steer new credit facilities, such as Special Drawing Rights, towards the credit-starved "Third World" (30). Revenues from North Sea oil could be the financially sound basis for a prosperous independent Scotland: "...the discovery of petroleum had drawn international attention to...the process of transferring Scottish independence from a romantic dream into a realistic political objective..." (31).
However, Maxwell did not view wealth as the absolute end in an
appeal to the electorate's feelings for the nationalist cause, but
rather as a way of stimulating social cohesiveness in the path to
full independence. Maxwell was uneasy about Scottish membership of
the EEC. For an independent Scotland he proposed a free trade
alternative which would hold clearer economic advantages for Scotland
than for the United Kingdom as a whole and would break the increasing
control of the multinationals over the Scottish economy: "Scotland,
once the thrusting partner in the world's greatest Imperial venture,
is herself now a colony of new economic empires" (Maxwell, S, 1982,
p.22).

Such a trading alternative would reserve Scotland's commercial
freedom to develop her important world-wide markets, including the
expanding markets in the Middle East and in the developing countries
now receiving surplus oil earnings as aid. It would leave a Scottish
Government free to pursue a Norwegian style oil policy aimed at
gaining proper benefits for Scotland from North Sea oil, without
falling foul of the Common Market's non-discrimination rules. It
would secure Scottish energy reserves from the threat of Brussels'
control as a result either of some trade-off in a package deal or as
a result of a loss of Scottish control as the Common Market moved
towards majority voting.

For Maxwell, the possession of sovereign rights of statehood
"represents for most societies their best hope of defending
themselves against the dangers international interdependence
presents, while sharing in the benefits it offers" (Maxwell, S, 1977,
p.2). He also dismissed economic federalism within the United
Kingdom because of the difficulty. "to accommodate so direct clash of
interests between Scotland and England.." (Maxwell, S, 1978, p.6).

As a result of the principle of Scottish sovereignty, a majority
of nationalists refused to 'share' the benefits from the North Sea oil with the other parts of the United Kingdom. Only a minority of nationalists led by Margo MacDonald accepted the principle of sharing North Sea oil revenues with the rest of Britain. Nevertheless, during the mid-1970s the slogan "It's Scottish oil" paradoxically had the contrary effect of what the SNP leaders expected. Maxwell strongly criticised what Mackintosh interpreted as a rejection by the majority of the Scottish public to such a self-interested approach and their willingness to share the new riches with the rest of Britain (32).

He also disagreed with the British Left-wing vision of an independent Scotland besieged and coerced by international hostile forces, due to her geographical situation and the permanent dispute of the two 'super powers'. Once again the example of Norway resurfaced to give support to Scotland's capacity for independent decisions comparable to that of other small European democracies. It was the time of 'small is beautiful' or the so-called 'Norwegian dream'.

The electoral débâcle of SNP

Maxwell always considered devolution as a step forward. Conversely to 'independence-nothing-less' demands, he found important advantages in the implementation of the devolutionist scheme. "The SNP...has...no experience of the practical problems of government which extends beyond what may be gained from leadership of a town or district council. One good reason for wishing to see a Scottish Assembly created was the opportunity it would have offered Nationalists to gain experience of government" (33). He also remarked, following the Norwegian model, that "...(she) gained herself complete independence after nearly a century of some form or other of

The electoral debacle of the SNP in 1979 and 1983 may be partially explained by its particular persistence in pursuing total independence as its sole objective (34). The "independence nothing less" slogan has been steadily rejected by the majority of the Scottish electorate in the 1979 and 1983 elections and clearly establishes the futility of such a maximalist approach to the issue of total secession. The data also shows, even more dramatically, the fact that a small majority of SNP voters want total independence for Scotland vis-à-vis the rest of the United Kingdom (ie. 55% and 60% in polls published, respectively, in Glasgow Herald (18.x.85) and The Scotsman (5.iii.86). Another partial explanation for the SNP failure may be seen as being its incapacity to "establish itself as the radical Scottish alternative to the Labour Party" (Maxwell, S, 1981, p.24).

The hopes of an SNP electoral revival for some nationalists rest on further economic and social deprivation in Scotland. Such a reactive approach which adopts a purely defensive role as the best means of spreading nationalist ideas throughout Scottish society is, if not antagonistic, very distant from that of 'radicals' such as Stephen Maxwell: "(We)...must look to Scotland's future not her past. It could do worse than adopt as its slogan Hugh MacDiarmid's prescription for a Scottish renaissance: 'Not traditions - Precedents!'"(Maxwell, S, 1981, p.24).

3.1.3. John Mackintosh and the devolution of power.

The comprehensiveness of the inadequacy of Scottish government was a matter which John Pitcairn Mackintosh (1929-78) was fully aware of. Nonetheless, Scotland and proposals concerning decentralisation
were not only matters which occupied his attention; but also democracy throughout the British political system. Such ideas were expressed in his "The Devolution of Power" (1968). John P. Mackintosh strove his whole life to make the existing machinery of government more responsive to its citizens.

He saw Britain as one of the most centralised of the major industrial countries which had the deep suspicion of local political and administrative initiative. Thus, "...Medical men, academics, planners and all professional leaders dislike being under lay control but would, if it has to come, far prefer the central government or an "ad hoc" body to a locally elected council" (35). An illustration of this is the figure of 1,680 "quangoes" (quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations) in November 1984, which the Conservative Government hoped to make subject to "...the same degree of financial accountability that applies to Civil Service departments." (36).

John P. Mackintosh was born in 1929 in India, where his father was in business. His mother, Mary Pitcairn, was a Londoner. In 1940 the family sailed for Edinburgh and six years later, Mackintosh entered Edinburgh University where he graduated in History. During 1950-2 he read PPE at Oxford and, subsequently, read for a Master's degree at Princeton (1952-3). He took his first teaching job as an Assistant Lecturer at Edinburgh University. Then for two years (1961-63) he was a Senior Lecturer at Ibadan (Nigeria). On his return to Britain in 1963, he took a job as Senior Lecturer in Glasgow and was adopted by Berwick and East Lothian as Labour Party candidate, which seat he won in 1966. In the interim he had taken and then resigned a chair as Professor of Politics at Strathclyde University.

As an MP, he was member of the Select Committee on Procedure (1966-73), Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee on Agriculture
(1967-9) and member of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs (1968-70). He lost his seat in the February 1974 General Election but regained it in the October 1974 elections. In 1975 he became Joint Editor of Political Quarterly and in 1977 he took the chair of Professor of Politics at Edinburgh University. On 30 July, 1978, he died aged 48.

He published major works such as The British Cabinet, Nigerian Government and Politics and British Politics and Government. From November 1975 until his death in July 1978, he wrote a weekly column in The Scotsman which was a big success at the height of the devolution enthusiasm (37).

Member of the Labour Party since 1948, John Mackintosh forged his beliefs about devolution in the late 1950s when his party was moving away from decentralised positions towards centralist solutions to Scotland's problems. Despite his strong Scottishness, he never projected his ideas from an exclusively nationalist perspective but favoured devolution as the antidote to the weakness of democratic accountability in the United Kingdom - not simply Scotland.

Mackintosh's personality combined both the impulse of an active and sometimes abrasive politician, with the laborious rigour of an academic. He introduced his first public argument for devolution at the Annual Conference of the Scottish Labour Party in 1958. The year after he made explicit his proposal for a directly elected all-Scottish Council. As was said above, Mackintosh's convictions were not separatist. Later he came to the conclusion that Scotland had an historic case for more devolution than the English regions. The wide range of Scottish Office powers made the case moreover necessarily different.

Even more strongly than the Kilbrandon Report did, John Mackintosh emphasized the dual-nationality of the Scots: "For over
200 years there has been a Scottish tradition fostered by the law, education, separate Church and local government, but the Scots..(are)..also British and have taken pride in British traditions. It..(is)..quite wrong to attempt to make the Scots deny half of their dual nationality" (38). Consequently, the Scots are both Scottish and British and the separation of Scotland from England (ie. the full independence claimed by the SNP) would do to their national aspirations as much injustice as the "status quo". He conceptualized the identity of the Scots as "quasi-nationhood", having been preserved since 1707 by a separate Church and legal system and by different methods and traditions in education and local government. The idea was merely to create a dual parliament to reflect this dual nationalism.

Public accountability.

The starting point of Mackintosh's criticism of the Scottish government was the "impenetrability" of the Scottish Office. In 1957 he observed: "The great weakness of our current (Scottish) government is just (that)...the public is not informed of the reasons for preferring one policy to another. The matter is settled behind closed doors. It is curious when one reflects on this country's great capacity for facing the facts, for accepting (as often in wartime) hard truths, that there is such tremendous official reluctance to let the electorate hear the debate that goes on before a decision is reached" (39).

His first contribution to the 1960's debate on devolution -his earlier 1958 proposals at the Labour conference having been lost- was formulated in 1963 after the Government published a White Paper on local government reform (ie. The Modernisation of Local Government, Cmd. 2067). It was put forwards as follows:
"Scotland would still obtain a two-tier system of local government. The top tier would be a single council elected every three years of perhaps 142 members (two for each parliamentary constituency). This council would receive a block grant from the Treasury equivalent to the total grants now awarded to Scottish authorities and would raise a uniform rate for Scotland. (More or new sources of local revenue might be provided but this scheme can be carried through quite apart from any review of local authority finances).

The Council for Scotland would control planning, development, overspill, river purification, main roads, fire and police services and valuation, and would supervise education, health, child care, water and sewage. Below it as second-tier authorities would come the existing four cities and then the 'natural' units - a town and the surrounding countryside, a group of villages, a single valley or an island" (40).

There should be, in Mackintosh’s view, three levels at which decisions should have to be grouped in order to bring about the element of popular scrutiny and suggestion. One, the rational level, the second, some sort of regional unit and the third, the local level. It might be argued that the described reorganisation should have been accomplished with the implementation of the Wheatley Commission recommendations in 1972, but there was a clear attitude from both the major parties to agree to the same degree of centralised control through St. Andrew’s House and not to consider the whole of Scotland as the second top-tier governmental unit. Therefore, his criticism of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 was direct and strong: "For many MPs on both sides of the House (of Commons), local government’s task was to execute policies decided on in Westminster; not to make policies of its own" (41).

It seemed to him that the new councils, especially the regions, were remote from the public and he stressed the Wheatley Commission’s recommendation to give far more freedom to local authorities from central government control by establishing a new form of taxation other than rates. The idea was to give genuine policy-making scope to the local authorities and then to attract candidates from wider sections of the community. A proper salary should, therefore, be paid to full-time councillors.
The newly created regional councils were viewed by John Mackintosh as highly disruptive to the functioning of a "future" Scottish Assembly, reducing its desired scope of political competence. "One would expect an Assembly with a desire to be a really effective force would end the regional councils (it could keep them as administrative units with their staff) and have only one subordinate level of government, the district council" (42).

**Regionalisation and Nationalism.**

For Mackintosh the final aim of regionalisation in England should be to devolve central government powers to elected regional councils. These should be the top tier of a new system of Local government and should, perhaps with a few extra powers, allow for the regional variations of policy and local control. For example, in the case of the South East or the East and West Midlands, it might suit local conditions to have large second-tier units of 200,000 to 500,000 inhabitants endowed with local government functions.

The distinctive treatment for the Welsh and Scottish Assemblies was to meet "...the legitimate aspirations of the Welsh and Scots for a degree of self-government and for jurisdiction over those aspects of policy peculiar to their own countries in a manner which would avoid both the retrograde step of total separation and the unnecessary complications of a formal federal system" (Mackintosh, J, 1968, p.187).

John Mackintosh apprehensively followed the process of the local reforms. Thus, once the possibility of creating from thirty to forty city-regions of 250,000 to over a million inhabitants had been eliminated, it became clear that both major British parties were willing to decide on large provincial regions in England (although the Maud-Redcliffe Commission proposals were not finally
implemented), and also to intentionally divide Scotland and Wales into smaller units. The decision seemed to be inspired by the idea of containing nationalism in the so-called "Celtic fringe" rather than to "...utilize the positive aspects of nationalism"; or furthermore,"...the nationalist challenge in Scotland and Wales makes a number of valid points of which the most obvious is that these countries must be treated as units and not split up in any way" (Mackintosh, J, 1968, p.51 and p.188).

In 1966 (Carmarthenshire) and 1967 (Hamilton), both Welsh (Plaid Cymru) and Scottish nationalists (SNP) won by-elections which provoked an earthquake in British politics. The Labour Party, particularly, was concerned that the nationalists appeared to mount a serious challenge in its Scottish and Welsh strongholds (NB. Both Carmarthen and Hamilton had formerly been safe Labour seats). Mackintosh described in detail the confrontation which had occurred within the Labour Cabinet over this issue and which had resulted in a victory for those who believed in a more provisional and spontaneous nationalist upsurge in Britain: "(In 1968)...The Welsh Council of Labour favoured an elected Council for Wales but the Scottish Council of the Party, led on this issue by the Secretary of State (for Scotland), Mr. William Ross was strongly opposed to anything of the kind. Among the English members of the Cabinet, Mr. Crossman spoke favourably of devolution. The outcome was a victory for those who wanted to do nothing but to resist the pressure, arguing that by the next General Election (1970), the Nationalist threat would have dwindled. Naturally other more fundamental arguments were advanced, the chief ones being that elected all-Scottish and all-Welsh authorities would only serve to encourage and provide a platform for the Nationalists and that the correct policy for Labour was to capture control at the centre and then push through policies dealing
with the entire United Kingdom" (43).

The Conservatives also reacted to the Nationalist tide of the late 1960s appointing a Scottish Constitutional Committee under the former Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, which reported, in March 1970, in favour of an elected Scottish Assembly to share legislative power with Westminster. After the 1970 General Election the proposals faded away to the special relief of the members of the formerly - until the late 60s - named Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party. In this respect it is illustrative to recall the candid statement made by Keith Joseph, the Conservative Minister of Housing and Local Government, in 1964:

"Regional plans, yes; regional developments, yes; but these do not necessarily involve regional government in the sense of regional representative councils. What they do involve is strong regional arms of central government and a reorganized more effective local government" (44).

It appeared evident to John Mackintosh that administrative devolution (deconcentration) and, therefore, the mere existence of the Scottish Office had no effect on reducing the rise of the nationalist voting (Mackintosh, J, 1968, pp.150-163).

He considered that some responsibilities should be added in Scotland, over and above the powers to be given to the English regions, mainly because there were other separate national institutions like the Scottish legal system, law courts, prisons and all Home Office functions except immigration and passport control.

An outline of Devolution.

The proposed device by John Mackintosh on devolution aimed to remove all the intermediate "ad hoc" and "quangos" bodies and institutions; to have regional planning supervised by an elected council and, finally, to make a degree of transfer of central powers possible to a series of nine English regions - ie. South West, South
Central, South East, West Midlands, East Midlands, Anglia, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside and Northern - as well as to Wales and Scotland.

The regional councils in England and the Assemblies in Scotland and Wales would be responsible for a specific set of responsibilities as follows:

* Regional planning (including planning of major communications)
* Highways (construction and maintenance)
* Housing (large scale redevelopment, overspill and new towns)
* Agriculture (advisory services, marketing and research)
* Forestry
* Fishing (grants and loans, supervision and research)
* Countryside amenities (parks and preservation of coasts)
* Police
* Fire services
* Water supplies
* River pollution (flood control)
* Education (higher, further and, in some cases, secondary)
* Refuse disposal
* Regional transport
* Support for the Arts
* Main drainage
* Hospitals (preventive medicine, G.P. and welfare services)
* General competence (to do anything not prohibited by law which might be in the interests of electors) (Mackintosh, J, 1968, pp.193-4).

On how the list of functions was to be generated, Mackintosh based his ideas on his own concept of democracy: "...there should be machinery for separating the important decisions from the mass of routine issues and that all such decisions should be taken by an executive which can be held electorally responsible and should be subjected to scrutiny, discussions and endorsement by an elected assembly. Some of these decisions will be on matters that affect the whole nation in the same way; these are therefore better settled by the central government. But there are others where it is possible and desirable that sections of the community might wish to act in a special way or to place a different interpretation on the matter" (Mackintosh, J, 1968, pp.46-7). Nevertheless he was aware of the different views concerning powers to be devolved or to be implemented.
nationwide. The case of the comprehensive education scheme during the 60s poses the key issue on whether policies directly affecting the local community should be determined by the central government or at the regional/local level. Mackintosh favoured the latter.

Contrary to the concept of "open-contract" between regions/states and central government, characteristic of federal systems (45), John Mackintosh proposed a clear-cut system of devolution with powers allocated to the central, regional and local levels. There was the problem however, usual in decentralised states, of determining the precise areas of competences between political units and intergovernmental relations. He was concerned that the lack of explicit delegation on transfer of power would encourage the central government to keep intervening constantly and would, therefore, fall into the "temptation" of reassuming powers.

The regional councils in England and the Scottish and Welsh Assemblies should be directly elected for a fixed term of three years. Chambers of 100 to 150 members would be most suitable, in Mackintosh's view, which would mean different sizes of constituencies in different parts of the country.

The device of Mackintosh for Scotland advocated a system of proportional electoral representation. He preferred either a system of largish constituencies with several members elected in a preference vote (ie. single transferable vote system) or a combination of single member seats plus a national list allocated on a proportional basis (ie. additional member system used, for instance, in the German "Land" of Baden-Württemberg). Accordingly, he was fully aware of the almost certain participation of the SNP in the Scottish Government in a direct coalition with other political parties, or indirectly giving legislative support to a minority government. He emphasized, as well, the establishment of an
electoral system of proportional representation which made it difficult for the party machines to control the list of candidates.

**The Scottish political class, a key element.**

John Mackintosh was most concerned about the issue of the Scottish politicians as the main protagonists in the development of the scheme of devolution for Scotland. Despite the fact that this aspect was now regarded as central by many observers, it proved to be of the greatest importance later on, especially in relation to the outcome of the 1979 Referendum. Undoubtedly, one of the consequences of the hyper-centralisation of British politics at Westminster-Whitehall was the lack of interest in local affairs by MPs. It was alleged that this was a cause of the limited scope of powers at regional-district level and also of the recurrent attempts by the Centre to impose controls and restrictions on local authorities. Consequently, what usually happens is that constituents consult their MPs only on mere local issues. These, in turn, have to ask local councillors or local party fellows for information on how to deal with the problems involved. MPs in general are not familiar with matters remote to their day-to-day main occupation at Westminster.

On the other hand, and not surprisingly, there has always been an "immanent" tendency for politicians in London not to allow Cardiff or Edinburgh assemblies to determine policies affecting housing, health or education. This ubiquitous centripetal political force characteristic of British politics, is of enormous strength. This made the implementation of devolution in Scotland and Wales very difficult and, thus, did not encourage ambitions at the regional/local level.

Mackintosh firmly believed there was a need to change the "old concept" of local democratic control through using part-time, paid or
unpaid "amateurs" (46). One of the principal purposes of the reform of local government in Britain in the early 1970s was to give greater powers and more freedom from central government. Hence, new, more capable and more representative people would be attracted into local government. Furthermore, he was also convinced that "...with power (for the regions) of the kind indicated, the head of a regional council would be as important a figure as a cabinet minister (47) and service on regional councils might, as with state governors in USA and "Land" leaders in Germany, become recognised paths towards national leadership...Some Conservatives with a bent for action who failed to get re-elected in 1966 were swept on to the GLC in the next year, found that they had more interesting work and more influence than in their days as backbenchers at Westminster...It is also important that the gap between those serving in local politics and those coming forward at the national level should be largely removed...In British terms it is hard to understand what kept the German SPD together and an effective force during thirty years in opposition. The (answer)...is that it was always in power in (Lower) Saxony and the city of (West) Berlin..." (Mackintosh, J, 1968, pp.95-6).

Moreover, a sufficient salary or proper compensation should be given to regional councillors or elected members of Welsh and Scottish Assemblies, "...to dismiss the phantom of corruption", in Mackintosh's own words.

John Mackintosh feared the misunderstanding by some sectors of the Scottish public opinion of the features and final *leit-motiv* of setting up an Assembly in Edinburgh and the role of the protagonists (ie. the Scottish politicians).

Many Scots were hypersensitive and uneasy about the "quality" of members to be elected to the Assembly. Now it appeared clear that
Mackintosh's concerns reached, when formulated in the 1960's, the category of premonition as he felt the evident hostility of businessmen, professional groups and middle-class people in general, to the proposals for devolution when they were being debated in the 1970s. Their alleged reasons were based mainly on the kind of candidates who would contest the Assembly elections. "It (The Assembly) would be bound, these people say, to consist of those with low ability, poor versions of councillors (unnamed) elected to authorities in the Strathclyde Region who might either be extreme Left-wingers or Nationalists, but who, whatever their views, would do enormous damage" (48).

Labour Governments' indecisiveness.

In November 1975 the Labour Government published its first full proposals for devolved assemblies in Scotland and Wales (Our Changing Democracy, Devolution to Scotland and Wales, Cmdnd. 6348). Devolutionists said it was "not enough", although John Mackintosh kept his head and welcomed the proposals as a sound base. However, he later rigorously opposed the latest developments prior to the 1979 Referendum.

He maintained his view expressed in 1968 that both the nine English regions and Scotland and Wales should recruit their own civil servants, so that regional loyalties would develop. Nonetheless, it would also be desirable to have equivalence of rank and pay so that a common training of civil servants could be provided for all regional and central civil services. Hence, transfers between central and peripheral administrations could be easy and frequent.

While disagreeing with the 1975 White Paper civil service uniformity standing, Mackintosh's devices on finances were basically in line with Labour's early provisions (ie. the block-grant system).
However, there was a remarkable disagreement of opinion on whether or not the Scottish Assembly could raise its own revenue. As he had pointed out earlier in The Devolution of Power, he was of the opinion that: "The provinces would have to have a...group of taxes left to their own discretion...There have to be an equalising grant to aid the poorer regions and then a fixed contribution which could...as in the Italian case, be an agreed quota of the yield of certain nationally determined taxes...They (the regions) would have a special added levy or income tax under their sole control should they wish to raise money for some particular project or contingency not covered by their existing funds. This arrangement...would provide the regions with the maximum autonomy possible in a country which has an economy and financial system directed from one central point" (Mackintosh, J, 1968, pp.206-7).

The preparation of the annual estimates and budget proposals and the conduct of overall economic policy would remain the Treasury's responsibility, as would the overall level of internal expenditure. But the way in which this money was spent would be left to the regional governments (ie. establishing their own priorities on roads, say, at the expense of new schools).

John Mackintosh considered the role of the Secretary of State for Scotland as the most serious area of confusion and potential difficulty in the process of implementing devolution. The logic of devolving Scottish government to a directly elected body made the continuity of the Secretary of State as a political institution unnecessary. It did not appear to him to be a wise idea to "intermesh" the territorial functions of a member of the British Cabinet with the role of a genuine Scottish Executive operating on a functional basis. Moreover, the hypothetical different political "colour" of both Scottish administrations would be another major
obstacle in this respect (e.g. Conservative minority in the Scottish Assembly with a Conservative Secretary of State).

John Mackintosh criticised what he called "indecisiveness" of the Labour Governments concerning the implementation of the devolutionist policies. He did not expect an absolute change in British politics as a consequence of devolution, but he pragmatically observed the necessity of reshaping the United Kingdom state's institutions (49). Yet, his words about the antidevolutionists still remain as a nostalgic claim for the future to come: "My own feeling is that the Tam Dalyell/Ian Sproat position that the whole thing is a mistake and should not happen is out of date. It is politically untenable and it is one thing that is not likely to happen" (50).

3.1.4. The three alternatives: an assessment.

On 1 March 1979 the majority of the Scottish electorate voted for Devolution according to the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978. However, the percentage of "Yes" votes (32.9) did not reach the 40 per cent of the registered electorate required by Westminster Parliament. Neither the then Labour Government, nor the Conservative Cabinet formed after the June 1979 General Election, put the referred Act into effect (51). Neither government considered the general principle of democratic liberalism which establishes the "Half-plus-one" majority applicable to this case.

The outcome of the 1979 Referendum brought about diverse setbacks to the three alternatives proposed by Dalyell, Maxwell and Mackintosh. It may be pointed out that the constitutional consequence of the "small" 51.6 per cent majority of "Yes" votes factually meant the maintenance of the "status quo" which Dalyell advocated. But the political implication of the result could hardly satisfy the advocates of this option for it exposed the precarious
foundations of British democracy. In a State where the universal rule of political decision-making is based on the "half-plus-one" democratic principle, it is problematic to sustain any degree of institutional credibility for a parliamentary body which does not follow the principles on which its representativeness rests. Thus, in the sole Western European State where all the MPs to the House of Commons could be elected by the simplest difference of one single vote, the defeat of the Scotland Act 1978, in removing one of the essential pillars of British democratic conceptualization, shows the inconsistencies and political backwardness of such a parliamentary model.

On the other hand, the considerable abstention in the 1979 Referendum factually made it impossible for either the "Yes" or the "No" side to get the 40 per cent rule requirement. The extra political value given to the voters who stayed at home, in a State where the electoral participation is one of the lowest in Western Europe, causes more than perplexity.

In contrast, the Welsh Referendum clearly showed the clear political will of the Welsh people who overwhelmingly rejected the provisions of the Wales Act: 80 per cent of "No" votes against 20 per cent of "Yes" votes, i.e. 46.5 and 11.8 per cent of the registered electorate, respectively. Paradoxically, the political interpretation made by the central government of both the Scottish and Welsh Referenda was exactly the same.

Tam Dalyell's "undemocratic" option.

Dalyell himself considered that the devolutionist argument, "...is precisely the extent of the Scottish Office's administrative authority which makes it so necessary for a democratic element to be added." (Dalyell, T, 1977, p.5). On denying the possibility of the
Scottish Office being accountable to a democratically elected Scottish Assembly, he was playing down the distinctive Scottish political identity. Because if it can be argued that ultimate accountability always remains under the democratic legitimacy of the British Parliament, what is the use of praising the excellencies of "...the large extent to which administrative devolution exists..." and considering the Scottish Office as another agency directly dependent upon the central government and parliament (52). Following Dalyell's argument, the "undemocratic" Scottish Office provides the Scots with enough say in their "own" business, although it is not accountable to them but to a non-Scottish democratic chamber (ie. Westminster). For Dalyell, the implementation of a scheme of devolution which meant that the Scottish Office's administrative powers were accountable to a Scottish elected chamber would be the first step against the centralist homogeneity of the British State and, ultimately, would "necessarily" lead towards the separation of Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom. Perhaps without realising it, Dalyell was entirely disqualifying the political theory on which Federal and Regional states are constituted. The existence of this form of government in regional Italy, the federal German Republic or the confederal Switzerland has not in any case led to the separation of any of their sub-State entities, but rather constituted a more participatory model of parliamentary democracy than the one existing in the United Kingdom.

Continuing the intrinsic contradiction of admitting administrative deconcentration for the Scots, but explicitly denying the Scottish right to democratic accountability, Dalyell was, not surprisingly, in line with the Wheatley Report's refusal to consider Scotland as a single governmental unit. The Report put the emphasis on the re-organization of the old burghs and counties in a manner
which was intended to provide a better provision of services for the local communities. However, it did not consider the case for a Scottish Assembly. Dalyell's position in refusing the possibility of creating an all-embracing Scottish top-tier political unit, coupled with his uneasiness about the issue of the Scottish political dimension, is also consistent with the internal administrative fragmentation produced by the local government reforms in the early 1970s. These arouse local feuds and "artificial" sense of grievance in different parts of Scotland (eg. Fife, Central and Lothian). Arguably, Scotland has traditionally been seen as being divided into two sub-nations, the Highlands and the Lowlands. But the neutralising and divisive purpose sought through the implementation of local re-organisation did not prove effective against the tide of the nationalist "revival" of the mid-1970s. On the contrary, the irrational composition of the different Scottish regions (eg. macrocephalia of Strathclyde, the breaking of the estuarial concept on the East Coast, etc.) not only exposed the political anxiety and improvised urgency deployed by the two main British parties, but also proved later on to be highly damaging from a purely administrative perspective (53).

The "West Lothian Question" can be analysed from two angles. Constitutionally considered it has to be said, first of all, that the Westminster Parliament has jurisdiction over the whole territory of the United Kingdom. Thus, and as a consequence of a basic juridical principle, the result of a sovereign decision taken by the Westminster Parliament in the form of devolving some powers to a sub-State legislative chamber cannot bring about in turn a discrimination against its own members. That is to say that all MPs are fully entitled to have a say in the rest of the non-devolved matters. Otherwise, the very existence of the Scottish Assembly could mean the
imposition of constraints on Westminster's sovereignty through forcing some MPs (i.e. those elected in the constituencies situated in Scotland) not to vote on some issues which would continue to be under the full jurisdiction of Westminster and, thereby, allowing a jurisdictional "subordinate" to coerce the actions of the body which created it. In any case, the right of a part of the United Kingdom not to exercise the demand for a similar scheme of devolution cannot be transformed into a limitation of sovereignty for all the representatives of the whole of the United Kingdom in the Westminster Parliament.

It is from the political perspective that the "West Lothian Question" reveals most clearly its demagogic nature. The Westminster Parliament is composed of United Kingdom MPs, not of representatives of the UK sections of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. There are no federal or territorial arrangements which could be used to argue this. Particularly, as regards Scotland, the 1707 Act of Union did not implement any scheme of federation between the two countries, but one of complete union with a single Parliament with sovereignty over one State: Britain. Henceforward, the elected members of Parliament were given the right to vote, "...on all questions whether of domestic concern or not" (54). Paradoxically the "West Lothian Question" could be used to disqualify the "English" intrusion of those MPs included in the Scottish Committees in Westminster in order to preserve the overall party balance in the House. In fact, they can vote on matters of Scottish concern, some of which are related to the preserved Scottish institutions by the 1707 Act of Union.

With the formulation of the "West Lothian Question", the attempt to create a feeling of political "jealousy" and comparative grievance on the part of the Westminster MPs elected in England, is noticeable.
There is, moreover, the slimly disguised intention to provoke a psychosocial sense of "bad conscience" in the Scottish public over a supposed political privilege for the "Scottish" MPs in Westminster.

The "slippery-slope" argument put forward by Dalyell was undoubtedly the key element of propaganda for those advocating the "status quo" during the campaign of the 1979 Referendum. The simplicity contained in its premonitory statement multiplied its powerful message: the Scottish Assembly is the first and inevitable step towards total separation. According to Dalyell's viewpoint the dissatisfaction produced by a complicated piece of legislation would lead to the expansion of the SNP secessionist ideas. Although there is no empirical evidence to support this, it is highly probable that the large number of abstentionists was very much influenced by the "slippery-slope" argument. It is problematic to argue that Dalyell's fears about total secession increased the "No" side, contrary to other interpretations. The Scottish population at large has steadily rejected the idea of complete independence, even during the peak of the nationalist upsurge of the mid-70s (ND. dual nationality, the larger proportion of votes for the British parties, the absence of secessionist violence, etc.). The "middle-of-the-road" option for many Scots apprehensive of the "slippery-slope" argument was surely to stay at home, instead of explicitly denying the Scottish political dimension with a straightforward "No" vote.

To sum up, Dalyell's alternative oozes both political conformism and reactive defeatism. If the former can partially be explained by the centralist tradition of politics in Britain, the latter is based upon an axiomatic prejudice: the Scots' lack of political self-confidence.

The "status quo" alternative is essentially the product of political doctrinaire immobility, a common feature shared by some of
the so-called "fundamentalists" in the SNP. This manifestation of political backwardness underlines the salience of governmental plutocracy as a decisive characteristic of the British State: the preference for undemocratically appointed agencies inherent to this parliamentary model, the patronage of the political local elites in channelling popular interests and, above all, the statist paternalism being concentrated in and irradiating from the State’s Centre, as a means of forging the civil society homogeneously.

Stephen Maxwell, a portion of "idealism".

Stephen Maxwell formulated an original case for a completely independent Scotland based upon a re-definition of Scottish consciousness and will rather than the exploitation of any salient element which was a prerequisite of state-building in other European countries: eg. economic-expansive (Spain and Britain), economic-oppressive (Ireland), language (Germany), ethnical (Hungary), geographical (Norway), historic (Switzerland), etc.

Maxwell strongly refused to manipulate Scottish mythology as a way of giving cohesiveness to the political case of independence, something otherwise unrealistic in the latter half of the 20th century. Moreover, Maxwell was very well aware of the fact that the forces of the British State have had more influence in neutralising the genuine nationhood of the Scots than the civil Scottish institutions of Church, Law and Local Government, preserved since 1707. However, the alternative put forward by Maxwell pre-requires the re-shaping and re-enforcing of the Scottish consciousness, this being provided with a completely new sense of political will not tied to past mythological values. For him such a regenerating attitude would be the only possible path available for the creation of a new political Scottish order in the form of an independent
State.

Such an "idealist" recipe for an "ideal" independent Scotland was not on the same wave-length as the Scots' attitudes and expectations in the 60s and 70s. He overemphasized the spontaneous tide of Scottish nationalism of that time. The initial stunning successes of the SNP seemed to confirm Maxwell's theses about the birth of a "new" Scottish collective will being genuinely expressed by means of a "new" political option. Certainly, the electoral behaviour of the Scots perfectly fits in with Maxwell's "revolutionary" pattern - i.e. one seeking an outcome which would neatly break with the immediate historical background. But the nationalists, in general, and Maxwell, in particular, failed to evaluate in its real terms the political-electoral meanings and implications of the hasty tide of nationalism in Scotland in those years.

SNP successes were mainly the product of a "protest vote" in Scotland against the shortcomings of both the two major British parties. The nature of such a "protest vote" was necessarily tied to the preserved sense of nationhood in a large sector of the Scottish population and was channelled by the "genuine" political expression of such national consciousness: the Scottish National Party. Yet, the characteristic element in this "unexpected" electoral behaviour is that it was aimed "against" the Wilson Labour Governments or, rather, it was meant to bring about a rectification of the handling of Scottish affairs by the Labour policies which increased the centralist trends in British politics and, consequently, the gap of discontent between centre and periphery. The peak of SNP electoral ventures in the October 1974 General Election, after four years of Tory Government, has to be seen against the background of the previous Wilson Cabinets. Certainly for a sizeable sector of the
Scottish society the alternative to the Heath Government was not to be found on the other side of the "same" coin represented by Wilson's policies. The electoral system was running out of alternatives; merely offering the political sequence of Labour-Conservative, Conservative-Labour. However, it was not the "opportunistic" timing of the SNP to catch the provisional defectors of both Labour and - to a lesser extent - Conservative parties which fully explains the electoral upsurge of nationalism in Scotland. The underlying factor is closely linked to the form of the Scottish "protest vote". If the electoral option to the Conservative-Labour sequence in England was offered then by the Liberal Party, which also had spectacular successes at that time, the situation in Scotland was being influenced by the growing sense North of the Border of being treated as a mere peripheral "region" within the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly, the bulk of SNP voters in the early 70s were very aware of the consequences of their votes. Precisely what they wanted was to shake up the system of the alternation in power, and its small concern for Scotland, by showing its "regional" discontent in the most effective manner possible: the vote for a Scottish party which programmatically wanted total independence. The SNP offered at that particular time, and in such a given situation, the greatest amount of political pressure to be put upon the Centre.

Having said that, it would be highly mistaken to consider that the massive vote for the SNP was the culmination of a process of assumption, by the Scottish people, of the need for political secession from the rest of the United Kingdom. Or, using Maxwell's ideas, the natural expression of a "new" Scottish collective consciousness and will.

Furthermore, one of those extraordinary elements which made the situation even more politically "uncontrollable" was provided by the
good economic prospects offered by the exploitation of North Sea oil. But, once again, the nationalists misjudged the use of such a formidable political weapon. The subliminal content of the SNP claim, "It's Scottish oil" was addressed to arouse feelings of egoistic political expediency from the electorate. Such an approach could hardly match the aspirations of creating a new sense of collective will because it was chiefly based upon parochial self-interest and an egocentric withdrawal from a British partnership, a partnership which many Scots felt had benefitted Scotland during the Imperial times of the 19th century. On the other hand, the pursuit of a Scotland "richer-than-England" was due to engender a more acute sense of rivalry against and resentment of the English. And it violently shook the dual-nationality character of the Scots, ie. Scottish but also British. As a consequence of this sharing attitude, the issue of North Sea oil should never have been manipulated for the cause of total secession but, perhaps, to revalidate the "status" of equal partnership vis-à-vis England.

The responsibility of the SNP for the "anti-climax" of the 1979 Referendum is high. Carried away by its overdesire to capitalise on the tide of electoral dissatisfaction with the British parties (primarily Labour) and the renewed Scottish aspirations for Home-Rule, the SNP committed gross tactical errors - before, during the Referendum campaign and on occasion of the vote of confidence which brought down the Callaghan Government. These mistakes greatly jeopardised the whole process of devolution.

The nationalists did not realize, for instance, that by taking an exclusivist leading role during the Referendum campaign on the "Yes" camp for Devolution, they were at the same time lending colour to Dalyell's claims that the scheme of the 1978 Scotland Act was about separation. This belief was being dramatically reinforced by the
emphasis on the secessionist doctrine put forward by the SNP after 1977. Paradoxically, it was the party which most wholeheartedly campaigned for Devolution in 1979 (55). Certainly, the SNP was much more interested in challenging the political leadership in Scotland than coherently developing an active, but secondary, role in an articulated platform with the rest of the pro-devolutionist forces. It was more likely that the SNP was inebriated with its own desire for political protagonism and failed to consider the fact that its strategy for the goal of total independence should have conditioned its tactics. The SNP's urgency to achieve immediate political/electoral results seriously handicapped the implementation of a collectively-shaped response for the collectively expressed demands for self-government put forward by the majority of Scots. Because, even if the measure for Home-Rule provided by the Scotland Act 1978 did not match the secessionist strategy of the SNP, it objectively inserted itself into the process of recreating the new spirit of national consciousness advocated by nationalists like Maxwell.

The nationalist upsurge of the 70s made some believe that Scottish society was on the move. After the 1979 Referendum it was "all over". Scottish society became stagnant and aimless. Such a sudden swing to apathy and political surrender invalidated a posteriori the beliefs of those who, like Maxwell, deployed their strategy from a feeble starting premise: the genuine strength of the movement towards independence. They failed to decipher the very nature of spontaneity and the sense of provisional momentum characteristic of this process.

Radical reforms can only be achieved when not only the consent and demands of the society at large exists, but also when there is a clear social determination to struggle for them. In Scotland, the
important blue-collar working class, from which Labour has received constant support, has traditionally tended to regard the improvement of its status through the enlargement of the activities of a "paternalistic" State. Consequently, it has tended to give support to the parties and interest groups (Labour and Trade Unions) which could better channel its aspirations from "above", ie. the institutions of the centralist British State. Within this context of social passivity, Maxwell's active communal ideas had little room to operate in a radical manner. Furthermore, Maxwell wanted the SNP to occupy the electoral place which had traditionally been occupied by the Labour Party, but in fact the SNP could not sustain a challenge to Labour in the central urban belt. Thus, most of the parliamentary gains by the SNP in the 1974 elections were in rural areas on the western periphery (Galloway, Argyll, Western Isles) and the North East (Angus South, Aberdeenshire East, Banff, Nairn and Moray). The tendency of the SNP to deploy a small town and rural populism subsequently hindered any real attempt to challenge Labour in the big cities. The major challenge for the SNP on how to attract urban votes - with the exception made of Dundee East, which otherwise confirms the general rule - remains the same.

Stephen Maxwell, as in the case of John Mackintosh experienced the inability to get his political message across to his own party. This aspect explains, at least partially, his own strategic indecisiveness: first, in favour of devolution and supporting independence as the ultimate goal; then, less enthusiastic about devolution, after the 1977 SNP Conference; once again giving maximum support to devolution during the 1979 Referendum campaign; and, advocating an independent Republic of Scotland a few months later. Such confusion about strategies and tactics, a common feature of many Scottish politicians, is another factor which creates social
confusion and, above all, which lacks the confidence and credibility to revitalise the ventures of Scotland's national aspirations.

John Mackintosh, a deepening of democracy.

One of the recurrent handicaps which Mackintosh had to face while formulating his devolutionist proposal was the vertical structure of his highly centralised Labour Party. The contradiction for Labour of formally advocating devolution, chiefly due to the "external" pressure posed by the SNP's spectacular successes, and of maintaining a hierarchically pyramidal London-based organisation, left Mackintosh in an awkward position. Not surprisingly in those years of the late 60s, some U-turns or volte face manoeuvering of leading Labour politicians were very usual. Harold Wilson, for instance, solemnly declared in April 1967 in the House of Commons that his Cabinet had no intention of implementing any scheme for legislative devolution in Scotland. Only six months later, and largely due to SNP's victory in the Hamilton by-election, he had a complete change of heart and reversed his original statement.

Mackintosh was never able to get rid of the image of being the "black sheep" within the Labour Parliamentary Group, as far as devolution was concerned. The very existence of a powerful anti-devolutionist platform in the 1979 Referendum campaign dramatically confirms not only this stigma but the contradictory nature of Labour politics in Scotland. In a wider context, he found himself "trapped" between the dogma of a statist centralist Labour policies and the utopian stance of separatist nationalism.

Mackintosh viewed devolution as the means of deepening democracy in Britain and the way of accommodating the reiterative wishes of the Scots for Home-Rule. His democratic proposals for Scotland embodied a "revolutionary" scheme in the tradition of British politics. They
were not part of a federalist alternative, although they contained some elements of what has later been denominated as "quasi-federal" devolution, namely the exercise of political authority by a sub-state legislative assembly with powers delegated from the centre. These autonomist or para-federal arrangements had no precedents in the history of the United Kingdom, apart from the unfortunate case of the Stormont Parliament in Northern Ireland.

Like many others, Mackintosh felt that the rise of the "modern" political nationalism in Scotland was largely due to the failure of devolution not having been implemented since the First World War. In much the same way as had happened at the beginning of the century, the Scots had renewed their desire for self-government in the late 60s. Then, with the growing political and economic dependence of Scotland on the centre, the response had been more explicitly put forward in electoral terms (i.e. upsurge of the SNP). It was a social response not pursuing either the "status quo" or the total separation. Mackintosh's concept of dual nationality invalidated such a dialectic reductionism, but in reality many Scots faced the dilemma of tearing apart the less salient part of their compound nationality in detriment to the most characterized one. However, his proposals found themselves in the cross-fire of the populist dichotomy unionism versus separatism. The delimitation of powers to be devolved to the Scottish Assembly and the relations between the new legislative and executive institutions and Westminster/Whitehall were, by nature, matters of no easy understanding and, consequently, were more exposed to the attacks of the "simpler" dichotomy "status quo" - secession.

Some inconsistencies can be found in Mackintosh's scheme; first, the issue of devolution to the rest of the English regions. Mackintosh was perfectly aware of the fact that a "Home-Rule-all-
around" solution throughout Britain could overcome not only a sense of political jealousy among certain English areas - mainly the North-East -, but could develop decentralisation harmoniously and avoid, at the same time, the political risk of concentrating the debate exclusively on the cases of Wales and Scotland. These peripheral nations had a special case for claiming self-government and achieving a greater degree of devolved powers due to historical and cultural factors. Certainly, a generalised reform of the regional government in Britain would eliminate tensions of comparative grievance coming from the English regions.

Notwithstanding, the theoretical model put forward by Mackintosh in his *The Devolution of Power* failed to realise the impossibility of implementing from above a devolutionist scheme to English regions with a lack of a clear regional consciousness or common identity (eg. South Central, South-East and South West-Cornwall as a single unit). Indeed, the desire for self-government and local autonomy has to be positively expressed by the people concerned, never imposed. The political temptation to "artificially" create English regions in order to eliminate a backlash of misunderstanding towards the Welsh and Scottish Assemblies, should not have guided Mackintosh to go as far as to disguise the real demand of the territories and communities involved for the constitution of the regional councils. Because if the Welsh people overwhelmingly refused to exercise their right to self-government in the 1979 Referendum, there was no evidence for Mackintosh in 1968 to suppose that the residents of Luton, Chelmsford, Reading, Brighton and London would be eager to demand or accept the regional council of the South-East as the expression of their common interests.

There exists, as well, a lack of clear vision on the problems of regional development and the issue of inter-solidarity in
Mackintosh's proposals. On financing devolution he was more "quasi" than "federal". The absence of any scheme which would equalize the spatial distribution of income and resources in Britain could hardly match the aspirations of a harmonious partnership between Scotland and England. Certainly, the economic impact of North Sea oil dramatically questioned the image of a past Scotland being subsidised by the wealth located south of the Border. If we bear in mind the failures in the 1960s and 1970s of the Labour regional policies in their attempt to close the gap of economic disparities, the absence in Mackintosh's proposals of a clear model of financial redistribution, by which the Scottish Assembly could develop industrial policies on its own and balance the tendency for the resources to concentrate in the South of England, causes no little surprise.

Finally, John Mackintosh had fully realized that a radical reform in the British political system, like the implementation of devolution, "needed" other major political innovations to be put into effect such as system of proportional representation or new constitutional arrangements (eg. Bill of Rights, Constitutional Court, accountability of public bodies, etc.) Certainly he was aware of the fact that the basic principles should normally be worked out prior to the implementation of the reforms. In the case of devolution, with its intrinsic challenge to deepening democracy in Britain, it certainly was very difficult to bring about such tremendous reform outside the aggiornamento of other institutional changes. Nonetheless, Mackintosh reversed the gear of the political timing in this process of radical reforms and perhaps hoped that the institutional "ripples" effect of the introduction of the devolutionist scheme in Britain could eventually accelerate the pace of the implementation of other major changes. But by the very fact of
considering such a strategy Mackintosh was misjudging the
powerfulness of the British centralist state. His optimism proved
to be fatally wrong as the State's response cruelly confirmed in the
late years of the 1970s.

It can be said in summary that the 1978 Scotland Act was more the
product of a provisional reaction, put forward by the political
opportunism of the British parties to hold up the separatist threat
posed to the British State by the SNP electoral successes, than a
real attempt to democratise the political system. Undoubtedly
Mackintosh's proposals fell through, trapped in the midst of the
strong response articulated by the central institutions.
Furthermore, the social pressure of the Scottish movement for Home-
Rule soon showed its spontaneous nature and began to wither away.

The main contradiction in the whole process towards devolution
during the 1970s remains in the conduct and attitudes of those
interest groups, trade unions, political parties and social
organisations in Scotland which, pursuing self-government, failed to
harness the Scottish aspirations for Home-Rule in a unitary platform.
Such sheer impotence proved to be more damaging to the fortunes of
the 1979 Referendum than the actual State response.
3.2. SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CATALONIA: THE OUTCOME OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS.

3.2.1. Recent historical background.

Although the formal process towards the achievement of a liberal democratic polity in Spain begins on the 20th November, 1975, with the death of Franco, the actual origin of this historical trend can be traced back to December 19, 1973, when the President of the Spanish Government, Admiral Carrero Blanco was assassinated in Madrid (56). The very nature and aim of this violent killing performed by the separatist Basque group ETA is meaningful. Certainly, some other interests—primarily foreign—beyond this domestic mise-en-scène, and equally and objectively interested in the demise of the Francoist dictatorship, have to be taken into account for the consequences of this assassination to be fully realized (57).

The incapacity of Franco's regime was rendered acute after the disappearance of "Generalísimo"'s right-hand man. The last acconising years of Francoism reflected its incapability to deal with the industrialised Spain of the 60s and 70s, as highly urbanised and sociologically patterned as the rest of the Western European countries. This progressive disparity between Franco's political regime and Spanish society turned into an apparent fracture of State institutions, e.g. the University (58). Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, some other "faithful" Francoist sectors of the Administration of Justice (ie. "Justicia Democratica") and even the Armed Forces ("Unión Militar Española") reflected a lack of confidence of Francoism as the ruling ideology of the State. Also significant is the fact that sections of the Roman Catholic Church, whose hierarchy had "blessed" the victory of Franco in the "National Crusade" (ie.
the Civil War) and advocated the ideology of National-Catholicism for the new regime, started to move in new directions especially after the II Vatican Congress in 1962 (59). Not surprisingly, some representatives of these sections clashed noisily with the regime as was the case of the exile of Abad Escarré of Montserrat (Barcelona) in 1965 or the attempt of expulsion of the Bishop of Bilbao, Monsenor Añoveros, by the Francoist authorities in 1974.

On the other hand, the active opposition of the workers' organisations, also from within the system, through their infiltration in the official Francoist "vertical" trade unions, accelerated the weakness of the authoritarian State to cope with the new situation, economically aggravated by the 1973 crisis (60).

Within this context diverse objective interests coalesced in the process of transformation of the Francoist State. They can be enumerated as follows:

1) The puissance of an industrial bourgeoisie which badly needed the establishment of a liberal democracy comparable to that existing in Western Europe. This economic class had historically failed to replace the traditional Spanish agrarian financial aristocracy. As Poulantzas has pointed out, the process towards the return to democracy was to some extent the result of the fragmentation and opposition within the economic and political ruling class itself (61).

2) The desire of transnational capitalism to get rid of the dictatorship in Spain although avoiding revolutionary processes such as happened in Portugal in 1974. As Carr simply observes, a "credit-card" consumer society could not be contained in the archaic political structure of Francoism (62).

3) The continuous pressure exercised by the popular classes and the workers' organisations to gain democratic liberties and to defend
their specific interests.

4) The active opposition by the centrifugal nationalist and regionalist movements against an oppressively centralised State.

Notwithstanding, it was not until Franco's actual death that the Spanish people realized the irrefutable fact that the dictatorship could no longer survive without the presence of the Dictator. Subsequently, the gradual process of re-establishing democracy in Spain would be characterized by the popular pressure and political compromise from below and from above, respectively.

Another peculiar feature in this transitional period was the political weakness of both the democratic Right and Left. The former reflected the old impotence shown by the industrial liberal bourgeoisie which had been attempting to supersede the traditional landowning ruling class since the early decades of the 19th century. Indeed, "the process of industrialisation in Spain followed the "Prussian model" in which the state and the financial oligarchy played the leading role, while the industrial bourgeoisie never attained the importance as a class which it possessed in countries like Great Britain or France" (Maravall, J.M., 1982, p.204).

As far as the Left was concerned, the Communists and Socialists were not sufficiently strong to be able to impose their strategy of bringing down the Francoist regime overnight, i.e. ruptura democrática. In the early stage of the transitional period, after the death of Franco, the Labour movement, as a natural consequence of 40 years of ferocious repression, was not well-organized. The number of working hours lost through strikes in 1975-76 multiplied tenfold (i.e. 15 million to 150 million hours), but despite their sharp impact in the crisis of Francoism, they did not constitute a decisive factor in fully breaking with the past. Moreover, the decision to give priority to the recovery of liberal democracy relegated the highly
ideological programmes of profound social transformation to second place.

By the time Franco died, several unitary or cross-party organisations, which had been channelling the increasing popular pressure for the recovery of democracy and home rule, already existed in Catalonia (see Table Appendix 3.2.i: "Chronology of political inter-party coordination and political unifications in Catalonia after the Spanish Civil War" together with Appendix 3.2.ii: "Political parties and trade unions in Post-Franco Catalonia"). The Assemblea de Catalunya, set up in 1971, genuinely reflected the struggles against both dictatorship and centralist rule. Its activities followed a simple four-point programme: a) Universal political amnesty; b) Basic democratic liberties; c) Home rule, according to the provisions of the 1932 Statute of Autonomy and, d) Coordination with the rest of the Spanish peoples to re-gain democracy. This Assembly of Catalonia gathered together trade unionists, Christian Social Democrats, Socialists, Communists, Urban community associations, University groups, intellectuals and ordinary people in a clandestine and highly representative movement of opposition to Franco's regime in Catalonia.

In his first official speech as King of Spain, Juan Carlos I advocated a democratic Spain, "...of all Spaniards..." which would take account of "...regional peculiarities and the diversity of the (Spanish) peoples..."(63). As a contrast to this, the then President Carlos Arias represented a mere continuation of Francoism with a low-key programme of political reforms.

In November 1975, the Arias Government approved a decree-law in which the teaching of "regional languages" was allowed. As a reaction to the political violence exercised by ETA, the Arias Government also set up ad hoc committees to study the possibility of
a special administrative status for both the Basque Country and Catalonia.

The political reforms of the Arias Government did not match the aspirations of the Monarchy and the Spanish society. In July 1976, Adolfo Suárez was appointed the new President of the Government. The young President, brought up politically within Francoism, would bridge the Francoist legality with the new formal democracy in a process filled with imagination, possibilism, audacity and the permanent concurrence of the Opposition parties. Suárez succeeded in implementing his strategy of ruptura pactada ("agreed rupture") as opposed to the continuismo reformista ("continuist reform") by the Arias Government and the "democratic rupture" advocated by the Opposition.

In December 1976, once the Political Reform Law was approved in the referendum, the Opposition parties set up the Comisión de los Nueve (Committee of the Nine) which, significantly, included among its members three delegates of the Catalan, Basque and Galician parties. In Catalonia, the Comissió dels 10 (see Appendix 3.2.1) twin organism of the Spanish "Comisión de los Nueve", was created by the Catalan parties in order to negotiate with the Spanish Government on matters affecting home rule.

In January 1977, the Comissió dels 23 (see Appendix 3.2.1) was established with the aim of articulating the co-ordination with the President in exile of the Generalitat, Josep Tarradellas. Twenty five Catalan political parties, five trade unions and representatives of the Assemblea de Catalunya agreed to form the Organisme Consultiu de la Generalitat, following the interview with Tarradellas in Sant Cebrià de Roselló (France).

Although all the most representative Opposition parties in Catalonia demanded the re-establishment of the Generalitat, not all
of them agreed on the strategy to be adopted in the beginning of the process. The discussion mainly concerned itself with the composition of the unitary organism which was to negotiate with the Spanish Government and on whether the negotiation should be developed in conjunction with the rest of the Spanish Opposition parties or directly conducted with the Spanish Government. President Tarradellas supported the second option basing his argument upon the historical legality of the Generalitat set up during the II Republic and which he personified. He was also aware that he needed active support from the Catalan parties to deploy a strong case in his negotiations with Suárez. The Opposition parties were reluctant to cede their protagonism and initiative to Tarradellas. However, the process of consensual decision-making was not broken on this occasion and the Organisme Consultiu de la Generalitat was born under the pledge made explicit by all the Catalan democratic parties to pursue the re-establishment of the Generalitat and of the 1932 Statute of Autonomy. It was also agreed that the negotiations with the Spanish Government would be lead by Tarradellas, with the consent of the parties. These would include in their electoral manifestos, their commitment to the re-establishment of the Generalitat and the return of the president in exile of the Generalitat.

In the campaign for the first General Elections held in Spain since February 1936, 13 out of the 20 electoral candidatures committed themselves to the re-establishment of Home-Rule according to the 1932 Statute of Autonomy. Eighty per cent of the elected candidatures in the General Elections held on 15th June, 1977 to the Congress of Deputies (Lower House) and all but one of the elected candidates for the Senate (Upper House) were committed to the re-establishment of Home-Rule (see "Electoral Results in Catalonia", table 3.2.1)

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(a) Pacte Democràtic per Catalunya (PDC) = CDC + PSC(r) + EDC + PNC
(b) Esquerra de Catalunya (EC) = ERC + PTC + EE + CSUT + Assoc. Dona
(c) Convivència Catalana (CC) = AP + UC
(d) Coalició Democràtica (CD) = AP + PPC
(e) Solidaritat Catalana (SC), conservative list with AP support
(f) Coalición Popular (CP) = AP + PDP + UL
(g) UCD-UCC
(h) UFCCC, coalition formed by UDC and CC obtained 5.6% of the votes and 2 MPs.

### 3.2.2. The conceptual inter-relation democracy-decentralisation.

It is an oversimplification to regard Spain as being politically divided into a backward centre-hinterland and a progressive periphery.
comprising the industrialised areas of Catalonia, the Basque Country and to a lesser extent, Valencia and Asturias. The active presence of the Left and radical democrats in Madrid and some cities of Castile and Andalusia during the II Republic and after the 1977 General Elections, invalidates such an reductionist assessment. Neither is the Italian model of North-South economic and/or political abrupt division applicable to Spain of this century. Having said that, territorial tensions have been, and still are, main sources for social conflict in Spanish life. The fact that, neither the attempted genocide of the Catalan cultural values, nor the belated policies of uniformization implemented after the Civil War were able to erase the centre-periphery problem, is remarkable. It cannot be aduced, in this respect, that Franco's dictatorship did not carry out its political aims wholeheartedly.

Indeed, two obsessions can be named as the bétes noirs of Franco's regime. First, its fanatical anti-communism. Francoism deployed a tireless propaganda, which was reinforced by the decisive support given by the USA to the regime after the agreement signed in 1953 between Franco and Eisenhower. Communism –together with the so-called Judaeo-Masonic conspiracy– posed not only an evil threat to Imperial Spain but to the "Christian Western civilization" as a whole. Under Franco's dictatorship all the political prisoners were labelled as "communists" for propaganda uses.

Second, the syndrome of separatism. For Franco any form or degree of autonomy or Home Rule was considered as separatist/secessionist. The foundations of the "new" post-1939 Spain were based upon the "sacred unity of the homeland". The geographical location of both dogmas by Francoism in Catalonia produced the calculated attempt to extirpate any sign of cultural identity. Such a pre-meditated cultural genocide was developed in the name of "Spain-above-all", a
distorted ideal coming from the "golden age" of the Spanish Hapsburg Empire in the XVI Century. Epitomes like the "God's Empire" (El Imperio hacia Dios) or "Spain, a unit of destiny in the universal" (España, una unidad de destino en lo universal), and a simulated "timeless" culture pertaining to the whole of Spain were used to destroy the diverse ethnic and regional cultures existing in Spain. Francoism tried, in fact, to articulate a last and futile attempt to implement a Spanish "national" uniformity. Paradoxically and as a result of this, the authoritarian regime provoked the opposite effect to such centralist State-making. Not surprisingly, during the democratic transitional period in Spain, regions and geographical areas lacking a desire for self-government in the past, claimed their own right for home rule.

In Catalonia, despite the prosecution and repression of any form of external manifestation of the Catalan national identity (eg. a total ban on the speaking of Catalan in public; a suppression of the press in Catalan, education, etc), the fight against the dictatorship was at the same time the struggle for their national aspirations. Thus:

"Even under the most extreme totalitarian circumstances such a task (ie. Spanish "national" homogenization and cultural assimilation) cannot be easily accomplished. One consequence of attempts to erode communal identities and national traits can be their intensifications. External threats and conflicts often lead to both internal cohesion and mobilization. They may also bring classes and interest groups together which otherwise have little in common with each other or whose aims are mutually antagonistic. That is why nationalism appeals to the solidarity of the non-solidary. Thus a nascent nationalist ideology is legitimized by the persecution of people, a language and a culture" (Giner, S, 1984, p.67).

Therefore, not only did Catalonia strengthen its separate identity and determination to achieve self-government, but decentralisation and political autonomy was also seen in nations, regions and other geographical areas of Spain (64) as the means of erradicating the centralist undemocratic regime.
Once the anti-communist myth was exploded, as the result of the legalisation of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the spring of 1977 by the Suárez Government, the real challenge left to be faced by the new democratic State was how to replace the old centralist polity. All the representative political forces in Spain agreed on the need for regional autonomy and widespread decentralisation. The State under Franco had been not just highly centralised and inefficient, but aristocratic and despotic. In such context, it could not achieve its uniformizing objectives: "The civil rights which, in countries like Britain and France, compensate to some extent for excessive centralism were non-existent in Francoist Spain. Francoism, paradoxically set up the conditions for regionalism, autonomism, federalism and ethnical nationalism" (Newton, M, 1984, p.104).

A conceptual inter-relation democracy-decentralisation, became apparent in the demands posed by the Opposition parties in the political negotiation with the Suárez Government. It was made plain by all of them that this fundamental reform of carrying out a deep political decentralisation in the post-Franco era would be a sine-qua-non condition for the establishment of a democratic regime. The new Estado de las Autonomías would be the consequence of dismantling the centralized and aristocratic Francoist State. Notwithstanding, none of the parties were in a position to foresee or impose any particular model of decentralisation, and this aspect provided the whole process with an element of open-ended compromise. The fears of a military involution were highly responsible for this intended ambivalence and terminological uncertainty. For the hierarchy of the Armed Forces all reforms could be assumed except one: that which could jeopardize the "unity of Spain".

This geographical pattern conditioning the new democratic institutions has subsequently had its effect on the
territorialization of politics in Spain. A view of the electoral results is highly meaningful. In the 1979 General Elections, for example, along with the Basque Country (PNV, HB and EE) and Catalonia (CiU and ERC), local parties won seats in Navarre, Aragón, Andalucía and in the Canary Islands. These political formations, which are based and operate in their territories, increased their proportion of seats in the Congress of Deputies by 36%, as compared with the 1977 General Elections. And, more significantly, they accounted for 10% of the total cast votes (65).

These figures compare with the 3.5%, 2.0% and 1.5% of votes obtained by the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the Oct. 1974, 1979 and 1983 General Elections, in a country like Britain with a salient territorial electoral pattern in Western Europe. Even if these results are combined with those of the Northern Irish parties—all of them locally based: DUP, UUP, SDLP, APNI, SF, WP—the percentage rises to totals of 6.5%, 5.1% and 4.5% for the United Kingdom, respectively (66).

In post-Franco Catalonia, the achievement of home rule was a political priority for all of the major parties, regardless of other ideological cleavages. This readiness to accept the so-called "national question" is particularly significant as far as the leftist parties are concerned. In contrast with some of their European counterparts, notably the British Labour Party, Socialists and Communists have had a strong anti-centralist tradition and federalist vocation in Spain. As a consequence of such approaches, "The Left (has assumed) the national question after the Civil War, but in the Basque Country it (has continued) instead to do mechanical analysis, linking national and bourgeois aspirations, and preventing the working class from assuming this national vindication and from using it as an instrument with which to fight the centralist State."
hegemony obtained by Esquerra Republicana after the proclamation of the II Republic can only be explained by the need for a nationalism which could represent the interests of the popular classes in Catalonia" (Vázquez Montalbán, M, 1981, pp.138-39).

In Catalonia the label "national" or "nationalist" cannot be claimed solely by the parties which explicitly define themselves as such. Both PSC and PSUC are not only Catalan national organisations but were also main catalysts in the process of political negotiation aimed at the re-establishment of self-government in Catalonia. A factor which partially explains such devoted participation may be found in the interaction between urban crisis and Home-Rule. Areas like Catalonia, which most benefited from the patterns of economic development and rising income during the time of the Spanish "boom" of the 60s, were also those which suffered most from the deficits in social consumption caused by a massive immigration and the malfunction of the administrative system in the urban areas. These effects were most acute in the surrounding areas of Barcelona city, viz the "natural" environment from where both PSC and PSUC draw the bulk of their electoral support. In those areas the problems of urban growth found a political channel in the fight against the excessive and inefficient bureaucratic centralisation. The great majority of the residents in these areas are immigrants. This non-Catalan speaking population easily adopted the national aspirations of the Catalan Left making them synonymous with the setting up of an institution of decision-making, which by the mere fact of its closer proximity could help to solve more efficiently their daily problems of lack of social facilities and infrastructure. Not surprisingly, therefore, the first semi-legal celebration of the Diada (Catalan National Day) took place in Sant Boi de Llobregat, heartland of the industrial belt of Barcelona, where 100,000 demonstrators congregated.
On the other hand, the Catalan nationalists have always been extremely careful in their relations with the immigrant population. They have deployed policies aimed at avoiding social confrontation and of promoting cultural assimilation. It is estimated that as much as 30 per cent of the immigrant population speaks Catalan (67).

A salient feature of the Catalan nationalists of CDC is that they had steadily refused secessionism. In their first Conference, held in November 1974, the party favoured a federal organization of the Spanish State, "...which guarantees the freedom of Catalonia and/with the other peoples of the Spanish State" (68). This anti-secessionist stance by CDC has cleared the way for an easier articulation of the national political consensus towards the achievement of Home Rule. Also true is that, at the same time that Francoism aroused the desire for self-government, even in areas of Spain where this had hardly existed before, a psychological fear about separation was also ingrained. The fears of another military rebellion, which eventually was attempted on February 23, 1981, factually conditioned the attitude of nationalists, federalists and autonomists, alike. In any case, it is vital to bear in mind that Catalan nationalism has always attempted to influence Spanish politics and has repeatedly avoided limiting itself to mere local activity.

As far as the Spanish framework is concerned, the general acceptance of territorial political autonomy for all nationalities and regions, by consent of both the Right and the Left, provided the means of achieving a peaceful transition from a dictatorship to a democracy in Spain. It also revealed the fragility and inconsistencies of the lack of a clear State model, this being the product of an intitutional compromise crippled by expressed desire to avoid confrontation on a highly sensitive issue.
3.2.3. The formulation of the Statute of Autonomy.

Prior to the analysis of the Catalan process of Home Rule after 1977, it is essential to make a reference to the notion of *pactisme* as a component of the Catalan way of life. It establishes, "that rules are made by parties entering into contracts of their own accord, and also that social life is the result of bargaining among people, and not of unilateral violence or imposition" (Giner, S., 1980, pp.5-6). This contractualist pattern can be used as a way of understanding class stratification and social consent and dissent in the history of Catalonia. Nevertheless, and for the purposes of this thesis, the relevance of the concept of *pactisme* is closely related to the inclination for negotiation and compromise characteristic of the Catalans, particularly in their relations with the central powers of the Spanish state. Even more important is the fact that, such a readiness for "realistic" bargaining and coalition formation taken by the Catalan political class, coincided with a similar attitude deployed by the Spanish forces and which had no tradition in modern Spain.

There is no doubt that such an historical centre-periphery conjuncture, provided by the existence of both political approaches complementary with each other, was the cornerstone which made possible not only the consensus politics to achieve self-governments in Catalonia, but also the peaceful transition to a democratic polity in Spain. Let us, subsequently, review the main features of the Catalan process.

The overall majority of elected candidates in the 1977 General Elections committed to the re-establishment of the Generalitat would pave the way for the political negotiations necessary to proceed with the making of the Statute of Autonomy. The Left and Centre-Left in Catalonia (PSC, PSUC and ERC) obtained 51.1% of the popular votes.
The Right and the Centre-Right (CDC, UCD-UCC, UDC and AP) received 37.1%. By contrast, in Spain as a whole the Right (UCD, AP, CDC and PNV) took the lead (48.6%) over the Left (PSOE, PCE and PSP) (43.2%).

These figures explain a great deal of the subsequent political developments both in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain. In Catalonia the immediate tactical move by President Suárez was to play down the political initiative of the winning Left through a decision which would satisfy the Catalans at large: the return of the exiled President of the Generalitat, Josep Tarradellas as head of a provisional Generalitat. To the surprise of all, the Republican Tarradellas flew to Madrid on June 27, 1977 to negotiate with Suárez the terms of his official return to Barcelona. Certainly, both Suárez and Tarradellas would hold the reins of political initiative in Catalan politics for the major part of the constituent period and until the celebration of the next General Elections in March 1979.

Furthermore, with the implicit acknowledgement by the Spanish Government of Republican legality, represented by Tarradellas, the first democratic President of Spain also "neutralized" the defeated Republican side in the Civil War mainly represented by the Left parties. Suárez gained not only political initiative but public credibility in dealing with the difficult issue of decentralisation and the Basque and Catalan "questions".

For its part, the Left and the elected candidates to the Spanish Parliament adopted a strategy of irreversibility in the process already started by making use of popular pressure. They prevented a system of self-government which could end up in a mere administrative decentralised system mobilising the fresh and widespread desire of the Catalan people for Home-Rule. On the occasion of the 1977 "Diada" (11th September), one million and a half
Catalans demonstrated in the streets of Barcelona demanding Home Rule. Its impact on the subsequent negotiations for the Autonomy of Catalonia would be decisive.

On 29th September, the Spanish Government decreed the re-establishment of the provisional Generalitat. On October 23 Tarradellas, as President of the provisional Generalitat, addressed the crowd in front of the "Palau de la Generalitat" of Barcelona with the celebrated words, "Ja sóc aquí!" (Here I am, at last!)

The Catalan parties and their leaders found themselves playing a secondary political role. However, their strategy of irreversibility and public mobilisation, instruments which would effectively bring about the realization of Catalan national aspirations, would ensure their absolute protagonism in the wording of the Statute of Autonomy. Thus, only ten days after the 15th June 1977 General Elections, the Assemblea dels Parlamentaris (Assembly of Parliamentarians) of the elected candidates for the Congress of Deputies and Senate in Catalonia, first met in Barcelona. Joan Reventós, leader of the PSC, made a speech which summarises the political philosophy not only of the Socialists but of the Catalan Parliamentarian Left during the period which culminated in the approval by referendum of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy:

"A memory especially painful for those who died during this process, in a special way and as a symbol for us all, the President, Lluís Companys, executed by shooting by those who believed that they could also 'execute' Catalonia by shooting...The most important meaning of the electoral results of the last 15th June is...the unequivocal manifestation of the democratic and autonomist will (in Catalonia) and also the will of transformation (of the society) which leads the Catalan people...The conquest of democracy for Catalonia means: the re-establishment of the principles and institutions of the 1932 Statute (of Autonomy); the recovery of the Generalitat and the return of its president, honourable senyor Josep Tarradellas...(Need for a Spanish Constitution) which recognises the right to the autonomy for all the nationalities and regions of the Spanish State. The right to self-government for Catalonia is inalienable" (69)

A highly significant aspect in this session of the Catalan
parliamentarians was that Jordi Pujol, leader of CDC, proposed Joan Reventós as president of the Permanent Committee of the Assembly. He was elected unanimously.

The nicknamed "troika" constituted by PSC, PSUC and CDC was de facto the maker of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. However, the fact that all parliamentary parties actively participated and agreed on the provisions contained in the Statute is also unquestionable. The wording of the Statute was only possible because of a national political consensus which genuinely reflected the genuine desire for Home Rule in Catalonia. On 29th December 1978, during the final vote by the Assembly of Parliamentarians on the draft of the Statute Bill, there were no votes against the text and only one abstention by Xirinachs, a senator supporting pancatalanism (70).

This political consensus was not the result of an ideological accommodation. Rather it was highly influenced by a tactical pragmatism which would preserve the final strategy of gaining the ideological goal of Home Rule. An analysis of the parties' positions during the process of the wording of the Statute draft is reproduced in Appendix 3.2.iii and provides us with a picture of the diverse approaches and emphasis developed by the Catalan Right, Centre and Left during this process.

The initial importance given by the PSUC to the reservation by public sector in Catalonia of the resources and services considered as "basic" for the community is not surprising. Neither is its insistence on a separation of the Catalan Government (executive) and the Presidency (honorary-representative) (71). Nor that the nationalists of CDC, suspicious then of the electoral behaviour of the non-native voters, proposed that the immigrants in Catalonia should maintain their former residence; or that the civil servants working in Catalonia should know and use Catalan. Concerning the
Socialists, their emphasis was placed on the system of proportional representation which would favour their electoral support in Barcelona city and surrounding urban areas, and on giving of Catalan political status to all residents in Catalonia (72).

The drafted Statute of Sau (73) involved the active presence of the AP MP, López Rodó, an ex-minister of Franco’s during the 60s. He also voted in favour of the final draft of the Autonomy Statute, a fact which underlines the dimensions of the political consensus. As far as the broader Spanish context is concerned, the drawing up of the 1979 democratic Constitution by agreement of the parliamentarian forces had an spillover effect in Catalonia of the highest importance.

In the constitutional pact which led to the wording of the draft of the 1979 Constitution, and its subsequent approval by the Spanish Parliament, the Catalan nationalists not only actively participated but also took collective responsibility for the new constitutional order together with UCD, PSOE(-PSC) and PCE(-PSUC) (74). Only AP and PNV did not join this pact. The former made its submission to the new constitutional order explicit and the latter opted for abstention, although it accepted the legal enforcement of the new constitution (16).

Therefore, the political agreement acquired national proportions in Catalonia although by extension it also followed the spirit of that pledge of greater dimensions which comprised the setting up of the new Spanish State. This dual process cannot be divided into two different and independent developments but has to be regarded as one interacted whole.

The articulation of the política de consenso made the making of both the 1978 Constitution and the 1979 Catalan and Basque Statutes of Autonomy possible. As far as the latter text is concerned, the cut
and out violence deployed by ETA conditioned the strategy of the PNV. While its approach to the Constitution was one of abstention, in order to maximise its electoral support, it instrumentalised the radicalization of ETA in order to be able to negotiate in Madrid on a platform of strength by presenting itself as the one "viable" alternative to the Spanish State capable of politically assuaging the embryonic situation of war in the Basque Country (ie. by means of a fully-powered Autonomy Statute).

For its part, with the Pactos de la Moncloa, the Catalan forces and the nationalists in particular, attained their two major strategic objectives: 1) Political recognition of the Catalan national aspirations and distinctiveness and, 2) Articulation of the Catalan "voice" in the political structure of the State.

Despite the context of violence in the Basque Country, the Catalans never lagged behind the initiative which came from this other historical nationality. In the end, the level and content of devolved powers for the Basque Country and Catalonia were alike. The parliamentary debates on the Basque Statute draft (76) preceded those of the Catalan Statute. However, the tough negotiation between the Government (UCD), Opposition (PSOE and PCE) and the Basque nationalists (PNV), to a great extent paved the way for the Catalan round of political discussions. In fact, the Catalan parliamentarians benefited from the previous settlement achieved on the Basque Statute simply because they had the "last word" in the whole process of consensus initiated in 1977 (77). Thus, both Statutes have a rather similar scope of devolved powers.

The last episode in the chronological process of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia started with the approval by the Catalan parliamentarians of the draft on December 29, 1978 (NB. With only one abstention). Once the constituent period was over, two new elections
(General and Local) were held on March 1 and April 3, respectively. Both electoral contests reinforced the political leadership of the Socialists in Catalonia. The governmental party CC-UCD also progressed in the legislative consultation (+3 MPs and in second place behind the Socialists), but did not gain control of any of the councils in the major cities and towns in Catalonia, due to the Pacte de Progrés (PSC + PSUC + CiU). The Communists obtained an equal number of MPs and controlled some local councils. CiU saw its electoral support slightly reduced (−3 MPs less if compared with the results of the "Pacte Democratic" in 1977), but it benefited from the Pacte de Progrés in the local councils (78).

In the interim produced by the electoral contests, the Left in Catalonia took the political initiative to maintain the political pressure on the demands for Home Rule. Proof of this was the massive demonstration called by PSC and PSUC which took place in Barcelona (Parc de la Ciutadella) on April 22 (79). The text addressed to the public shows the unequivocal vocation of the Catalan Left for self-government:

"In the process of recovery of the national liberties of Catalonia, the local elections of April 3 have brought about an important step forward because they enable, for the first time in 40 years, the constitution of democratic and Catalan local councils....However, they can only be efficient within a framework of authentic (Catalan) self-government...more than ever before the approval of the Statute of Autonomy is immediately necessary." (80)

The parliamentary debate on the draft worded by the Catalan parliamentarians began in the Congress of Deputies on the 25th June, 1979. The amendments presented by the governmental party UCD were many —ie. fifty nine— and affected three quarters of the text. Nonetheless, this combative approach was more the product of a calculated tactical move within the global scheme of negotiation with the Catalan and Basque parliamentarians than an attempt to reduce the degree of political autonomy expressed in both drafts. Furthermore,
the Galician draft of the Autonomy Statute was also handed into the Congress of Deputies on June 28. This text had a great resemblance to the Catalan draft. In fact, the political negotiation in course did not referred exclusively to these three drafts but, in a broader perspective, was set to put forward the constitutional foundations of the new Estado de las Autonomías.

As regards the particular interests of the Centrists, Suárez was most interested in gaining political initiative for the CC-UCD in Catalonia by means of enlarging the "troika" (PSC, PSUC and CDC) to a quartet which included the Centrists. He wished to capitalise on the negotiations in order to maintain the strong presence of his party in Catalonia, once the electoral fortunes of UCD in the Basque Country seemed to be irreversibly in the doldrums. Finally, an objective consideration he had constantly in mind was the apprehension about the process of decentralisation repeatedly manifested by preeminent members of the hierarchy of the Armed Forces. The possibility of a military uprising dominated this stage of the process.

In the end, the modifications carried through by the consensus of the "quartet" (UCD/CC-UCD, PSOE/PSC, PCE/PSUC and CiU) were significant but did not reduce the scope for Home Rule expressed in the draft of the Statute agreed by the Catalan forces (see Appendix 3.2.iv: "Modifications in the draft of the Statute of Autonomy during the debate of the Bill in the Spanish Parliament"). They can be summarised as follows:

1) Replacement of the term realitat nacional (National reality) for nacionalitat (nationality) with reference to Catalonia.

2) Introduction of a new subsection (art. 5.4) preserving the existence of the four provincial councils, diputaciones, and the consideration of the province as a territorial unit of State
administration.

3) Concerning the exclusive devolved powers of the Generalitat, the exclusive jurisdiction of the Catalan institution for the regulation and execution of the popular referenda was withdrawn, although legislative powers for popular municipal consultations were maintained. The exclusive power of Culture should be exercised in cooperation with the State.

The "decisive" - so labelled by the Catalan forces- exclusive power of Education was made "more" concurrent. It reads as follows: "It is fully within the jurisdiction of the "Generalitat" to regulate and administer education within the area of its jurisdiction, without prejudice to the provisions of art. 27 of the Constitution (ie. essentially the autonomy of the Universities) and Organic Laws which, in accordance with the first paragraph of art 81 therein (ie. Organic laws which deal with the development of fundamental rights and public liberties) may be developed, or to powers assigned to the State by number 30 in paragraph 1 of art. 149 of the Constitution (ie. "...regulation of the conditions relative to the obtaining, issuing and standardization of academic degrees and professional qualifications...") and to the inspection necessary for their proper implementation and safeguarding".

On economic matters under the basic legislation of the State, some formal precisions were included regarding the powers on Industry (ie. State rules for reasons of safety, health and military interest; regulations on industries subject to legislation on mines, hydrocarbons and nuclear power; and reserved power to the State to authorize transfers of foreign technology).

As regards Health and Social Security, the State reserves for itself the legislation -but not the management- of the economic regime of the Social Security.
The provisions referring to Law and Order were substantially modified. All the executive powers of the Generalitat with respect to internal public order were replaced by the power to create an Autonomous Police force in legislative concurrence with the State and to establish a Joint Security Council whose purpose was to coordinate the action of the Autonomous Police and the State Security Forces and Corps.

With respect to the administration of Justice, certain powers were transferred to the independent General Council of the Judiciary (eg. appointment of the President of the High Court of Justice in Catalonia). However, the Generalitat would continue to exercise all the powers which the Organic Laws of the Judiciary and the General Council of the Judiciary may assign to the central government. On the appointments to fill vacancies for Magistrates, Judges, judicial Secretaries and other related staff, as well as for Notaries Public, the knowledge of Catalan law would be regarded as a special merit instead of a compulsory requirement.

4) A remarkable addition to the Bill is the fact that the Generalitat could request the formalization of treaties with other foreign States including Catalan-speaking territories (eg. France). This aspect acknowledges the cultural unity of the Països Catalans but also the frontiers of the Spanish State.

5) In respect to the institutions of the Generalitat, the major modification refers to the electoral provisions. This issue was the most controversial during the discussions of the Catalan Assembly of Parliamentarians. In the first Sau draft, the four provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona were designated as electoral circumscriptions. Because of their subjective electoral interests, CiU, CC-UCD and ERC pressed to establish as electoral constituencies the 38 comarques of Catalonia, but the Left (PSC and PSUC) was more
interested in implementing a system which would not weaken its strongholds in Barcelona city and its industrial surroundings. In the subsequent draft approved by the Assembly of Catalan Parliamentarians, the Left carried an intermediate scheme which, like the 1932 Statute of Autonomy, established nine veguerías as electoral circumscriptions (see Table 3.2.ii for the territorial divisions in Catalonia). Finally the Statute Bill returned to the original formulation of the Sau draft, with the provinces of Catalonia forming only four large constituencies. Barcelona should elect 63% of the seats for the Catalan Parliament (NB. This accounts for 77% of the total population of Catalonia) and Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, the remaining 37% (corresponding to 23% of the Catalan population).

6) The title referring to "Finance and Economy" experimented a modification on the percentage share to be perceived by the Generalitat in the total revenue from direct and indirect taxes, including the fiscal monopolies. This percentage should be negotiated between the central and the autonomous governments as the average of the coefficients of population and tax burden in Catalonia (NB. not the Income as regards the latter proposed by the Statute draft). This tax burden should be measured as the revenue collected from personal income tax in Catalonia. Subsequently, the proportional contribution of Catalonia to the general services and burdens of the State should be deducted. Finally the "solidarity" coefficient in accordance with the inverse ratio of income per habitant in Catalonia, as compared with that of the rest of Spain, should be applied.

7) In the final Bill the popular initiative, as one of the means whereby the Statute of Autonomy can be amended, is suppressed. Furthermore, the passing of the amendment by the Spanish Parliament is required before the consultation in popular referendum to the Catalan
electorate. Nonetheless, the stipulation that mere consultation with the Spanish Parliament when the amendment only refers to the organization of the powers of the Generalitat is introduced.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Comarques</th>
<th>Main city/town</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Llobregat</td>
<td>PRIMERA (First)</td>
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<td>Baix Llobregat</td>
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<td>Vallès Oriental</td>
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<td>Vallès Occidental</td>
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<td>Olot</td>
<td>SEGONA (Second)</td>
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<td>Alt Empordà</td>
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<td>TARRAGONA</td>
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<td>Tarragona</td>
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<td>Valls</td>
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<td>Vilafranca del Penedès</td>
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<td>Garraf</td>
<td>Vilanova i la Geltrú</td>
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<td>TARRAGONA</td>
<td>(B) Baix Penedès</td>
<td>Reus</td>
<td>QUARTA (Fourth)</td>
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<td>TARRAGONA</td>
<td>Terra Alta</td>
<td>Gardesa</td>
<td>CINQUENA (Fifth)</td>
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<td>Baix Ebre</td>
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<td>La Cerdanya</td>
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<td>Bages</td>
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<td>SETENA (Seventh)</td>
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The Bill of the Autonomy Statute for Catalonia was debated in the Joint Parliamentary Committee which was composed of the members of the Constitutional Committee of the Congress of Deputies (34 votes in favour, 1 against, ie, the extreme right MP, Blas Pinar, and 1 abstention from an Andalusian MP) and the Assembly of Catalan Parliamentarians (21 affirmative and 1 abstention by the representative of ERC). On October 25, 1979, 88.14% of the Catalan vote (52.62% of the registered electorate) voted affirmatively for the implementation of the Autonomy Statute. The turnout was 59.7% of which 7.76 were "No" votes, 3.55% Blank votes and 0.47 spoiled votes.

On the 30th November and 12th December, respectively, the Congress of Deputies (317 MPs in favour, 1 against, ie. Piñar and 13 abstentions: PSA, AP and one MP from the Canary Islands) and the Senate (168 MPs in favour, 1 against and 3 abstentions) approved the Statute. The Royal Assent was given on December 18, 1979. On 17th January, 1980, the provisions of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia were fully put into effect, after their publication in the Official Gazette BOE in December 22, 1979.

The historical point of reference for the 1979 Autonomy Statute is given by the 1932 Republican text (81). Indeed, the whole process
of political consensus among the Catalan forces and the negotiations aimed at this end were highly influenced by the Republican legality and the scope for self-government with which Catalonia was provided during this historical period.

In principle, it is broadly by Catalan political leaders agreed that the extension and scope of the political and administrative powers is higher in the 1979 text (82). Comparisons respecting this usually fail, nevertheless, to take into account the different political circumstances involved in both processes. Moreover, the 1932 Statute was never legislatively implemented as a whole because of the Civil War. As regards the 1979 text it will not be possible to make an accurate evaluation until both legislative developments by the Spanish Parliament —via Organic Laws— and the Catalan Parliament are completed —no sooner than 1990.

In any case some scrutiny is highly valuable in determining the actual outcome of the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. In the 1932 text Catalonia was defined as a "region" instead of as a "nationality" as it was in the 1979 Statute. The latter also establishes the Catalan as the "genuine language of Catalonia". The range of devolved powers in their diverse nature (ie. Exclusive, concurrent or executive jurisdictions) has to be recognized as being wider than the one provided in 1932. In the 1979 Statute the Treasury of the Generalitat is made up, among other financial resources, of the transfer of services and patrimony which actually become a full property of the Generalitat. The Republican arrangements viewed such properties as a kind of usufruct and the Generalitat needed permission from the State to alien or mortgage them. But, above all, the financial system in the Republican text could be changed unilaterally by the State whereas a mutual agreement between the Catalan and Spanish Governments is now required (83).
The "full" jurisdiction of the Generalitat on Education in the 1979 Statute contrasts with the reserved powers to the State in the 1932 text, which only observed the possibility of creating Catalan schools although financed by the Generalitat itself.

Certainly the maintenance of the provincial administrative unit, "Diputaciones", which de facto disappeared during the II Republic, is the major functional inconvenience "imposed" in the 1979 Statute. The territorial organization of Catalonia in comarques, naturally assumed by the Catalans (see table 3.2.v), is difficult to fit comfortably into the existing three-tier system composed by municipalities, diputacions and institutions of the Generalitat.

However, the very open-ended nature of the quasi-federal Estado de las Autonomías makes it difficult to assert a final comparison between the two referred Catalan Statutes. The outcome of the legislative implementation of the State Organic Laws and the ulterior trends in the whole process of Spanish political decentralisation will provide us with a clearer picture, which will furthermore be affected by Spanish membership of the EEC.

3.2.4. Home-Rule, expression of the Catalan identity.

Since the military defeat of the II Republic, the Catalan national identity has been essentially preserved by the survival of its language. Indeed, "...cultural nationalism became a surrogate for political nationalism, when political nationalism was perforce a clandestine affair" (Carr,R & Fusi,J.P, 1979, p.157). At the same time, this culturally conformed self-awareness has come to express itself by means of the struggle for -and subsequent achievement of- Home-Rule. Therefore, cultural and institutional elements form not only a closely interrelated process but are inseparable parts of it.
It is the contention of this thesis that in such a process of coalescence, economic and social class factors have played a less salient, or even secondary, role.

The secular failures of the Spanish State with its lingering internal "malintegration" from the time of the Hapsburgs do explain, at least partially, the existence of powerful centrifugal forces. However, it is precisely after the 40-year period of Francoist dictatorship and its last attempt at State homogenization when the common realization of local, regional and sub-national (84) aspirations reaches its most spontaneous and meaningful manifestation: ie, the need for communal and territorial self-government as the sine qua non for the maintenance of a liberal-democracy polity in Spain.

In this process of self-realization the different territorial entities put the emphasis on economic, cultural, social or purely administrative considerations depending upon the salience of these structuring values in each respective case. In any case, the common feature of all of them has been the impulse to rebuild a decentralised and territorially assimilated Spanish State, something which in turn responds to the very nature of the diversity reflected in the historical origins and evolution of the peoples living in the Iberian Peninsula. As far as Catalonia is concerned, the social cohesion given by the language is paramount to understanding the political drive of the national will. Likewise, other territories have used other prevailing components like the popular refusal in Andalusia to be left behind politically, the social rejection to accept a prospect of a massive depauperization in Extremadura, the trends towards isolation fed by strong boundary regions in Cantabria and La Rioja, or the administrative accommodation of regions with a similar historical background (ie. Castilla-León, Castilla-La Mancha
The economic sense of comparative grievance felt by Catalonia should not be denied as another important factor of social cohesiveness and mobilisation (see section 5.2.iii) Nonetheless, for the Right as much as for the Left in Catalonia the handling of this delicate issue had to be very careful. Its own implications in the inequality of the income distribution in Catalonia could have jeopardised the consensual strategy towards the common and higher ranked aim of Home-Rule. Therefore, the adopted role of a more "European" and entrepreneurial Catalan bourgeoisie was to be always ready to compromise, whereas the workers' organisations put their priorities on consensual and corporatist policies in order to regain power in the democratic institutions to be created.

For the nationalists of CDC, the strategy has always been clear: the "resurrection" of the Catalan people could only be based on a unitary and cross-ideological movement. Jordi Pujol considered the Statute of Autonomy, "as the tool to rebuild, from the bottom to the top, the reality of Catalonia as one community" (85). This pragmatic pactist approach by the middle-class "catalanists" (86) and the local petit-bourgeoisie, -shared to a extent by the reformist Left-, can be characterized by three main elements:

1) The establishment of a negotiated and fully-supported institutional framework in Catalonia as the first step to "intervene" in the government of the whole State. For both the historic Catalan leaders, Francesc Cambó and Enric Prat de la Riba, the Catalan leadership within the Spanish State was an objective, "far nobler, far larger than the ideal of secession and independence which is considered the sumnum by some people" (Balcells, A, 1983, p. 186). On this subject see Nacionalitat Catalana (1906) by Prat de la Riba.

2) The political re-adaptation made necessary by the great influx
of immigrants from poorer Spanish regions who were needed because of the economic demand of the expanding Catalan industry. The net immigration in 1960-70 accounted for 720,255 people (Alcaide, J., 1983, p.20). Between 1940 and 1974, the total population of Catalonia increased from 2.9 to 5.3 million, the bulk of this being a consequence of immigration. It is also estimated that in 1960-70, 1,080,000 Castilian-speakers came to live in Barcelona city and surroundings (87). Finally, 62% of the male active population in the province of Barcelona—which comprises 77% of the total Catalan active working population—is made up of immigrants (Balcells, A., 1983, p.332).

3) The European vocation which provides with a supra-State dimension and a chance to expand not only industrial but new political ventures (e.g., better access to European financial markets and industrial joint ventures, and the possibility of forming with other nationalists parties a "regionalist" parliamentary group in the Strasbourg Parliament).

The national vocation of the Left in Catalonia has been deployed in a unitary manner, as well. For the Communists of PSUC the integration of the immigrants in this process was put forward as a political priority and seen as a real challenge for the Autonomy Statute. Antoni Gutiérrez, leader of the Catalan communists, praised the unitarian struggle of the Catalan people, "as well as the solidarity...and the will for (regional) political autonomy reflected in the Spanish State" (88).

In sociological terms this political convergence of the centrists (CDC and, to some extent, UDC and ERC) and the reformist Left (PSC and PSUC) has also been a manifestation of the class-structure in Catalonia. As it was pointed out early in the analysis of the social composition in Catalonia: "A more modern political solution to the
Catalan Question may be emerging from the embryonic centre-left movement in the region. Admittedly, it is a middle-class solution; but in Catalonia, the middle-class is likely to be dominant long after the Franco regime disappears" (Jones, N.L., 1976, pp. 266-7).

Thus, in Catalonia the diverse interests of its economy along with the composition of its social classes, have been influential in the whole process. However, the massive culturally-orientated repression of Catalonia, rather than in Catalonia, exercised by Franco's regime has been the dialectic factor for the national revival.

Indeed, the process towards self-government in Catalonia has to be seen as the response to the belated attempt by Francoism to make the Spanish State uniform. It can be argued, however, that this process does not "fit" into the midst of a trend towards a progressively more self-affirmed corporatist State. In a broader perspective, the revival of cultural, ethnical or sociological identities may be also considered as the expression of another corporatist interest, economically sustained and promoted. Conversely, in the modern liberal state which has a tendency to homogenize citizens and communities and to concentrate economic and political power, the manifestation of anti-corporatist feelings shows the rebellion of communities like Catalonia against living in the anonymity of McLuhan's "global village" and expresses a claim to the initiative from below in a more peripheral trans-State world.
1. In the SNP Conference held on September 1979, he was beaten by his main opponent, Gordon Wilson, in the contest for the leadership of the SNP.

2. A simple indicator of the greater involvement in the Referendum campaign is the volume of press releases and press conference appearances during Jan-Feb 1979 (respectively, 86 and 90). This volume placed the SNP in the first position in the rank of order of the "Yes" organisations which took part in the 1979 Referendum campaign.

3. David Marquand (1982, p. 20) writes as follows: "John would have been appalled by the Labour Party's move to the left after the 1979 election, and would have fought hard to stop it. I think it more probable than not that he would have broken away from the party altogether, and that he would have taken the lead in setting up a new social–democratic grouping of some kind".


5. Anti-devolution Labour back-benchers, mostly English who had first demanded the celebration of referenda in Scotland and Wales, later adopted a more expeditious attitude towards halting the legislative procedure of the Devolution Bill, which eventually they achieved (Guillotine Motion). On this see Kerr, J (1978), Naughtie, J (1978), Lindley, P.D (1978) and Jordan, J.G (1979).

6. Defeat of the Presbyterian Convenant force in the battle of Rullion Green (1666) by the royalist Scottish aristocratic troops under the command of his ancestor, General Tam Dalyell (see Mackintosh, 1968, p. 20).


8. The biographer Patrick Cosgrave reveals, in his Thatcher: The First Term, "...how subtly and patiently she disengaged the Tory Party from its commitment on Scottish and Welsh devolution...In Parliament she was in secret and friendly communication with, of all people, Tam Dalyell (see The Economist, 24.iii.85, p.85).


11. See McCartney, A. ibid, p. 38.

12. With mere capacity to propose ideas but with no executive powers.

13. A meaningful quotation by Roy Jenkins (Inverclyde, March, 1976) in Dalyell, 1977, p. 290: "We may be at a stage in relations between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom rather like those with Ireland in the eighties of the last century -except that events now develop at a pace more suitable to the jet age than the railway age..."

14. "Out of every 100 of public expenditure per person, someone in Scotland currently receives 119, someone in Humberside 87" (Dalyell, T, 1977, p. 234). Those figures might have been compared, as well, with the following: the relative per capita income (percentage of the UK standards) was in Scotland 86, while in Humberside 99 (Commission on the Constitution, 1973c). In any case, poorer Humberside & Yorkshire are not representative regions of the English average economic indicators.

15. On most Tuesday and Thursday mornings, when the House of Commons is in session, Scottish MPs usually met in the largest Committee Room at Westminster to form the Scottish Grand Committee, which transacts exclusively Scottish business. The Scottish Grand Committee deals with the general Second Reading discussion of Scottish Bills, after they have been referred to it by a purely formal Resolution on the Floor of the House. Note that, in order to preserve the party balance of the whole House, a number of English MPs are added to the Scottish Grand Committee. Occasionally, the Grand Committee meets in Edinburgh.

16. "The first idea was to give up members at Westminster for though matters affecting Ireland would be settled their, Gladstone said 'it passes the wit of man' to define such Imperial occasions" (Mackintosh, J, 1968, p. 197).

17. The Kilbrandon Report simply pre-established an assumption: "The supporters of legislative devolution do not consider that the English people would in fact have any feeling of injustice or that the admitted difficulty about representation should be allowed to stand in the way of a desirable measure of devolution" (Commission on the Constitution, 1973a, para. 1153-d).

18. After the 1983 General Election, Scottish Labour MPs accounted for 20 per cent of the whole group of Labour MPs. This compares with a Scottish population of 10 per cent in Britain. Note also that, after the 1983 general election, a majority of Labour's Scottish MPs were on the right of the parliamentary group. On this see Drucker, H (1983) and Bochel, J.M & Denver, D.T (1983).

19. Fisher, S in The Scotsman, 22.ii.84: "...it is simply a non-problem. The Speaker of the Commons could debar Scots MPs from voting on those subjects over which an Assembly had legislative competence
in Scotland. It is as simple as that. The situation could then arise, of course, where the UK parliament could have a Labour majority legislating on foreign affairs, but being outnumbered by Tories on English domestic matters. Tam Dalyell would deplore this but I call it extending democracy to the English.

20. In contrast with this point, two different views are reproduced as follows: a) Keating, M & Midwinter, A, 1983, p. 102: "...as the report itself suggested (Stodart Committee set by the Conservative Government in 1981 - see 'Committee of Inquiry into Local Government in Scotland'), in the not too-distant future the arguments about a single-tier system are likely to resurface"; b) Hetherington, P. The Guardian, 1.ii.83: "Eight years after the creation of Britain's largest regional authority, the name of Strathclyde evokes little more in England than the vaguest image of same great industrial mass across the Scottish border".

21. In 1975, only 33 per cent of house holds in Scotland were in owner-occupation, compared to 53 per cent in England, 970,000 having been built since 1945 (Keating, M & Midwinter, A, 1983, p. 158).

22. In response to the persistent SNP accusation that so many of the firms operating in Scotland have their headquarters in the South of England-London.


24. "The break-up of Britain", Question, 24.6.77, p. 7. Maxwell also wrote: "Traditional nationalists will look for this new nationality to rise, Phoenix-like, from the remnants of the old, born upwards on the shoulders of Weelum Wallace, Rabbie Burns and the rest of MacDiamid's 'heterogeneous hoth and rabble of Scottish heroes' (A Drunk man looks at the Thistle). Realists on the other hand will accept that the inspiration of a new Scottish nationality will not be found among the wreckage of Scotland's past but in the ambitions for Scotland's future" (Maxwell, S, 1981, p. 7).

25. Maxwell, S "Politics and culture", Question, 1.iv.77, pp. 4-5). The originator of the term "antisyzzygy", Professor Gregory Smith in his book Scottish Literature (1919), defines it as the quality of the Scottish imagination: a capacity to juxtapose disparate, apparently contradictory ideas, to jump from the sublime to the ridiculous, from the real to the fantastic, from the sacred to the profane.

26. Both, Leader and Chairman respectively of the Labour Party in 1983, are now supporters of Devolution for Scotland. In the 1979 Referendum Campaign they fiercely opposed it. See Heffer, E (1975) for the ideas he had before his "conversion" to devolution.

27. In 1976, while the SNP manifesto said nothing concrete about wealth inequality within Scotland, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Wealth and Income reported the following figures from 1974: 1% of the Scots held 36.6% of the nation's wealth: 19% held 59% and 80% held 4.5%, respectively.


29. Tom Nairn, an SNP member himself, wrote: "I put 'radical' and 'socialist' together here, because clearly insofar as nationalists
have become genuinely radical and socialists have become Scottish, they have the most powerful common interest", Question, July, 1976, pp. 8-11). On his distinction between "old" (regressive) and "new" (progressive) nationalism see Nairn, T (1975b).


32. See controversy in Question review ("The trouble with J.P. Mackintosh, 18.3.77, p. 5 and "The trouble with Stephen Maxwell", 15.4.77, p. 5)


34. At its Annual Conference in May 1977, the SNP abandoned its commitment to devolution as a step towards independence. At its 1979 Conference, the SNP decided that it would campaign for full independence - nothing less. In September 1985, the total percentage of Scots in favour of the secession option amounted to 29 % (Glasgow Herald, 18.x.85).


37. For a bibliography of the political and academic writings of John Mackintosh, see Daltrop, A & Crick, A (1982).

38. Why I cannot join the SNP, address at the North British Hotel, Edinburgh, 28.2.77, in Drucker, H (ed), 1982, p. 141.


44. Lecture to the Royal Institute of Public Administration, reproduced in Mackintosh, 1968, p. 110.

45. John Mackintosh rejected federalism for Britain basing his arguments on the financial provisions for the sharing of the national income and the distribution of tax collection. In a British federal Parliament he was of the opinion that the majority of English members
would be very reluctant to "subsidise" with a greater yield of the Federal income the poorer "state" member of Scotland. On this, see Mackintosh, J (1974).

46. On this issue he put the example of the elected representatives in the German Federal Republic: "his or her job (is) kept available with promotion and pension rights secured...thus ensuring a wider range of candidates." By contrast, and due to inadequate allowances, he believed that the local representatives in Britain were in a situation more prone to corrupt influences ("A cure for corruption", in The Scotsman, 16.8.76, in Drucker, H (ed), 1982, p. 47.

47. Note that in Spain, and tacitly agreed, the salaries of the presidents of the Autonomous Communities are equivalent to those of the members of the National Cabinet (similar to the British Secretaries of State), and those of the regional executives to top-rank Ministries' officials.


49. Mackintosh believed that there was no point in creating a Scottish Parliament if the result was not an improvement in the running of the Scottish affairs ("Scottish Government must reform government" in The Scotsman, 21.6.76, reproduced in Drucker, H (ed), 1982, p. 125.


51. On how the decision not to implement the 1978 Scotland Act which brought down the Callaghan Government, see Naughtie, J (1979) and Ascherson, N (1985). Jim Sillars offers an interesting interpretation on the awkward SNP's handling of this issue as follows: "Had the SNP...held on until Callaghan brought forward the repeal motion, then either the Assembly would have been saved (unlikely, I agree) or Labour MPs would have been clearly seen as the people who killed it" (Sillars, J, 1986, pp. 73). For subsequent events see Drucker, H (1983).

52. An illustration of this, as follows: "The week for Sir William (Fraser, Permanent Under Secretary at the Scottish Office since 1978 and, consequently, head of the civil service in Scotland) begins at his desk in Edinburgh on the Monday and then follow three days in London and back in Edinburgh on Friday" (Glasgow Herald, 11.vii.84).


55. However, Jim Sillars gives an interesting account about how frequently, "SNP and SLP activists in the Yes for Scotland campaign quietly helped out the very small groups of Labour Yes activists by distributing thousands of official Labour leaflets" (Sillars, J, 1986, p. 65).

56. The political transition from Franco's regime to a liberal democracy in Spain is a theme which has drawn the attention of

57. The behind-the-scene manipulation of ETA in this particular criminal act has been a widely considered hypothesis. The fact that the members of the ETA command were able to dig under a street scarcely 200 metres away from the US Embassy was remarkable.


61. For the distinction between "domestic" and "comprador" bourgeoisie and the internal factors affecting the dominant classes in mid-1970s Spain Portugal and Greece, see Poulantzas, N, 1976b, pp. 41-67.


63. First speech of King Juan Carlos I addressed to the Cortes Generales (Spanish Parliament), 22nd November, 1975.

64. These three terms are subject to problems of conceptualization and interpretation. The disparity in and range of opinions concerning the territorial use in Spain of these concepts is considerable. It is generally agreed that Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia are minority nations within the Spanish Nation-State—and are constitutionally considered as historical "nationalities". However, Andalusia opted for the same scope of Home Rule as the ones previously referred to, and labelled itself a "nationality" as did Valencia. Other Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) may be considered as regions, although the Madrid metropolitan province achieved its status as a self-governed community because of a pre-
determined territorial situation. Finally, the "foral" community of Navarre introduces a distinctive terminology.

65. The figures for locally based parties which are federated or maintain organic links with nationwide formations (eg. PSC and PSUC, as regards Catalonia) are not included.

66. See Butler, D & Kavanagh, D, 1984, p. 300 and pp.352-359.

67. In 1981, 78.65 % of the Catalan population was able to understand Catalan and 19.54 % was not. Five years later, the latter percentage dropped dramatically to only 4 % of residents in Catalonia who were still unable to understand Catalan (El País, 6.1.84 and 20.v.85).


70. He advocated an independent State for the Països Catalans which comprise all the areas where Catalan is spoken and which includes Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, Andorra and the Roselló (France).

71. PSUC hoped to obtain the Presidency because of the popularity of its proposed independent candidate, Josep Benet.

72. For issue related to the making of the Statute of Autonomy see the seminal publication, L'Estatut d'Autonomia de Catalunya 1979, by Sobreques, J & Riera, S which gives a full account of facts related to the whole process. See also review in Avui, 1.VI.83 by Jaume de Puig i Oliver and Santamaria Pastor, J (ed) (1985).

73. Named after the town of Sau (Girona) where the committee in charge of the first preliminary draft of the Statute Bill Comissió dels Vint held various meetings. The 1932 text is also referred to as the "Núria Statute" for similar reasons.

74. The 1979 Constitution was passed in the Congress of Deputies by 325 votes with 6 against and 14 abstentions. In the Senate the figures were 226, 5 and 8, respectively.

75. Abstention in the Basque Country in the constitutional referendum accounted for 53 % of the registered electorate. Twenty four per cent of the turnout voted against the 1978 Constitutional text. The Basque Country was the only Spanish territory where the 1978 Constitution was not ratified by more than half of those entitled to vote. In contrast, in Catalonia 61.1 % of the registered electorate (90.4% of the turn-out) voted for the 1978 Constitution.

76. Anecdotically, it was due to the fact that the draft of the Basque Statute was registered in the Congress of Deputies one hour before the Catalan one was on December 29, 1978. On the same day, President Suárez called for General Elections. This fact enabled the closure of the process initiated by the Basque and Catalan parliamentarians elected in the 1977 General Elections in the drafting of their respective constitutional texts. For a subsequent chronicle of the legislative process of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in the
77. The "unexpected" exception to this general arrangement was brought about later on, due to the success of the Andalusian nationalists in the 1979 General Elections (4 MPs of the PSA) and the growing atmosphere of comparative political grievance felt in Andalusia against Basques and Catalans. After this outbreak of popular manifestation of the Andalusian identity in demand of Home Rule, which was promoted and electorally capitalised on by the PSOE, this "new" nationality achieved the same constitutional scope of devolved powers as the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. This was possible because of the success of the Andalusian Referendum held on February 28, 1980 which decisively conditioned the subsequent development of the Estado de las Autonomías.

78. As a consequence of the Pacte de Progrés, the Socialists gained control of the four main city councils (i.e. Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) and other important town councils like Reus, L'Hospitalet del Llobregat, Manresa, Mataró, Terrassa, Figueres, Sant Feliu de Guixols, Vilanova i la Geltrú, Vilanfranca del Penedès, Valls, Ripoll, Esplugues de Llobregat, etc. The Communists gained control of Sabadell, Badalona, Cornellá, Santa Coloma de Gramenet and Balaguer. Finally, CiU contro led Vic, Igualada, Tortosa, Olot i Salou.

79. The rest of the Catalan parties, with the exception of the Centrists (CC-UCD) and the conservative Coalición Popular, also supported the demonstration which attracted a quarter of a million people.


82. Reventós (PSC), Pujol (CiU), López Raimundo (PSUC) and Sentís (UCD) supported this view right after the conclusion of the political negotiations in the parliamentary debate. Only the Republican Arrera disagreed. (El País, 8.VII.79).

83. See "L'Estatut de Catalunya" by Josep Maria Vilaseca i Marcet, La Vanguardia, 21.X.1982.


85. Temporarively – and mainly – used in the past which stresses not only the differences of Catalonia from the rest of Spain, but also the institutional recognition of these.

86. El País, 19.x.79.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO SELF-GOVERNMENT.

4.1. Introduction.

The development and implementation of a coercive constitutional order is one of the essential pillars for the legitimacy and consolidation of the modern industrial nation-state. However, despite the fact that constitutions have normally had the initial territorial goal of the self-preservation of the spatial unity of and coherence in the political programmes of the state, this role has been regarded as falling along the functional dimension. Not surprisingly, widely-accepted definitions of the concept of constitution have insistently tended to lay an emphasis on the functional goals of the constitutional arrangements of the state:

"Constitutions are codes of rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and define the relationships between these and the public" (1).

Much in the same line, the differentiation between federal and unitary constitutions is often made on a mechanical consideration rather than the value preference of, for instance, including or not a Bill of Rights (2). It is against this background that devolution/decentralisation can also be seen as a mere instrument of state-building which is utilized in order to accommodate those sub-state territorial units which threaten the stability of the state. In any case, the form and content of the provisions of any constitutional order reflect, to a great extent, both the institutional premises and, more importantly, the philosophy of political transformation under which the particular state is ready to operate.

The United Kingdom and Spain are considered to belong to the
category of unitary states. Their constitutions, however, show important differences which make the denomination of "unitary" rather equivocal. The constitutional principle, for instance, that the British Parliament is omnipotent and paramount offers a picture of legislative concentration, and the subsequent executive monopoly of the Prime Minister, in one single core of sovereignty and power. Furthermore, the judicial function of the superior Courts of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, together with that of the House of Lords (3), cannot review the alterability of fundamental "constitutional" terms like the Articles of the Union.

Although the 1978 written Spanish Constitution "...is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation." it also recognises "...and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed..." (Art. 2). Nevertheless, the ambivalent constitutional treatment of both the State Parliament supremacy (which "...exercises the legislative powers of the state", art 66.2) and the limited sovereignty of the regions (i.e. constitutional right to self-government), brings an element of permanent political transaction or contractualism to the Spanish constitutional order.

Furthermore, whilst in Britain all the territorial bodies with rule-making powers are subordinate to the Westminster Parliament, and not coordinate with it, in Spain the independent Constitutional Court exercises its role as an arbitrator above the State parliament and resolves the "...conflicts of jurisdiction between the State and the Autonomous Communities." (art. 161; 1,c).

This chapter will focus on the constitutional terms of the Scotland Act 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia 1979 which establish the characteristics and scope for self-government in both cases. Since the provisions of the former text were not implemented and the latter were, being approved by the Spanish
Parliament on December 18, 1979, this comparative study is unbalanced de facto by the absence of one of them. Consequently, the analysis which will be carried out in this chapter will be restricted to a theoretical approach to their provisions with special emphasis on the political implications of the different schemes embodied in each. Nonetheless, the Scotland Act 1978 still constitutes a crucial point of reference for any future scheme of devolution to be implemented in Scotland.

After careful examination of the main divergences and similarities of both constitutional pieces of legislation, this thesis will contend that the arrangements proposed for Scotland by the 1978 Act largely continued central control, whereas Catalan self-governed institutions were granted a more meaningful level of political autonomy.

Although, the Royal Assent to the Scotland Act was given on July 31, 1978, the devolution of powers proposed by the Act would come into effect only if the following requirements were met:

(a) More than 40 per cent of the Scottish electorate voted "Yes" to the provisions of the Act and, on the hypothesis of a turn-out of over 80 per cent, there was a majority of affirmative votes. With respect to this, neither the Kilbrandon Report nor any of the Labour Government White Papers made any reference to the desirability or otherwise of inviting the general public to express their views on devolution through a referendum. Moreover, the Scotland and Wales Bill, as originally drafted, did not contain provision for a referendum. Nevertheless, at the end of the debate following the Second Reading of the Bill, the Labour Government was forced to announce its intention to consult the Scottish people via referendum,
largely because of the pressure put forward by its own English MPs (see Table 4.1.1). In fact a new clause and schedule were added during the Committee stage (4). The Labour Government in effect won its Second Reading vote by promising to hold referenda in Scotland and Wales. Such a "concession" was believed to have killed the notion of devolution in Wales, and have made it difficult in Scotland (according to surveys of opinion at that time). Nevertheless, on February 22, 1977, the Government, despite its "concessions" to holding referenda, failed to impose a time-table schedule (i.e. "guillotine").

Table 4.1.1: "Scottish" and "English" key divisions on the Scottish Bill parliamentary debate.

1977

Jan., 25.....Vote to amend the proposal to introduce a 33.3% percentage of registered "positive" votes in the referendum and to impose instead a 40% percentage (Cunningham amendment). Carried by 166 to 151.

54% of Scottish MPs voted against the amendment.
94% of those voting for the amendment were non-Scottish MPs.

Jan., 25.....Vote to consolidate the 40% amendment and include it in the Bill. Carried by 168 to 142.

48% of Scottish MPs voted against.
93% of those voting for were non-Scottish.

Feb., 14.....Vote to ensure that three months must elapse between polling day in a general election and the date of the referendum. Carried by 242 to 223.

62% of Scottish MPs voted against the amendment.
94% of those voting for the amendment were non-Scottish.

Feb., 15.....Vote to remove the 40% (Canavan's amendment). Lost by 298 to 243.
64% of Scottish MPs voted in favour of the amendment.
94% of those voting against the amendment were non-Scottish.

Feb., 15.....Vote to substitute 33.3% for 40% percentage. Lost by 285 to 240.

52% of Scottish MPs voted in favour of the amendment.
95% of those voting against the amendment were non-Scottish.

b) The Secretary of State for Scotland made an order for the "Commencement" of the provisions of the Acts [Ss. 83(4) and 85(3)] under an affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament (4), and regardless of a "positive" referendum result (see Table 4.1.ii).

Table 4.1.ii.: The 1979 Devolution Referendum results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Eligible Electorate</th>
<th>Votes Yes</th>
<th>Votes No</th>
<th>Spoiled Ballots</th>
<th>Turnout %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>76,742</td>
<td>20,746</td>
<td>30,780</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>195,673</td>
<td>71,296</td>
<td>59,105</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumfries &amp; Galloway</td>
<td>104,085</td>
<td>27,162</td>
<td>40,239</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>243,485</td>
<td>86,252</td>
<td>74,436</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grampian</td>
<td>339,881</td>
<td>94,944</td>
<td>101,485</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>134,997</td>
<td>44,973</td>
<td>43,274</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>65.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lothian</td>
<td>561,234</td>
<td>187,221</td>
<td>186,421</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathclyde</td>
<td>1,750,299</td>
<td>596,519</td>
<td>508,599</td>
<td>1,302</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayside</td>
<td>290,076</td>
<td>91,482</td>
<td>93,325</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island Areas</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orkney</td>
<td>13,789</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>5,439</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shetland</td>
<td>14,724</td>
<td>2,026</td>
<td>5,460</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Isles</td>
<td>22,127</td>
<td>6,218</td>
<td>4,933</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| SCOTLAND               | 3,747,112           | 1,230,937 | 1,153,502 | 3,133           | 63.8      |

"Yes" Majority: 77,435
## The "Yes" Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% Votes &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
<th>% Electorate &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dumfries &amp; Galloway</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fife</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grampian</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lothian</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strathclyde</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayside</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Island Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% Votes &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
<th>% Electorate &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orkney</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shetland</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Isles</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scotland**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% Votes &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
<th>% Electorate &quot;Yes&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scotland</strong></td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the constitutional principle of "unlimited sovereignty" it was for Parliament to give the "last word" whether or not the Act were repealed, regardless of the 40 per cent "Yes" or "No" majority of Scottish votes in the Referendum. However, the limitation imposed by s.85(2) on the Secretary of State, allowed him/her a very little scope for manoeuvrability. It could be argued again that the principle of the "unlimited sovereignty" of the Westminster Parliament could, constitutionally speaking, make the implementation of the Act feasible despite the actual Referendum results. Yet, according to the actual provisions of the Act, it would not be "possible" not to take into account the 40 per cent rule, unless the actual provisions of the 1978 Act were subsequently overruled.

Indeed, the ss. 85(2), 83(1) and 83(4) read as follows:

"If it appears to the Secretary of State that less than 40 per cent of the persons entitled to vote in the referendum have voted "Yes" in reply to the question posed in the Appendix Schedule 17 to this Act or that a majority of the answers given in the referendum have been
"No", he shall lay before Parliament the draft of an Order in Council for the repeal of this Act"...."The preceding provisions of this Act ...shall not come into operation until such day as the Secretary of State may by order(*) appoint"...."The order(*) under this section shall not be made unless a draft of it has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament".

In Catalonia, even before the Spanish Constitution was adopted by referendum on December 6, 1978 (see Table 4.1.iii), the entire Catalan representative political force -i.e. the Comissió dels Vint- started the drafting of a Statute of Autonomy. Nationalists, socialists, communists, republicans, christian-democrats and conservatives first met in the town of Sau (Girona) and had completed the wording of the Bill by the end of 1978.

The implicit constitutional definition of Catalonia as a "nationality", together with the historical communities of the Basque Country and Galicia, and later Andalusia (5), has to be emphasized. This gave them more than merely semantic difference when compared with the remaining regions in the 17 Spanish Comunidades Autónomas.

---

Table 4.1.iii Results of the Referendum on the Spanish Constitution 1978 in Catalonia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>El.census</th>
<th>Affirmative %</th>
<th>Negative %</th>
<th>Abstention %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>3,439,121</td>
<td>2,091,897</td>
<td>109,527</td>
<td>1,124,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girona</td>
<td>335,197</td>
<td>218,370</td>
<td>10,693</td>
<td>91,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lleida</td>
<td>266,412</td>
<td>162,849</td>
<td>6,790</td>
<td>88,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona</td>
<td>369,237</td>
<td>224,648</td>
<td>10,867</td>
<td>117,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>4,409,967</td>
<td>2,697,764</td>
<td>137,877</td>
<td>1,422,548</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Bill of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was passed in the Spanish Parliament, after ratification by popular vote of 52 per cent of the registered electorate in Catalonia (see Table 4.1.iv) in the referendum held on October, 25, 1979.
Table 4.1.iv: The 1979 Referendum results on the Catalan Statute of Autonomy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROV</th>
<th>Elec. census</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Blank</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Null</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bar.</td>
<td>3,371,558</td>
<td>1,809,186</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>165,032</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>72,051</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9,437</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gir.</td>
<td>336,296</td>
<td>191,223</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>13,320</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8,481</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llei.</td>
<td>265,083</td>
<td>139,320</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>8,668</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5,474</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarr.</td>
<td>385,949</td>
<td>182,849</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18,174</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8,323</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>Turnout</th>
<th>% electorate</th>
<th>Abstention</th>
<th>% electorate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>2,055,706</td>
<td>60.97</td>
<td>1,315,852</td>
<td>39.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girona</td>
<td>213,936</td>
<td>63.62</td>
<td>122,360</td>
<td>36.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lleida</td>
<td>154,359</td>
<td>58.23</td>
<td>110,724</td>
<td>41.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarragona</td>
<td>210,639</td>
<td>54.57</td>
<td>175,310</td>
<td>45.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL RESULTS IN CATALONIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral census</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% elec. census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>2,592,997</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstention</td>
<td>1,765,379</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative</td>
<td>2,281,024</td>
<td>87.97</td>
<td>52.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>205,174</td>
<td>7.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank</td>
<td>94,312</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null votes</td>
<td>12,487</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Historical background.

Scottish attempts for Home Rule began in the UK Parliament in 1889 (see Appendix 4.i). To date none of these attempts have been implemented. This circumstance made the United Nations Economic and Social Council adopt the Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) which described such legislative failures in Westminster as "...a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights." In any case, the immediate political background to the Scotland Act 1978 may be found in the growing criticism during the 1960s of the machinery of government and in the electoral upsurge of the Scottish National
Party, genuinely expressed in the results of the General Elections held in October 1974, when 11 CUP members were elected to Parliament—with 30.4 per cent of the popular vote.

The Catalan Generalitat has its origins in the Corts Catalanes (Catalan Parliament), which were representative of the Catalan population and first met during the reign of Jaume Ier, el Conqueridor (1213-1276). Having a parliament and a Constitution, Catalonia can be cited as the first Constitutional Monarchy in Europe.

In 1359, the Corts Catalanes set up the Generalitat, originally as a permanent organism for the collection of taxes and, subsequently, as the institution wherein the self-government of Catalonia was politically and administratively organized.

In 1714, the Generalitat was abolished by the first Spanish King of the Bourbon dynasty, Felipe V d'Anjou (Philip V), after the War of Succession. The second or modern Generalitat was re-established on April 17, 1931, three days after the proclamation of the II Republic in Spain. By April 1, 1939, the Spanish Civil War was over. The exiled President of the Generalitat, Lluís Companys, after being arrested in France and handed over to the Francoist authorities by the German Gestapo was executed by Franco’s forces at the Castle of Montjuïc on October 15, 1940 (For an account of the origins and re-establishment of the Catalan self-governed institutions, see Generalitat, 1979).

After the political agreement reached on July 22, 1977 by Josep Taradellas, President of the Generalitat in exile from 1954, and Adolfo Suárez, the first elected Spanish President since the death of Franco in 1975 (Generalitat, 1978, pp. 33-34), the Generalitat was
provisionally reestablished on September 29, 1977, following the provisions of the Royal Decree-Law 41/1977.

4.2. Main divergences and similarities.

Although the Scotland Act 1978 did not make its major intended achievement explicit, this was generally accepted to be the devolution of power through the setting up a directly elected Assembly in Scotland, which would be responsible for some legislative and executive matters concerning Scottish affairs.

However, in the last paragraph of the initial "Arrangement of Sections" a brief description is given as follows:"...to provide for changes in the government of Scotland and in the Procedure of Parliament and in the constitution and functions of certain public bodies". A similarly vague description precedes section 1 which simply states: "There shall be a Scottish Assembly".

The justifying political basis of the Act, however, rested upon the fact that Scotland was considered to be an appropriate territorial unit for the operation of the democratic principle of accountability. Furthermore, and for the authorities constituted by the Scotland Act 1978, this piece of legislation can be considered as a written constitution: it established them and fixed their powers (6).

The Catalan preface in the Statute asserts that it is "...the expression of the collective identity of Catalonia and defines its institutions and its relations with the (Spanish) State within a framework of free solidarity with the other nationalities and regions."

The Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 is an "open" piece of law following the political philosophy of consensus inaugurated with the Spanish Constitution of 1978. According to this transactive approach
to the setting up of the new democratic institutions, the Spanish Carta Magna is rather ambiguous as regards the "Tittle VIII" which deals with political decentralisation and self-government. Not surprisingly, for instance, the decentralisation and allocation of almost all State powers is feasible in strictly constitutional terms: "The State may... transfer or delegate powers in its exclusive competence to the Autonomous Communities." (art. 150; 2). This feature contrasts sharply with the punctilious nature of the Scotland Act 1978 whereby the "lawful" application of its provisions are carefully specified and doubts and "misunderstandings" concerning the correct development of the scheduled devolution of powers are "clarified".

Basically, both the Act and the Statute seek devolved legislative powers for a directly elected Assembly or Parliament, and executive powers for an executive or Government. Despite the fact that the kind of devolved matters in both texts is similar, there are important differences between the constitutional texts. Let us, subsequently, analyse the most relevant ones.

Legislative supremacy.

The United Kingdom parliament retained full legislative capacity to amend or repeal the Scotland Act 1978 at any time, whether before or after the referendum (s. 85), and whether or not the provisions of the Act had come into effect. Also the UK Parliament would retain full legislative capacity on all matters affecting Scotland, whether or not the Assembly had yet legislated on these matters. Thus, the United Kingdom would have the power to amend any Assembly Acts. Accordingly, the "last word" on any legislative collision between Parliament and Assembly remained with the former. Indeed, there is an exhaustive persistence throughout the Act of underlining the
Westminster Parliament supremacy.

Both the Kilbrandon Report, Commission on the Constitution, (1973a, para. 1126) and the Labour White Paper, Our Changing Democracy, (1975, para. 51), indicated that a constitutional convention should develop to solve the issue of the legislative collision between Westminster and the Scottish Assembly. Undoubtedly, conflicts would have arisen between Acts of Parliament and Assembly Acts. The state of the problem was set out, therefore, as follows:

"If inconsistencies do arise, it remains to be seen whether the courts would treat both measures as having equal right, and so apply the normal rule of construction whereby the later measure is regarded as having impliedly repealed the earlier to the extent of the inconsistency between them, or whether the courts would prefer the Act of the supreme legislature to that of the subordinate; there is no doubt that Scottish Assembly Acts are 'species of subordinate legislation" (Bradley, A.W & Cristie, D.J, 1979, s. 17).

Regarding the judicial review of the Assembly Acts, there is a full provision both before enactment (ie. Scottish Assembly Act) (s. 19) and thereafter (s. 65 and sched. 12). While some "devolution issues" may be settled in the ordinary civil and criminal courts, the Act envisages a new constitutional role for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in interpreting and applying its provisions.

In the pre-assert scrutiny of Assembly Bills, if the Secretary of State for Scotland is of the opinion that any of the Bill's provisions are beyond the Assembly's legislative competence, he/she must refer the suspected provisions to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If this decides that the provisions in question are not within the Assembly's competence, the Bill cannot then be submitted to Her/His Majesty in Council for approval.

Paradoxically, there is nothing in s. 19 of the Scotland Act to prevent the Assembly from reconsidering a Bill which has not been submitted for approval and from passing it again with such alterations as it thinks fit. Nonetheless, the Labour Government
White Paper (1975) envisaged that a Bill containing provisions considered to be *ultra vires* would be referred back to the Assembly by the Secretary of State for Scotland with a statement of reasons.

The most notable aspect of the machinery for the post-assent review (s. 65 and sched. 12) is also assigned to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Devolution issues would not have reached the Judicial Committee except on appeal from an appellate court or on reference from the House of Lords, so that particular devolution issues might have been decided by other courts. The role of the Judicial Committee is, consequently, diverse in both procedures, the main difference being that in the pre-assent scrutiny no other courts are involved.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has had an important role in advising the British Crown on discussions arising from the United Kingdom colonies and the Commonwealth, and it has had considerable experience in dealing with constitutional questions covering the legislative competence of colonial and similar legislature. A constitutional precedent of the mission of the Judicial Committee can be found in the Government of Ireland Act 1920, which gave the Judicial Committee power to decide questions of legislative validity at both the pre-enactment and post-enactment stages.

The Spanish Constitution 1978 delimits those powers which are exclusive of the state and those which are "available" for the Autonomous Communities (art. 149; 3). Thus, there is no constitutional possibility of any legislative "intrusion" of the Spanish Parliament into the exclusive powers adopted in the Statutes of Autonomy (eg. art. 9, Catalonia), once those powers "available" under the Constitution have been fully devolved to the nationalities.
and regions.

The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional (7), the highest judicial tribunal, has amongst its attributes, the capacity to solve the "conflicts of jurisdiction between the State and the Autonomous Communities, or between the Autonomous Communities themselves" (art. 161; 1,c). Consequently, despite the faculty of the Spanish Government to "contest before the Constitutional Court the provisions and resolutions adopted by the Autonomous Communities" and, in spite of the fact that the Spanish governmental contention "shall bring about the suspension of the contested provisions or resolutions", the Constitutional Court, "must either ratify or lift the suspension...in a period of not more than five months" (art. 161; 2).

The Tribunal Constitucional has twelve members and is composed as follows:

(a) Four members nominated by three fifths of the MPs of the Congress of Deputies (Lower House).
(b) Four members nominated by three fifths of the MPs of the Senate (Upper House).
(c) Two members nominated by the Government.
(d) Two members nominated by the General Council of the Judiciary - also elected by Parliament.

Since, due to the Spanish electoral system of proportional representation, it is highly improbable that a single political party will achieve 3/5 of the members of both Houses of Parliament, there is a need for compromise on the nomination of candidates to the Constitutional Court between -at least- the major parliamentary forces. Otherwise, a sort of constitutional cul-de-sac would impede the functioning of the democratic mechanisms of the State. This circumstance provides the highest Court with a great deal of
authority and independence.

It might be argued, as the Kilbrandon Report does, that the role of any constitutional court in solving disputes about governmental powers is ultimately that of placing electoral bodies in a position subordinate to the judiciary and, hence, there is a risk that judges tend to become political and that their known political views are taken into account when they are appointed. Regarding the particular case of Spain, the need for a political pact between the Government and the Opposition in the election of the members of the Constitutional Court—contrary to the case of the UK Judicial Committee of the Privy Council—is a barrier against open political sectarianism or proclivity in the nomination of the candidates. The important judgement of the Court on the LOAPA Act (Organic Law on the Harmonisation of the Autonomical Process) passed by the Spanish Parliament has, for instance, reinforced the "quasi-federalist" interpretation of the 1978 Constitution very much against the views of both UCD and PSOE Governments (8).

Power to raise revenue.

Following the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Report, which stressed that the United Kingdom should continue to require powers for the centralised management of the economy, there was no kind of delegation of power for the raising of revenue by taxation in the Scotland Act 1978:

"...the assembly's total expenditure would ultimately be for the United Kingdom to decide. The government would also need to be satisfied that the assembly's proposed allocation of expenditure was broadly consistent with the pursuit of central policies. With these reservations all decisions on expenditure would be a matter for the assembly itself." (Commission on the Constitution, 1973a, para. 1163).

In the White Paper, Devolution: Financing the Devolved Services
(1977), the Labour Government explained why it preferred the system of block funds voted by Parliament and calculated on an expenditure basis to take into account the need of the whole United Kingdom as well as the needs of Scotland. After examining many proposals for devolving taxation, the Labour Government opted for no devolved form of taxation, although it was not opposed in principle to a devolved administration having power to raise limited additional revenue to supplement block funds.

The Assembly would not have had power to impose taxation, despite attempts made in Parliament, and the Act contained no formula either governing the block payable to the Scottish executive or even requiring the considerations which could be taken into account in the calculation of the grant. Although the Labour Government believed it was desirable to establish a formula to calculate the block fund, they also considered that such an arrangement should not be actually put into writing (White Paper, 1977, paras. 76-78). The necessity of the setting up an independent advisory body (NB. without executive responsibilities), to provide information of the needs and standards of public services in all parts of the United Kingdom (ibid, para 72) was also considered.

Part III of the Scotland Act 1978 accordingly merely contains the legal framework necessary to enable block grants for expenditure on the devolved services to be paid from the United Kingdom Exchequer to the Scottish Executive establishing two Scottish Funds (ie. the Scottish Consolidated Fund and the Scottish Loans Fund) modelled on their United Kingdom counterparts.

The Spanish Constitution guarantees the right of the Autonomous Communities to levy their own taxes in art. 156.1: "..(they) will
have financial autonomy to accomplish their functions in accordance
with the principle of solidarity and in coordination with the
Treasury of the State.". The financial provisions are established in
art.157 as follows:

"1. The financial resources of the Autonomous Communities shall
comprise:

(a) Taxes wholly or partially made over to them by the State;
surcharges levied on State taxes and other shares in State
revenue.

(b) Their own taxes, rates and special levies.

(c) Transfers from the inter-territorial clearing fund and other
allocations to be charged to the General State Budgets.

(d) Revenues accruing from their property and private law income.

(e) The yield from credit operations."

According to these constitutional provisions, and to those of the
Catalan Statute of Autonomy and the subsequent LOFCA (Organic Law for
the Financing of the Autonomous Communities), the financial resources
of the Generalitat are as reproduced in Figure 4.2.i.

Finally, the LOFCA also developed the concrete provisions and
financial mechanisms as regards both schemes in the Constitution and
the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. However, much of the political
tension since 1979 between the Central and Catalan governments has
been due to the difficulties which have arisen from the
implementation of these provisions.

As will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis, the
negotiations between Madrid and Barcelona to find a "definitive"
system of financing Catalan self-government have been of the highest
importance, not only for the Generalitat but for the whole process of
political decentralisation in post-Franco Spain.
**Fig. 4.2.i: Financial resources of the Generalitat.**

**RESOURCES**

**PATRIMONIAL**

Income from property of the Generalitat

**FISCAL**

Percentage share in total state revenue

**By Generalitat**

Yield from own taxes

Surcharges on State taxes

Levies for services of the Generalitat

Special contributions

Fines and penalties

**From State**

Yield transferred state taxes (*)

Tax on wealth

Gift and inheritance tax

Tax of transfer of wealth

Tax on gambling

Luxury taxes on consumer goods

**OTHER**

Public debt and credit operations

Income from Inter-territorial Clearing Fund

Other allocations charged to General State Budgets

Income from private law; legacies and donations; subsidies.

(*) Some of these taxes were eliminated in January 1, 1986, because of the implementation of VAT following the Spanish accession to the EEC.
Financial arrangements.

The Kilbrandon Report emphasized that one of the main causes of
general discontent with the United Kingdom government was the over-
centralisation of power in London. However, after rejecting a
transfer of powers which could have involved the transformation of
the United Kingdom State, either into a number of separate sovereign
states (separatism) or into states (regions) sharing sovereignty
with the United Kingdom (federalism), the Report stressed the need to
maintain the centralised management of the economy. The contradiction
of advocating political but not financial devolution is apparent.
Moreover, the consideration by the Kilbrandon Report of only two
options (separatism or federalism) with regard to the issue of the
devolution of financial powers is also very limited.

It also concluded that, while the powers of taxation should
continue to remain with the United Kingdom Parliament, the devolved
administration in Scotland and Wales should be allowed to make their
own expenditure decisions within a total budget. The Kilbrandon
Report proposed an annual block grant for each devolved area,
calculated by an independent exchequer board which would set the
standards to be met by the devolved services and would estimate the
corresponding expenditure:

"The scheme would require an exchequer board, acting in relation to
both countries and independent of the Scottish, Welsh and the United
Kingdom Governments. The annual Scottish budget, which would be in
time to fit in with the central government's Public Expenditure
Survey, would be drawn up by the Scottish Government in accordance
with its own policies and standards of provision, and would be
submitted to the exchequer board...The board would recommend what
Scotland's total expenditure should be...The total expenditure
recommended by the board might be rather more or less than the
previous year's expenditure...but in no circumstance would it be
below a level adequate to finance all the transferred services"
(Commission on the Constitution, 1073a, paras, 1136-7).

The block grant would thus have been calculated on an expenditure
basis and not with reference to sources of revenue available or assigned to the devolved governments of Scotland and Wales.

Regardless of the Kilbrandon Report's recommendations, the Scotland Act 1978 contained no formula governing the block grant payable to the Scottish executive or even requiring certain considerations to be taken in the calculations of the grant.

The then Labour Government expressed its hopes that it would be possible, by agreement with the devolved administrations, to establish a formula relating "needs" in Scotland and Wales with respect to the devolved services to comparable expenditure elsewhere in the United Kingdom, on a percentage basis. Such a formula might have needed reviewing periodically, say every four years. But no such formula would be written into the devolution legislation. Consequently s. 48 of the Scotland Act reads simply as follows:

"48.—(1) The Secretary of State shall from time to time make out of moneys provided by Parliament payments into the Scottish Consolidated Fund of such sums as he may determine by order made with the consent of the Treasury".

Probably s.48 (1) is the most important financial subsection in the whole of the Scotland Act 1978, since it gives authority for the financing of devolution by means of a "block fund". Once again, as throughout the legal text, the patronising figure of the Secretary of State for Scotland appears to be central, although, despite the reference to his role and that of the Treasury, the sums in question would have been so large and of such political importance that the necessary decisions would undoubtedly have been taken collectively by the U.K. central government. The absence of any reference to the frequency of the payments means that, even though an annual basis could have been adopted, there would have been no obstacle to the making of discretionary supplementary payments. Once more, the
outstanding feature of s. 48 of the Act is that there is no indication of how the payments were going to be calculated.

The block fund is said, in the Act to include provision for rate support for local government current expenditure, but the Scottish Executive would be responsible for deciding the amount of rate support grant (s.68). It was assumed that approximately 50 per cent of the block grant would be used for rate support purposes.

As has been indicated, the Scottish Assembly would have had no power to impose taxation, other than the "power" to replace rates with a local tax of practically the same character and nature. Nevertheless, although sub-paragraph 2 allows the Assembly legislative competence in respect of the local government rating system which is a devolved matter by Sched. 10, Pt. I, group 5, this competence is very restricted. Thus, for example, it would not be within the competence of the Assembly to replace rates by a new form of local tax such as local income tax, since rates are based on the occupation of property. Nor would the Assembly be able to take from local authorities their powers to levy rates. Accordingly Scheds. 2, 4 (2) and 2, 3 (1) state, respectively, as follows:

"This paragraph does not prevent a provision from being within the legislative competence of the Assembly if its effect is only— (a) to alter a rate levied at the passing of this Act without substantially (emphasis added) changing its character...". "A provision is not within the legislative power of the Assembly if it would impose, alter or abolish any tax".

Of great importance too is section 52 which, together with s. 48, contains the powers which the United Kingdom Government would need to control the total levels of public expenditure on the devolved services in any financial year. That section seeks to fix control over capital expenditure by public corporations and local authorities that are financed by borrowing and, consequently, "...a Scottish Secretary shall endeavour to secure that the aggregate of the
expenditure incurred in any financial year which is relevant capital expenditure does not exceed such an amount as the Secretary of State may, by order made with the consent of the Treasury, determine as the limit of such expenditure for that year (emphasis added)."

Finally, the Act gives the Scottish Executive and Assembly discretion over how the block fund is to be divided between the various devolved matters. The question arises as to whether in practice the central government would have refrained from taking an "active" interest in the detailed expenditure decisions of the Scottish administration and from seeking to influence them. Legal possibilities of doing so were established by s.46 (1) of the Act which reads as follows: "Sums forming part of the Scottish Consolidated Fund may be appropriated only for the purpose falling within devolved matters or a purpose for which they are payable out of that Fund under this Act or any other Act of Parliament (emphasis added)".

The instrumental institution for putting into practice the provisions on financial matters contained in both the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia has been, since 1979, the Joint Commission, which has included representatives both of the State and of the Generalitat. The relevant aspects of its constitution and functions are in Transitional provisions 3 and 6 of the Catalan Statute. A relevant aspect is that the Joint Commission consists of an equal number of members nominated by the central government and by the Consell Executiu of the Generalitat and that it also decides on its own working rules.

Once the Joint Commission agreed on the moneys to be transferred to the Generalitat, as far as the percentage share in the total State
revenue from direct and indirect taxes including fiscal monopolies was concerned, the Central Government approved such resolutions by decree-law. This process of costs calculation, however, has not been exempt from some political interference.

In February, 1982, the legislative action of the minority UCD Government began to be persistently, and to some extent unexpectedly, supported by the Catalan nationalists of CiU. At the same time a compromise was reached in the Joint Commission (composed of representatives of both Central Government and the Generalitat) on the valuation of the services transferred to the Generalitat which disregarded a method adopted by the Treasury Secretaries of all the Autonomous Governments some days before.

Several weeks later it was "discovered" that there had been an overestimation of 21,000 million pesetas (ie. around 100 million pounds) to be transferred to the Generalitat in 1981. The explanation of such a deviation is simple. Instead of considering the State revenue corresponding to the financial year of 1980, the valuation was construed on the 1979 basis (NB. The percentage share of the Autonomous Communities in the total State revenue is set by means of a mathematical operation in which the "real cost" of the transferred services is divided by the tax revenue of the financial year prior to the transfer, and excluding the taxes made over to them from the State. Due to the consideration of 1979 revenue instead of 1980, the divisor in the fraction was smaller and, therefore, the result larger).

Finally, the UCD Government was politically forced not to implement its arrangement with the Generalitat and, after more than a year of sometimes tough discussions, and a stoppage of the transfer of further services to the Generalitat, such a stalemate situation was finally overcome by the above mentioned compromise between the
socialist Prime Minister Felipe González and Jordi Pujol, President of the Generalitat.

Although the Generalitat can establish its annual budget according to its financial resources and expenditure goals with entire political independence, art 21.3 of the LOFCA advocates a certain standardization in the form of the different budgets of all the Autonomous Communities in order to include all types of state revenue and expenditure in the annual General Budget of the State.

Electoral proportional representation.

Despite the suggestion in the Kilbrandon Report and the views of the House of Lords, a system of proportional representation was not adopted in the Scotland Act 1978.

The Commission on the Constitution (1973a, para. 1140) proposed an assembly with a single-chamber of about 100 members directly elected for a fixed term of four years by the single transferable vote of proportional representation, using as far as possible multi-member constituencies obtained by grouping Parliamentary constituencies. The exceptional use of the alternative vote system in single-member constituencies in the sparsely populated areas of the Scottish Highands and Islands, where geography would make multi-member constituencies impracticable, was also proposed by the the Kilbrandon Report.

Under the single transferable vote system each constituency elects not one but two or more members. Electors rank the candidates in order of preference and to be elected a candidate must obtain a quota of votes. For example, in a three-member constituency the quota is more than a quarter of the votes cast; in a four-member constituency it is more than one fifth of the votes, and so forth. If, when the first preferences are counted, any candidate has his
quota, he is declared elected. Votes in excess of the quota are transferred to the other candidates in proportion to the second preference shown on the ballot papers. This process is continued in a series of counts until all the seats are filled.

The main consequence of the application of this system is that the parties have a representation which corresponds more nearly to their electoral strength; small parties are assured of a hearing and there are few "wasted votes" going to defeated candidates. The main disadvantage, as viewed by the Kilbrandon Report, is that there is less likelihood, under the relative majority system (Westminster representation), of any party securing an absolute majority of seats. Consequently, governments formed through coalition are often required.

As provided for in the Act, the parliamentary constituencies existing at that time would be used for the initial election of the Assembly, each returning two or three members according to the following circumstances (s.1; 2):

"...(a) Three initial members for each of those areas of which the electorate is more than 125 per cent of the electoral quota (i.e. the number obtained by dividing the electorate of Scotland by the number of parliamentary constituencies there at the time of the election of initial members ( sched. 1; 14) and,

(b) Two initial members for each of the others, with exception of Orkney and Shetland with one member each.."

However, for subsequent elections, existing constituencies at that time would be divided into single-member Assembly constituencies, on the recommendation of the Boundary Commission for Scotland. The initial Assembly was expected to have in the region of 150 members under the "first-past-the-post" system already described.
The Spanish system of proportional representation is established on a provincial basis. The province is the electoral circumscription and all 50 provinces are represented in Parliament by, at least, two MPs (Ceuta and Melilla by one, respectively). The remainder of MPs, up to 350, who sit in the Chamber of Deputies, is allocated to each province according to their populations. The major criticism of this system concerns the disparity in the number of votes required to elect the "non-fixed" or remainder of deputies in each province. For instance, while an MP in the least populated province of Soria is elected with 30,000 votes, in Barcelona—the province with the largest population in Spain—150,000 are required for a candidate's seat in the Chamber of Deputies.

Not surprisingly, the main modification brought about by the provisions in the Title II, chapter III, arts. 161-166, of the new Electoral Organic Law (published in B.O.E., June 29, 1985) has been the change in the number of Deputies/parliamentary seats allocated to some provinces in order to gain more proportionality nation-wide. According to the new electoral provisions, Madrid, Alicante, Cádiz, Málaga, Las Palmas and Valencia will have one more parliamentary seat each, and the less populated provinces of Asturias, Badajoz, Cuenca, Jaén, León and Tenerife will lose one, respectively. This is the result of allocating the non-fixed number of 248 parliamentary seats in the Chamber of Deputies through dividing the provincial population by the provincial quota (ie. product of dividing the total population of all provincial constituencies by the figure of 248, "non-fixed" Deputies/parliamentary seats).

The Catalan Statute of Autonomy establishes that the Parliament of Catalonia shall be elected for a term of four years, in accordance with the electoral law approved by (the Catalan) Parliament itself. The electoral system shall be one of proportional representation and
shall also ensure adequate representation of the territory of Catalonia (art. 31; 1). Furthermore, Transitional Provision 4 indicates the following procedures:

"..(2). The electoral districts shall be the four provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona. The Parliament of Catalonia shall consist of 135 deputies (MPs) of whom the district of Barcelona shall elect one deputy per 50,000 inhabitants with a maximum of 85 deputies. The districts of Girona, Lleida and Tarragona shall elect a minimum of six deputies plus one per 40,000 inhabitants, there being allocated to each 17, 15 and 18 deputies, respectively (see Table 4.2.i.) (3) The deputies shall be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage, by adults over the age of eighteen, in accordance with a system of proportional representation."

Table 4.2.i: Catalan census of 1st March, 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (sq. Km)</th>
<th>Population (%)</th>
<th>Per sq. km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BARCELONA</td>
<td>7,773</td>
<td>4,618,734 (77.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TARRAGONA</td>
<td>6,283</td>
<td>516,078 (8.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRONA</td>
<td>5,886</td>
<td>467,945 (7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLEIDA</td>
<td>12,028</td>
<td>355,451 (6.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first elections for the Parliament of Catalonia, held on March 20, 1980, were governed by the same electoral system as the previous Spanish General Elections in 1979 (9). The second election held on April 29, 1984, followed the regulations of the law passed by the Catalan Parliament (March, 1983) which developed in detail the above mentioned provisions of both Constitution and Statute of Autonomy. According to this system, electors are asked to vote on a
list of candidates presented by each party or political group. They can neither delete nor withdraw any candidate from the chosen list. This "blocked and closed list" system is criticised for stressing more the political role of the party than that of the candidate him/herself.

All the parties and political groups must present their lists with, at least the same number of candidates as MPs to be elected in each province. After the ballot is finished, and in order to draw from the lists the candidates actually elected, the so-called "d'Hondt rule" is applied—in the same line of the Spanish elections for the Chamber of Deputies. First, the total number of votes corresponding to each list is divided successively by 1, 2, 3, 4 and so on. Then the elected candidates are allotted gradually to the lists from the larger to the smaller results until the established number of parliamentary seats in each province is complete. A minimum percentage of 3 per cent of the votes of the turnout is required for the person on the list to be elected. For instance, in the last Catalan elections of April 29, 1984, a total of 154,547 (5.4 per cent of the total turnout) were "spoiled" votes because they corresponded to electoral parties and coalitions which did not obtain the required 3% of the votes.

The d'Hondt system of proportional representation slightly favours the major electoral parties and goes against the intermediate ones. Nevertheless, its "corrective" aim does not alter substantially the proportionality of the results achieved by the different parties in each province. The differences reflected in the percentages of popular votes of each Catalan party and the actual number of seats allotted in the Catalan Parliament—see electoral results in Table 3.2.i—-are due to the diverse electoral strength of the parties either in the cities or in the rural areas. The system favours
slightly more the "territorial" electoral representation of the less populated provinces of Lleida and Girona than the conurbation of Barcelona. In the 1980 elections, for example, the percentage of seats won by the Eurocommunists of PSUC, who were very strong in the industrial belt of Barcelona, was marginally smaller than the number of votes corresponding to them. Conversely, CC-UCD benefitted from its greater political acceptance in the countryside.

In any case, the stark difference between the relative majority "first-past-the post" electoral system in Scotland and the d'Hondt provincial system of proportional representation in Catalonia is reflected in the huge disproportion between the parties' electoral support and the representation gained in parliament as shown in Table 4.2.ii.

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**Table 4.2.ii: Votes and seats in Scotland and Catalonia.**

**SCOTLAND (1983 General Election)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
<th>Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>+ 11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>+ 0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lib/SDP Alliance</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>- 13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNP</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>- 8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CATALONIA (1984 Regional Elections)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
<th>Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>+ 6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC-PSOE</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>+ 0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>+ 0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSUC</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>- 1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secretary of State and Delegate of Government.

Constant references are made throughout the provisions of the Scotland Act 1978 to the supervisory role of the Secretary of State for Scotland, in the control and even in the regulation of the functions of the Scottish legislature and Executive. Remarkably, Ss. 38-41 of the Act, retain for the Secretary of State an important group of reserve powers related to his intervention in matters devolved to Scotland. Thus, he/she as an "individual institution" could decide that certain Assembly Bills should not, in the "public interest", become law:

"If it appears to the Secretary of State

(a) that a Bill passed by the Assembly contains any provision which would or might affect a reserved matter (10), whether or not directly or indirectly; and

(b) that the enactment of that provision would not be in the public interest

he may lay the Bill before Parliament together with a reasoned statement that in his opinion ought not to be submitted to Her Majesty in Council" (s. 38, 1).

It appears that the procedures created by the transcribed section were intended to permit the scrutiny of Assembly Bills by Parliament on political grounds, while those created by s. 19 were intended to permit their scrutiny by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on legal grounds (Bradley, A & Christie, D, 1979). However, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the Secretary of State from referring a provision in an Assembly Bill to the Westminster Parliament under this section even if it has been found by the Judicial Committee to be within the Assembly's legislative competence. Furthermore, considering the possibility that not only the Secretary of State and
the United Kingdom government as a whole, but also the House of Commons agreed that a provision in an Assembly Bill was "damaging" to the United Kingdom's interests, and if the House of Lords alone had disagreed with this assessment, then the United Kingdom government, if it wished to maintain its objections, would have to pass an Act of Parliament (1). As stated by Lord McCluskey, Solicitor General for Scotland in 1978, the confusing procedures created by the referred section 38 should in practice be supplemented by informal consultations between the Scottish administration and the United Kingdom government. Both ss. 39 and 40 also provide the Secretary of State with powers to make orders based simply on his/her political "individual" judgement.

Furthermore, the Act establishes that certain functions of local authorities would be reserved for the control of central government through the Secretary of a State, i.e. the "scheduled functions". These range from Police, Civil Defense, and Consumer Protection to Diseases of Animals, Rodent Control or Protection of Birds (11).

The identification of these "scheduled functions" is important for calculating the Rate Support Grant. By far the most important of these functions is the police. It was estimated that approximately 10 per cent of the total expenditure of local authorities would be on these "scheduled" functions. As the general support for these functions would have to be made through the Rate Support Grant, the presence of the Secretary of State for Scotland would once again be required in this process. Consequently, the Secretary of State for Scotland would exercise the powers of central government over the local authorities with respect to the "scheduled functions".

There are, as well, powers exercisable concurrently as observed in the s. 23 (3): "Notwithstanding anything in the preceding provisions of this Act, any power under the enactments listed in
Schedule 5 (eg. the Historic Buildings and Ancient Monuments Act, ss. 4 to 6, or the Inner Urban Areas Act 1978, para. 2 of the schedule) may be exercised both by the Secretary of State and a Scottish Secretary).

A decisive element conditioning the aforementioned schemes is that both powers should be exercised "concurrently". This refers to the possibility of two persons exercising the same power either separately or together and contrasts with the concept of "concurrence", which denotes agreement (see sched, 4 of the Act). This element would consequently leave another "back door" ajar for the day-to-day disputes over the limits of exercise of the same powers between the Scottish Executive and the Secretary of State for Scotland.

The Secretary of State is also empowered by the Act to prepare industrial and economic guidelines. Subsequently, the Scottish Assembly could merely exercise, "...the powers with respect to which guidelines are prepared under this section so as to give effect to the guidelines" (s.42, 4). Since regional policies would remain a central government responsibility, the autonomy of both SDA (Scottish Development Agency) and HIDB (Highlands and Islands Development Board) would therefore be subject to limitations according to the directions of the Secretary of State. Although consultations on the guidelines operating between the Scottish and central government could take place in the proposed Joint Councils, these would have a purely non-statutory basis. Had the guidelines been drawn up following the same "negative power" of the Secretary of State, the Agencies would have been told what they could do and not what they should do (12).

Certainly the referred to attributes of the Secretary of State for Scotland envisaged in the Scotland Act 1978 appear to be more the
fruit of vested political interests, in order to preserve his/her role, than a response to a "credible" devolved administrative and political structure in Scotland.

The main argument supporting the maintenance of the post of the Secretary of State for Scotland emphasized the fact that, it could otherwise mean a serious threat to Scotland's ability to protect her economic interests at Westminster, in view of the non-devolution of economic power interests at Westminster. One could present the counter-argument that a democratically-elected Scottish Assembly would undoubtedly exercise a more effective political pressure when lobbying the central government than one single "territorial" member in a fully "functional" cabinet.

Furthermore, it might be argued au-dessus-de-la-mêlée of this constitutional context that his/her role as a political controller is the evident expression of central government mistrust of the ulterior development of the devolution issue in Scotland. And, precisely, this element of mistrust would provoke on its own a permanent and unnecessary reaction in the opposite direction, i.e. a progressive uneasiness between the Scottish Assembly and central government.

A clear symptom of the erratic political will of the Labour Government at that time was that neither the Assembly nor the Executive were granted corporate personality by the Act (NB. Unlike the Welsh Assembly -see Wales Act 1978, s. 1, 4). Nor did the Act provide for the Assembly and the Executive's exercising of their powers in the name of the Crown (1). The "missing link" was obviously taken by the Secretary of State for Scotland who retained all powers involving "advice" to the Sovereign.

In Spain a Delegate, Delegado del Gobierno, in each of the 17
Autonomous Communities is appointed by the central government with the functions regulated by both the Real Decreto-Ley Oct. 10, 1980 and the Ley Ordinaria Nov. 1983. The nature of these can be summarised as follows (13):

1) Representative. The "Delegado" is the highest authority of the central government in the region or "nationality".

2) Cooperative. This coordinating function carried out by both the administration of the state and that of the Autonomous Community can only be developed in concurrence (ie. by means of mutual agreement).

3) Instrumental, by providing the means for the development of policies both by the central government and the region on functions concurrently exercised.

4) Executive, with respect to the state agencies and services not transferred to the Autonomous Community and according to the guidelines and political decisions taken by the central cabinet (14).

5) Impugnative, by contesting the decisions taken by the regional parliament or its administration which could be seen as going beyond the legal power of the Autonomous Community.

6) Consultative, by informing directly to the central government on the transfer or delegation of powers to the Autonomous Community.

Despite this list of functions to be exercised by the Delegado del Gobierno, representative bureaucrats of the central government in Madrid are of the opinion that the political attributes of this governmental delegate resemble more closely those corresponding to an Ambassador than a Governor (15). Since the creation of this new institution, the "real" Delegate's job has not been so much to coordinate as to inform of possible breaches of law -both under legal and political considerations- by the institutions of the Autonomous Communities. If the central government wants to suspend any order or resolution taken by, for example, the Generalitat -most likely having
previously been informed and advised by its Delegate in Catalonia—then it has to contest it before the Constitutional Court and, subsequently, wait for a "favourable" decision by the highest judicial committee which is the only institution able to deal with conflicts between the central government and the Autonomous Communities (NB. The reverse process may be used by any of the 17 Autonomous Communities over any central government decision which might be considered to interfere with their own powers - eg. the previously mentioned decision on LOAPA).

The Delegates in the Autonomous Communities are not members of the Spanish cabinet. The Civil Governors in each of the 50 Spanish provinces continue to exercise their functions depending hierarchically on the Home Ministry, although they are coordinated by each of the governmental Delegates in each of the 17 Autonomous Communities. The figure of the provincial Civil Governor was a result of the policies of the Bourbons carried out by the Liberals in the first third of the 19th century. Much in the line of the Napoleonic model, Spain was in 1833 administratively divided into 49 provinces directly subject to the central government in Madrid. These reforms led to uniformize and centralize government were not only aimed at destroying the local oligarchies but also regional consciousness, which existed principally in the geographical periphery. The ambiguity of the Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution together with the maintenance of the Civil Governors and the creation of the Delegados de Gobierno, underlines the permanent bargaining process in the new political state system of Estado de las Autonomías.

4.3. Devolved matters and transfer of powers.

Essentially, the Assembly's legislative competence, as viewed in the Scotland Act 1978, is defined in terms of devolved matters. It
was taken for granted that once the Assembly (sched. 2, para. 1) was in operation, the Westminster Parliament would no longer make laws on matters falling within the Assembly's competence without the prior agreement of the Scottish administration. Putting forward this line of argument, the Kilbrandon Report held the following point of view:

"Parliament would retain ultimate legislative authority in all matters, but it would be a convention that in the ordinary course this power would not be used to legislate for Scotland and Wales on an transferred matter without the agreement of the Scottish or Welsh Government. The power, however, would be available for use at any time without agreement in exceptional circumstances. The United Kingdom Government would also have power, for use in exceptional circumstances, to determine, with the approval of Parliament, that a Bill passed by the Assembly should not be submitted for the Royal Assent" (Commission on the Constitution, 1973a, para. 1126).

However, this speculative insight into the future constitutional arrangements between the UK parliament and the Scottish Assembly is aprioristically undermined by both the unclear distribution of powers and the absence of an independent arbitrary judicial body to solve litigations between them.

From a strictly constitutional point of view, there was nothing in the law to prevent the Westminster Parliament from legislating on matters under the Assembly's competence. Undoubtedly, it would have been inadvisable to operate in such a political way, in order not to spur Scottish feelings of being manipulated by the British central institutions. In any case, and throughout the text of the Scotland Act 1978, there is an intermingling set of juridical precautions which overemphasizes both Westminster's supremacy and the "conditional" nature of the devolved powers to the Scottish Assembly.

Thus, the allocation of legislative and executive powers to the Scottish Assembly (sched. 10 and 11, respectively), is the most intricate and complex part of the Act. It is most unlikely that it was understood at the time of its publication either by the Scottish
electorate, or even by the politicians involved in the political process.

In particular it was unfortunate that subjects were included or excluded from the legislative competence of the Assembly by reference to provisions of existing statutes. Most probably, this would have had the effect of placing obstacles in the way of an Assembly which wished to legislate comprehensively on a given subject. Furthermore, the safeguarding of the United Kingdom government's interest by reference to specific statutory provisions (eg. Town Planning, s. 71 and sched. 14) would have made it impossible for the Assembly to legislate on and to amend those provisions even though elsewhere in the Act legislative competence is apparently conferred on the Assembly in precisely that area (eg. entry for Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act in sched. 10, Pt. III). Similarly, since the power to recommend to Her Majesty the appointment of members, for instance of the Mental Health Commission, was excluded from devolution, it was uncertain whether the Scottish Assembly's power to legislate on mental health included the power to abolish the Commission or to alter its functions (Bradley, A & Christie, D, 1979, comments on sched. 10 and 11).

Some other anomalies can be detected, as far as the division of powers between the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Assembly is concerned. For instance, although social welfare is a devolved matter, the employment of disabled persons is not. Westminster would also retain control of careers guidance despite the fact that school, higher and adult education were powers within the jurisdiction of the Assembly.

As a result of all this legislative complexity concerning the allocation of the devolved powers, the basic benefit of bringing the government nearer to the public and, consequently, of increasing
the extent of public participation, is drastically undermined. Because, if the rise of political nationalism in Scotland and the renewed quest for self-government is largely based upon the feeling of remoteness of the government in London, one can conclude that the intricacies of the political system after the implementation of such devolutionist proposals might increase, in fact, not only the sense of remoteness but, more importantly, the sense of frustration in the political consciousness of the Scots.

The degree of intricacy in the juridical arrangements of the territorial model brought about by the 1978 Spanish Constitution is also considerable. Nonetheless, and by virtue of the two basic constitutional principles of state unity and sub-state autonomy, a federalist orientation embodies the latent spirit of negotiation by which neither the central government, nor the intermediate-local units of government can directly overrule each other. Very illustrative is the fact that in the period 1981-1985, the central government initiated 82 actions before the Constitutional Court "against" the Generalitat. Nevertheless, the latter also initiated 134 actions "against" the central government, as well (16). As a consequence of this, only a fracture in the political pattern of bargaining consensus inaugurated by the drawing up of the 1978 Constitution could not only jeopardise the territorial division of constitutional powers in Spain but also the form of the democratic state itself. The crucial decision of the Constitutional Court against the "harmonising" attempts sought by the central government, by means of the implementation of the LOAPA, came to reinforce this federalist orientation latent in the 1978 Constitution.

Furthermore, despite the fact that the state law is in any case
supplementary to that of all the Autonomous Communities, the same cannot be said about the constitutional competence by the Spanish parliament in the repealing of laws passed by those regional legislatures. Indeed, art. 150. 1,3. of the Constitution indicates that the state may make laws to establish the necessary principles to harmonize general norms of the Autonomous Communities, "...even in the case of matters over which jurisdiction has been conferred upon the (Autonomous Communities), when this is necessary in the general interest". However, the Constitution does not specify any guidelines as far as to the criteria for deciding upon this general interest is concerned and, consequently, this category clearly falls into the realm of the political -an absolute majority in both Houses of Parliament is required to determine such necessity of general interest- instead of that of the constitutional.

According to this autonómical model, the "peripheral" administrations tend to maximize the constitutional opportunities to increase their share of political power at the expense of central government reluctance to lose them. This is made possible de facto because Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution does not include a systematic division of powers, but rather criteria fixing such power distribution.

However, and as a general constitutional provision, those powers not listed in art. 149 of the Constitution as being of exclusive state jurisdiction (see Table 4.3.i) may fall under the competence of the Autonomous Communities by virtue of their respective Statutes of Autonomy.

Table 4.3.i: Exclusive powers for the state in Spain.

* Nationality, immigration, emigration, aliens and right to asylum.
* International relations.
* Defence and armed forces.
* Administration of justice.
* Customs and excise, foreign trade.
* Monetary system.
* Control of credit, banking and insurance.
* State budget and fiscal revenue.
* Merchant navy and registration of ships.
* Ports and airports of national importance.
* Control of airspace, air transit and transport.
* Meteorological service and registration of aircrafts.
* Intra-regional train and road transport.
* Control of communications, traffic and motor vehicles, mail and telecommunications, cables, submarine and radio communications.

* Public works of national importance involving more than one region.
* Control of production, commerce, possession and use of arms and explosives.
* Regulation of academic qualifications.
* Authorization of referendums.

The Catalan Statute of Autonomy (art. 9) list the sole jurisdiction of the Generalitat over a number of matters according to art.148 of the Constitution. Furthermore, and within the framework of the basic legislation of the state, it is incumbent upon the Generalitat to develop legislation and implementation on another wide range of matters (arts. 10 and 11). For instance, although the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia clearly accepts the bases and planning of the Spanish general economic activity by the central government, and the monetary policy of the state, the Generalitat holds sole jurisdiction over other related matters (eg. planning of Catalan economic activity, agriculture and livestock farming, internal trade, etc.) (see appendices 3.2.ii and 3.2.iv for the distribution of powers in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy).

In any case, and with the purpose of a later assessment of the different scope of powers envisaged in both the Scotland Act 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia, a comprehensive, albeit simplified, list of legislative and executive powers are reproduced in the next section.
4.4. List of legislative and executive powers.

Devolved matters

Transfer of powers

HEALTH

Prevention, treatment and alleviation of disease or illness, including injury, disability and mental disorder. Structure and operation of the NHS. Family planning except abortion, devolved only exclusively. Investigation of maladministration.


Not included power to regulate the medical and other health professions. Excluded control of drugs, medicinal products, biological substances and food. Animal health, occupational health and medical school are also not devolved.

SOCIAL WELFARE

Social welfare, including children and adoption, the handicapped, the elderly and those of special care (eg. alcoholics).

Social welfare work. Implementation of the basic State legislation of the Social Security matters, except rules on the economic regime, but including management. Protection and guardianship of those under age. Adoption.

Excluded Social Security, pensions and related benefits, disabled persons employment and sheltered employment.
School, higher and adult education, the arts, crafts, cultural and recreative activities.
Museums, Libraries and Arts Galleries. (NB. Except power to appoint Trustees of the Board of the National Library of Scotland).

Not included university education, research councils, career guidance, students grants (university, teacher training and HND) and Carnegie Trust

Culture, comprehensively

"It is fully within the jurisdiction of the Generalitat to regulate and administer education in all its scope, levels, degrees, kinds and specialities, assuming the principles of the Constitution in this matter". (art.15)

Research. Academies whose seat is Catalonia. Handicraft. Archives, libraries, museums, newspaper libraries and other cultural reference centres not in State ownership. Music conservatories and Fine Arts services of interest to Catalonia. Museums, archives and libraries in State ownership when the State does not reserve their management for itself

Housing

Public sector housing.

Regulation of rents. Rent allowances and rebates in both public and private sector. Mobile homes and caravans. Upkeep and improvement of all accommodation. Building standards and slum clearance.

Excluded power to legislate regarding building societies (eg. building society loans to housing societies and option mortgage subsidy). Also excluded legislatively guarantees by local authorities in respect of loans by building societies, although executive

Housing, comprehensively.
power to approve guarantees by local authorities is granted.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Constitution, area and general powers and duties of local authorities and similar bodies. Investigation of maladministration, Revenue and expenditure of local authorities and similar bodies (NB. With respect to devolved matters only). Calculation, assessment and payment of the Rate Support Grant. Rating support grants for specific purposes.

Excluded all specific services provided by local councils (eg. education, housing, social work) Also not included voting system, frequency of elections, voting and membership qualification.

LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT


However, very limited by other provisions in the Act. SS. 14 and 71 provide for intervention in planning matters by the Secretary of State (NB. SDA and HDB industrial investment programmes are within the administrative competence of the Scottish Executive, but subject to guidelines of the Secretary of State).

Local government, taken into account art. 140 of the Constitution (ie. "The Constitution guarantees the autonomy of the municipalities, which shall enjoy full legal status").

Town and country planning. Compulsory expropation, administration contract and concessions (within framework of basic legislation of the State).

Development and implementation plans drawn up by the State for restructuring of industrial sectors. Industry, except State rules on safety, health or military interest and regulations on mines, hydrocarbons and nuclear power. No powers on the transfer of foreign technology.

Under basic State legislation: Hydraulic projects, canals and irrigation works, whenever the
Excluded industrial, development certificates, compensation for compulsory purchase of land and power to guarantee loans to New Towns.

POLLUTION

Some aspects of pollution control. (NB. No power to regulate use of injurious aircraft, nor to regulate the discharge of oil at sea and noise control). Other minor aspects are devolved only executively.

Protection of environment (within basic legislation of the State). Substances, eg. in cars or Executive powers on dumping of industrial waste and pollutants at sea.

COUNTRYSIDE

Development of the countryside for public enjoyment and the conservation and enhancement of its natural beauty.

Not included forestry.

Nature Conservancy Council, Forestry Commissioners and Crown Land, responsible to central government.

Woodlands, forestry resources and services, livestock trails and pastures, specially protected natural areas and mountain zones, all within the framework of basic State legislation.

TRANSPORT

Provision of public passenger and freight transport services within Scotland (NB. Not included B.R.). Payment of subsidies to operators of such services within Scotland. Aerodromes (only those owned privately or by local

Railways, transport byland, sea, river and cable, ports, heliports, airports (excluded general purpose ones), and the Meteorological Service, all within the territory of Catalonia. Executive powers on planning of transport of goods and passen-
authority. Insulation of nearby buildings from noise and vibration attributable to the use of aerodromes. Inland waterways, although restricted the powers of the Secretary of State.

ROADS AND PUBLIC WORKS

Provision, improvement and maintenance of streets, roads and bridges Marine works in concurrence with the Secretary State. Provision, improvement and maintenance of harbours and boatslips, principally for the fishing or agricultural industries or for the maintenance of communications between places in Scotland (NB. No powers are devolved in respect of harbours connected with other industries such as North Sea oil). Executive regulations affecting the movement of traffic except motorways.

Not included legislation relating to traffic management, motoring offences and Traffic Wardens.

ROADS AND PUBLIC WORKS

Roads and highways whose routes are entirely contained within the territory of Catalonia. All public works not legally classified as being of general interest for the State or whose execution does not affect another region. Installations for production, distribution and transport of energy, within Catalonia.

AGRICULTURE

Agriculture itself is not a devolved matter.

Tenure and management of agricultural land, in general (this includes management of

Agriculture and livestock farming, in accordance with the bases and planning of the general economic activity and the monetary policy of the State.
Secretary of State's agricultural holdings. Grants, loans to landholders. Crofting.

Agricultural prices, subsidies, marketing and animal health under central government responsibility. Also excluded acquisition and management of land for agricultural research.

______________________________
FISHERIES
______________________________

Protection, improvement and maintenance of salmon, migratory trout and fresh water fisheries in any waters, within Scotland.

Excluded seawater fisheries, the basic State legislation.

Fishing in inland waters, the shellfish industry, aquaculture, hunting and river and lake fishing Planning of the seawater fishing sector, within the framework of

______________________________
TOURISM
______________________________

Matters relevant to the development of tourism in Scotland. Tourism, comprehensively.
Fire services and fire precautions.

Excluded powers of the Treasury to determine rates of interest on loans made by local authorities for expenditure for fire precautions. Power of Secretary of State to make regulations offire precautions, not devolved.

ANCIENT MONUMENTS

Ancient monuments and historic buildings. Concurrent powers with Secretary of State on grants for the preservation of historic buildings (e.g. National Trust of Scotland).
Executive powers for managing the two Scottish Royal Parks (i.e. Holyrood and Linlithgow).

HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

Historical, monumental, artistic, architectural, archeological and scientific heritage.

REGISTRATION SERVICES

Registration of births, deaths, marriages and adoptions. Population statistics. Excluded censuses of population; this function under Secretary of State.

General statistics concerning Catalonia.
Not devolved matter.

Establishment by the Generalitat of an Autonomous Police Force, with the following competences:

a) Protection of property and persons and maintenance of public order.

b) Watching over and protection of the buildings and installations of the Generalitat.

c) Coordination with Local Police Forces under command of the Generalitat.

Not devolved matter

Development and implementation of legislation on Press, Radio, TV and social communications media. And so, the Generalitat may regulate, create and maintain its own television, radio, press and other media.

Courts, including juries. Court jurisdiction and procedure.

Contempt of Court. Vexatious litigation. Justices of the peace.

Legal profession. Legal aid, ad-

As regards the administration of justice, except military justice, the Generalitat may exercise all the powers which the Organic Laws of the Judiciary and the
vice and assistance.

Excluded power to abolish the superior courts and the sheriff courts and to appoint Judges or Sheriffs.

General Council of the Judges recognize or assign to the central government.

TRIBUNALS AND INQUIRIES

Tribunals and inquiries related to certain matters. The Lands Tribunal for Scotland.

Composition, statutes and jurisprudence of the Courts of Tribunals, and its Scottish Committee are under the attributes of the Lord Chancellor and Lord Advocate.

Establishment of the boundaries of the territorial divisions of the jurisdiction agencies of Catalonia and determination of their seats.

CIVIL LAW MATTERS

Civil law and juristic persons unincorporated bodies. Obligations including voluntary and conventional obligations of restitution and obligations of reparation. Heritable and moveable property, Conveyancing, Trusts, Bankruptcy, Succession, Remedies, Evidence, Diligence, Recognition and enforcement of courts orders, Arbitration, Prescription and limitation of actions, Private international law (NB. The listed functions indicate the areas of private which the Assembly could have had legislative competence, but specific areas, principally those related to commerce, finance, the economy, industry and employment would have been reserved to the U.K. parliament, i.e. law relating to non-devolved subjects).

"In the determination of the and sources of civil law, the State shall respect the rules of Catalan civil law" (art. 26, 3, Statute of Autonomy). Also in matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Generalitat, Catalan law is applicable in its own territory in preference to any other (NB. The jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in Catalonia extends in civil cases, to all instances and degrees, including appeals for review and high-court law appeals in matters of Catalan civil law).

The Scottish Law Commission.
whose duties include making proposals for the reform of (Scottish) civil law is devolved.

CRIME AND PENAL CASES


Excluded any matter relating to the prosecution of offences and those affecting the security of State (e.g. treason and terrorism). No possible amendments on provisions of legislation on matters not devolved (e.g. misuse of drugs, deportation and extradition, etc).

The State holds exclusive jurisdiction on criminal, penitentiary, commercial and labour jurisdiction.

MISCELLANEOUS

Not included betting and gaming, game licences and petroleum spirit licensing

Co-operative, mutual benefit societies not included in the Social Security. Establishment and planning of centres for dealing in commodities and securities, under State commercial law. Also Real State Chambers, Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Shipping. Foundations and associations of an educational, cultural, artististic, charitable, welfare or similar nature in Catalonia.

Promotion of women.
Advertising, without prejudice to the rules issued by the State for specific sectors and circles. Entertainments. Casinos, gaming and betting, excluding the national system of sports wagers for charity (e.g., football pools). Executive powers on copyright and patents; appointment of bill brokers; weights and measures. Hallmarks; international fairs held in Catalonia. Under basic State legislation; international trade, protection of the consumer and user; institutions of corporate, public and territorial credit and Savings Banks; public economic sector of the Generalitat.


The Scotland Act 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia 1979 are aimed at providing constitutional frameworks for the exercise of self-government in both territories. However, whereas the piece of Scottish legislation has to be considered as the result of a political response from the state centre to try to accommodate the threat posed by the electoral rise of the SNP, the Catalan Statute is
the product of political negotiation between Catalan forces and Spanish representatives to create a new decentralised model for the post-Franco democratic state.

The actual methodology adopted for the implementation of both legislative texts is, accordingly, highly illustrative. The Bill of the Scotland Act 1978 was worked out by Labour Governments of the 1970s and passed by the Westminster Parliament with largely Labour support. Note that the Bill was given its Third Reading in the House of Commons on February 22, 1978 with 53 per cent of the MPs in favour of its implementation. At that time, Labour's parliamentary share in Westminster's Lower House ranked 50.4 per cent of the total number of MPs.

The fact that the Labour majority in the Commons after the October 1974 General Election corresponded to a percentage share of the popular vote in Scotland of 36.6 per cent must also be underlined. Once the Act had been passed in London, a Referendum was held on March 1, 1979, when a majority of Scots responded affirmatively to the implementation of the provisions of the Act (ie. 52 % of the turnout). However, Labour had stipulated the requirement of a 40% of registered "Yes" votes before the Act could be put into effect. Such a figure was well above the actual 36.3% Labour share of the Scottish popular "turnout" vote and of the 32.5 % of the registered electorate which voted for the Act. Eventually the Act was repealed by the first Thatcher Government after the 1979 elections.

In Catalonia the wording of the Statute of Autonomy was first agreed on by the Catalan parliamentarians who represented 89 per cent of the popular vote in Catalonia after the 1977 General Election —ie. PSC/PSOE, PDC, PSUC, UCD/UCC and ERC. This draft of the Autonomy Statute Bill was subsequently debated in a Joint Parliamentary Committee, within the framework of the Spanish Parliament, and the
Bill agreed upon then was voted for by a number of Catalan parliamentarians who represented the 85 per cent of the Catalan popular vote in the 1979 General Election -ie. PSC/PSOE, CC-UCD, CiU, PSUC and CD. The Bill, later submitted to popular referendum in Catalonia, received 86 per cent of the Catalan vote and was finally ratified and passed by the Spanish Parliament as an Organic Law by 95 per cent of the MPs in the Chamber of Deputies and 97 per cent of those in the Senate.

Both the Act and the Statute sought to devolve or transfer legislative and executive powers, to directly elected Assembly in Scotland and Parliament in Catalonia, on matters concerned with the "domestic" government of both territories. The Scottish and Catalan constitutional proposals also aimed at maintaining "the firm continuing framework of the United Kingdom" and at guaranteeing the solidary "unity of all the peoples of Spain", respectively (17).

The Scotland Act 1978 was the result of legislative action taken by the Westminster Parliament, the only legislative body holding "unlimited sovereignty" over the territory of the United Kingdom. In the case of the Autonomy Statute, the powers of the Generalitat "emanate from the Constitution, this Statute and the people".

There is, therefore, a basic constitutional dissimilarity between the two schemes as concerns the political philosophy which underlies them. The Scottish Assembly is a legislative body subordinate to Westminster, while the Catalan Parliament is a chamber which operates in coordination with the central government.

In fact, the complex intricacies laid down in the provisions of the Act are in line with "...the desire of the Government to establish controls and safeguards over the exercise of the devolved powers, in order to maintain the 'political and economic' unity of the United Kingdom" (18).
As regards the ambiguity reflected in the Title VIII of the Spanish Constitution and, to some extent, the Catalan Statute of Autonomy, the intended purpose of both constitutional documents, although lacking a clear model of central-peripheral division of powers, is in line with the political desire not to establish safeguards for the overriding of the regional autonomy by the Spanish Parliament. Accordingly, "...the(central) government and parliament cannot interfere with the free exercise by the Autonomous Communities, of their legislative and executive powers, exception being made of those matters falling under sole state jurisdiction set down in the Constitution" (19). Thus, a certain "limited sovereignty" rests with the powers of the Autonomous Communities which confers, furthermore, a distinctive "federal" complexion to the Spanish constitutional order.

The same, in contrast, cannot be said of the Scotland Act. Indeed, Westminster would have retained legislative supremacy over the Scottish Assembly, basing its over-riding authority on the premise of the unlimited sovereignty of the central parliament. Westminster, furthermore, would have had the power to amend or repeal Assembly Acts at any time.

The fact that the Scottish Assembly lacks the power to reform the Scotland Act 1978 is highly remarkable, although this is a direct consequence of its subordination to Westminster. Conversely, and due to an implicit—although partial—recognition of Catalan sovereignty with the involvement of the Catalan parliamentarians in the wording process of the Statute, the power to reform the Autonomy Statute is included in the Title IV of the 1979 text. Any amendment to the Statute would not, nevertheless, require only the approval of both Catalan and Spanish Parliaments, but also confirmation by the Catalan electorate in a popular referendum.
This last aspect provides a crucial point of reference for the assessment of the institutional conceptualization of self-government in both Scottish and Catalan schemes. The only procedure whereby the Scottish Assembly can amend the provisions affecting "domestic" concerns would involve Westminster in the first, intermediate and final stages of the process, whereas the Catalan Parliament has the initial "say" in a process which also includes the concurrent approval of the Spanish Parliament (NB. In both cases with a two-thirds majority of Catalan or Spanish MPs) and the confirmation by a majority of Catalans in popular referendum.

In the event of an institutional collision, the political implications of these constitutional arrangements can be speculated upon in the following tentative sequence:

1) Both Scottish and Catalan self-governed institutions may wish to modify the conditions of their autonomous governments.

2) The Scottish Assembly cannot initiate the process of amendment, whereas the Catalan Parliament can.

3) The Scottish Assembly "lobbies" Westminster parliament through its own MPs. The Catalan initiative, however, only requires the approval of the Spanish Parliament and a political centre-periphery negotiation is, consequently, brought about in the process.

4) The "British" parties have the initiative—in its scope and timing—to establish the possible modification in the Scottish Act to be put before Westminster. The Catalan political forces—or those "Spanish" branches operating in Catalonia—have already taken the political initiative of Statute amendment.

5) The political party which has the legislative majority in Westminster decides politically on its own any constitutional variations to be put forward. The Spanish Parliament cannot constitutionally "offer" different proposals of amendment to those
put forward by the Catalan Parliament.

6) The party's legislative majority in Westminster may impose a degree of constitutional modification short of the political expectations of the Scottish Assembly. A Spanish Parliament cannot, in political terms, reject out of hand a proposal for Statute amendment which has been approved by two thirds of the MPs in the Catalan Parliament.

7) Political frustration grows in Scotland. A legislative majority in the Assembly might decide to implement legislation beyond its constitutional scope of devolved powers. In such an instance, Westminster would immediately overrule such Acts. Strife and political negotiations between Spanish central and peripheral institutions continue.

8) The lack of institutional instruments of communication between the Scottish Assembly and the UK Parliament may result in open confrontation. The Assembly may, on both constitutional and political grounds, be suspended. The Catalan-Spanish process of institutional disagreement can be politically overcome with the submission of new proposals of amendment. The Spanish Parliament cannot unilaterally suspend the functioning of the Catalan institutions.

Beyond this speculation into possible outcomes of institutional collision between central and peripheral legislative bodies, a basic conceptual difference underlies both decentralist philosophies. This divergence is best illustrated by point no. 5 of the referred to sequence. Because, if self-governments are closely related to conditions affecting a sub-state spatial community, the initiative to modify these conditions cannot be taken contra natura, by the larger state entity to the detriment of the territory involved. A basic differentiation between the concept of "accommodating devolution from the centre in the case of Scotland", and of "creating decentralist
self-governm ent with the periphery", as regards Catalonia, has to be fully underlined as being the basic dissimilarity existing in the conceptual constitutional philosophies operating behind the provisions of the Act and the Statute.

Indeed, this diverse philosophical conceptualization provides the key element for the comparison and interpretation between the different scope of legislative and executive powers of both constitutional pieces.

Rather than pursuing a detailed analysis of the differences between the devolved powers included in the Scotland Act 1978 and the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia 1979, this dissertation will seek to examine any relevant areas which affect either degrees of political autonomy or notable constitutional divergence.

Health matters, including the National Health Service, are for instance widely devolved to the Assembly. However, diverse exclusions in both areas - eg. control of medicinal products, rates regarding compensation for hospital property, etc. - would leave the Assembly unable to implement policies on a comprehensive basis. This pattern can be applied to the remaining devolved "areas" of powers.

Catalan powers on internal health matters refer to the legislative development and implementation of the basic legislation of the Spanish state. This is also the characteristic pattern of some forms of Catalan concurrent powers principally in those areas affecting the principles and basic rights "common" to all Spaniards. The Generalitat also has legislative powers to develop basic legislation concerning the Social Security system - which also comprises the equivalent of the NHS -, although the economic regime is only executively devolved as is the implementation of pharmaceutical
products.

Under the Education section of the Act—which is widely devolved except for university education (20)—, recreative (eg. sports) and cultural activities are also included. Education having been one of the preserved Scottish institutions after the 1707 Act of Union, the comprehensive devolution of powers in this area causes little surprise.

Culture is regarded as being an "exclusive" power of the Generalitat; Education also is included within its full jurisdiction (NB. Assuming the constitutional principles of the universal right to education and freedom of instruction). The autonomy of the Spanish universities, which are outside the direct control of either central or regional administrations, is another constitutional principle regulated by Organic Law (21).

Except for private financial matters, housing, together with town and country planning and building control, is also devolved to the Assembly. The Generalitat enjoys a similar type of power concerning these areas. However, a remarkable difference between both constitutional pieces of legislation can be seen in the fact that the Scottish Assembly cannot either demand or compensate for compulsory land purchase. The Generalitat, however, can develop policies of compulsory expropriation, administrative contracts and concessions.

As far as the countryside is concerned, forestry is a non-devolved matter for the Assembly, whereas it is under the sole jurisdiction of the Generalitat. Seawater fisheries is another non-devolved matter for the Assembly. The planning of seawater fishing, within the framework of basic state legislation, as well as the inland water fisheries comes under the Generalitat's jurisdiction.

Agriculture itself is not a devolved Scottish matter, whereas in Catalonia the Generalitat holds sole jurisdiction on agriculture and
livestock farming in accordance with the economic guidelines and the monetary policy of the Spanish state. The same applies to industry and the public economic sector of the Generalitat.

Two important dissimilarities are provided by the areas of Mass Media and Law. As far as the former is concerned, there is no provision in the Act for the implementation of any devolved powers to the Scottish Assembly or the Executive. In the case of Catalonia, the Generalitat can not only develop and implement legislation on social communications media, but create, regulate and maintain its own television, radio and press (22).

Scottish law is another of the institutions preserved by the 1707 Act of Union. Consequently, civil, criminal and penal law are also legislatively devolved, although with some significant exceptions (eg. taxation, commerce, finance, economy, industry and employment are all areas reserved for Westminster). Prosecution of offences and, for instance, misuse of drugs are not devolved. More important still, neither is responsibility for the police a devolved matter.

As far as the Generalitat is concerned, Catalan law in preference to any other is applicable in its own territory. In the determination of the sources of civil law, the state must respect the rules of Catalan civil law. Having said this, and in contrast with the Scottish case, the Spanish state holds sole jurisdiction on criminal, penitentiary, commercial and labour legislation. The Generalitat, notwithstanding, can legislate on some taxes, as well as on some aspects of company law (eg. co-operatives, foundations, professional associations, etc.).

In the Miscellaneous section, the non-inclusion of betting and gaming licences in the Scotland Act contrasts with the Generalitat's "exclusive" powers as regards entertainment, casinos, gaming and betting (23).
Broadly speaking both the Act and the Statute include a range of legislative and executive powers which is quite similar. It can be noted that the constitutional differences between them are based mainly upon aspects which concern the different traditions of both countries. Law, education and local government are three areas legislatively devolved to the Assembly by the Scotland Act 1978 but which have been administratively Scottish since 1707. The Generalitat receives through the Statute of Autonomy comprehensive transfer of powers in those areas where the "spirit" of Catalonia has been preserved despite the passing of time: language, cultural traditions and indiosyncratic values. Not surprisingly, therefore, education, culture and mass media are among the activities which are fully integrated in Catalan self-government.

Only from the philosophical viewpoint which "shapes" both constitutional provisions can a remarkable difference be detected. In fact, any consideration of to what extent the provisions of the Act provide any form of self-government is highly problematic. Much in the same line with the problems which have faced the local authorities in Scotland in the last two decades with a growing centralisation around London, the Assembly would have found it extremely difficult to implement genuine "domestic" policies in an autonomous way. Apart from being able to transfer funds from one functional area to another -eg. health to education, or viceversa- the constitutional scope left for the Scottish government can be considered to be purely academic. Indeed, the "real" scope for the political manoeuvring of the Scottish Assembly and Executive is severely limited, leaving such Scottish institutions as - following the acronym-like British tradition- mere QUAGELAS: "quasi-
autonomous-governmental-elected-agencies".

Having said that, there is no doubt that the very existence of a form of institutional self-government in Scotland would have brought a legal or constitutional framework to the political aspirations of the Scots.

In the case of Catalonia, the constitutional provisions set out in the Autonomy Statute have allowed the Generalitat to carry on with Catalan polices since 1980. The interrelation between the scope of constitutional self-government and the provisions of an adequate financial framework has revealed itself as the major feature concerning the exercise of self-government in Catalonia. This, nevertheless, being an aspect beyond the constitutional boundaries of this chapter, will be analysed in Parts V and VI of this dissertation.
NOTES

1. See Finer, S. E, 1979, p. 15.

2. ibid, 1979, p. 21.

3. The House of Lords acts normally, in the legislative dimension, as a common final Court of Appeal for some, although not all, matters.


5. Andalusia opted for a quicker access to further self-government, as did the other three historical nationalities, which required a regional referendum for the approval of such legislative initiative (Total percentage of registered "Yes" votes: 54 %). On the access of the different Spanish regions to self-government and the establishment of the Comunidades Autónomas see, for example, Fernández, T.R (1977), Boucsein, W (1978), Brunn, G (1978), España de las Autonomías (1980), Álvarez Conde, E (1980), Clavero Arévalo, M (1983) and Elorriaga, G (1983).


8. See Constitutional Court on "LOAPA. For a discussion on this issue see Prada, J.L. et al (1982) and section 6.2.1 of this thesis.


10. One which concerns Scotland but with respect to which the Scottish Assembly has no power to legislate. This concept of 'reserved matter' is unique to the override sections 38-40 and does not appear elsewhere in the Act. On this issue cf., for example, Grant, J.P (ed) (1976), Faculty of Advocates (1977) and Bradley, A.W & Christie, D.J (1979).

11. See the complete list of Scheduled Functions (Local Government Bodies) in sched. 15 of the Scotland Act 1978.


Díaz de Liano, D & Valles, A (1980).

14. However, in 1983, on the occasion of the devastating floods in the Basque Country, the Socialist Central Government "ceded" the control of its "own" institutions—including the Security Forces—to the sole coordination of the Nationalist Basque Executive. Therefore, and despite the fact that it was a case of sheer emergency, the Delegate of the Central Government—as superior authority of the state in the Basque Country—came significantly to depend upon the instructions of the Lendakari (President) of the Basque Government.


16. Out of the 82 appeals put forward by the central government before the Constitutional Court for alleged "unconstitutional" legislation of the Generalitat and Catalan "invasion" in the legislative and executive powers of the central government, 14 had been withdrawn by the Spanish authorities, 10 had been judged "unfavourably" by the Court, 12 had been judged "favourably"—at least partially, 10 had been voluntarily accepted by the other party (ie. Generalitat) and 36 had not been judged by the Constitutional Court. As regards the 134 appeals which had been put forward by the Generalitat the figures had corresponded, respectively, to 18 withdrawn, 13 "unfavourable", 16 "favourable", 23 accepted by the central government and 64 were still awaiting the decision of the Court (La Vanguardia, 22.xii.85). See also Díaz López, C (1985, p. 259).


19. See Díez Moreno, F (1983, p. 156). On this issue see decision by the Constitutional Court on the LOAPA.

20. According to Labour's Green Paper on Devolution (1984, p. 5), universities would be one of the few "new" responsibilities for a future Scottish Assembly in addition to the powers envisaged in the 1978 Act. The other "new" powers would include responsibility for the legislative framework within which Police services are provided by local authorities, selective assistance to industry and the power to vary the basic rate of income tax of the Scots.


22. TV3 is the third "autonomical" channel operating in Catalonia, alongside the two Spanish channels.

23. One of the genuine new taxes created by the Generalitat has been a surcharge on the game of Bingo.
5. ECONOMIC DECENTRALISATION AND REGIONAL POLICIES.

Introduction.

Scotland and Catalonia have regional economies within the economic framework of their unitary states, the United Kingdom and Spain. They are also European regions which share a similar percentage of the EEC GDP (ie. 1.6 % and 1.3). These two frameworks greatly shape the form and content of their respective economies.

Inward investments, monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies are powerful instruments of economic policy which rest under the responsibility of the UK and Spanish central governments. Complementary to these, some EEC institutions - eg. ERDF- allocate funds to finance programmes of regional development, although the operation is governed by national criteria. Thus, Scottish and Catalan economies can be referred to as being regional and highly dependent upon the economic forces of their respective unitary states and, to a lesser extent, to the EEC institutional action.

However, if both economies can commonly be labelled as regional, they also show two basic distinctive and divergent features:

a) While Scotland is a country with important natural resources (with or without the North Sea Oil), its process of de-industrialisation and progressive impoverishment is reflect by the increasing rate of net out-migration (eg. 23,000 inhabitants in the 1980-81 period) (see sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). Scotland, in short, is a peripheral territory much poorer as compared with the average standards of the other nine British regions (section 5.2.3).

Catalonia, conversely, is a country with very few natural resources that experienced a wave of great industrialisation and economic expansion between 1950 and 1970. During these years Catalonia's average rate of annual growth of population was 2.3 % in
comparison with 0.8 for the EEC (NB. Immigration accounted for over 60% of the total population growth in this period). Catalonia is a peripheral country richer than the average of the other 16 Spanish regions (section 5.2.3).

b) Scotland has some economic powers administratively decentralised to the Scottish Office (section 5.1.4). Instruments like the SDA have brought a distinctive perspective to the economic policy, although the process of decision-making is not autonomous and, in last instance, subordinated to the economic priority of the central government (section 5.1.5).

The Generalitat of Catalonia has political autonomy over a considerable number of "micro-economic" powers transferred from the central government according to the constitutional arrangements set up by the 1978 Spanish Constitution and the 1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy (section 5.2.4).

The degrees and modalities under which the regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia can operate are, therefore, of a diverse nature. As far as the Scotland case is concerned, the wave of political nationalism in the late 1960s a 1970s was influenced, at least partially, by the severe economic decline in the traditional mining, shipbuilding and steel industries and the progressive underdevelopment of its rural areas. This decline coincided, on the other hand, with the discovery and exploitation of the North Sea oil wells. The creation by the central government in 1975 of the SDA, with the aim of developing genuine regional economic policies, has resulted in an attempt by the own Agency to accommodate itself to the political constraints imposed by a unitary and highly centralised British system of government (1).

In Catalonia, in the period 1980-85, the Government of the Generalitat developed its economic policies according to three
general objectives: a) rapid process of political negotiation for the transfer of power; b) provision of a financial base for the regional public spending by means of the recourse to public borrowing, and c) maximization of human and material resources available to the self-governed institutions. The economic strategy set by the Catalan Plan of Development on the economia intersticial has aimed to those "interstices" left by the multinationals, the public corporations and the large financial-industrial groups, and has basically operated in the realm of the economies of scale and transport costs.

In order to gain perspective on the issue of regional economic policies together with the interplay of state priorities and multinational intervention, a subsequent brief review to models and politics around regional development is carried out to frame the scope within which Scottish and Catalan economies can operate.

Unitary states, regional inequalities and market forces.

Much in contrast with the neoclasical/Keynesian regional models which assume territorial equilibrium or self-balance, the observable trend of regional inequality has to be considered as intrinsic to the capitalist economic growth.

Early "orthodox" theory put the "where" under the "why". According to this view, the location of industries should be determined by the cost factor and, consequently, the workers should maximise wages by moving to those areas more profitable for the industries. The consequence of this economic approach was an agglomeration of financial and human resources in some geographical areas -processes of concentration and urbanisation.

The so-called neoclassical counter-revolution at the end of the 19th century, although admitting the uneven geographical distribution of production and consumption, failed to understand that its model
was circular due to its self-balance assumptions. The neoclassical school maintained the view that inter-regional trade and factor movements had beneficial effects tending to the equalisation of factors and commodity prices, much in the same line of reasoning for the price equalisation under free-trade conditions.

In fact, the neoclassical model fails to fully realize the locational impact of the scale economies, the different industrial composition with the regions and the evolving nature of the demand pattern which creates divergent spatial frictions (2).

Despite the fact that Marxist theory has put the emphasis in the realm of the functional rather than that of the territorial, the Keynesian models of regional imbalance have taken up a key factor which was anticipated by Marx: the concentration of production in particular areas was not "exclusively" generated by the nearer access to raw materials or the need to reduce transport costs, but rather by the concentration of production in economic sectors.

The "cumulative imbalance" and the "spatial polarisation" theories (3) argue that market forces tend to open rather than close the inequality gap among regions within the state. And it does so because economic growth begins "unevenly". In other words, the capitalist mode of production is also unequal in its origins, starting in some areas and not simultaneously in all territories of the modern state. Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, and the Midlands and London in Britain offer good examples of such early industrialisation which attracted not only trade but also labour and capital. This process of attraction has persistently tended both to be cumulative and to promote spatial polarisation and concentration of growth in some state areas at the expense of others.

For most of the 20th century, and according to the Keynesian approach, Scotland has played the role of a donor-region for the
development of other British regions. Further, the issue of the North Sea oil profits has come to underline this Scottish donor role with the transfer of economic resources, via central macro-economic policies, to subsidise declining manufacturing English areas, UK unemployment or to finance outward investment. Catalonia, in turn, has benefitted from the highly productive immigration of less-developed donor-regions and with the investment of agricultural profits by regional oligarchies of the Spanish hinterland and South which have sought the higher return on industrial investment rather than re-investing in their regional agricultures.

Keynesian centralist/interventionist alternatives about regional policy stress the role of state governments in establishing counterpoles to those faster growing regions which were the result of the "free" functioning of the market forces. Thus, this model assumes that a push of factors to one region rather than other will cause factors to move towards such a designated area and away from others.

Such strategies of regional development has been developed in Britain and Spain with a rather poor results (eg. SPA, New Towns and Francoist polos de desarrollo -poles of growth). The Italian experience in the Mezzogiorno has proved as well that the designation by central governments of nuclei intended to function as growth for the South, has not resulted in a self-sustaining process of growth generation. Such exercises of central management of regional growth can be criticised in the following terms:

"There is a failure to relate the location aspect of growth-pole with the wider aspects of inter-regional disequilibrium. For instance, the question of which industries to locate in a particular growth 'complex' cannot usefully be determined without an evaluation of the interrelationship between the designated growth pole and other growth areas (or other firms supplying or buying from the firms in the growth-pole concerned). And this itself will suffer if it reflects the wider general context of inter-firm oligopolistic competition, granted that firms operate essentially in markets which are to a lesser or greater extent the field of inter-firm price, marketing,
innovation and other tactics. A ceteris paribus assumption which takes it for granted that firms will thrive simply because they are favoured through government incentives in growth areas is not likely to be soundly based unless these firms are themselves able to cope with national and multi-national oligopolies as well as the competitive local or regional firms" (Holland, S, 1976a, pp.52-53).

A framework for regional development.

In the development of the advanced capitalism, the rise of micro and meso-economic companies in national economies and the spread of multinational firms and operations around the world are conspicuous features. As far as the former trend is concerned, the need for coordinating public resources at the regional level in order to promote small and medium-size companies is essential to overcome the disastrous effects of de-industrialisation in problem regions like Scotland, with declining gigantic "lame-ducks" industries. The role played by wealthier regions like Catalonia in the provision of public resources and income transfers to equalise resources and promote development in poorer Spanish regions, raises the delicate issue of re-distribution of wealth through processes of horizontal decision-making. Such a horizontal co-responsibility has to extend its effects, in any case, to the realm of the economic private sector. In states with a mixed economy like Britain and Spain, the private sector accounts for the lion's share of their respective GNPs. The formulation of local/regional solutions, even when political solidarity and coordination among sub-state entities exists, must also take into account the corporate interests of national and international companies. In fact, despite incentives or disincentives, the private firms have a considerable degree of free choice to determine the location of investments, jobs and incomes.

As for the multinational operations is concerned, "where" to locate is a factor of the highest potential distortion for the regions. At this level, state governmments and to a lesser extent
supra-national institutions (EEC), have still a great say. And, not
surprisingly, centre-periphery conflicts very often come out very
sharply when the locational factor of a transnational company
threatens to increase rather than diminish the imbalance gap among
regions. How to reconcile both local/regional and state/transnational
interests is very much a political question which only accepts an
ideological answer.

This thesis contends that regional imbalance is a product of the
industrial capitalism and, consequently, can only be corrected if
values of inter-regional solidarity and horizontal political
cooperation among sub-state regions are achieved.

The elaboration of economic plans of development to reconcile
national and regional priorities is not a technical matter which can
be provided by "think-tanks" of central planners. In fact, the very
creation of the centralist nation-state as we know it by the
industrial capitalism exacerbated the problems of regional
imbalance. The political nature of the modern capitalist state runs
parallel to the application of machinery and the extensive scale
production which concentrated the means of production in certain
areas, displacing the previously more dispersed handicraft
manufacturers. In the advanced/post-industrial Western societies, the
"statisation" of multinational companies, or their corporatist
relationship with state central government, has not changed the basic
nature of the capitalist state and its intrinsic regional
disequilibrium.

The challenge to the capitalist state from below, therefore, not
only articulates political solidarity and horizontal involvement of
the constituent regions, but provides as well the basis for the
overcoming of regional differences. The welfare of the state citizens
cannot only be achieved by the implementation of corporatist policies
pursued from the centre of the polity, a practice which conceptually perpetuates regional inequality. Certainly, the union bargaining, for instance, has bought about some functional income equalisation for the workers in a capitalist state, but the differences between, say, Scotland and the English South East as regards other working conditions -eg. unemployment, social indicators, process of de-skilling, etc- has remained the same if not increased.

In this context, the political autonomy exercised by self-governed regions in the formulation of economic policies does not only have a considerable impact in their economic development but, more important, it interacts with the state central governments and supra-national institutions in a way at which political cooperation is required unless the whole system risks total collapse.

In Part 5 of this dissertation, the analysis of both regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia will be carried out putting the emphasis in their respective resources and potentialities, together with a close examination on the actual scope left for the implementation of an autonomous policy-making.
5.1. THE SCOTTISH ECONOMY DIMENSION.

5.1.1. Historical background

It is a subject of discussion whether there is such a concept as a Scottish economy. Certainly, in the 18th century most Scots regarded the British Empire as a provider of career opportunities, a source of commercial profit or an empty space awaiting colonisation. Consequently, in the first half of the 19th century—the heyday of Scottish private enterprise—existed a characteristic economic system and industrial network, albeit one which was closely linked to England.

If Scotland benefited as the junior partner of the British Empire, this fact also hastened its decline (5). At least half of the profits generated by the overseas Scottish expansion were invested in North America and the Dominions. Moreover, with the economic centralisation in London—the Imperial capital—, Scotland's own capacity to operate on an autonomous basis became very limited. In fact, at the turn of the century the Scottish economy began a process of gradual stagnancy. It was mainly due to the refusal of important sectors of the Scottish capitalist class to re-invest the profits accrued during the 19th century in industrial modernisation and economic diversification. These representatives of the larger units of the industrial capital became completely "anglicised" and, although they bought large estates and "unproductive" land in Scotland, they moved to London and disregarded the possibility of developing a Scottish distinctive economy. They were "externally-orientated" and viewed their future inextricably bound up with that of the centralised British State.

In fact, by the First World War, the Scottish economy was very dependent on a limited range of heavy industries—coal, steel,
engineering, shipbuilding and locomotive construction. The subsequent slump of such industries in the 1920s inaugurated a period in which the control of Scottish industry gradually passed out of Scottish hands. Scotland suffered severely as a result of the United Kingdom's protectionism generated by the inter-war depression. It demonstrated, on the other hand, the extent to which Scotland, as a small country, has always been dependent on trade outside her frontiers (6).

Rearmament and the Second World War gave a temporary and relative boost to the heavy industries located in Scotland. Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s the "old" problems were back again. Between 1954 and 1960, the Scottish manufacturing output increased by only 9% compared with 23% for the United Kingdom as a whole (7). As a result, the Scottish GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per head fell from 92% of the UK average to 88%.

Ever since the 1960s a drift in ownership and control away from Scotland and towards England and the United States of America has taken place. The Scottish manufacturing industry has increasingly become subject to decision made outside of Scotland's borders and, for this reason, it is difficult to sustain any idea of distinctive and autonomously Scottish patterns of economic development. An illustrative example is that, between 1958 and 1968, overseas investment accounted for 30% of all new employment created by new enterprises in Scotland.

During the 1960s, efforts to devise a distinctive Scottish arm of the economic and industrial policy-making system were implemented. Thus, Scotland received over 30 per cent of all central government regional aid in the period from 1960 and 1972. Such aid was meant to diversify the Scottish economy. However, it did little to improve the situation since heavy industry continued to decline. In the 1960s and 1970s multinational enterprises moved into Scotland and began to
change the industrial base, basically from heavy industry to
electronic and service sector. The immediate consequence was that,
in 1973, almost 60 per cent of manufacturing employment was owned
from outside Scotland. This drift towards what is known as "branch
plant economy" meant that the largest plants and the fastest growing
industries (electronics, chemicals and vehicles) were dominated by
non-Scottish firms. (8). Leaving aside the United States' investment
in the North Sea oil and gas, Scotland has the highest level of per
capita investment in dollars in the world after Canada.

In the 1960s and 70s, in line with its drive into EEC markets,
British capitalism progressively abandoned the Celtic fringe. This
loss of capital engendered local crises in traditional industries and
forced the state to enlarge its sector and provide for some new
employment through regional aid schemes. The outflow of capital led
to alterations in the social structure as the decline of heavy
industry hit the skilled and the status of key sections of the
working class.

In importing production line branch plants, mainly requiring
semi-skilled workers and a disproportionately low number of technical
and skilled workers as against indigenous employers, the
multinationals—mostly US firms—reinforced the de-skilling process
of the Scottish working population. This led some to conclude that,
by the mid-1970s, Scotland was more working class and its population
less skilled, vis-à-vis England, than any time since the First World
War (Dickson, T, 1980, p.296).

By the late 1970s, much of the economic optimism in Scotland in
relation to the North Sea oil and gas had evaporated. Probably the
SNP slogan, "It's Scotland's oil" was the expression not only of an
open optimism but of a hidden pessimism, both characteristic of the
period, "...optimism that control over the oil resources would create
a viable Scottish economy, and pessimism that this potential would be frittered away by the Westminster government" (Scott, J, 1983, p.163).

It is estimated that North Sea oil and gas has created between 85,000 and 100,000 new jobs on and offshore. But its impact on Edinburgh, Tayside and Grampian and Strathclyde has failed to slow down the continuing decline in the process of de-industrialisation —principally— in Clydeside. Moreover, unemployment has increased from 4.5 per cent of the active working population in 1945 to over 15 per cent in 1984 (9).

The main instruments of economic policy —inward investment, fiscal policy, monetary and exchange rate policies— are a UK responsibility and, unless Scotland should become an independent state, those instruments are likely to remain so. Therefore, the responsibilities of the Treasury, the Inland Revenue and the Bank of England are identical in England and Scotland.

The prosperous financial system, a consequence of the internationalisation of the Scottish economy (10), is the only sector which has not become so closely tied to the British economy. It also reflects dramatically the shift in this century from an internal situation of "underdevelopment" within the United Kingdom, to an external orientation and dependency of the Scottish economy (11).

In any case, the Edinburgh-based financial sector is much more interested in the speculative bussiness of the international market, than to inject capitals to revitalise the productive structure of the Scottish industry. Not surprisingly, the sharpening decline of the Scottish industry has continued in recent years and is illustrated by the fact that, by the end of 1981, industrial production in Scotland was 89.3 per cent of the 1975 level.

What is important for the purposes of this thesis is the fact
that Scotland has become simply a "region" within the framework of the United Kingdom. Indeed, since 1900 Scotland has been reduced gradually from the status of an equal partner nation with England, a founder member of the United Kingdom since 1707, to one of its eleven constituent regions. Another point is also very clear: since such a process has become more acutely made evident in economic terms, the political expression of the Scottish identity has gradually come out more sharply.

After analysing the Scottish resources and potentialities and the impact of relative deprivation with respect to England, in the first part of this chapter, the two remaining parts will concentrate on the importance of the public sector in Scotland and the promotion of regional policies in the specific case of the SDA, respectively.

5.1.2. Resources and potentialities.

Undoubtedly, Scotland is passing through one of the most turbulent periods of its entire economic history (12). There are two main economic indicators which prove this to be true. First, unemployment. A simple piece of information on this issue underlines the severe job losses and lack of new ones: during 1980 the notified redundancies in Scotland were running at more than three times the figure for 1978 (13) (NB. Almost 3 out of 4 occurred in the manufacturing industry. Moreover, the decline of heavy industry during the 1970s produced the loss of one-third of Scotland's manufacturing jobs).

The recession took the number of people registered as unemployed in Scotland above to over 270,000 in January. By May 1981 the total had reached 288,000. If we compare these figures with the period up to the 1930's depression, we can see that in January 1933, at the
height of the slump, the official figure for unemployment in Scotland stood at 407,300 (14). If forecasts of three and a half million unemployed in the UK by late-1980s come about, then the Scottish unemployed population is likely to rise above 400,000. These figures dramatically contrast with the total registered unemployment in 1960 which stood at less than 60,000.

Secondly, the variation in the growth of the population (i.e. the simplest indicator of the "well-being" of an industrialised country) reflects the stagnant and declining Scottish economy. Scotland's population is expected to fall by almost half a million over the next 40 years from 5.15 million in 1983 to 4.66 million in the year 2023 — its lowest level since 1907. This population drop contrasts with the post-Second World War trend which reached its peak at 5.21 million between 1971 and 1975 (15).

---

### Table 5.1.i: Net loss of the Scottish population by migration (1881-1979).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Net loss by migration ('000)</th>
<th>Percentage of natural increase for period.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881-91</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1901</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-11</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-21</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-31</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-51</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-79</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lythe, C & Majumdar, M, 1982, p.10).

The main explanation for such a decline is an excess of emigration over the natural increase of the population (see Table 5.1.i). Obviously the level of emigration in turn reflects the employment opportunities available in the country. It is very signficative to observe that whereas in 1973-74 the migration loss in Scotland was 2,000, in 1980-81 it rose to 23,000 and also to note
that one-third of the number of people who migrated in recent years have gone to England. Needless to say, the highest proportion of this immigrant population is formed by the youngest and best trained Scottish workers.

Moreover, and according to World Bank figures in 1982, no other industrial country, "free-market" or Communist, is expecting a decline in its population over the next forty years. This contrasts with the demographic prospects for the United Kingdom as a whole for which is forecast an increase of one million in the population in the period 1984-1994 (see Table 5.1.ii).

| Table 5.1.ii: Demographic Projections for United Kingdom (1981-1992) |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Under 15.............. | 11.6  | 11.0  | 11.1  | 11.7  |
| (as % total)........... | (20.6)| (19.5)| (19.5)| (20.4)|
| 15 to pensionable age.| 34.6  | 35.1  | 35.3  | 35.2  |
| (as % total)........... | (61.6)| (62.4)| (62.0)| (61.5)|
| Pensionable age....... | 10.1  | 10.2  | 10.5  | 10.4  |
| (as % total)........... | (17.9)| (18.1)| (18.4)| (18.1)|
| TOTAL.................. | 56.3  | 56.3  | 56.9  | 57.3  |
| of which over 75........ | 3.3   | 3.5   | 3.9   | 3.8   |
| (as % total)........... | (5.8) | (6.3) | (6.9) | (6.7) |

(Source: Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), 1984)

But we must also take into account the fact that one in five of Scotland's population lives below the so-called "poverty line" (i.e. the level of income approved by the Westminster Parliament for claimants dependent on supplementary benefit). It has been calculated that 1,664,000 Scots were living in "poverty" or on margins (below 140% of the SB) by the end of 1982 (16), at which time there was a total population in Scotland of 5,150,000 inhabitants.

It might be concluded, therefore, that the picture of the
Scottish resources and potential is very pessimistic and discouraging, although there are alternative diagnoses of the situation. Let us see SNP's points of view on this subject:

"Scotland is a wealthy nation. This may come as a surprise to those many Scots struggling to survive on unemployment benefit, pensions or low wages.

* Overall, Scotland is self-sufficient in food - agriculture and fisheries together worth £1200 million last year.

* Scotland has enormous potential for developing the timber industry - up to two and a half million hectares could be developed, providing up to 70,000 extra jobs.

* Exports of Scotch whisky are expected to earn about £850 million this year.

* Reserves of coal amount to almost 12,000 million tonnes, equivalent to 1000 years consumption, although improvements in technology will be required for it all to be economically viable.

* Estimated oil reserves total 3,500 million tonnes - sufficient for 400 years at present rates of consumption, and worth about a quarter of a million pounds for every Scottish household.

* Enormous potential exists for developing renewable energy sources - hydro-electricity alone could provide over one-third of our electricity, with wind, wave, tidal, geo-thermal and solar power also to be harnessed.

* Up to 600 million tonnes of peat could be made available through commercial means of extraction.

* Mineral deposits, although often low-grade, are potentially valuable as raw materials become scarcer, and include iron ore, zinc, magnesium, chromite, bauxite, barytes, limestone, granite, potash, diatomite and clays.

* Human capital is potentially our greatest resource - despite the drain of emigration, Scotland retains a relatively highly-educated and skilled workforce.

* Our geographical assets include excellent deep-water ports, a situation close to the world's most important trading routes, and scope for expansion of the tourist industry".(17)

The divergence between both diagnoses of the Scottish economy arises from the political perspective of either the SNP's consideration of a sovereign independent Scotland, or Scotland being a region within the whole of the United Kingdom - the view sustained by the major British political parties. In any case, the factor which
makes the real difference in both economic approaches is the revenue which comes from the North Sea oil and gas production -£11 billion in 1984- and its distribution, either from London to the whole of the United Kingdom or its exclusive implementation in Scotland by an hypothetical Scottish government.

Most authors and economic experts agree that oil and gas production could transform the current account of the balance of payments of an independent Scotland, providing a substantial surplus relative to the size of national income. Naturally "...it would represent a substantial increase in the wealth of the community" (Lythe, C, 1977, p.35).

In the the first half of the 1980s decade the "encouraging" signs in Scotland were the strength of the electronics sector (almost totally controlled by US multinationals), the diversity of financial services, the new prospects for some onshore companies serving North Sea oil and gas, and the development of a slight recovery in the whisky and textile industries.

The "discouraging" symptoms were the factual decease of heavy industries (with the loss of one-third of Scotland's manufacturing jobs in the decade of the 1970s) the severe deprivation in the west of Scotland, namely Clydeside, and the lack of business in the country's peripheral area.

Even if the "encouraging" signs in the Scottish economy are analysed in depth some disappointing discoveries are due to come out. Electronics, for instance, a sector which employs the same people (40,000) as the total of 16,000 in shipbuilding, 14,000 in mining, and 11,000 in steelmaking, and which produced 79 per cent of the UK silicon chip output (ie. 21 per cent of European capacity) (18), lacks corporate inter-mingling. The big multinationals, such as IBM, Honeywell, Burroughs and Motorola, have not become involved in new
product ventures with the sub-stratum of small local companies or any
other similar forms of corporation.

Further, there is little interaction between the Electronic and
the North Sea oil industry (involving some 100,000 jobs), despite the
proximity of both industries. Only the banking sector (employing
80,000) has intermingled with the industries of the so-called Silicon
Glen.

The fact of the matter is that the stimulation of new industry
is likely to require very heavy public sector funding in Scotland, a
country where the weight of the public sector already accounts for
nearly 50 per cent of its GDP (NB: Without counting the revenue from
the North Sea oil and gas).

Probably a major concern which has been prevalent for long in the
Scottish economy is the vulnerability of large and medium-sized
companies to outside take-over and the subsequent transfer of
decision-making activities south of the border.

This dual and contradictory vision of the Scottish potentialities
(19) is a major feature of Scottish disorientation on assessing its
own economic role. But above all, the industrial recession of the 70s
and 80s breeds defensiveness and resistance to change by the own
Scottish people themselves. And it also poses the question of "who"
benefits in the United Kingdom. For a broad popular belief is that
Scotland (and some parts of England, as well) are paying a high price
for the prosperity in the South East of England.

5.1.3. The perception of relative deprivation "vis-à-vis" England.

The perception of relative deprivation vis-à-vis England is
common ground on which a large sector of the Scottish society has
stood for a long time. The definition of the concept of "relative
deprivation" is a consequence of the popular feeling that the English
-especially those living in the south- are "better-off" than the
Scots are. Nowadays, after exhausting discussions about the right or
wrong justification of such a feeling, there is not much room left to
rule out the soundess of the "relative deprivation" argument. Such
argument is certainly based upon a psycho-social perception rather
than on an Scottish attitude generated on purely empiricist grounds.
In any case, the following evidence related to issues perceived as
socially "hot" by the Scots offers the foundation upon which such a
perception is construed.

Unemployment

As far as unemployment is concerned, the Scottish rates since
1930 have always been greater than the British rate (20) (see table
5.1.iii).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Scotland/GB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lythe, C & Majmudar, M 1982, p.11; Financial Times,
7.xii.83 and The Scotsman, 13.ii.84).

Employment is not on its own the only important variable to take
into account in this respect, but the wage levels, as well. According
to Table 5.1.iv, and with the exception of male manual workers, all other categories of full-time workers received lower average weekly earnings in Scotland than Great Britain as a whole. In any case, the "advantage" which Scottish male manual workers enjoy can mostly be explained by their higher overtime earning. Also the standard hourly rates of pay are lower than those in the whole of the United Kingdom.

In April 1981, Scotland contained 10.6% of all male, and 11.5% of all female low paid workers in Britain. Only the South West and East Anglia had more of their male-manual workers lower paid (ie. £85 per week). As regards women workers, only Yorks/Humberside (62%), East Midlands (62%) and Northern (60.8%) regions, had in 1981 more women lower paid than Scotland (60.7%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average weekly earnings (£)</th>
<th>Of which overtime (£)</th>
<th>Average weekly earnings (hours)</th>
<th>Of which overtime (hours)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCOTLAND</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males: Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-manual</td>
<td>124.8</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females: Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-manual</td>
<td>161.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREAT BRITAIN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males: Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-manual</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females: Manual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-manual</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part-time</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Bell, D in Ingham, K & Love, J (eds), 1983, p. 72)
The regional distribution of the low paid workers, however, must be compared with the regional distribution of all employees (see Table 5.1.v). In this respect, Scotland was the worst region in Great Britain as regards its disproportionate share of all paid workers (21).

Table 5.1.v: Ratio of the regional distribution of the low paid compared with the distribution of employees in Great Britain, (1981)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorks/Humberside</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Midlands</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Anglia</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Health.

Poverty and ill health are closely related. Death rates from heart disease and lung cancer in Scotland are among the highest in the world and higher than in England and Wales. Certainly infant mortality is a sensitive indicator of the state of health of a society. Here Scotland also lags behind (see Table 5.2.vi).

Table 5.2.vi: Infant Mortality (*) rates (1961-1982).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Deaths of infants under 1 year of age per 1,000 live-births).
Life expectation is lower in Scotland than in England and Wales: 68.2 years in 1978 for men as compared to 71.3 years in England and Wales; and 74.5 years for women as compared to 76.3 years in England and Wales.

Scotland ranked thirty-first out of thirty-three "developed" countries (only surpassed by Hungary and East Germany) in death per thousand population in the late 1970s. Tuberculosis is usually more prevalent in poor environmental conditions—poor housing and overcrowding being the two major factors. Again Scotland's male death rate at 24 per million is significantly worse than the 15.3 per million for England and Wales. The corresponding female rates are 7.82 and 5.16 per million respectively.

The biggest change foreseen for the health service in Scotland for the last decade of the century is increasing demand for institutional care due to an increase during the 1980s in the number of people over seventy-five years old. Geriatric (old and infirm) patients tend to stay longer in hospital and it seems that fewer old people are cared for at home by their families (22).

Housing

As pointed out above, a decisive environmental factor affecting people's health is housing. Of course, there are distinctive Scottish housing problems differing in degree and intensity from the rest of the United Kingdom (eg. overcrowding, bad housing).

The post-war period in Scotland saw a rapid expansion of public housing, totalling nearly 1 million dwellings up to 1980s. Consequently, 50 per cent of Scotland's housing and 75 per cent of the public sector stock was built after 1945. Since then, 82 per cent
of new houses were built by the public sector. Only 33 per cent of Scottish housing is owner occupied. This is a lower proportion than almost any other European country. In the rest of Britain, the proportion is around 57 per cent (see Table 5.1.vii).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage owner-occupied</th>
<th>Percentage rented from public sector</th>
<th>Percentage rented from private sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wales</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (1968)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German D. R.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1971)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German F. R.</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (1971)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (1970)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1970)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (1970)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (58)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Another measure of physical deprivation is provided by overcrowding. Between 1966 and 1971 the rise of overcrowding as a serious problem was entirely attributable to the public sector. The percentage of households living at a density of over 1.5 persons per room doubled from 3.9% in 1966 to 7.7% in 1971. The parallel figures in England were 1.5% in 1966 and 1.8% in 1971 (Cook, R, in Brown, G & Cook, R (eds), 1983, p.179).

Further, between 1965 and 1978, 8 per cent of all households in Scotland were below the bedroom standard, while in England and Wales
the figure corresponded to 4 per cent. Another indicator of the bad housing in Scotland is shown by the lower rental value of the houses there than in England and Wales (eg. in 1976/7, 37 per cent of Scottish housing had an annual rental value of less than £100).

Perpetual condensation is one of the most significant sources of housing deprivation, a situation more acute in Scotland than in England, simply because of the much higher proportion of all-electric houses. And all-electric houses were attractive to housing authorities in Scotland because their capital costs were lower.

Glasgow, especially, has been considered the "slum of Western Europe". Scottish slums began with the industrial revolution as local landlords started to build tall continental-style tenements to house the workers flooding into the cities. These slums mainly developed during 1800-1850. In 1975, a report by the Home Office noted that Clydeside had 90 per cent of Britain's worst housing areas.

North Sea oil revenue and public spending.

Some authors have considered that during the half-century following the First World War, Scotland with a ninth to a tenth of the UK population, contributed a twelfth of the revenue and enjoyed an eighth of the public expenditure. One thing is sure about this controversial issue: there has certainly been no systematic detailed publication of accounts for Scotland in the last half-century.

Another school of thought has sustained that, in terms of government and expenditure it appeared that Scotland has been subsidized on a UK basis since the First World War.

Apart from abstract calculations and biased estimations, it is essential to review some macroeconomic data to figure out the state of things.

According to Lythe, C & Mujmadar, M (1982, pp. 18-49), and during
the period 1961-79, there was an excess of expenditure over product in Scotland. This excess is calculated at between £225 million and £1,380 million at 1975 prices, averaging at £885 million, so consequently Scottish expenditure exceeded Scottish output. Lythe, C & Majumdar, M also conclude that during the mentioned period 1961-79, part of the excess of the Scottish expenditure over income was indeed financed by the United Kingdom taxpayer (23).

It has also to be borne in mind that the referred authors consider Scotland as a "region" within the United Kingdom. Thus, the possibilities of separate exchange-rate monetary adjustment and of using oil and gas revenues are not available to Scotland within such "status quo".

As far as the perception of relative deprivation is concerned, however, the public expenditure in Scotland period 1979-84 offer interesting figures. The Scottish percentage of territorial identifiable public expenditure was the only one to fall in the United Kingdom. Further, the percentage increase in territorial public expenditure in the same period was the lowest as compared with England, Wales and Northern Ireland (see Table 5.1.viii a and 5.1.viii b).

Table: 5.1.viii a: UK Territorial identifiable public expenditure (1979-80 1983-84).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979-80</th>
<th>1983-84</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGLAND</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALES</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN IRELAND</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5.1.viii b: Increase in territorial identifiable public expenditure in the United Kingdom (1979-80 1983-84).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
<th>1983-84</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENGLAND</td>
<td>57,135</td>
<td>60,081</td>
<td>4.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOTLAND</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>8,420</td>
<td>3.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALES</td>
<td>3,757</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHERN IRELAND</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>5.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Total identifiable public expenditure represents about 80 per cent of the total public expenditure on UK spending programmes.

(Source: Hansard: 22.2.85, vol. 73, cols 607-616).

In any case, the discovery of oil in Scottish waters destroyed the belief that Scotland could not be economically viable separated from the rest of the United Kingdom. In an independent Scotland, even if all other taxes were abolished, sufficient revenues from the North Sea oil and gas would be available to finance expenditure which the government of any modern state is expected to undertake (24).

In 1982 the share of the total United Kingdom Gross National Product by the oil and gas was 4.75% at factor costs. Gross revenues were around £14.3 billion for oil and £1 bn. for gas the same year. Excluding national insurance contributions in 1982-3, taxes and royalties from oil and gas exploitation amounted to almost 10% of the total central government tax revenues. Including payments of the national insurance, the percentage was nearly 8%. Further, in 1982 approximately 25% of the UK's gross capital investment was related to the North Sea oil and gas exploitation. This figure amounted to
about £3.1 billion, representing around 7.6% of the gross domestic capital formation in 1982 in the United Kingdom. It has been calculated, at 1982 prices, that until 1983 almost £30 billion had been invested in the North Sea Continental Shelf and some £6 bn had been spent on exploration (25).

Without taking into consideration the wealth provided by the North Sea oil, it is assumed by the own Scottish National Party itself that expenditure exceeded revenue. In its estimated budget 1984/85 prior to the SNP's own proposals (26), the pre-budget expenditure total amounted to £12.8 billion, but the pre-budget revenue total (without North Sea moneys) reached £11.7. Therefore, there is a pre-budget deficit of £1.1 billion.

From the secessionist point of view, the conclusion is clear: an independent Scotland would be better off than not only England but many of the "developed" industrial countries of the world.

From the consideration of the United Kingdom as a unitary state, Scotland receives more money than she raises not including the North Sea Oil revenue. Nonetheless, the data of 1978 (27) shows that, with the exception of the West Midlands, all the regions of Britain plus Northern Ireland, got more expenditure money than the revenue they raised.

There is also the usually neglected geographical factor of Scotland—roughly a third of the United Kingdom's total extension—and the necessary larger subsidies on agricultural and roads than, say, the West Midlands where the "spillover" effect of public expenditure requires less net investment. Moreover, the higher unemployment rate in Scotland, vis-à-vis the UK as a whole, obliges higher social security payment and regional policy grants within the total public expenditure.
All these arguments support the view that relative deprivation vis-à-vis England is not only a feeling held by a large sector of Scots but consequence of the disadvantageous evidence on some issues, as compared with the south of England, which greatly shape the own Scottish perception of the social well-being. Relative deprivation in Scotland not only explains human frustration and political apathy, but also the "negative" approach by some nationalist separatists to the case of independence. Only, they sustain, in a gradually more and more impoverished Scotland is the swing of votes to gain the majority of the Parliamentary Scottish seats possible. The great paradox is drawn up very simply; Why become poorer in a wealthy country?...

The gross miscalculation of such a separatist device is that the Scots, due to their dual national identification, have been very reluctant to regard North Sea oil and gas as exclusively Scotland's property. On the other hand, it is hard to understand why none of the oil revenues have been distinctively applied to create a specific fund which could offer economic alternatives to the process of wild de-industrialisation which has taken place in Scotland and other British peripheries, during the 60s, 70s and 80s. Among the British political parties, only the SDP-Liberal Alliance formally proposed before the 1983 General Elections that, after the implementation of Home Rule in Scotland "...the (Scottish) Parliament should receive 50% of North Sea Oil revenue together with a share of UK taxation"(28).

In fact, the governments of the 1960s and 1970s promoted schemes of regional aid which assumed the diagnosis of a worse economic situation than the rest of the United Kingdom (ie. a ratio between 121-133 per cent of more public expenditure in Scotland as against England) but they failed to fulfil the electoral promise set in the October 1974 General Manifesto that, "...revenues from North Sea oil will be used whenever possible to improve employment conditions in
Scotland and the regions elsewhere in need of development"(p.11). The schemes of industrial promotion in Scotland were the "political" consequence of the SNP electoral upsurge in October 1974 (Labour, 36.2 % popular votes; SNP, 30.4 %).

In this context of "realpolitik" exercised by the two main political parties in Britain, relative deprivation is, surprisingly, a reactive factor in Scottish politics, very much the opposite of what happened with the perception of comparative grievance in Catalonia under Franco's regime. It handicaps the articulation of political initiatives shaped in a common Scottish identity. At this point the role of the political parties does not induce the formulation of global alternatives in the dimension of Scottish politics. Public participation and "positive" responses to the Scotland's perceived problems of poverty and deprivation depends upon the degree of political "pragmatism" exercised by the hierarchies of the two main political parties in Britain.

5.1.4. The public sector in Scotland.

In principle the public sector in Scotland consists of the Scottish Office, other central government departments established in Scotland (e.g. defence establishments), the local authorities and the nationalised industries. There is also a miscellaneous assortment of public corporations, quangos, such as the SDA (Scottish Development Agency) or the HIDB (Highlands and Islands Development Board).

Together, they account for 35 % of total employment in Scotland, and 25 % of the Scottish GDP(NB. including North Sea output) (29). As regards the control of identifiable public expenditure in Scotland, the Secretary of State for Scotland is responsible for 63 % of the total figure, but of this spending he has no real control over the allocations to the Agriculture and Industry programmes (Cuthbert,

It must be borne in mind that large areas of central government assistance do not fall under the heading of public expenditure and are mainly determined at a UK level. It is difficult, therefore, to draw a line as the central government can alter the figures by relabelling unchanged activities, for example by converting a nationalised industry from a public corporation into a limited company, or by financing services instead of taxes.

Further, central government public expenditure has always tended to consider the provisions in terms of functional programmes throughout the United Kingdom, rather than on the territorial distribution between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The expression "officially" used as identifiable public expenditure poses the limits and constraints of any study on this matter.

The "productive" public sector in Scotland includes such nationalised industries as coal, gas, shipbuilding, steel, posts, railways, airlines and airports. In addition to these monopolies or quasi-monopolies, there are other companies in Scotland with central government presence.

As far as nationalised industries are concerned, they are not responsible to the Secretary of State for Scotland but to other Whitehall ministerial departments, such as Trade, Industry, Employment or Treasury. So many varied factors constitute a major obstacle to any systematic and comprehensive analysis of identifiable and aggregate public expenditure in Scotland: "...the very lack of publicly available information on their Scottish operations (British Nationalised Industries) makes it impossible for any serious research to be carried out on their role in the Scottish economy, or for their efficiency to be monitored" (Cuthbert, M, 1982, p.243).

Non-global accurate figures when assessing the public sector in
Scotland are, therefore, a proviso to be borne in mind as a preliminary conclusion.

In the late 1970s and early 80s, Identifiable Public Expenditure has been produced by the Treasury and the Scottish Economic Planning Department. Defence, overseas aid and other overseas services are excluded. Figures of the Scottish Office Identifiable Public expenditure are given in the Table 5.1.ix.

Planning of Public Expenditure and decision-making.

Following the report of the Plowden Committee in 1961, the Public Expenditure Survey system was introduced in the United Kingdom. Its aim was based on the principle that decision-making involving substantial future expenditure should always be taken in the light of surveys of public expenditure as a whole, over a period of years (30), and in relation to prospective resources.

The process involves three main stages. First, from December to July, an administrative exercise is co-ordinated by the Treasury. Then, ministerial departments submit preliminary expenditure estimates by March. Subsequently, bilateral negotiations between the Treasury and spending departments take place, to reach agreement on the figures.

A draft report on public expenditure is produced by the Treasury and submitted to consideration by the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC), which is an interdepartmental committee chaired by a Deputy Secretary in the Treasury, and on which sit the Principal Finance Officers of all major spending departments. The main function of this committee is to provide a context for expenditure decisions, showing the cost of current policies, and the implementation of possible changes in policy. The process so far has been handled entirely by civil servants.
From July to October, the Cabinet takes its political decisions on the level of expenditure and the process surfaces to the public opinion with the publication of the annual White Paper on the Government's expenditure plans. At one time, the Secretary of State for Scotland was able to bargain for a Scottish Office share of each of the appropriate functional totals. In 1978 the system was changed with the introduction of the "Barnett formula". According to this, spending totals are set for Britain for functional programmes. Any increase or decrease in spending is then allocated, 85% to England, 10% to Scotland and 5% to Wales (31). But this only applies to some programmes within the Secretary of State for Scotland's responsibility and not to the spending of UK departments like Social Security or Industry in Scotland. Once more, the intermesh of functional and territorial patterns—although the former is what most accounts in this respect—makes it almost impossible for Scottish public opinion to assess where the political responsibilities of both the Secretary of State and the British cabinet are placed. In any case, the role of the Secretary of State since 1978 is merely instrumental of the central government decisions as a whole.

Some authors (Keating, M & Midwinter, A, 1982, p.185) sustained that the Barnett formula for the whole UK "...protects Scotland's position in a period of retrenchment". In fact British governments never hypothecate revenues and spending decisions are not tied to specific revenue sources. Taking the "separatist" perspective it can be concluded, otherwise, that Scotland's position in recent years has been dramatically unprotected.

The main spending targets made by the British Government for the financial year 1984-85 reached £126,353 million as total public expenditure, with £12,800 million for Scotland (10%). Considering that the estimated revenue produced in Scotland was £22,500 million
(NB. including the Continental Shelf profits from the North Sea oil and gas), the ratio revenue/expenditure was 17.4%/10%, or an excess of 7.4% in Scottish revenue contribution against 10 per cent of Scottish total public expenditure in UK basis.

The Secretary of State for Scotland is able to reallocate moneys from one spending programme to another, once the block of expenditure total is set. In practice the scope of reallocation is very reduced because the block-grant system is based upon the principle of financing of the "need" expenditure (see Table 5.1.ix. for figures of the Scottish public expenditure under the Secretary of State's responsibility) But as said above, the role of the Secretary of State is more "functionally" controlled by the Central Government and so its position as a "territorial" lobbying advocate of the Scottish "interests" in the Cabinet is purely decorative.

Table 5.1.ix: Scottish Office Public Expenditure (1)

(£ million at survey prices - 1980=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, industry, energy, and employment(excluding tourism)</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services(2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, industry, energy and employment(tourism only)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads and Transport</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other environmental services</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, order and protective services</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Science</td>
<td>1,305</td>
<td>1,336</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>1983-84</td>
<td>1984-85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and Libraries</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and personal social services</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>1,546</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public services</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local authority current expenditure not allocated to services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other services</strong></td>
<td>4,663</td>
<td>4,935</td>
<td>4,976</td>
<td>4,877</td>
<td>4,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalised industries external finance</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EXPENDITURE WITHIN SECRETARY OF STATE'S RESPONSIBILITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which financed by European Regional Development Funds receipts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds receipts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(£ million at survey prices - 1980=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1983-84</th>
<th>1984-85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, industry, energy and employment(excluding tourism)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, industry, energy and employment(tourism only)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads and transport</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other environmental services</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law, order and protective services</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Science</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>1,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts and libraries</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>1978-79</td>
<td>1983-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and personal social services</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>1,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other public services</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority current expenditure not allocated to services</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total other services</strong></td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>4,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalised industries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External finance</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL EXPENDITURE WITHIN SECRETARY OF STATE'S RESPONSABILITY</strong></td>
<td>5,324</td>
<td>5,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase 1978-79 83-84</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which financed by European Regional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Funds receipts</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) These figures correspond to that expenditure which is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. There is expenditure in Scotland in other programs.

(2) The allocation of expenditure among these services may be altered at the discretion of the Secretary of State for Scotland. Expenditure on agriculture, fisheries, food and forestry and on industry, energy, trade and employment (excluding tourism) is not similarly transferable because these services are influenced to a greater extent than others by British and European Community policies. These services are not governed by the "Barnett formula".

(Note: Figures have been deflated with the consumer price annual rate. 1980=100)


The next step in the process is to pass on to Scotland’s sixty-five local authorities just over half of the expenditure within the Secretary of State’s block. The two main instrumental transfers are allocated through the Rate Support Grant and the Housing Support Grant. In theory the Scottish local authorities are able again to reallocate spending among services. In practice, the Secretary of State uses his financial instruments (RSG, HSG and capital allocations) to exercise pressure on local authority expenditure in line with the White Paper plans established by the central government.
Local Authorities finances

The Scottish Local authorities are financed from four main sources: fees and charges for services (e.g. rents from the housing council), local rates (i.e. the only genuine local tax) and government grants borrowing, the last providing some 55% of total income (NB. excluding charges) (32). The most important of these is the Rate Support Grant which is calculated as a percentage of what is termed "relevant expenditure" (see composition and figures in Appendix 5.1.i). In Scotland the budgetary guidelines are rather similar to the GREAs. These are meant to take into account the variations for different local government to provide a common standard of services.

Annual consultation with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) leads to the final configuration of the Rate Support Grant. The practice is to determine the total of relevant expenditure and the aggregate grant (in 1981-82, 66% of relevant expenditure) which the Secretary of State will "pay" in respect to such expenditure. Specific grants are then deducted (see Appendix 5.1.i) and the balance is the Rate Support Grant.

The Aggregate Grant is divided into three elements:

Domestic element, which is a subsidy to domestic ratepayers set at a standard rate for Scotland. It was introduced in 1966 when the Labour Government was concerned about the effect of rising rate poundages on its ability to maintain an incomes policy.

Resources element, which compensates poor authorities by equalising the income raised by a penny rate on a per capita basis. Without such a grant, those local authorities with high per capita rateable values would be able to finance a given level of per capita expenditure much more cheaply than those with a low level. And so, a "rich" local authority may not be composed of "rich" inhabitants
because non-domestic rateable values vary between local authorities in the percentage set in Scotland as a whole. The most significative feature of the resources element is critically considered as inevitable although desirable by Heald, D et al (1982, p. 20): "The basic principle of resources element is to compensate local authorities which have low per capita rateable value. Local authorities either have the physical rateable value or they are credited with notional rateable value. The Secretary of State "pay rates" on this notional rateable value at the poundage which the local authority itself declares. Therefore for any local authority in receipt of resources element it will attract more grant the higher the rate poundage it sets".

Needs element, which is distributed in three stages: firstly among regional and island authorities; secondly between regional and district councils within each region; and thirdly among the districts within each region. This Needs element is designed to offset differences in "need" contribution on a per capita basis towards the cost of local government services. Obviously, the "need" of local government services varies between areas. The type of factors which have been built into Needs elements are population, number of school children, number of old age pensioners, population sparsity and population decline. A figure is calculated for "weighted population" which is meant to reflect more closely the "need" of a particular local authority area for services than population itself would do. In Scotland the distribution of needs elements has always been much more judgemental, reflecting the electoral interests of successive Secretaries of State, than what should be an "objective" pattern of grant distribution.

For instance, Bruce Millan (Labour Secretary of State for Scotland, 1974-79) altered the weightings for loss of population as
a way to return to Glasgow District the grant which it automatically lost for population decline. George Younger (Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, 1979-1986), changed the ratio of needs and resources as a method of moving grant towards low spending rural authorities.

In addition to the RSG system, there are a number of other grants (see Appendix 5.1.ii) which account for less than 6% of the total relevant expenditure of the local authorities. The most important among them is the Housing Support Grant, which was introduced in 1979-80 by the Labour Government.

A local authority's HSG is calculated by formula as the difference between its "eligible expenditure" and its "relevant income". The former includes standard allowances for management and maintenance, and actual loan charges. The latter consists of assumed income from rents and from rate funds contributions. This is the amount local authorities themselves pay out of the rates to subsidise council house rents.

Since 1980 the Central Government has been reducing the Housing Support Grant, so forcing councils to put up rents or the rate fund contributions, or both. The Conservative Government has been trying to ensure that the necessary increases fall on rents rather than the rate fund contributions and the rates. In fact, the Secretary of State issues a ceiling on Rate Fund Contributions.

The trend to deeper centralisation leads to local authorities being highly dependent on central government financial provisions, with a mere façade of elected bodies but firmly controlled from the centre.

The only "autonomous" way for local authorities to supplement the grants and fees and charges allocations is by levying higher rates, although not only the political but the economic scope is very
restricted. In 1978–79, the rates financed 25% of the total revenue expenditure of the Scottish Local Authorities (see Appendix 5.i.ii). On the other hand, grants controlled by central government amounted to 51.5% of the total revenue expenditure. Hence, the Secretary of State for Scotland in fact enjoys the power of achieving the reduction in local authority expenditure—as was the case in the early 1980s, eg. the Lothian Regional Council conflict—to, respectively, match the guidelines established by the Government’s White Paper and to force each local authority to take its proper "share" of the cuts.

An illustrative example of the swing of public expenditure taken from local authorities to other central government priorities (ie, Defence, in the case of the Conservative Governments since 1979) is the very figures given by the White Paper, The Government's Expenditure Plans 1980–81 to 1983–84: the expenditure of local authorities had been falling in real terms, at 1980 survey prices, from £2,664m in 1975–76 to £2,218m in 1981–82, a fall of 16.1 per cent.

All this complex process of local financing does not camouflage the firm control by the central government of the local council's political manoeuvrability. Unless the local councils decide to break the law which obliges them to pursue central government policies, they face electoral débâcle either by cutting community services or by raising the rates or the council housing rents in order to meet their financial necessities.

The central government, furthermore, may put the blame of macroeconomic failures (eg. the rise in inflation and the cost of living) on the "irresponsible" overspending done by local authorities. In practice, it exercises its options according to its own ideological priorities. For instance, the 1984 Expenditure White
Paper, although establishing a real decrease in the total of the Scottish Office Budget (rises by 1.7 per cent in 1984-85 compared with the Treasury forecast of 5 per cent inflation), observed an increase for the Law and Order area (£45m in 1984/5 and £30m in 1985/6) against Housing (cuts of £20m in 1984/5 and £60m in 1985/6) (33).

The trend to further centralisation in Britain has been reinforced by the last Conservative Governments (1979-1985). They made clear their intention to slash local authority's finances—which are mainly under Labour control—in order to transfer revenue to other central government departments. And so, defence spending increased between 1979/80 to 1984/5 by a total of 21 per cent. During that time, defence rose as a proportion of the national (UK) GDP from 4.6 per cent to 5.2 per cent—more in absolute terms, per capita and as a percentage of the GDP, than that of any major Western European country. Further, the defence budget for 1984-85, set at £17,031m, represented an 8.4 per cent increase over the previous financial year (34).

**Nationalised industries.**

After the Second World War the development of public ownership in the United Kingdom increased enormously. The number of nationalised industries multiplied under the economy model adopted by the Labour Government (1945-1951). The inception of these corporations, whose assets were publicly owned, brought about the development of the mixed-economy in Britain. This latter concept is defined as the share of output-input relations within the state with several inter-related economic, political and social factors—the goods and services produced by nationalised industries could be produced by private enterprises, and vice versa.
The original aim of the nationalised industries was a three-fold one: maximization of scale economies, control of monopoly power and provision of non-profitable services to the community as a whole. The bulk of public corporations less engaged in the direct sale of goods and services to customers fall into the latter mentioned aim.

The nationalized industries constitute an important sector of the United Kingdom's economy: 8 % employment, 11 % output and 17 % capital investment (35). Scotland has a disproportionate share of the "unprofitable" activities of the nationalised industries(e.g. steel, shipbuilding and coal) which are likely to progressively shut down during the 1980's and 1990's.

Because of the lack of separate data and territorial overlapping it is more accurate to speak of British nationalised industries rather than Scottish or English ones. However, there are three genuine Scottish nationalised industries controlled by the Scottish Office:

* The North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board. Created in 1943, its territory covers about one-quarter of the extension of the United Kingdom, but contains only about 2 per cent of the UK population and serves less than half a million customers, having 4,000 employees.

* The South of Scotland Electricity Board. Established in 1947, its area covers the Scottish industrial belt, the Borders and part of the North of England. Over one million and a half of customers and 13,000 employees.

* The Scottish Transport Group, set up in the years 1943, 1954 and 1968, respectively. It has 11,000 employees. With 2.96 employees per vehicle compared to 5.39 for London Passenger Transport and 3.61 for the National Bus Company, it constitutes the lowest percentage of costs in the United Kingdom (36).

These three public industries are responsible to the Secretary of
State for Scotland, unlike the rest of the "GB nationalised industries" operating in Scotland which are responsible to the respective central ministry in London (see Appendix 5.1.iii)

The Secretary of State for Scotland has statutory powers as far as the "genuine" Scottish nationalised industries are concerned. Those powers include the appointment of Executive Board members and the industries' borrowing and investment plans. Therefore, their financing plans are closely scrutinised each year by the Scottish Office and their results are constrained with the central government policies by the Secretary of State—the last word always remains the Treasury's responsibility. The Scottish Office performs a barely consulting role with the Treasury and acts as a lobby for the "Scottish nationalised industries".

The role of the Secretary of State is almost non-existent concerning the "GB nationalised industries" operating in Scotland. These are directly supervised by the central departments at Whitehall, and by the Treasury as the ultimate ministerial comptroller. The only political resort available, then, is the pressure exercised by the Secretary of State for Scotland within the British Cabinet: a personal, voluntarily determined effort, based on territorial responsibilities which tries to influence the decisions of the rest of the members of the central government entrenched in their functional commitments (e.g., the opposition to the closure of Ravenscraig).

The lack of publicly available information, concerning operations, future plans and the measure which the Scottish dimension exerts over the nationalised and state owned industries, brings about an element of uncertainty, out of which the central government—and its bureaucratic factual powers—is the sole beneficiary. This world of secrecy and decision-taking out of the public eye is a main
feature of the British political system as a whole.

5.1.5. SDA, instrument of regional development.

The Scottish Development Agency, established under the Scottish Development Agency Act 1975, was the immediate political response by the Labour Government to the electoral challenge mounted by the SNP in the 1974 General Elections. The first clear commitment to create a development agency for Scotland appeared in the Labour Party Manifesto for the October 1974 General Election. The proposed agency was to integrate a wide variety of bodies, both at regional, national and local level (37). At the same time its implementation actually meant the recognition by the Central Government of the trailing position of the Scottish economy compared with England.

The other three important public regional development agencies in the United Kingdom are the Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB, set up in 1965) (38), the Welsh Development Agency (WDA, 1975) and the Northern Ireland Development Agency (NIDA, 1976).

The year 1975 also saw the creation of the National Enterprise Board (NEB) - scrapped by the second Thatcher Conservative Government - with the intended purpose of extending nationalisation into profitable sectors of private industry. The three regional agencies, while also having powers to take equity and to enter into partnerships with private firms, were orientated towards offering alternative solutions to the rising unemployment and lack of investment in the most deprived areas of the United Kingdom. Thus, the SDA's essential objectives were originally to further economic development; maintain, provide and safeguard employment; promote industrial efficiency and international competitiveness and support environmental improvement, especially in areas of industrial and urban
dereliction. The SDA was provided with financial powers to carry on
the referred functions, including the power to make loans and equity
investments, to give guarantees, to form companies and to enter into
partnerships, as well as to build and make available factory space.

However, none of the SDA, WDA and NIDA were given the powers to
dispense regional financial incentives in order to accomplish the
fore mentioned ends. This prerrogative was preserved by the central
government.

The SDA is the largest of the three regional agencies in the
United Kingdom. The 1975 Act provided the Scottish Agency with the
sum of £300 million. The Industry Act (1979) provided for an increase
in the SDA's resources to £500, and included a provision to raise the
figure to £800 million by ministerial instructions. After the May
1979 General Election, the Conservative Government withdrew the
latter provisions with the implementation of the Industry Act (1980).
Moreover, following the change of government in 1979, the investment
guidelines were modified and the SDA had to concentrate on the
following objectives: industrial promotion and the attraction of
industrial investment to Scotland ("in which the Agency will act at
all time in close conjunction with, and according to general
objectives agreed with, the Scottish Economic Planning Department" -
later Industry Department for Scotland) (39), the provision, letting
and management work including the clearance of derelict land.

The obligations to maintain, provide and safeguard employment
were removed. The promotion of industrial democracy in the companies
the Agency was involved in was no longer required of the SDA and
another provision was made, in the referred Industry Act (1980), to
transfer its equity holdings to a wholly owned investment subsidiary.

The Agency is appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland
and it is responsible to him/her. Its sponsoring body within the
framework of the Scottish Office is the Industry Department for Scotland (IDS)—formerly the Scottish Economic Planning Department (SEPD)—, which deals with the formation of plans for economic development in Scotland and co-ordinates their implementation. The IDS is responsible for other Scottish "quangos" and public corporations such as the HIDB, The Scottish Tourist Board, the Scottish Electricity Boards, the Scottish Transport Group and the New Town Development Corporations.

The financial resources of the SDA mainly derived from the Exchequer. Funds are received from the Secretary of State in the form of Public Dividend Capital and loans from the National Loan Fund to finance the Agency's net capital and revenue expenditure or all other activities and all administrative expenses. With the agreement of the Secretary of State for Scotland, the Agency borrows funds from the European Coal and Steel Community to finance loans to small business located within areas affected by the contraction of the coal and steel industries. Ultimate control is tightly exercised by the Treasury via cash limits and budgetary guidelines:" The Government for their part will maintain arrangements for the exercise of budgetary control and oversight of the Agency's activities."(40)

The need for a Scottish regional policy.

The poor performance of the Scottish economy as measured by levels of unemployment, net emigration and the decline of the manufacturing industry has always been considered as establishing the need to develop a distinctive industrial regional policy. In the mid-1970s the Labour Governments interpreted such an economic disadvantage of Scotland, compared with the rest of the United Kingdom, as the most important cause of the political discontent expressed by the electoral rise of the Scottish National Party."
This, at least partially, analytical simplification was fuelled by the electoral "clientelist" approach made by the Labour Governments to prevent further loss of votes in Scotland and was dominated by highly reactive fears to the threat posed by the nationalists. For Labour the immediate response was to increase the allocation of public moneys in Scotland where their traditional strongholds were at risk.

On the other hand, the reluctance shown by the Thatcher Conservative Government to completely dismantle the SDA after the 1979 General Election - and despite its hardline commitment to the Monetarist policies of minimal state intervention in the economy - also underlines the "clientelist" political code of the other British political formation. Certainly the Conservative Government was extremely reluctant to scrap the Agency due to the low electoral support given to the Tories in Scotland.

It would be unrealistic to believe that the political/electoral arguments did not influence the decision to set up the Scottish Development Agency. There are adjacent aspects of the whole question which are analysed below, but none of them should be considered in abstract with the same level of specific weight as the political/electoral one.

When considering the purely economic angle of the establishment of the SDA, there is a need to review the two main economic schools of thought concerning the implementation of industrial regional policies in the United Kingdom. First the neo-liberal/monetarist theory which advocates the free play of markets in the spatial allocation of economic activity in the whole of the UK. This approach is characteristic of the Thatcher Conservative Government. The drift of people and investment to the South East or the Midlands is interpreted by the monetarists as desirable since it is an indication
of a "higher" level of productivity obtained in those areas and a main consequence of the proximity to the larger English home markets and the better access of communications with the overseas markets.

On the contrary, the neo-Keynesians argue that labour migration is highly undesirable and, therefore, the Government should "aid" the peripheral regions by supporting existing industry, encouraging the settlement of new industry or stimulating demand in these regions. This argument was put forward by Labour economists to support the scheme of a regional development agency whose potential role should be to encourage indigenous growth by means of a local and sector-based industrial strategy.

According to McLennan, D & Firn, J (1979, p.293), the SDA's role should be that of developing a "micro-orientated view of the region's problems and potential, an approach which could be contrasted with the macro-orientation of central government, but would be entirely complementary to it".

This type of regional agency had its genesis in the proposals made by the Labour Party's Scottish Enterprise Board (41), the West Central Scotland Planning Team (42) and the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC). The outlined Agency would, therefore, "..involve the transfer of extensive financial resources from Government to Agency. It (would) be the main instrument for planning and ensuring the long run economic development of Scotland". Moreover, the SDA should be "..at arms length from the Government (i.e. it should have its policy objectives laid down by Parliament -or Scottish Assembly)" (Stephen, F., 1975, pp.229-230).

In any case, it was viewed by the referred economists that the Agency's funds should be provided by the United Kingdom Treasury and that these funds should not be tied to the revenue from the North Sea Oil.
Once again the general view fails to consider Scotland either as the "poor" region in need of extra public expenditure and regional financial incentives vertically allocated, or as the "rich" oil producer country subject to horizontal equalisation with the rest of the United Kingdom. Otherwise, the traditional hostility to a Scotland having sufficient autonomy to out-compete other areas of the UK would come into play as the brake against any attempt for political devolution of economic powers.

The "pact" in 1984 between the Scottish Council of the Labour Party and their counterparts from the North of England was very significant. The former agreed to back the calls for a Regional Industrial Executive in the North of England, which would be an umbrella body bringing together local authorities, northern English MPs, the Trades Union Congress and the CBI to administer administrative devolved powers. In return the English delegation would fully support the setting-up of a Scottish Assembly with legislative devolved powers: "...the initial (Northern Regional Council) concern over Scottish devolution was due to the fear that a Scottish Assembly would put the North of England at a disadvantage as no similar policies had been worked out to meet its needs" (43).

As analysed above, the Achilles' heel of a middle-of-the-road attempt to visualize the SDA as a Scottish based agency, but financially controlled and orientated by Whitehall, not only arouses deep feelings of suspicion in other areas of the United Kingdom, apprehensive of "unfair" competitiveness in the search for inward investment, but also camouflages the persistent imbalance in the formation of the National Income and the redistribution of financial resources.

It should be considered as an academic boutade to sustain that the financing of regional policies in Scotland is not tied to the
revenues from North Sea oil. Perhaps indirectly—by means of the
National British Budget—and surely partially, the North Sea revenue
receipts are an important element in the central government’s hands
which is, subsequently, reallocated territorially by the public
expenditure not only through the functional programmes included in
the Budget, but also by the genuine territorial provisions
(eg. Regional aid and Scottish Office expenditure).

The estimates of North Sea taxes made by the Government for the
financial year 1984-85 amounted to £10.2 bn in current prices (44).
However, and coherently with the neo-liberal/monetarist policies, the
plans of the Government for the 1985-86 financial year were intended
to cut regional aid throughout the United Kingdom by as much as £200
of a total of £650, from which £90 m would be chopped out of the
Scottish programme (SDA and HIDB are to be the bodies most
affected) (45).

Further cuts of £30 m from the regional aid budget—in concept of
incentives to incoming industry—leave Scotland with about £104 m in
1987/88. Even the CBI—most faithful supporter of the policies taken
by the Thatcher Conservative Government—reacted strongly to such
measures in Scotland. Industrial organisation fears the impact on
inward investment and re-equipment, and the effect on areas such as
the Highlands and Islands, large parts of which lost eligibility for
automatic loans (46). It was estimated that, under the new system set
up by the Conservative Government in 1984, the grant assistance per
job would probably be at least 50 per cent less in Scotland than that
previously prevailing (47). A more important question, in need of
being evaluated, refers to how much of the old regional development
aid in the 1960s and 1970s went to Scottish projects, as opposed to
compensating UK and multinational companies for their investment in
Scotland, something which they would have undertaken in any case.
Anecdotally, the annual £400 m spending in the Falkland Islands (1984) amounts to more than three times the total regional aid for Scotland (48). In any case, in the period 1980-86 the central government funding of the SDA has failed even to keep pace with the inflation and has sharply declined (see Figure 5.1.i.).

![Figure 5.1.i: Central government funding of the SDA.](Source: The Scotsman, 28.11.86)

Finally, the SDA's own organisational constraints show to what extent the scope for action is severely determined by the centre. Since the primary responsibility for promoting investment in the United Kingdom lies with the Department of Trade and Industry, the SDA efforts to expand its overseas promotional activities have always been resisted by the ministerial departments.

But if the function of the SDA, or rather of its associated mixed "quango", Locate in Scotland, is more or less delimited as regards the promotional aspects of attracting overseas investments (ie. preparation of marketing materials, contacts through overseas offices in Brussels, Chicago, Stanford, Houston and San Francisco -in 1984-; and coordination of promotional activities of local authorities and
agencies), its financial "muscle" is provided by diverse
govermental bodies, albeit tightly controlled by Whitehall.

The Department of Trade and Industry (in London) is also
responsible (regional aid) for grants to encourage special projects
throughout the United Kingdom. Secondly, and often the most important
element of the whole financial package, the IDS controls regional and
selective assistance in a wide range of cases. Finally, the
remainder is available in the public expenditure for the SDA.

Approximately, two thirds of government expenditure on regional
policy in Scotland is on assistance given under the Industry Act
(1972) (see Table 5.1.x), although since 1985, and only for budgetary
purposes, the Scottish Office total budget includes the moneys for
regional development grants, previously administered by the
Department of Trade and Industry.

Table 5.1.x: Regional preferential assistance (1981-82).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£ million</th>
<th>1981/82</th>
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<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry Act 1972</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Selective Financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>142.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIDB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grants</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOURISM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>235.4</strong></td>
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</tr>
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</table>


The RDGs (Regional Development Grants) are automatic grants on
manufacturing investment which amount to 15 per cent in Development
Areas chosen by the central government and 22 per cent in Special
Development Areas, also established by the central government. The
SFA (Selective Financial Assistance) consists of discretionary grants or loans on investment projects in Development and Special Development Areas. This aid can be added to RIDGs and to be eligible, the investment project must be economically "viable".

Another scheme implemented by the Conservative Government in 1980 was the setting up of Enterprise Zones. These areas have a maximum of one square mile and are designed to halt the decline of certain inner city areas. Companies within Enterprises Zones benefit from tax relief and planning, and bureaucratic inconveniences are greatly removed. This scheme applies over and above other benefits, such as regional policy, urban development or derelict land policies.

In any case, the role of the SDA was seriously undermined with the announcement made on regional aid in 1984 by the Conservative Government which redrew the qualifying map, established new aid categories and made overall reductions in expenditure. Once again it is the SDA's lack of power to dispense these regional financial incentives - preserved by the central government - which makes its task merely subsidiary.

**Organisation, functions and performance**

The Secretary of State for Scotland appoints the Chairman and the 10 members (1984) of the Board of Directors, according to his/her entire political choice. Although he/she also has the power to appoint the first Chief Executive, the Agency has had, in practice, the prerogative to do this "autonomously" (see structure and functions in Appendix 5.l.iv)

Since the change of guidelines made by the Conservative Government in 1979 - and the subsequent emphasis given to the profitability of any enterprise before providing finance - , there has been a shift from the SDA's bigger industrial investment to a more
commercial approach. Hence its risk-taking role has scaled dramatically. The Agency had previously been ready to back financially high technology projects, even if an immediate return on such investment could not be expected.

An illustrative example of this is provided by the Agency's 1978 £1.4 m investment in a factory making rough terrain vehicles. Surveys made by professionals had assured a good prospect for the vehicles but the project was not expected to produce profits for a further 3 years. In 1979 the SDA asked the Scottish Office for permission to inject an extra 2 million funds. Only £600,000 were sanctioned by the Scottish Office, with the proviso that a private partner should be found in three months or no more money would be supplied to the project. "When no such private partner was found within the required period, the Government denied further funding, and the firm went into receivership, with the subsequent loss of some 100 jobs" (Hancher, L, 1983, p.83).

The Agency's own expenditure objectives have primarily led to provide sites and premises, services for small business, industrial investment and environmental improvements. In 1982-83, the Agency completed or refitted 119 factories comprising almost 180,000 sq. metres of space and negotiated 330 new leases. Some 46,000 people were employed in factories in which the SDA has some financial involvement. Nevertheless, the industrial investment in 1982-83 hardly amounted to the low figure of £7 million (40).

According to SDA's own figures (see "Financial Summary" and "Summary of Financial Position" in Appendix 5.1. v), the main destination of its financial resources took the form of loans, mainly to non-small industrial companies (ie. almost 80 per cent of the total portfolio valuation in 1983-84). More significant is to observe the percentage of increase in the loans provided to non-small
industrial. companies from 1982-83 to 1983-84 (65 %), in contrast with real decreases in loans given to small businesses in urban areas (-0.65 %), and loans to local authorities (-30.6 %), both of which were in fact more accentuated when considering the rate of inflation.

The figures referred to show an unequivocal political meaning. The SDA's Board, appointed by a Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, opted preferably for loans to non-small industrial companies in its bigger increase between 1983 and 1984, and for loans to local authorities in its major real decrease. The former fall within the traditional social sector of electoral support for the Tories, but the latter were converted by the Labour Party in the "last ditch" to fight back the Tories' policies in those years.

The latest development of the SDA as a mere political instrument to articulate strictly party tactics constitutes the final step in enervating the principle of autonomy in the implementation of regional schemes of industrial development. And hence, it also questions the SDA's own label as a "regional development agency". A re-definition of it as a small provincial branch of a public banking corporation would surely better fit its status and performance.

"Locate in Scotland".

The birth of "Locate in Scotland" as an associate quango of the SDA was the result of a political compromise between the Conservative Government and the Labour Opposition, after the 1980 report of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs on inward investment.

The Conservative majority had recommended the closure of the SDA overseas offices and the concentration of investment promotion in the Invest in Britain Bureau (IBB) at the Department of Industry and the consular service (Foreign and Commonwealth Office). Labour had supported the overseas offices.
The result was a new body which was created to bring together the investment of the SDA and the SEPD, and to take over the overseas offices and promotion. A firmer and closer control by the central government was in line with the intention by the Conservatives to slow down Scottish ventures which could arouse suspicion in other governmental departments.

Locate in Scotland was meant to assume the "one door" approach to inward investment. Its establishment was considered as a "victory" for the Civil Service in Whitehall and the Scottish Office, both of which had sought to reduce "complexity" and to establish a predominant role for itself.

Further, and after the recommendations of the Stolart Committee on local government (1981), the Secretary of State for Scotland required local authorities to obtain permission before making promotional trips abroad. The whole issue of regional industrial policies in Scotland came under the strong trend of the centralisation of decision-making.

**SDA: An assessment.**

As analysed above, the role of the SDA is highly determined by the IDS in the first instance. Furthermore, the role of the Scottish Office is highly subordinated to the central government in the formulation and implementation of regional industrial policies. The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Scottish Office, even taking into account its "devolved" administrative powers, is very marginal. Finally, its funding by the central government has sharply decreased in the period 1980-1986 (see Figure 5.1.i.).

If the process of deconcentration—or administrative devolution—was believed to have been culminated in 1975 with the establishment of the SDA, later developments have showed that the SDA has adopted a
residual or "façade" role in the process of implementing genuine regional industrial policies. The SDA has had some success in attracting foreign investors and promoting some local businesses. The latter because of its own character as a local-based agency. Nonetheless its vocation and performance have not extended any further than that of a good public-relations and advisory-orientated "quango", with a marginal role as a provincial branch of a public central bank.

"In no sense could the SDA be considered some form of regional government with economic and industrial powers. The possibility even of conflict ..(is)..immediately reduced by subordination of the SDA to the IDS and move from co-operative to hierarchical forms of coordination" (Hanover, L, 1983, p.91).

Even the Labour Party commitment to the accountability of both the SDA and the MIDR to a future Scottish Assembly, persists to indicate that, "..the guidelines under which they would continue to operate would be decided at a UK level"(50). Certainly it is difficult to conceive a Scottish Assembly with legislative devolved powers but without autonomy being able to implement economic regional policies.

Therefore, the existence of these quangos merely disguises the Gordian knot of the regional democratic accountability. The political control continues to remain in the centre. While the Agency is set to operate with a highly centralised system of government, and without constitutional change, it is most unlikely for the SDA to constitute itself as a tool to implement autonomous Scottish regional policies.
5.2. THE REGIONAL ECONOMY OF CATALONIA.

5.2.1. Historical background

Catalonia based its great industrial expansion of the 19th century on capital accumulation brought about by agricultural production and colonial trade with America during the second half of the 18th century. Overseas trade, in fact, trebled between 1760 and 1780. In 1778, with the promulgation of the Decree of Free Trade by the Spanish Government (51), Catalan merchants saw the legal acknowledgement of a factual situation which would be seen to mark the starting point for the modern Catalan prosperity.

The demographic increase of the population of Catalonia between 1787 and 1857 was nearly 90 per cent (i.e. from 875,388 to 1,652,291 inhabitants). Such figures correspond to 7.8 and 10.7 per cent of the total Spanish population, respectively. The city of Barcelona, alone, increased its population between 1830 and 1877 by 155 % (i.e. from 97,418 to 248,943 inhabitants). During this period the manufacturing industries fuelled the Catalan economy and the sizeable number of immigrants from Valencia and Aragon outnumbered those Catalans who emigrated to Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay, in the main.

In 1832, the first factory in Spain to be operated by a steam engine was inaugurated in Barcelona. Such industrial impetus was later favoured by the return of capitals brought in from America by Catalan businessmen, whose wealth had been largely acquired through trading operation with Cuba and Puerto Rico.

During the decades of the mid-19th century, the great Catalan industrial expansion in the textile sector was spectacular. The Basque Country, the other Spanish territory where a great industrial development was also taking place at that time, held the primacy in
the metalurgical sector and, indeed, frustrated the aspirations of Catalonia in such industrial sector.

The industrial Catalan take-off, as compared with the rest of Spain, is best illustrated by the fact that in 1862, 41 per cent of the power produced in Spain for industrial use was located in Catalan territory. In 1851, very significantly, the College of Industry founded in Barcelona remained the only one of this academic kind in the whole Spain until 1897. However, and despite all this panorama, it is rather inaccurate to speak of a genuine Catalan industrial revolution:

"Even taking into consideration the consolidation of the cotton-industry during Isabel II's reign (1843-1866), it is wrong to consider such an expansion as constituting a Catalan industrial revolution or, otherwise, of a process of generalized mechanization...In Barcelona (1866) the industrialists only paid 6.9 % of the direct-tax collection...(This) compared with the 49.6 % paid by the merchants and trade-businessmen, 14.7 % by the craftsmen and manufacturing sector and 23.1 % by the financial companies...The process of industrialisation in Catalonia was very much focussed on the cotton-textile industries" (Balcells, A., 1983, p.33).

It has to be underlined, in any case, that Catalan agricultural production also experienced better crops, a consequence of the improvement in productive methods and means. In the 19th century the extension of irrigated arable land in Catalonia reached 20 per cent of its total extension. This figure dramatically compares with the 5 % percentage for the rest of Spain.

The great economic development in Catalonia in the 19th century took place in the midst of strong protectionist policies carried out by the Spanish government. Thus, in order to defeat the liberals and free-trade supporters, the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie -the most progressive section of the Spanish dominant class- was willing to join its interests with those of the most reactionary Spanish agrarian oligarchy. This subordination to the backward Spanish landowning economic and political forces was aimed at deterring the import, among others, of British textile products which were much
more competitive than their Catalan counterparts (52). The agrarian oligarchy, in turn, benefitted from the oligopoly of its much less competitive cereals in both the Spanish and colonial markets.

The position of subordination of the Catalan bourgeoisie is clearly revealed in the policies of public expenditure developed by the Spanish Governments controlled by the referred to agrarian oligarchy. By the end of the 19th century, the ratio road kilometres/inhabitant was three times higher in Castile than in Catalonia and this despite the fact that the traffic on the Catalan roads was five times higher than in Castile.

Between 1888 and 1930, and as a consequence of the low birth-rate and industrial development, 700,000 immigrants came to work and live in Catalonia. In the latter part of this period, people from Murcia and Andalusia outnumbered the traditional flow of immigration to Catalonia from Aragon and Valencia. At the turn of the century, almost one third of the population of Barcelona was made up of Spanish people born outside Catalonia (34.3 % in 1930).

Catalonia, very much in contrast with the case of Scotland in the United Kingdom, has been an advanced economic region in the Spanish context from 1812 until now (53). Furthermore, while America's Catalan merchants and other ambitious young Spanish immigrants brought their capital and labour to expand the industrial economy in Catalonia, the reverse process has characterised the economic situation in Scotland since Victorian times.

A look at the different levels of occupation in the three economic sectors provides a remarkable picture of Catalonia's industrial "modernisation" vis-à-vis Spain's as a whole (see Table 5.2.1.)

Table 5.2.1: Occupation by economic sectors in Spain and Catalonia since 1900
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>52.88</td>
<td>27.28</td>
<td>19.84</td>
<td>66.34</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>17.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>36.31</td>
<td>37.87</td>
<td>22.52</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>15.82</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>33.23</td>
<td>41.52</td>
<td>24.44</td>
<td>57.30</td>
<td>21.90</td>
<td>20.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>26.63</td>
<td>50.76</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>45.51</td>
<td>26.51</td>
<td>27.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>26.86</td>
<td>42.76</td>
<td>30.10</td>
<td>50.52</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>27.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>46.91</td>
<td>35.94</td>
<td>40.54</td>
<td>30.26</td>
<td>29.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>9.61</td>
<td>51.34</td>
<td>39.04</td>
<td>24.86</td>
<td>36.18</td>
<td>38.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>46.58</td>
<td>46.15</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>34.44</td>
<td>45.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982(*)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Figures according to INE (Spanish Institute of Statistics)


The Spanish Civil War ended, the Catalan economy continued to hold the lead in the process of massive industrial expansion and economic "modernisation" which has occurred in Spain since the 1950s (54).

Between 1940 and 1974 the population of Catalonia grew from 2.9 million to 5.3 million inhabitants (ie. from 11.2 % to 15.6 % of the total Spanish population). The most relevant figures, as regards this great increase in population, refer to the growing flow of immigrants from other Spanish regions -mainly from the southern territories. Between 1951 and 1960, the annual average number of net immigration in Catalonia was 43,988 (393,716 new inhabitants in the 1951-60 period). In the decade 1960-70 the annual average increase rose to 72,025 (ie. 720,255 "net" immigrants for the 1960-70 period), while
between 1970 and 1975, the number of "new" residents in Catalonia was 244,169, finally dropping to 40,499 for the period between 1975 and 1981. Not surprisingly, in the 1950-70 period the population of Catalonia grew at a higher rate than any other EEC region (ie. 2.3 % increase of annual rate) (55).

The ratio between the percentage of the Catalan share in the Spanish GDP and the Catalan percentage of the total population shows the greatly developed nature of the Catalan regional economy in the last decades (see Table 5.2.ii). The figures related to the per capita output in Catalonia as compared with the total Spanish average are also significant (see Table 5.2.iii). Having said this, the gap between the growth of income and production between Catalonia and the whole of Spain has been gradually narrowed in recent decades (see Table 5.2. iv).

Table 5.2.ii: Percentages of Catalan and Spanish population and GDP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP (Millionsof ptas.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Catalonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,888,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(12.60%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,107,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(15.06%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,956,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(15.86%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) (**) Figures corresponding to 1973 and 1979, respectively.

(Source: Capellades i Cebolla, J & Alcaide Inchausti, J, 1983, pp. 32, 34 and 47)
Table 5.2. iii: Per capita Catalan productivity in relation to the Spanish total annual average rates.

(Total average production rate = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1960 CATAL.</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
<th>1973 CATAL.</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
<th>1979 CATAL.</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricol.</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisheries</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>151.7</td>
<td>133.7</td>
<td>120.8</td>
<td>119.5</td>
<td>112.8</td>
<td>109.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const.</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>155.8</td>
<td>139.1</td>
<td>140.4</td>
<td>126.8</td>
<td>140.6</td>
<td>127.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>119.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Alcaide Inchausti, J. 1983, p. 33)

Table 5.2.iv: Spanish and Catalan per capita percentage increases of net production, domestic internal income and family income.

(In constant 1979 ptas.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net production</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1973</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 - 1979</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 - 1973</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 - 1979</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967 - 1973</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 - 1979</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.2. Resources and potentialities.

As a consequence of the 1973 oil-price crisis and its subsequent effects, Catalonia has had to face the challenge of re-orientating its industrial strategy for another time in its history. The formulation of new industrial strategies, together with the restructuring of economic sectors, has coincided both with the democratic political process of decentralisation after Franco's death in 1975 and the Spanish accession to the EEC from January 1, 1986. Finally, for an industrial country like Catalonia the existence of an institutionalised form of self-government also gives a new dimension to the definition and pursuing of new industrial policies. A review of Catalan resources and potentialities is, however, essential in order to gain perspective on the analysis of future developments.

The regional economy of Catalonia produces nearly one fifth - 19.93% in 1981 - of the total Spanish production (gross added value) (Madrid and Andalusia followed with 16.49% and 12.59%, respectively). Over 23 per cent of Spain's industrial employment is located in Catalonia (56). One consequence of this larger industrial Catalan share of the Spanish economy has been the higher rates of unemployment in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the period 1978-81, for instance, Catalonia lost 90,000 jobs which accounted for one third of all the losses in employment in Spanish industry as a whole.

The traditional pattern of a industrially dynamic Catalonia offering new jobs to immigrants from other Spanish regions has been dramatically broken in the 1980s. In fact the rates of unemployment in Catalonia are the highest of all the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas and higher than the Spanish average rate (see Table 5.2.v)
Table 5.2. v: Spanish and Catalan levels of unemployment 1960-83

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CATALONIA</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: El País, 14.iv.84 and Alcaide Inchausti, J, 1983, p.31)

However, the figure of 443,312 unemployed in Catalonia out of an active working population of 2,313,356 by December 31, 1983 is rather misleading as far as the "real" levels of occupation and production are concerned. The so-called economía sumergida (underground or black economy) is an important feature of the Spanish economy as a whole and particularly characteristic of Catalonia. Since unemployment benefit is not universal in Spain - in 1985 the Government implemented policies in order to cover 42 per cent of the unemployed workforce- a substantial number of the unemployed as well as businesses avoid direct taxation by means of "clandestine" production. This economía sumergida does not only engage in fringe and alternative activites but also in "mainstream" lines of production. CiU politicians were of the opinion that, in 1984, 15-20% of the Catalan economy was in the economía sumergida (57). By the end of 1984, the Catalan body Consell de Gremis (retailers and shopkeepers association) calculated that as much as 20 per cent of commercial activities in Catalonia were in the economía sumergida with around 50,000 "unemployed" working in this sector (eg. toy stores, jewellery, furniture, shoe-shops,etc) (58).

It is difficult to extrapolate the previous figures to other economic sectors. In any case there are no reliable data in this respect. However, it is beyond any doubt that the "official" levels of
unemployment do not take into account the importance of such "underground" employment, particularly, in industrial Catalonia.

Another significant change in the Catalan economic structure has been the increasing role of the multinational companies (59). Some 42 per cent of the total sales of the big companies, which have their headquarters in Catalonia are produced by companies which are financed to some degree by foreign capital -48.7 % for all the specialized industries. In 1983, one third of the 297 big companies with headquarters in Catalonia had part of their property-shares controlled by foreign capital. In 25 % of these, foreign control was 50 per cent or higher of the total shares. This foreign capital came predominantly from Italy, Switzerland, West Germany, Holland, France and USA (see also Table 5.2.vi on the higher control of CEE capitals in Catalonia as compared with the rest of Spain).

Table 5.2.vi: Foreign control of Spanish and Catalan big companies, 1974-76.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>No. companies</th>
<th>Revenue (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CATALONIA</td>
<td>SPAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>66 71</td>
<td>190 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Europe</td>
<td>14 14</td>
<td>41 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA-Canada</td>
<td>28 31</td>
<td>120 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of World</td>
<td>1 1</td>
<td>4 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No foreign control</td>
<td>193 240 700 825</td>
<td>55.6 58.1 57.7 57.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>302 357 1,055 1,215</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Caixa, 1983, p. 36)
This specialization of the Catalan economy in the 1960s initiated a cycle which has successively brought about concentration, oligopolic practices, foreign investment and, finally, trasnationalisation. The latter has focussed on three particular sectors: iron-steel metallurgy, chemicals and food industries. In the period 1970-77, 36.23% of all the investments in Catalonia by companies which had 50% or more of foreign control were made in the iron-steel metallurgy sector (particularly, automobile industries, technical machinery, computers and musical equipment); 32.51% corresponded to chemicals (pharmaceutical and industrial chemistry) and, finally, 10% to food industries.

The process of both oligopolisation and foreign intervention in the Catalan economy has not only a common point of departure—i.e. production specialisation—but also a common destination. Indeed, only in three of the seventeen branches of industrial specialisation is the fraction outside the foreign control of oligopolistic companies with headquarters in Catalonia more than 40 per cent (i.e. the sugar industry; textile-manufacturing and publishing industries) (Caixa, 1983, pp. 56-7 and 231).

Another characteristic element of the Catalan economy, and which is also very much in contrast with the Scottish case, is the lack of a strong indigenous financial sector. Between 1940 and 1953, 21 Catalan commercial and industrial banks were bought by the big seven Spanish banking corporations. Consequently, the Catalan banks passed from controlling 6.6% of all banking deposits in the Spanish market to only 2.8%. During the 1960s and 1970s years of great economic expansion, the commercial and industrial banks, which had their headquarters in Catalonia increased their share of the total Spanish banking external resources from 3.4% in 1960 to 5.7% in 1969 and 12.3% in 1979. Nevertheless, the crisis of the Spanish banking
system -ie. 110 commercial and industrial banks - had problems of solvency in the early 1980s- principally affected the Catalan banks and, very significantly, Banca Catalana, an indigenous bank promoted by the nationalist politician Jordi Pujol, ended up completely bankrupt (60).

The Catalan economy has generally been very exposed to the monetary fluctuations occurring in the Spanish state. The process of concentration within the Spanish banking system has particularly hit the Catalan commercial and industrial banks. In 1980, 9 of the 22 Catalan commercial and industrial banks -with 41.3% of the total deposits in Catalonia- were controlled by one of the "Big Seven" (ie. the seven most important banking corporations in Spain: Central, Banesto, Hispano-Americano, Bilbao, Vizcaya, Santander and Popular). By mid-1984, 17 of the 20 Catalan commercial and industrial banks - representing 78.2% of the deposits- were controlled from outside. As a consequence of this, the Catalan share in the total Spanish amount of commercial and industrial banking deposits declined from 12.3% in 1979 to 7.9% by mid-1984.

However, the role of the saving banks in Catalonia - especially the Caixa per a la Vellesa i d'Estalvis de Catalunya i Balears (61)- is very relevant as compared with the rest of Spain (see Table 5.2.vii on the percentage distribution of deposits in commercial and industrial banks and saving banks).

The Catalan companies and businesses generally finance their activities by means of loans and self-financing. Their share in the Spanish equity market is very low (eg. 13.6% of all the share issues and 19.99% of the bond issues). The financing of the Catalan businesses by the saving banks -eg. La Caixa- is remarkable higher than the rest of Spain. But more significant is the fact that large flows of private savings from other Spanish regions come into
Catalonia, in search of better market rates, via commercial and industrial banks.

Table 5.2. vii: Percentage distribution of banking deposits in Catalonia and Spain

(\% of the total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CATALONIA</th>
<th></th>
<th>SPAIN</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
<td>Commercial and industrial banks</td>
<td>Saving banks</td>
<td>Commercial and industrial banks</td>
<td>Saving banks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Caixa, 1983, p.176)

Despite the fact that the Catalan economy has seen its share in the total Spanish GDP diminished -22 % in 1973 and 20 % in 1980-, it has continued to perform the steam-engine role for the Spanish economy (62). On the other hand, the economic crisis of the 1970s has also revealed the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the Catalan industry (63):

a) A highly diversified structure avoiding excessive specialisation in few sectors. Consequently, other manufacturing industries, less affected by the economic recession have been able to compensate for the problems mainly faced by the textile industry.

b) A productive structure largely consisting of small firms and businesses. In 1981, for instance, there were 140,000 firms in Catalonia, 73 % of which had fewer than 5 employees (NB. Only 16.5 % of the industrial workforce was employed by companies with over 500 employees). These small and medium-size companies have proved to be
more able to adapt themselves to the changes brought about by the capitalist recession of the 70s and 80s.

c) Outphased productive technologies as a consequence of a lack of investment in research. The limited size of companies, deficiencies in the financial system and protectionist policies have all served to worsen the situation.

d) A re-formulation of industrial policies provoked by the economic recession and a re-orientation of aims and goals: international marketing and exports orientation; re-training of workforce and the search for better financial channels for Catalan businesses.

Unlike Scotland, Catalonia has few natural resources: some salt mines in Suria and Cardona, the lignite mines in Bergueda and the small-scale oil production from the wells off the Tarragona coast.

Within the services sector, tourism is an important source of the total Catalan income -12% in 1984. The Catalan share of the total Spanish number of annual visitors has increased in the last decades: 29% in 1983, or 12.4 millions. As far as the tourist supply is concerned, Catalonia is the first region in Europe having two and a half million lodging-places for tourists (64).

Indeed, the challenging potentialities of Catalonia are based upon two genuine characteristics of the Catalans: a high sense of adaptability together with hard work and creativity. Catalonia's labour force and entrepreneurs are experienced in a diverse number of fields and its industry is also highly diversified. Such economic diversity places the Catalan economy in a situation from which it can reduce the threats of a prolonged capitalist recession and can afford a better adaptation to the new market circuits which are now emerging with the development of new technologies.
It is important, moreover, to emphasize the entrepreneurial character of initiative, also characteristic of the Catalans, which has made it possible for them to overcome past periods of deep economic pauperization and political crises—mainly during the period 1550 to 1750 (65).

Catalonia and the EEC.

The European vocation of Catalonia has a long tradition. For many Catalans even the conquest of the lands south of the Pyrenees by the King of the Franks, Charlemagne, in 800, is considered more a crusade of the "europeization" of Catalonia than that of the "liberation" of such territories from the Arabic domination.

After the demise of Franco's dictatorship, moderate nationalists, left-wing parliamentary parties and social organizations have seen both the institutional processes of European integration and Catalan self-government as being overlapping elements of an entire political challenge:

"If economic, monetary and political unity is to be achieved in Europe, the Community must necessarily build upon regions with different cultural and historical foundations. Regions will have to serve as political and administrative units in order to provide decentralised public services to the citizens and to act as the basic unit of European regional policy" (66).

The economic links between Catalonia and the European Communities have certainly been important prior to the Spanish accession to the EEC on January 1, 1986 (see Table 5.2.viii on the evolution of Catalan exports and their share in the total Catalan export production)

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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2. viii: Catalan exports and their destination

(millions ptas.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978 (%)</th>
<th>1979 (%)</th>
<th>1980 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>92,356</td>
<td>125,544</td>
<td>169,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>20,044</td>
<td>27,577</td>
<td>37,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterr.</td>
<td>25,443</td>
<td>29,473</td>
<td>32,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA</td>
<td>19,070</td>
<td>22,208</td>
<td>27,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the</td>
<td>51,110</td>
<td>60,647</td>
<td>77,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>world</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>208,023</td>
<td>265,449</td>
<td>344,862</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the percentage of the total Catalan exports in 1983 to the CEE was lower than that corresponding to Spain as a whole (48 %), it was rather similar to that of the United Kingdom (43.8 %) (67).

Prior to the Spanish accession to the EEC, and according to its GDP (1.3 % of the total EEC production), Catalonia was ranked 27 among the 54 CEE regions. The share of the Catalan regional GDP was then very similar to that of Scotland (1.6 %), alike or bigger than some EEC member states (ie. Luxembourg, with 0.2 % and Ireland and Greece with 0.6 % and 1.4 %, respectively), but also very inferior to top regions like Nordrhein Westfalen (7.9 %), the British South East (6.2 %), Île de France (6.1 %) or Bayern (5 %).

The first two nationalist (CiU/ERC) Governments of the Generalitat have repeatedly considered the integration of Spain in the EEC as being positive for Catalonia, in both the political and
the economic sense. As far as the latter dimension is concerned, the Catalan agriculture is believed to compete well except for some difficulties with the bovine sub-sector. Textiles, chemicals, fertilizers, commerce, tourism and food industries are other sectors to benefit from the exchanges in the 270-million European market (68). In general, those advantages can be summarised as follows:

a) New access to the larger European markets.

b) New and more diversified European financial instruments and institutions.

c) Participation in joint research projects and better access to new technologies being developed in Europe.

d) Changes in the fiscal regime and harmonization of prices and salaries with those existing in the rest of the EEC countries.

Conversely, the problems for companies with deficient lines of production or lacking in competitiveness, as well as the possible attitudes of some multinationals, which may get rid of some of their industrial plants in Catalonia, are considered to be the most probable disadvantages (69).

5.2.3. Catalonia's financial autonomy and the inter-territorial equalisation in Spain.

Spain is a country with considerable differences in its regional income distribution. In 1981, for instance, the more prosperous Balearic Islands (473,654 ptas, per inhabitant), Madrid (450,118 ptas) and Catalonia (445,286 ptas) were well above the average of disposable per capita family income, as compared with Extremadura (262,487 ptas), Castile-La Mancha (283,409 ptas) or Andalusia (298,518). Having said this, it is also clear that the North-South model of deep regional disparities, characteristic of Italy and, to some extent Britain, bears little resemblance to that of Spain. In
fact the "first periphery" around Madrid, and still inside the Spanish hinterland, has faced the problems of emigration and pauperization in the last decades more acutely. In the period 1960-73, for example, while the effects of the economic expansion were spectacular in the Balearic Islands, the Canary Islands, Madrid and Catalonia, the two Castiles (-La Mancha and -León) saw their share in the total Spanish internal income dramatically diminished. Furthermore, while in the period 1973-81 this decreasing pattern remained the same, Castile-La Mancha together with the turbulent Basque Country, lost 18% of its share in the Spanish National Income (see the Diagram 5.2.i and Table 5.2.ix for some basic data on regional population, production and income).

Since the 1960s, a gradual reduction in the differences between regions as regards regional per capita income has taken place in Spain. In 1960 personal income in the then richest region, the Basque Country, was 2.8 times that of the poorest region Extremadura. In 1973, the difference between Madrid and Extremadura fell to 2.3, remaining the same in 1981. Perhaps a better economic indicator of social welfare in the regions is provided by the level of disposable per capita family income. According to this premise, in 1973 income in Madrid was double that of Extremadura -2.3 times-, but in 1981 the gap between the best-off region, the Balearic Islands, and the worst-off, Extremadura, was reduced to 1.8 (70).

Having said this, the trend towards the narrowing of regional income disparities in Spain stopped in 1981. The "first periphery" regions have seen the return of many of their 1960s emigrants from either Europe, or other Spanish industrial cities—namely Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao. And, not suprisingly, the central administration has consequently increased its level of public expenditure in the area of social policy in those territories (eg.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>PRODUCTION (Gross added value)%</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>POPULATION (%)</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Per capita Family INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andalucia</td>
<td>2,102,420 12.59(−)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,440,985 17.09</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>298,518 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aragon</td>
<td>552,792 3.31(=)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,196,952 3.18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>371,344 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asturias</td>
<td>498,417 2.98(=)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1,129,556 3.00</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>383,238 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>381,147 2.28(+)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>655,909 1.74</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>473,654 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Country</td>
<td>1,050,829 6.29(+)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2,141,809 5.68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>381,028 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canary Islands</td>
<td>585,908 3.51(=)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,367,646 3.63</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>324,335 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>225,208 1.35(=)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>513,115 1.36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>371,764 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-León</td>
<td>975,483 5.84(−)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,583,137 6.86</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>310,500 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castile-La Mancha</td>
<td>555,499 3.33(−)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,648,314 4.37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>283,409 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>3,327,963 19.93(+)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,965,514 15.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>445,286 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Valencia</td>
<td>1,679,540 10.06(+)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,646,778 9.68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>380,702 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremadura</td>
<td>291,617 1.75(−)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1,064,968 2.83</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>261,487 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galicia</td>
<td>994,910 5.96(−)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,811,912 7.46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>318,448 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>2,756,320 16.49(+)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,686,895 12.44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>450,118 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>361,806 2.17(−)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>955,487 2.54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>311,357 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navarre</td>
<td>244,236 1.46(=)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>509,002 1.35</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>373,068 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rioja</td>
<td>121,078 0.73(=)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>254,349 0.67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>381,618 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Millions ptas.
(2) Signs +,− and = in brackets indicate more, less or equal share in Spanish production as compared with the respective population share.
(3) Spanish average of disposable per capita family income in 1981 was 365,967 ptas.

(Source: Banco de Bilbao, reproduced in Anuario El País, 1984, pp. 389-414 and El País, 19.viii.84)
The "solidarity" of Catalonia with the poorer regions of Spain, even prior to the 1979 constitutional order, has been remarkable. In the period 1968-73, for instance, some 10% of the Catalan Income was transferred, via the Spanish Social Security system and the Public Institutions of Credit, to poorer regions of Spain. As for public investment, the reduction of public spending in Catalonia continued to be a traditional pattern: with some 14.5% of all the Spanish cars registered in Spain, it had only 1.08% of the Spanish road-network (71).

Underlying the debate of the income flows among Spanish regions rest the same political question characteristic of federal and quasi-federal states: how to equalise, vertically or/and horizontally, the spatial economic differences within a given polity.

In the case of Spain the debate does not refer so much to the constitutional principles of solidarity/self-government as to how to establish the mechanisms for making them work properly. The Intergovernmental Compensation Fund is an instrument for fiscal redistribution with a very limited scope: all 17 Comunidades
Autónomas have access to its funds but these are only eligible for projects of "new investment". Since the distribution of the funds is based on parameters inversely proportional to per capita regional income and regional tax burden, there is always the temptation for the regions not to "maximise" tax collection on the basis that the less tax revenue yielded in a region, the more funds such a region will receive from the Fund (72). Furthermore, the financing of the devolved services, whose "effective cost" is calculated one fiscal year in advance, has tended to perpetuate the level of regional disparities which existed prior to the Spanish process of decentralisation. Finally, there are other instruments of public spending and investment, such as public institutions of credit, nationalised industries, subsidies for industrial re-structuring or investments in non-devolved areas, which have a considerable impact on the development of the regions.

Last but not least, when debating the principle of equalising solidarity among regions, a wide-range of private instruments of a speculative nature, in search of more profitable markets, must necessarily be taken into account as well. And this issue, beyond the scope of our research, constitutes a decisive element which affects not only the conditions under which regional development occurs but is also an element which ultimately affects the territorial disparities created by the dynamics of capital accumulation.

Fiscal autonomy and equalising solidarity: the sense of comparative grievance

Seen from the Catalan "perspective", the disproportion between the public revenue raised in Catalonia and the Catalan share of the total Spanish public expenditure has resulted in the growth of a sense of comparative grievance, in relation to other Spanish areas.
This sense of comparative grievance, which began to manifest itself in the mid 19th century, has been, and at the same time is, an important element in the development of modern political nationalism in Catalonia. In contrast with the feeling of relative deprivation, characteristic of the Scottish case, this particular region is economically better-off compared with other Spanish territories. It is the "waste" of Catalan taxes by an inefficient state machinery—often controlled by the oligarchies of poorer regions— which has traditionally spurred the Catalan sense of comparative grievance (see section 2.6).

In 1985, an institutional publicity campaign developed in the Catalan Media by the CiU-FRC Government of the Generalitat, presented the "hard facts" in the following figures: the Catalan population only accounted for 15.8% of the Spanish total, its contribution to the total Spanish fiscal revenue was 20.1%. Furthermore, the total public resources spent in Catalonia amounted to only some 13% of the total Spanish expenditure (i.e. 18.5% in concept of the share for the financing of the devolved services to the Generalitat; 8.6% from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund and 7.2% in concept of direct public investments made by the central government) (73).

In a wider context, two features which have characterised the "provisional" system for the financing of the Spanish Autonomous Communities must be underlined:

a) Relative low degree of regional financial autonomy. In 1984, out of all the Spanish economic resources, the central government controlled 71 per cent, the local government 15 per cent and the self-governed regions some 14% (20). Some other studies put the aggregate of both local and regional expenditures at around 25 per cent as compared with 75 per cent controlled by the central government (74).
Such figures are far behind the 50% foreseen by politicians and Spanish Treasury experts as being the desirable percentage for both central and local/regional expenditure, once the process of political decentralisation is concluded in Spain. Indeed, the level of financial resources available for the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas (14% in 1984) is much lower than that of the West German Länder (26%), the Italian Regioni (25%), the USA States (25%) or the Canadian Provinces (40%). Note that local/regional expenditure in unitary-centralised states like Denmark, Sweden or Japan also reaches percentages of around 40% of the total public spending.

b) Heterogeneous system of financial autonomy. There are two types of economic device for the financing of the 17 self-governed regions in Spain. First of all, there is the foral system which applies to the Basque Country and Navarre. This system of concierto económico (economic accord) concedes fiscal independence to the two foral territories to collect all local and Spanish taxes (75). Subsequently, the cupo, or quota, previously agreed on by both the foral and central administration is handed over to the central administration. This quota is for the payment of proportional costs of non-territorial common Spanish services as well as those costs produced by the state agencies and services operating in the foral territories.

The other 15 Autonomous Communities come under the general regime (LOFCA) (76). This system, apart from the regional taxation which could be established by the actual self-governed region, combines the following financial sources:

- Revenue produced by Spanish taxes whose fruits are ceded over to the regions.

- A percentage-share of the total Spanish fiscal revenue.

- Investment moneys from the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund.
After five years of existence, and once the period of actual decentralisation was completed, the LOFCA system faced a total revision. The implementation of VAT, introduced with Spain's accession to the EEC on January 1 1986, brought about the disappearance of other taxes which had existed previously. These accounted for some 50% of the revenue of those taxes which had been ceded by the central government (77).

Furthermore, the formula governing the foral system clearly discriminates the remaining regions under the LOFCA provisions. More importantly, it does not observe faithfully the equity principle which, together with the principles of autonomy and sufficiency, has inspired the constitutional arrangements since 1979 (see Table 5.2.x).

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Table 5.2.x: Principles and instruments for the financing of the Spanish Autonomous Communities in the 'provisional' period of decentralisation.

a) Principle of sufficiency: To guarantee that the devolved services have, at least, the same level as when administered centrally.

a,1) The yield of taxes turned over by the central government (ie. tax on wealth, tax on transfers of wealth, gift and inheritance, luxury taxes levied on the consumer, tax on gaming and betting). (NB. Some of these taxes disappeared with the Spanish accession to the EEC on January 1, 1986).

a,b) A percentage share in the total State revenue from direct and indirect taxes.

b) Principle of solidarity: To decrease the economic inter-territorial disparities.

b,1) Inter-territorial Compensation Fund.

b,2) Allocations to be charged to the General State Budget to guarantee a minimum level of public services in all Spanish territories (NB. This mechanism was never used during the 'provisional' period).

c) Principle of financial autonomy: To develop the constitutional principle of self-government.
c,1) Surcharges on central government taxes.

c,2) Taxes, rates and special levies created by the Autonomous Communities.

c,3) Public debt and the recourse to credit.

Some figures can illustrate the discrimination between those Communities under the foral regime and those under the LOFCA provisions. In 1984, for instance, the Basque Country and Navarre with 7.1% of the total Spanish population received 24.5% of all the financial resources available for the Comunidades Autónomas (ie. 247,427 million ptas and 93,340 ptas per inhabitant). The other 15 regions inhabited by 92.9% of the Spanish population received, in turn, 79.5% of those resources (ie. 957,762 million ptas; 27,339 per inhabitant). For Catalonia the situation was not only one of solidarity with the worse-off regions of Castile—La Mancha or Extremadura, but also with the better-off Basque Country and Navarre.

Put simply, the application of the "provisional" LOFCA system was clearly disadvantageous for Catalonia. Thus, in 1984 in the concept of percentage-share for the differential payment of the "effective" cost of the devolved services to Catalonia, the Generalitat received 18.5% of the total amount available in this LOFCA category. This percentage corresponded to a per capita sum of 16,856 ptas, which was well below the average figure of 24,046 for the 15 LOFCA self-governed Communities.

In view of this situation, there has been a political consensus, among all the Catalan parliamentary forces, on the criteria for developing the "definitive" of fiscal autonomy as opposed to the "provisional" financial decentralisation. Such criteria incorporates the principles set in art. 45 of the Catalan Statute of autonomy and art. 13 of the LOFCA (78):

a) The average of the coefficients of population on tax burden in
Catalonia.

b) the proportional contribution due by Catalonia for the general state services and burdens.

c) Inter-territorial solidarity to be applied in accordance with the inverse ratio of per capita income in Catalonia.

The central government, too, recognized the unsuitability of carrying on with a financial system which was mainly intended to meet the needs of the provisional period of decentralisation of powers (79). Such a system certainly allowed for a rapid process of devolution in the period 1980-85. However, once the transfer from the centre of the powers "claimed" by the 17 Comunidades Autónomas was factually completed, the demand for the establishment of a system of financial autonomy and regional solidarity, rather than one of financial decentralisation, was set as a priority for the consolidation of the Spanish Estado de la Autonomía. Thus, the Generalitat was more willing to assume its proportional share of the services and burdens of the Spanish state ("càrrega assumida") rather than continue its inevitable annual negotiations for the calculation an updating of the effective cost ("cost efectiu") of the devolved powers with the central government.

Most of the financial problems which the 15 LOFCAs regions have faced during the 'provisional' period have arisen as a consequence of their desire to receive devolved powers as quickly as possible. The Generalitat, for instance, accepted a restrictive criterion, set by the central government (see Acuerdo 1/1982), in the calculation of the "effective cost" of the services to be devolved (e.g. the financial impact of indirect costs were not analysed in great detail and, hence, provoked a minus-valia in their calculation). On the other hand, the Comunidades Autónomas benefitted from the so-called efecto financiero (financial effect). Since the evaluation of the
cost of devolved services was based on estimates of revenue to be collected in Spain in the subsequent fiscal year, and because the "effective" regional expenses for the maintenance of the devolved services grew at a slower pace than those of the central administration, an over-financing or efecto financiero in favour of the regions was produced. In short, the provisional financial autonomical arrangements were not satisfactory either for the central or peripheral administrations.

Due to the fact that important high-spending areas, such as Health, Education, Culture or Territorial Planning, fell under regional jurisdiction, the sums of money needed to implement genuine "new" regional policies are accordingly high.

The recourse to credit operations and public debt has, therefore, been used as the main financial instrument for the implementation of such policies. In constitutional terms, regional expenditure by means of indebtedness is unlimited. Thus, by the end of 1985 the Government of the Generalitat admitted it was in debt to the sum of some 114,679 million pesetas (ie. a figure equivalent to some 30% of the total 1985 Catalan Budget of 384,413,184,825 ptas) (80).

Note that in 1983 only 34% of the expenditure incorporated in the Budget of the Generalitat can be labelled as being entirely "autonomous" and charged according to the political priorities of the Consell Executiu and the Parliament. State grants for the Health and Social Security accounted for around 43.6%; sums of money transferred to central government agencies under the executive management of the Generalitat for 19.4%; and, finally, capital investment projects previously committed and financed by the Interterritorial Compensation Fund for 3.0% (81). As far as the Budget revenue is concerned, the Generalitat in 1983 had only 1% of its total finances provided by new taxes implemented in Catalonia,
whereas 20% and 79% were, respectively, funded by the yield of taxes turned over by the central government and block-grants as a percentage share in the total State revenue from direct and indirect taxation.

While the process of decentralisation of power was being carried out in Spain in the period 1980-85, some of the self-governed regions with nationalist administrations frequently adopted a position of victimismo or being victimised in the centre-periphery negotiations. However, they have been more ready to use public debt as a preferred financial instrument than to assume the political impopularity of creating new taxes or increasing the level of the regional fiscal burden.

As a consequence of the Catalan perception of comparative grievance and the sense of "waste" of the Catalan fiscal revenue by an inefficient Spanish bureaucracy, the parliamentary forces in the Catalan Parliament have broadly shared the view that a horizontal equalising fund of current revenue, together with an investment fund for regional development, would serve better to carry out the objectives of the constitutional principle of regional solidarity. Behind this issue lies the uneasiness felt over the "vertical" role which the central government could take in order to re-distribute investments among the regions and equalise services.

As far as this dissertation is concerned, the multiple issues involved in this financial discussion are similar, both in form and content, to those frequently arising between sub-state territorial entities and central government in countries with federal or quasi-federal systems (82). It can be concluded, hence, that the prospective features of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías will be closely linked to the achievement of a financial system of a federal nature, which will not only provide a high degree of financial
autonomy but will reduce traditional Spanish regional income distribution disparities.

5.2.4. The economic policy of the Generalitat.

The Generalitat, according to the provisions of the Catalan Autonomy Statute, has a considerable number of powers and resources for developing what can be defined as a regional economic policy. This policy incorporates key economic elements such as the forces of agglomeration and diffusion—economies of scale—and the costs of transportation. As far as these elements are concerned, the Generalitat has an important source of economic intervention: its public spending, which greatly influences the location of infrastructure and services and operates in both the realm of the economies of scales and the costs of transportation.

Certainly, the Generalitat does not have the resources and instruments to implement fully-independent economic strategies. Monetary and fiscal policies, the unity of the Spanish market and the general planning of economic and industrial activities are powers which rest with the central government and, thus, put limits on the involvement of the Generalitat in the macro-economic arena (eg. anti-inflationist policies which can affect unemployment). Further, several of the economic powers of the Generalitat are exercised in concurrence with those of the central government.

However, the principle of coordination with the central government brought about by the reality of a unitary Spanish market and the considerable number of concurrent powers between existing the two administrations, has a dual significance which can be summarized by the view of the Catalan Department of Industry and Energy:

"...This coordination has to be developed in two senses: on the one hand, the harmonisation of regional activities with the economic guidelines of the State and, on the other hand, regional involvement
in the elaboration and development of industrial policy throughout the Spanish State. This approach puts the emphasis...on regional participation in the process of central planning and decision-making and not simply on the achievement of more or less, small, scattered and not very well coordinated autonomous economic powers" (Generalitat, 1984, p. 29).

Catalonia has repeatedly expressed its desire for self-government not only in political terms, but also in a social, cultural and economic dimension. All these national aspirations form a solid aggregate which has greatly fortified the economic position of Catalonia in the Spanish State.

However useful and necessary coordination with the central government is, the initiative rests ultimately upon the regional community. In fact, it is the very idea of a regional plan or project which can put the forces of economic development at work. This plan, in turn, requires a vision of the future framed more on the economic than the juridical terms of the devolved powers set by the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy.

Given the fact that such an economic plan and vision of future actually existed in Catalonia during the first years of its having an institutionalised self-government, a review of the performance of the Generalitat and an evaluation of this is required in order to set the basis for further discussion of the scope of elaborated sub-state economic policies.

During the 1980-85 provisional period, the economic involvement of the Generalitat has been determined by the following objectives:

a) Factual achievement of the powers and services set down in the Autonomy Statute by means of rapid political negotiation with the central government (NB. While the 1980 Generalitat Budget was 6,691 million ptas, this increased in 1985 to 384,413 million ptas).

b) Provision of a financial base for regional public spending by means of the recourse to public debt, instead of increasing the level
of fiscal burden in Catalonia (NB. The level of indebtedness of the Generalitat by December 1985 amounted to 114,679 million ptas, according to the Consell Executiu, and over 160,000 million ptas in the opinion of the Socialist Opposition).

c) Maximization of human and material resources provided by the administrative framework of the self-governed institutions.

The economic policy of the Generalitat was first established by the Pla d'Actuació Econòmica, and put before the Parlament in 1980 by the President Jordi Pujol who posed an unquestionable analytical premise: "We will have a long-term crisis and long-term unemployment" (83). This affirmation has, in fact, been corroborated by the subsequent reality (see Table 5.2. xi).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Catalonia</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>% Cata./ Spain</th>
<th>Total liabilities (million ptas)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No. suspension of payments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>26,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>40,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>44,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>349</td>
<td></td>
<td>93,000</td>
<td>107.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: El País, 24.iv.84).

The commitments set in the Pla were renewed by Pujol in September 1983. The Plan established two basic objectives: to fight against unemployment and create new economic foundations on which the regional economy could benefit once the international recession was over. The economic strategy of the Pla assumed that the future
Catalan economy could not be globally planned on the basis of an ideal situation where great finances and new high technologies could be provided overnight. The alternative was offered by the so-called economia intersticial.

The industrial strategy of the Pla was aimed at those sectors which did not require high technological investments and which could benefit from the "interstices" left unattended by the multinationals, public corporations and large financial-industrial groups.

Indeed, the Pla was primarily formulated on micro-economic terms which, moreover, better fit the economic powers set by the Spanish Constitution and the Autonomy Statute. Such strategy focussed on three priorities (84):

1) The removal of those infrastructures which impeded economic growth in Catalonia (e.g. scarcity of sources of energy and water and deficiencies in transport communication).

2) Institutional involvement in Catalan economic activity by means of sectorial policies which aimed at the modernization of the primary sector and the reinforcement of the tertiary sector as regards three main areas: technological innovation, modernisation of commercial structures and promotion of tourism.

3) The creation of adequate institutional instruments to stimulate the growth of the regional economy (e.g. CIDEM, INCAVI, ICS, etc.)

The general criticism of these strategic priorities and instruments set by the Pla can be formulated in the following terms (85):

a) A lack of "globality" in the economic programme and a profusion of small-range interventions. One consequence of this approach has been the proliferation of "quangos", as well as some degree of improvisation in the process of decision-making.
b) A "centralist" approach to the territorial management of the regional economy. There has, indeed, been a lack of a definition of the territorial division of Catalonia as well as confusion over which constitutes the most appropriate organisation among the many different tiers of Catalan administration (i.e. municipalities, comarques, provinces, metropolitan areas and Generalitat).

c) An absence of mechanisms for better coordination between local and central governments.

In fact the major criticism of the economic policy developed by the Government of the Generalitat during the "provisional" 1980-85 period deals with the inconsistency shown by the Catalan institution in its territorial approach to both central and local governments. While the Generalitat has repeatedly claimed a horizontal cooperative stance vis-à-vis the Madrid administration, it has attempted to implement in Catalonia a territorial model of diffusion-polarisation growth irradiating from the industrial urban centres (i.e. The Barcelona conurbation). According to the federalist rationale set by the Estado de las Autonomías and embraced by the nationalists of CiU, it would have been more appropriate to apply a regional model which was more related to the endogenous potentialities of the local areas in Catalonia: In other words, decentralised models of planning which would establish channels of input-information and provide coordination between the bottom and the top. Partially due, perhaps, to the acceleration of the process, the first nationalist Governments of the Generalitat have developed practices of "mono-centrism" and hierarchical planning. These approaches are very different from those of the mobilisation of local/regional resources and autonomy usually claimed by the Generalitat in its political negotiations with the central government.

On the issue of public spending, the policies of the
Generalitat's Consell Executiu have put the emphasis on public works and infrastructure. The approach of fer feina ("get things done") has been paramount in the political maximization of the financial resources gradually devolved during the "provisional" period (see Table 5.2.xii on the Generalitat's investments financed by public debt).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT</th>
<th>Million ptas.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbours and ports</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydraulic works</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing grants</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports facilities</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residences for the elderly</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment schemes</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>118,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Figures given by Jordi Pujol, Avui 1.v.85).

By contrast, the moneys allocated by the Generalitat for the implementation of regional industrial policies have been very meagre. In 1982 the budgetary resources for the Departament d'Industria i Energia accounted for 935.5 million ptas (i.e. 0.7 % of the total Generalitat Budget, Health and Social Security expenses excluded). The figures for 1983 corresponded to 1,935.5 and 1.06 %,
respectively. In 1985 the resources increased to 3,046.5 and 1.4% - or 0.78%, Health and Social Security expenditure included) (see Extract of the 1985 Generalitat Budget in Table 5.2.xiii).

| Table 5.2.xiii: Extract of the 1985 Generalitat Budget. |
| REVENUE (million ptas) |
| 1. Direct taxes..................11,700 |
| 2. Indirect taxes...............60,400 |
| (Bingo tax) (12,000) (3.1% total) |
| 3. Rates and related income......33,250 |
| 4. Ordinary transfer.............228,084 |
| (block grants from State) |
| 5. Generalitat property income...900 |
| 6. Other investments.............1 |
| 7. Capital transfer.............24,003 |
| (The Generalitat's own investments and Inter-territorial Compensation funds) |
| 8. Variation of financial assets...150 |
| 9. Variation of financial liabilities.............25,924 |
| TOTAL..................384,413 |

| EXPENDITURE |
| Generalitat Parlament...........1,253 |
| Presidency Generalitat..........11,233 |
| | Departaments: |
| Interior..........................7,815 |
| Economy.........................2,950 |
| Education.......................101,647 |
| Culture..........................4,996 |
| Health and Social Security......186,286 |

336
Public Works and Territorial Policy..............28,678
Agriculture..............................6,152
Labour..............................6,878
Justice..............................4,516
Industry..............................3,046
Trade and Tourism..............................3,686

Miscellany

Juridical Consultative Committee..............67
Pensions..............................37
Debt..............................15,020
Audit Office..............................147

TOTAL.................384,413

(Source: Diari Oficial, January 2nd, 1985)

The industrial policy of the Generalitat has also sought to maintain a level of coordination with the central government on the difficult issue of the re-structuring of some Catalan sectors -eg. the textile and motorcycle industries. Indeed, the political content of the centre-periphery economic discussion is always very high. Rarely do the negotiations between the central and peripheral administrations constrain the juridicial interpretations of the exclusive, concurrent or executive powers and areas of economic influence as set down in both the Constitution and the Autonomy Statute. Initiatives and political determination in either or both governmental sides usually carry decisive weight in the process of economic policy decision-making. Between 1983-85 the Socialist Government, for instance, implemented a drastic re-structuring plan in the Community of Valencia -which also has a Socialist regional
administration—which involved the closure of the main lines of production in Sagunto’s blast-furnaces and steel mills, and the consequent loss of thousands of jobs. Had this plan been implemented against, say, a hypothetically hostile Government in the Catalan Generalitat, the outcome might have been different.

In summary, the political self-governed institutions of the Generalitat certainly constitute an economically autonomous power in themselves: one which also influences the decision-making of the general economic, financial and monetary activities of the Spanish State.

Apart from its participation, in coordination with the central government, in the industrial re-structuring plans, the Generalitat has focussed its industrial involvement through policies of financial endorsements and guarantees to Catalan companies in sub-sectors needing further re-structuring as well as by means of subsidies to new technological and energy-maximisation projects. These last two objectives have been put into practice by newly created departments (see Table 5.2.xiv on Catalan Autonomous Agencies and Public Corporations). However, two basic instruments have developed the bulk of the industrial policies of the Generalitat (86):

a) CIDEM, Centre d’Informació y Desenvolupament Empresarial (Centre for Managerial Information and Development). This carries out consultancy activities for companies mainly in the field of new technologies, productivity, the maximisation of energetic sources, industrial location, financing and access to public grants and incentives. It also coordinates other centres of research and universities (through the Comissió Interdepartamental de Recerca i Innovació Tecnològica - Interdepartmental Committee for Research and Technological Innovation) and manages the supporting schemes for
industrial promotion. Finally it has assumed the functions of the IMPI (Institute for Small and Medium-size Companies) and the CDTI (Centre for Technological Industrial Development), formerly dependent upon the central administration. The CIDEM is organically structured in four main areas: technology, productivity, training and managerial promotion. By December 1984, two years after its creation, the CIDEM had given consultancy advice to nearly 3,500 companies (1,808 managerial promotion; 631, training; 510, technology and 464, productivity) (87).

b) CARIC, Comissió Interdepartamental d'Ajuda per a la Reconversion Industrial a Catalunya (Interdepartmental Committe in Support of Industrial Re-structuring in Catalonia). This body grants financial endorsements for those projects and managerial initiatives which seek to make improvements in industrial productivity. The Committee shows preference of support to those projects with an export orientation. Due to the intensity of the recession in Catalonia in the early 1980s, this Committee has tended to perform more in ad hoc "curative" basis than to plan ahead in a "preventive" approach in order to re-structure industrial sectors and sub-sectors in a medium-term basis. In the period 1981-83, the CARIC provided financial endorsements accounting as total of 8,000 million ptas. Independently of the CARIC financial commitments, the CiU-ERC Consell Executiu has also given direct endorsement to companies, an action which has been criticised as being biased and of expedient electoral interest.

Table 5.2.xiv: Autonomous institutions and agencies dependent upon the Generalitat's budgetary resources, 1985.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Millions ptas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Autonomous Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Institut Català de Serveis a la Joventut</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* Institut Nacional d'Educació Física de Catalunya .......... 373
  (Catalan Institute of Physical Education)

* Escola d'Administració Pública de Catalunya .......... 229
  (Catalan School of Public Administration)

* Organització d'Espectacles y Festes ................... 543
  (Organisation for Public Acts and Festivities)

* Institut d'Estudis de la Salut .......................... 63
  (Institut of Health Studies)

* Junta de Sanidad ...................................... 4,009
  (Sanitation Committee)

* Junta de Residus ...................................... 56
  (Refuse Committee)

* Institut Català de la Vinya y del Vi .................. 116
  (Catalan Vineyard and Wine Institute)

* Institut Català de la Carn ............................. 52
  (Catalan Meat Institute)

  Subtotal ........................................... 6,330

Commercial, Industrial and Financial Autonomous agencies

* Institut Català del Crèdit Agrari ...................... 1,745
  (Institute for Agrarian Credit)

* Institut Català del Sòl ................................ 5,523
  (Catalan Land Institute)

* Comissió de Ports de Catalunya ....................... 538
  (Committe for the Ports of Catalonia)

* Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya ..................... 404
  (Cartographic Institute of Catalonia)

  Subtotal ........................................... 8,210

Health and Social Security executive institutions

* Institut Català de la Salut ............................ 163,954
  (Catalan Health Institute)

* Institut Català d'Assistència i Serveis Socials .... 16,476
Subtotal.................180,375

Public corporations

* Ferrocarrils de la Generalitat de Catalunya.............10,179
  (Railways of the Generalitat of Catalonia)

* Centre Informatí de la Generalitat de Catalunya, S.A...275
  (Computer Centre of the Generalitat de Catalonia)

* Túneles y Autopistas de Barcelona, S.A..................51
  (Tunnels and Motorways of Barcelona)

* Ferrocarrils de Muntanya de Gran Perdents...............165
  (Mountain Railways)

* Televisió de Catalunya, S.A................................7,242
  (Catalonia Television)

* Catalunya Radio............................................834
  (Radio Catalonia)

Subtotal.................19,547

TOTAL.......................214,462

(Source: Diari Oficial, January 2nd, 1985)

The CIDEM and the CARIC have developed complementary schemes which provides a set of industrial incentives and grants with a fourfold programme: productivity maximization, technological renovation, the use of energy and of alternative and renewable energies. All these policies have been undertaken with the aim of encouraging private investment which in Catalonia account for some 80% of the total regional portafolio.

Outside the CARIC financial endorsement policies, the mobilisation of private investment encouraged by the Generalitat has specifically aimed at the implementation of public works sponsored by the Catalan local authorities and the saving banks (16,000 millions
ptas up to 1984), and subsidies granted for the purchase of houses (5,000 million up to 1984).

Despite the fact that the largest municipalities in Catalonia have had a socialist administration since the 1979 local elections, the Generalitat has established conjunctural joint projects with these councils and others, in order, primarily, to develop public works of infrastructure. In 1985, furthermore, nationalist-socialist institutional cooperation reached an ambitious cultural agreement negotiated between the CiU-ERC Consell Executiu and the PSC Executive Council and, finally, an important compromise was achieved as regards the candidature of Barcelona for the 1992 Olympic Games.

The local public sector in Catalonia has had a "chronic" malaise of budgetary resources, and the impact of a new regional-tier will have deep and long-term consequences. Although the comarques have been traditionally considered to be the "genuine" territorial unit of Catalonia, the three types of local administrations in the 'provisional' period continued to be the diputació (provincial units), the ajuntaments (local councils) and the Corporació Municipal Metropolitana of Barcelona (metropolitan corporation of the conurbation of Barcelona which is composed of several ajuntaments).

In 1981, some 80 per cent of the revenue and expenditure of the local authorities in Catalonia corresponded to ajuntaments, and Barcelona city alone shared, very significantly, nearly 50 % of such a percentage —38.90 % of the total expenditure of the local public sector in Catalonia. In the same year the Generalitat regional public expenditure made by the Generalitat was still lower that that of the local government, but the aggregate of both was over three times lower than that of central government spending in Catalonia (see Table 5.2.xv).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total revenue</th>
<th>Own revenue</th>
<th>Direct Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>114,053</td>
<td>82,299 (8.3%)</td>
<td>138,615 (17.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalitat</td>
<td>57,891</td>
<td>66 (0.001%)</td>
<td>56,769 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>943,368 (91.6%)</td>
<td>596,578 (75.3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The situation as regards local/regional vis-à-vis central expenditure has been altered since 1984 due to the transfer of high-spending programmes and services to the Generalitat (eg. 180,375 million ptas. of the 1985 Generalitat Budget constituted payments for Health and Social Security, formerly charged to the State Budget).

The third specific policy, developed by the Generalitat, of grants for the purchase of houses has aimed at revitalising the industrial building sector, badly hit by the economic recession and a sector which always actively generates employment. Despite this, the unemployment policies of the CiU-ERC Goverments of the Generalitat have been fiercely attacked by the Opposition. In fact, sources of the Consell Executiu estimated the number of new jobs created, directly or indirectly, by the Generalitat in the period 1980-83 at 70,000. Such a figure contrasts dramatically with the number of 152,283 net job losses—or an increased-rate in unemployment of 38 per cent—which occurred in Catalonia in the same period (88).

As a consequence of the modernising policies set by the PLA, a group of agencies have been set up by the Generalitat for those areas of highest priority. Agricultural products, and in particular wine,
have been extensively promoted by the Institut Català de la Vinya i del Vi (INCAVI). Also with the administrative aim of better coordination in the meat subsector, the Institut Català de la Carn, although lacking of adequate funds, much in the same line of the financial body, Institut Català del Crèdit Agrari (ie. respectively 52 and 1,750 million ptas in the 1985 Generalitat Budget), imposed regulatory policies.

The Institut Català del Sòl was constituted as an instrument for implementing policies of development in connection with the territorial disequilibrium within Catalonia. However, and due to the considerable amount of investments required for the buying and transaction of land, the Governments of the Generalitat maintained a low profile in the 1980-85 period.

The Generalitat, in cooperation with the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Shipping and the Association of Exporters, created the Servei d'Assesorament i Promoció d'Exportacions (SAPEX) with the aim of promoting economic activities orientated towards export.

Prospects of an autonomous economic policy.

In the 1980-85 period, the Generalitat developed economic policies which had a predominantly sectorial rather than territorial involvement. The actual organic structure of the Consell Executiu greatly resembles that of the functional departments of the Spanish central government (see Table 5.2.xiii). In this respect the Catalan government faces an important political challenge on the issue of how to establish a "workable" and coordinated tier-system of public administration in Catalonia. The Generalitat, provincial diputacions, comarques, the Barcelona Metropolitan Corporation and local/city councils provide a miscellany of elected administrations whose intermeshing is a source of potential conflict and which requires
intricate and problematic mechanisms of input information in order to coordinate public spending.

The Generalitat has another important issue to deal with and which concerns the debate on the level of indebtedness/level of autonomous taxes. The provision of a "definitive" system for the financing of the 15 LOPCA regions, including Catalonia, does not subsume the discussion on this matter. The mixed system of autonomous financing on the criteria of "need expenditure" does cover the financing of those autonomous economic policies put forward by the Generalitat. The two main sources for the covering of such autonomous expenditure are the two referred to, that is public debt and new taxation.

The alternative of increasing the level of indebtedness has the basic "pro" of its immediate applicability and its main "con" in the fact that it can seriously restrict the future scope of autonomous economic decision-making. Indeed, increases in the recourse to the public debt would, in any case, reduce the range of political choice for long-term projects in capital investment. Some 75% of the accumulated public debt of the Generalitat by November 1985 had been arranged under a long-term basis (89). If the pattern remains the same in the foreseeable future, the draining of moneys in the annual budgets of the Generalitat would reach the point from which further increases in autonomous public spending would require the use of other financial instruments. It is important to point out, at this point, that according to the provisions of the LOPCA (Art. 15; 2,b) the annual budgetary resources for the re-payments of long-term public debt cannot exceed 25% of the ordinary annual revenue of the Generalitat.

The second option of creating new regional taxes has political risks in the process of its implementation. Autonomical taxation or

345
the application of regional surcharges on top of existing state taxes is not only unpopular but, perhaps more important, a "disincentive" for the location of industries or the development of new entrepreneurial activities in Catalonia. Indeed, a higher level of fiscal burden in Catalonia could bring about a lack of industrial "competitiveness" in Catalonia as compared with other Spanish regions.

The CiU-ERC Governments of the Generalitat explicitly refused to take this second option in order to avoid the threat of industrial re-location outside Catalonia. Thus, the only autonomous tax created by the Generalitat was the so-called "Bingo tax". This is, in fact, a surcharge this gaming activity which did not have a direct impact in the Catalan fiscal burden. The yield from the Bingo tax has been, nevertheless, much less than was expected when it was created. The budgetary estimates for the 1985 fiscal year reached 12,000 million ptas, or 3.1% of the total Generalitat's Budget for that year. However, the sums of money collected from the Bingo tax did not reach half of the estimated figures (90).

The possibility of creating new taxes or surcharges similar to the Bingo tax has been considered by the first Governments of the Generalitat. Fiscal taxation on this type of leisure activity has, in electoral terms, the beneficial effect of not creating a "universal" feeling of uneasiness in the populace at large. In fact, the "negative" moral aspects involved in the issues of betting and gaming acted as a "safety cushion" for the decision taken by the Generalitat to create its first "autonomic" tax. Having said this, it is clear that the use of new regional taxation is in itself a financial source, albeit limited in its scope, which is available for exploitation by the self-governed Comunidades Autónomas.

In any case a combination of the two referred to sources of
autonomous financing is a provider of distinctive funds on which autonomous public spending of the Generalitat can be projected and developed. According to this pattern, the political expenditure options for the government of the Generalitat are of a multiple nature and can only be constrained by the "macro-economic" framework set up by the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Autonomy Statute.

After a brief review of the economic powers which can be exercised by the Generalitat (see section 3.2.3), it can be concluded that the scope of autonomous policies which can be implemented by the Catalan institutions, is wide. Territorial planning, public works and infrastructure, railways and transport or social welfare are matters which come under the sole jurisdiction of the Generalitat. In accordance with the bases and general planning of Spanish economic activity, the Generalitat has full power, for instance, on agriculture, industry and internal trade.

Very significant for the Generalitat's autonomous economies are also its participation in the management of the State public economic sector in Catalonia (Art 12, 2, Autonomy Statute); compulsory expropriation in areas under its jurisdiction together with the retention for the public sector of essential resources and intervention in companies of general interest (Art. 10; 1; 2 and 3) and, finally, the creation of a Catalan public economic sector. As far as the latter is concerned, although the number of the Generalitat's public corporations is small -see Table 5.2.xiv- their budgetary resources (20,000 million ptas in 1985) accounts for over 6% of the total Generalitat Budget and can be greatly expanded.

In any case, the juridical provision set down by the Constitution and the Autonomy Statute do not exhaust the discussion on the economic powers of the Generalitat. Even after the framing of the institutional/juridical aspects involved is envisaged, the
governmental options still available are essentially ideological and political. Further, the "micro-economic" powers under the jurisdiction of the Generalitat are both complementary and influential in the process of economic decision-making taken at the level of the central government within the context of the Spanish state.

In Catalonia, limited but effective policies against unemployment, social welfare, industrial development or structural re-allocation of financial resources, for example, can be implemented by the Generalitat. Once again it is the political perception of both regional and state dimensions which will decisively shape the future economic performance of the Generalitat. After all, the symbiotical and dual nature of the Catalan economy is in line with those cultural values of dual national identification expressed by the majority of Catalans.


4. Further insights into this issue are provided by the same author (1976b and 1978).


6. According to McGilvray, R ("Economic policy and management" in MacKay, D (ed), 1977, p.48), some 40% of the Scottish GDP is dependent on trade.


9. The figures of January 1984 correspond to 353,444 unemployed in Scotland which is equivalent to a rate of 15.8 per cent of the active working population. The worst partial percentages are in the Western Isles (22.7 per cent), Strathclyde (18.1 per cent) and Central (16.7); Shetland (7), Grampian (9.3) and the Borders (9.5) had the lowest levels (The Scotsman, 3.ii.84).

10. As regards North Sea Oil, merchant banking and investment management have grown rapidly in response to the needs of incoming business. For this see Scott, J & Hughes, M (1980).

11. A very expressive statement was made by Mr. Bill Reed, executive director of SEMI (Semiconductor Equipment and Materials Institute) based in California, who forecast (The Scotsman, 16.xi.84) in relation to the electronics sector "...that Scotland's outstanding industrial relations record and high productivity would be rewarded with a new wave of investment and jobs over the next few years".


15. The Scotsman, 20.x.84.


18. The Scotsman, 16.xi.84.

19. Paradoxically, while The Scotsman in 15.i.84 read: "Scotland's economy is on the upturn, according to the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce", The Financial Times, 18.xi.83, read: "Business confidence in Scotland has dropped considerably."


23. See also Short, J (1981).


30. Over a five-year period on constant price basis, which was abandoned in 1982-3.

31. Scotland's 10 per cent contrast with the 12.1 per cent under the Goschen formula (11/80th of England and Wales, based on 1913-14 population). This was used to allocate education expenditure between 1918 and 1959.

33. The Scotsman, 17.ii.84.

34. See previous footnote.


37. At the beginning, the SDA took over the activities of the Small Industrial Council for Rural Areas in Scotland, the Scottish Industrial Estates Corporation and the Derelict Land Unit of the Scottish Office. For a brief description of the SDA's early purposes and organisation see Robertson, L (1978). Further reading is provided by the SDA's own publications (see References).


39. SEPD, 1980, p. 1

40. ibidem


43. The Scotsman, 11.xii.84

44. Financial Times, 14.iii.84. The figure includes receipts from royalties, petroleum revenue tax (including advance payments) and corporation tax, before any off-set in respect of advance corporation tax. It also includes receipts for supplementary petroleum duty between 1982-83. It does not include non-recurrent payments on the grant of licences.

45. The Scotsman, 13.xi.84 and 6.xii.84.

46. Financial Times, 17.xii.84.

47. Neil Hood, Professor of Business Policy, Strathclyde University in The Scotsman, 16.xii.84.

48. The Scotsman, 11.xii.84.


51. Catalonia, as part of the confederated Aragonese Crown, always looked to the Mediterranean countries for economic expansion. Thus, the Spanish colonisation of the American Continent was mainly developed by the Kingdom of Castile. After the War of Succession (1705-1714) and until 1778, the American markets were prohibited to the Catalan merchants.

52. Miquel Izard (1970, 1979) has calculated that while in 1846
Catalan textiles were 70 % dearer than English products, in 1878 the difference reached 159 %.


54. On the recovery of the pre-Civil War macro-economic levels in the 1950s see Montserrat, A & Ros, J (1972).


56. Avui, 12. iv.85.

57. Miro i Ardèvol, J, 1984, p. 72.

58. Avui, 17.ii.85.


60. On this subject cf. Llarch, E (1985), Cabana, F (1972) and Servicio de Estudios... (1983)

61. La Caixa ranks sixth of all clearing, industrial and savings banks in Spain and fifth in Europe within its category.

62. In June 1985, King Juan Carlos visited Catalonia and expressed the view shared by many: "Si Catalunya va bé, va bé Espanya" (The better for Catalonia, the better for Spain) (El País, 16.v.85 and El Temps, 27.v.85. For the GDP figures see Avui, 16.iii.86.


64. See La Vanguardia, 16.ii.84 and Avui, 3.iii.85 and 19.iv.85. See also Miquel Sarz i Arnalot, A (1983).


66. Generalitat, 1982a, p. 27.


69. Josep Maria Cullell, Conseller d' Economia i Finances, in Avui, 8.vi.85.


73. La Vanguardia, 14.iv.85, pp. 22-23.

74. El País, 6.ix.84.


77. The application of VAT from January 1, 1986 has brought about for Catalonia the disappearance of the yield accrued by the Tax on Luxury goods, the Transfer of Wealth Tax and Public Acts Tax (56). The suppression of these taxes meant a loss of some 25,000 million in revenue for the Generalitat. On the transfer of taxes see Ley 41/1981, Generalitat (1983) and Rovira i Molla, A (1984).

78. See Avui, 10-12-15 iv.85 and Proposals by the economic Joint Commission, 18.ii.85.


83. Jordi Pujol, on presenting the Pla d'Actuació Econòmica in November 5, 1980. La Vanguardia, 6.xi.80.


87. El País, 31.iv.84.

88. El País, 12.iv.84. The Bill for the 1986 Catalan Budget estimated the debt necessities for such a fiscal year in 30,766 million ptas., or 7.1% of the total expenditure of 429,558 million ptas. (El País, 3.iv.86).

89. According to the Socialist opposition, the public debt of the Generalitat in November 1985 reached 160,314 million ptas. and was divided into the following categories: a) long-term, 122,814; b) short-term, 22,500, and c) debt to the Spanish Exchequer and Health and Social Security System (see El País, 11.xi.85).

90. El País, 11.xi.85.
6. SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA: A SPECULATIVE EXERCISE OF PROSPECTIVE INSIGHTS.

Introduction: visions of the future.

The final part of this thesis examines prospective future developments in Scotland and Catalonia in regard to political decentralisation and self-government. The background to this speculative task is provided by the contrasted data and interpretations of past and present events, together with the analyses carried out in previous sections of this dissertation.

The fact that this piece of research was undertaken with the purpose of exploring hypotheses of future trends cannot be overemphasized. Let us, accordingly, review some basic concepts with respect to this.

This thesis holds the view that the future is both multiple and indeterminate. In fact, the future cannot be seen as being the mere prolongation of a predetermined line. Thus, images of the future are so central to the progress of society that an understanding of the dynamics of their making and transformation is crucial to realizing social mobilisation and change (1). Further, it is inappropriate to speak of one future, but of diverse alternative future scenarios instead (2).

There are several ways of considering the future. According to the empiricist approach related to the philosophy of Locke, the prognosis or forecasting of future trends is based on the data of the past and the present, which necessarily indicate the things which may happen and trace among the possible what is probable. A second
approach, very much in line with Leibnitz's belief that "something must be changed", looks to find the desirable futures from among a set of alternative options. The underlying element of this approach is that it aspires to transform the present through a vision of the future, which can only be built on the basis of a "voluntarist" desire for the things to change.

A third "project building approach", made up of elements of the previous two, is based on both empiricist knowledge of "possibles" and "probables" and on a vision of "desirables" (3). According to this approach, the desirable -"the ideal" or "the infinite" in Kantian and Hegelian terms, respectively- is subjected to the test of what is the possible and the probable. This desirable future, then, inserts itself into reality and forms a synthesis or rather a kind of synergy.

This thesis will apply the project building approach to the futures of self-government in Scotland and Catalonia. As far as the Scottish case is concerned, it will be contended that an inter-party constitutional convention will be the desirable option for the achievement of self-government. It must be emphasized, however, that not only is it an absolute requirement that the Scots have a vision of self-government but that this vision must also be brought into the realm of the possible/probable through social mobilisation. In Catalonia, the vision of an institutional form of government which could deepen the exercise of self-government within the European context, runs parallel with an uncertainty in visions of the other Spanish communities over the desirability or not of a federal democratic Spain.

In the subsequent sections of this chapter, this thesis will examine and explore variables and alternatives with the object of conceptualizing future scenarios in both Scotland and Catalonia,
which will be based on assessments of the possible and the probable together with the choice of the desirable.

6.1. THE PRESSURE FOR A SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT.

This thesis postulates non-secessionist self-government in Scotland basing its argument on mainly the following:

1) The Scottish cultural, economic and political differences with the rest of Britain, marked by an increased centre-periphery dichotomy in Britain.

2) Scottish dual nationality: one being the result of a reinforcement of the pre-Union identity, and the other being the product of the national integration brought about by British state-building after 1707.

3) A desire for democratic political decentralisation related, in the case of Scotland to a sense of national/regional consciousness.

4) The trend for supra-state unification - in the search of a new European culture- which seeks institutional coordination from above and democratic self-government from below.

Once these elements have been realized, the achievement of a Scottish political organisation, or institutionalised form of government, according to the perceptions, interpretations and aspirations of the Scots for Home-Rule, will still depend on social mobilization for its realisation.

A Scottish Constitutional Convention and a subsequent popular Referendum are the means of social mobilization which this dissertation believes are the most desirable for the achievement of Scottish Home-Rule. However, given the characteristics of the British
political system and traditions, this option might be least likely to happen in the near future, or at least would be less likely than the legislative implementation from above (i.e. by the Westminster Parliament) of some scheme of devolution by a future Labour or Alliance —or both in a legislative pact— Government.

The different ways in which the "representative" political parties in Scotland approach the issue of self-government, together with a speculative insight into the prospects of their future actions, will constitute the concern of this section. There is no doubt about the fact that all the Scottish social agents and channels of influence would have to play some role in the process of gaining self-government for Scotland. This thesis, nonetheless, will preeminently analyse the policies, expectations, tactics and strategies of the Conservative, Labour, Liberal/SDP and SNP parties. A study of the approach of these parties is considered to be the most appropriate due to the fact that they, as "purely" political organisations, are the protagonists and they alone can implement or not any political proposals concerning a genuine political matter: to accomplish the goal for self-government sought by the majority of the Scots.

The Conservative Party.

Following its stunning electoral success in 1979, the incoming Thatcher Government declined to implement the 1978 Scotland Act despite the fact that 49 out of the 71 MPs elected in Scottish constituencies were in favour of devolution.

The "better" scheme of devolution for Scotland, which the ex-Premier Alec Douglas-Home had promised if the Scots voted "No", rapidly withered. The axis Unionism-Centralisation was, subsequently, given renewed emphasis.
Not surprisingly on 20th June 1979, George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland, voted for the repeal of the 1978 Scotland Act. A few months earlier he had resigned from the Conservative front bench when Margaret Thatcher decided to oppose devolution.

Since the 1979 general election the Conservative Party has remained opposed to the implementation of any form of political decentralisation for Scotland. In the 1983 Conservative Electoral Manifesto for Scotland there was no reference to the issue of a Scottish Assembly (4). Only on a sheet attached to this Manifesto did George Younger implicitly refer to the issue of self-government in these terms: "We stand ready to consider with all other Parties any further proposals for worthwhile Constitutional change in Scotland. However, we do not believe that Scotland wants an extra layer of government—certainly not one which would involve extra taxes on the Scots" (5).

This position was a reiteration of what George Younger had said in October 1982 when he expressed his belief that "...most people in Scotland are no longer interested in this subject (i.e. Scottish Assembly) as a practical proposition" (6).

The constant refusal by the Tory Party to implement any scheme of self-government in Scotland since 1979 has coincided with a steady decline in the Party's electoral support. In 1979, the Conservatives obtained 31.4 per cent of the vote in Scotland, but in 1983 their percentage fell to 28.4 per cent, the second worst electoral performance in Scotland of the post-war period and far from its peak in 1955 when it obtained 50.1 percent of the vote (see Table 3.1.i for post-WWII popular vote results in Scotland).

Thus, the "no mandate" question has acquired political relevance since 1979 and the subsequent further electoral decline of the Tory vote in 1983. This question implicitly establishes that the
Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland has no mandate to implement the "defeated" policies put forward in the Scottish Conservative electoral manifestos in 1979 and 1983 (7). For instance, only 21 out of 72 Scottish seats went to the Tories in 1983 (ie. 28.4% of the popular vote). Nevertheless, the "political" representative of the British Cabinet in the "territory" of Scotland was a Conservative member. Obviously such a political contradiction can only be explained by emphasizing the unitary nature of the British Constitution. But this has a logical sequel unacceptable to Scottish Conservatism: if the Scottish political dimension within the United Kingdom cannot be adduced, then there is no need for a "territorial" Secretary representing Scottish interests in the British Cabinet.

In fact, and following the logic of the unitary position, the election of only one out of the 72 MPs elected in the Scottish constituencies would not change the situation of "no mandate" by a Tory Secretary for Scotland. Significantly, given the peculiarities of the "first-past-the-post" British electoral system, a tactical agreement by an anti-Tory Home-Rule "popular front" would have obtained 71 out of the 72 seats elected in Scotland in the 1983 Elections (8).

Indeed, the Labour, SNP and Alliance parties contested the 1983 General Elections with at least some level of commitment to Scottish self-government and altogether received over 70 per cent of the popular vote. The "no mandate" issue has received, nonetheless, a straightforward Tory disregard which can be reproduced as follows: "Our country is Great Britain. We have one Queen, one Parliament and one people" (9).

In the foreseeable future, and with the same type of right-wing leadership, the attitude of the Conservative Party towards the issue
of self-government in Scotland will certainly remain the same.

However, two factors may operate as causes for another Conservative change of minds: a) A sharper electoral decline; b) the pressure of a prosperous Edinburgh-based financial sector. Let us make some insights into these two possible variables.

a) Tory electoral decline.

The Conservative Party has steadily lost electoral support in the two following situations: 1) after taking over office from a previous Labour Government and, 2) in an election prior to a successive new term of office (See Table 6.2.i). The figures speak for themselves in this respect: while the percentage deviation in the elections 1951-1979 corresponded to a decline of 17.2 points, the gap in the 1955-1983 electoral decline increased to 21.7 per cent. Finally, if a comparison between the Tories' electoral percentages in Scotland -as regards a third consecutive victory in British General Elections- is made with survey polls in 1985, the decline amounts to the very significant figure of 26.2 points.

Table 6.2.i: Conservative electoral decline in Scotland since WWII.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tory Percentage</th>
<th>Decreasing Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Tory Scottish percentages in a second consecutive General Election victory.
1955 1983 Decreasing deviation

50.1% 28.4% 21.7

c) Tory Scottish percentages in a third consecutive General Election victory.

1959 1985 (*) Decreasing deviation

47.2% 21% 26.2

(*) MORI opinion poll published in The Scotsman, 16.9.85 (NB. In the 1986 regional election, the Conservatives received 16.8% of the popular vote in Scotland).

As regards the deviation of the Scottish vote when compared with the English electoral pattern, the trend also shows a progressive loss of electoral wave-length with the Scots' political preferences (see Table 6.2.ii).

Table 6.2.ii: Deviation of the Scottish vote vs. English electoral pattern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>apparent (% MD)</th>
<th>real (% MD3)(*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The quest for self-government, revived in Scotland after the Tory victories in 1955 (50.1% vote) and 1959 (47.2%), has continued during the 60s, 70s and the 80s. The Conservative Party, nonetheless, has held a monolithic "Unionist" -namely, centralist- stance, despite some tepid commitments to devolution by the 1970-74 Heath Governments.

This dichotomy between a greater move towards centralisation by the last Thatcher Governments and a renewed demand for self-government by the Scots provides one explanation for the Tories' electoral decline in Scotland. Highly significant is, nevertheless, the fact that 25 per cent of all the Conservative voters questioned in 1985 in the poll reproduced in Table 6.2.iv came out with the answer that they were in favour of a Scottish Parliament while only 15% were "neither/no opinion" responses (ie. a remarkable 40 per cent of "non-centralist" Tory voters).

Table 6.2.iv: Scottish Office versus Scottish Parliament.

Question: "Which do you think would serve Scotland better-the Scottish Office or an independent Parliament for Scotland?".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Scottish Office</th>
<th>Independent parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neither ........................................... 6 %
No opinion ......................................... 9 %

Source: MORI poll published in The Scotsman, 5.7.85 (N=962)

In a wider context, the anti-Scottish Thatcherite policies — as so expressed not only by the SNP but also by the British Opposition parties — are seen even by their own Scottish MP's as being the main cause which could produce, in the near future, "another drive to devolution" (10). The weakening of the Scottish lobby, which has traditionally coalesced around the Scottish Office in defence of Scottish material interests, has to be seen as another relevant issue in this respect. Further, the proposal to close down the steel mill in Gartcosh could jeopardise the works at Ravenscraig. As a matter of fact, the steel issue is seen as highly important by Scottish Conservatives in preserving Scotland's industrial base and, by showing that they can stand up for Scotland, to save what is left of Scottish Conservatism (11). The devolutionary implications of these issues made a prominent Conservative like Ian Lawson first to abandon the Tory Party, then to join the the CSA (Campaign for a Scottish Assembly) and, finally, to become an SNP member (NB. Lawson campaigned for the NO vote in the 1979 Referendum).

b) Scottish financial sector.

In the last 20 years the expansion of the Scottish-based financial industry has been considerable. In 1985, for instance, Edinburgh was ranked as the second largest financial centre in Britain after London, with funds and assets accounting for £25 billion.

The connections between the Conservative Party and the Scottish leading capitalist institutions have been important in the post-WWII
period (eg. Lord Fraser of Allander and Hugh Stenhouse). Recent
developments, since the first Thatcher Government took office in
1979, have reflected sporadic conflicts between the financial
industry in Scotland and that based in the City. These conflicts have
remained more acute as a consequence of the Thatcherite monetarist
and supply-side economic policies, aimed at enhancing the City's
paramount role in the British world of finance.

In 1981 there was a major battle over the take-over bids put
forward by the City to gain control of the Royal Bank of Scotland
(i.e. Standard Chartered Bank and Hong Kong and Shangai Banking
Corporation). The mobilisation of the Edinburgh-based financial
community neutralised the attempt to drop the distinctive
"Scottishness" of the Royal Bank, and indeed avoided another takeover
much in the same line as that of the Clydesdale Bank by the Midland
Bank. However, this episode does not hide the fact that, originally,
it was the own Royal Bank Board of Directors which wanted a take-over
and, secondly, that it was the London-based Monopolies Commission
which vetoed such a take-over.

Some leading financial experts considered the Royal Bank battle
as the "Bannockburn of Scottish finance" (12), much in the same line
with the later attempt by the Conservative Government to drop the
"Scottishness" of the TSB organisation, a saving bank which was
precisely born in Scotland. Such financial experts are even of opinion
that since 1979 the only real victories for the autonomy of Scottish
institutions have been won in this field of capital. They also
believe that no cause is going to prosper unless it makes some
obeisance to Scottish national aspirations. It is precisely from
this standpoint that the Conservative's unyielding "Unionism" is
detected as being the main cause of the high electoral costs in the
decline of the Tories in Scotland.
The Scottish financial sector, however, will not play its card of economic independence because of its own position within the UK and international frameworks. The role of the powerful life insurance companies against devolution in 1979 is very significant. In fact, the very existence of the Edinburgh-based financial sector was made possible as the result of the fruitful Scottish junior-partnership with the London imperial capitals during the 19th century. On the international level, the penetration of US multinationals has increased considerably in recent times. Leaving aside the United States' investment in North Sea oil and gas projects, Scotland has the highest level of per capita investment in US dollars in the world after Canada. This multinational factor with its expansion of macro-corporatist practices is not objectively interested in dealing with institutions which are the product of anti-corporatist and anti-centralist mobilisation.

In conclusion, the Scottish financial sector would be provoked to press their "natural" Tory allies to be more Scottish only if they felt that the predatory movements of the City capitals were jeopardising their own portion of the profits cake. Or, alternatively, if they felt obliged to bow to social pressure exerted by other Scottish channels of influence (the Kirk, political parties, trade unions, chambers of commerce, etc.) to reinforce their Scottishness. In any case the survival of an independent capitalist sector in Scotland is an issue to be explored in order to determine its links with the survival of Scottish Toryism. Certainly, it was very significant that, at the height of the devolution issue in the 1970s, the Scottish Tories, following the Fairgrieve report, amalgamated their organisation with their English counterparts because, with the collapse of Scottish industry, financial contributions were drying up. On the other hand, the growing presence
of SNP members in the Edinburgh financial centre is also noticeable.

**The Labour Party.**

The Labour Party has been the dominant political party in Scotland since the 1964 Elections. Its electoral support, however, has steadily declined from a peak of 49.9 per cent of the vote achieved in 1966 to 35.1 % in the 1983 General Election (see Table 3.1.i)

In much the same way as the Conservative Party, Labour has a highly centralised structure. Policy making, even on "purely" Scottish matters, is the absolute prerogative of the National Conference. Since the time of the 1918 Labour Party's constitution, Scotland has been considered a "region" with the same status as the regions in England.

The absence of a decentralised and territorially-patterned structure within the Labour party is best illustrated by the fact that the NEC's interim manifesto of 1980 failed to make any mention of the party's commitment to Scottish devolution (13).

The Labour Party has traditionally embraced the "statist" variant of democratic socialism from-above. Labour in Scotland, therefore, has tended to approach political alternatives from an exclusively British perspective. Labour, for instance, was the first governmental party to give the Secretary of State for Scotland powers to penalise councils and, accordingly, made patent their small concern for the autonomy of the bottom-tier local authorities and their centralist/corporatist mentality -this 1966 Act has been claimed by the Conservatives as the father of the 1981 Act.

In the 1960s the Welsh Labour Council pushed for devolved institutions whereas the Scottish Council did not. In Scotland, Labour has been committed to the creation of a Scottish Assembly
since 1974, but this commitment was principally a reaction to the electoral pressures posed by the SNP electoral successes in the period 1965-1975. The fact that the 1978 Scotland Act was initially more the product of political expediency to combat the Nationalist upsurge in the ballot-box than the result of an ideological standpoint assumed by the bulk of Labour's rank-and-file has to be strongly emphasized.

The ideological tone of the Labour Party has remained steadily centralist in recent times. Not surprisingly, Labour backbenchers disregarded the party whip on the devolution debate in the Commons and, more significantly, the leadership was unable or unwilling to discipline them.

Labour's ideological unease with the multinational nature of British society has furthermore been reinforced by a pragmatic approach, very characteristics of the general pattern in British politics. Thus, Labour political "marketing advisers" have traditionally held the view that the more decentralist the Party became the more chances would exist for the Nationalists in Scotland and Wales to revive their electoral fortunes. For them what "really" matters is how to maximise the prevailing centralist strategy of winning power at the centre, ie. London, and subsequently implement policies from-above in order to develop policies of social transformation at state level. In fact, Labour's position has traditionally gone for centralised government, with access for Scottish interests to the centre. From this point of view the theme of privileged access has been as important to Labour as centralisation per se.

Since 1979, however, a schizophrenic attitude has come about as a result of a dual electoral challenge: Labour as the first party in Scotland must take the opposition to the "illegitimate" Tory
Secretary of State for Scotland; but, on the other hand, the more concerned such an approach becomes with the territorial politics of Scotland, the greater are the difficulties laid down for an exclusive centralist UK strategy.

It is against this background that the issue of the "no mandate" Tory rule in Scotland offers a typical illustration of Labour problems in its handling of the dichotomy centralisation/decentralisation. After the 1983 General Elections the Conservatives were set to govern Scotland with a consecutive minority of seats elected in the Scottish constituencies. The Brighton Labour Conference held that year endorsed the view that "...this (Conservative) Government has no mandate in a Scottish context". Subsequently, Scottish MPs put forward the tactical proposal of disrupting Scottish legislation in Westminster. This move was intended to highlight the "no mandate" of the Tory Secretary of State for Scotland (14). After an exchange of views, the bulk of the MPs elected in Scotland retreated from this plan of legislative disruption because "...the response from the national committee in London has been so good that they can relax their pressure for a strong line on Home Rule" (15).

Only occasional gestures adopted by Scottish MPs in Westminster have left their mark as a symbolic political testimony of the Labour electoral majority in Scotland. In December 1984, for example, the Scottish Grand Committee, with a Labour majority, routed the Government in a vote on regional aid. Subsequently, the Conservative majority in the floor of the House of Commons over-ruled the decision taken by the Scottish Grand Committee.

On the "no mandate" issue, other behind-the-scene interests have to be taken into account. Leading Scottish MPs like John Smith, Robin Cook and George Poulkes find themselves in the "awkward" position of
how to conciliate the tactics of putting forward the quest for self-government in Scotland assuming, at the same time, Labour's centralist strategy of gaining power in London as the absolute priority. Some of them who are expected to become Ministers in a future Labour Cabinet ponder very carefully their respective position before committing themselves to the task of leading an effective opposition to the Tories in Scotland.

The absence of a decentralised structure in the Labour Party makes the Labour argument of setting up a Scottish Assembly to bring power as near to the people as possible weak. In this context, the suggestion envisaged by John Maxton that the Shadow Scottish Secretary should be elected directly by the Scottish conference was seen by many Labour members as radical: "...It is impossible to believe that the Scottish party who have been in the forefront of the campaign for democracy in the party nationally should turn their back on democracy when it comes to their own party...If we appear frightened of democracy in our own party, then why should people believe we will extend democracy when we come to power?" (16).

The "no mandate" issue has not concealed the fact that, in denying Tories rule in Scotland, the "unlimited sovereignty" of Westminster is also questioned. This point crucially exposes the contradiction of Labour in claiming its political hegemony in Scotland, so asserting the Scottish territorial dimension within UK politics but, nonetheless, refusing to fight democratically for its Scottish "mandate" in Scotland.

The Labour Party, nevertheless, has to be regarded as the only British party which has put forward legislative proposals of devolution which it did through the 1978 Scotland Act. This aspect confirms Labour's concern for Scottish Home Rule.

In 1979, for instance, the Labour Party manifesto for Scotland
offered the other parties talks to find a way forward for devolution:
"We are therefore ready to discuss constructively with all concerned
any changes which would make the scheme in the present Act (1978
Scotland Act) more widely acceptable, so that we can establish a
Scottish Assembly" (17). Furthermore, in February 1983, a statement
by the NEC (ie. "Scotland and Devolution) advocated "..the
establishment of a Scottish Assembly directly elected by a 'first
past the post system' as in UK General Elections".

In the 1983 Manifesto, Labour believed "..that the vast majority
of our Scottish people want to see more control over Scottish affairs
exercised in Scotland" (18).

However, in de facto politics Labour has not been ready to
discuss with other pro-devolutionist political parties and social
groups a framework strategy which would achieve in a common platform
some degree of Home-Rule for Scotland. Donald Dewar, the Shadow
Scottish Secretary, ruled out in the 1984 Conference of the Party in
Scotland any idea of a "Popular Front" with other parties advocating
self-government -namely, the Liberal, SDP and the SNP parties.

The contradiction between recognising the desire for an Assembly
expressed by a majority of Scots and the fact that Labour only
represents a minority of Scots becomes apparent. In much the same
line of argument, this approach compares with Labour's fierce
opposition to the implementation of any system of electoral
proportional representation in Britain. In fact, Labour still believes
that the "first-past-the post" electoral system will eventually put
it back in power at the centre, where it can start pulling levers.

Indeed, the acceptance of devolution as the means "..to create a
wider, deeper democracy -a corner-stone of socialism to give people a
greater say in decisions which affect them" (19), also implicitly
recognises the fact that other parties, representing as many votes as
Labour does, also support for devolution and, consequently, the "business" of deepening democracy must count on theirs (NB. Alliance-SNP popular votes in Scotland in 1983 accounted for 36.6% as compared to 35.1% of Labour). Following this argument, Labour cannot claim to be the sole—or even the most "qualified"—representatives where the deepening of Scottish democracy is concerned, despite the fact that it obtained 41 of the 72 MPs elected in the Scottish constituencies.

The lukewarm enthusiasm, to the say the least, of Labour for a cross-party organisation like the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) which only operates with the aim of setting up a Scottish Assembly is also illustrative. The Scottish executive of the Labour Party urged individual party members in 1984 "..to affiliate to the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly...and play an active part" (20). This decision was seen as a victory for the "ultras" (sic) party members who hold an active commitment to the cause of devolution in Scotland. In any case, and despite the "ultras" victory" the rules of the Labour Party as a whole prevent party's affiliation with the CSA.

The Green Paper on Devolution, published in June 1984, ruled out any prospect of discussion over alternative forms of Home Rule outside Labour's proposals. Once again, this attitude cannot disguise the ingrained centralist inertia of past Labour policies and strategies. Labour's corporatist approach to governing sees "Scotland" as another corporate interest to be accommodated in the British political system. Thus, Green Paper's authors give warning that Labour supporters must accept that the process of decentralisation, when extended to England—supposedly without taking into account the real feeling about self-government of the different English regions—, could lead to a loss of influence for a Labour government at Westminster (21).
The North-East of England, where there exists a demand for a bigger say in its own regional affairs, is the exception which otherwise confirms the general rule of Labour's general indifference to this regional issue in the rest of England. This inconsistency of Labour policies, as regards political decentralisation, can provoke the "kafkaian" situation of Labour MPs from the North of England (ie. Mark Hughes, Durham, March 85) opposing a Bill, moved by members of his own political party, advocating devolution for Scotland (ie. John Maxton). This Bill was meant to pursue the establishment of "..a democratically elected Scottish Assembly with legislative and administrative powers to deal with all matters at present administered by the Secretary of State for Scotland" (22) (ie. the "official" Party's policies towards Scottish devolution).

For many Labour activists in the North of England, this lack of conviction, as far as Scottish devolution is concerned, is due to the feeling that, after devolution has been granted, Scotland would become completely independent. Consequently, they would never see the return of a Labour Government -without the Scottish electoral contribution- and the North of England would be left on its own. In any case, they are mainly concerned about the fact that an Assembly would give Scotland more economic leverage.

Diverse leading figures of the Party have repeatedly stated that Labour is the only party with an Assembly commitment likely to form a Government at Westminster (23). This does not take into account the possibility of other devolutionist parties (Liberal/SDP) forming a Government at Westminster as well, and contrasts dramatically with the lack of faith of other leading members of the Party in Scotland: "The Labour Party has invited discussion on the content of its Assembly scheme (Green Paper proposals)...But the highest priority is the discussion of the means by which an Assembly is to be achieved."
Until that has been recognised, worked out and publicly recorded by the Labour Party, even dedicated party members are entitled to scepticism about that Assembly pledge" (24).

The Labour Party will have to undergo in the near future a rethinking of its ideologies in order to incorporate decentralisation both in its policies and in its own structure if indeed any real commitment to the socialist principle of deepening democracy is to be realized. In the Scottish context, unless Party members assume the so-called "rational question" as an issue of their own concern, and all the British Labour Party members hold the view that the decentralist alternative is one of the means whereby the trend of political backwardness which lingers on in this model of European state could be overcome, the fortunes of Home-Rule are not encouraging.

Labour's commitment to setting up an Assembly within two years of being returned to power in London (25) has to be seen, therefore, more within the realms of the good political faith put forward by its leaders than in the light of past experiences. There is, indeed, an emerging decentralist strand in the Labour Party and Labour is beginning to convince itself of the merits of its own policy. In any case, devolution cannot be considered as a priority for the national Labour Party.

The Alliance.

The Alliance coalition made up of the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party has become a major electoral force in Britain during the mid-1980s; one which could win a majority of seats in a future General Election or hold the balance of power in a "hung" Parliament. In Scotland, the Alliance has set itself up as the main challenger for second place in the electoral preferences of the
Scots (26). As far as the Scottish debate is concerned, and despite its political nature as a coalition, Alliance policies have to be examined from the individual positions of both the Liberal and the SDP parties.

The Liberal Party.

Although there is one single parliamentary group of Liberal MPs in Westminster, the Scottish Liberal Party is organically a separate organisation from that of the Liberal Party in England and Wales. Accordingly, the conference of the Scottish Liberal Party makes policy concerned with Scotland. This constitutes a distinctive element when compared with the centralist structures of the Tory, Labour and SDP parties.

The Scottish Liberals have been committed to a federal United Kingdom for a long time. Since the 1880s, Liberal policy has been seen to be federal in character. At the outbreak of the First World War, the Liberal Government of Asquith favoured "Home-Rule-All-Round" scheme of territorialisation of politics in the UK. In fact in 1913 Scottish Home Rule was passed in its Second Reading by 204 to 159 (Scottish MPs, 45 to 8). However, the Great War interfered decisively with the implementation of such legislation.

The policy of the Scottish Liberal Party is for a revised Treaty of Union which would create a new federal relationship between the nations of which the United Kingdom is composed (ie. England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) (27). In St Andrews, in March 1982, the Scottish Liberal Party reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, elected by proportional representation, within a federal United Kingdom. At its pre-electoral Conference in 1983, the Scottish Liberals resolved to fight the General Election Campaign with its first priority being the
establishment of a Parliament for Scotland and the introduction of proportional representation. This was stated to be the first constitutional stage in the process of British federalisation.

Although in favour of the setting up of a Scottish Constitutional Convention, the Liberal Party opted, before the 1983 General Election, for the "quicker" means of delivering a Scottish Parliament through the legislative resolution of an Alliance majority in the Westminster Parliament. This "competitive" attitude of by-passing any previous form of previous political agreement among the Scottish parties for the implementation of Home Rule has been the pattern characteristically followed by the political parties in Britain.

This dissertation believes that an institutional reform, based upon an expressed demand for self-government by a majority of Scots, has to be correlated with the involvement of those parties in the political spectrum which represent such a majority in favour of Home Rule. Otherwise, paradoxical situations, like the one provided by the "against" Liberal votes in the guillotine motion on the debate on the Scotland and Wales Bill in February 1977, tend to occur time and time again. In the same line, the contradictory "federal" Liberal position in the Devolution legislative debate of voting against the policy of giving the proposed Scottish Assembly control and management of Scottish finances is also put into evidence. A final significant piece of information which further illustrates the unclear Liberal commitment to Home Rule is provided by the fact that Liberal MPs were divided on the 40 per cent rule for the 1979 Referendum (ie. the Cunningham proposal). In consequence, the Liberals do not escape the practices of "realpolitik" and U-turns as far as the "federal" issue of Home Rule is concerned.

The Social Democratic Party.
The newcomers on the British political scene have shown a special interest in the need to decentralise government ever since the Limehouse Declaration which marked the foundational standpoint of the SDP. This party, however, maintains a highly centralised structure (eg. all membership subscriptions must go to the London headquarters; the Scottish organiser is appointed by the National Committee, etc).

In response to the problems of over-centralisation in Britain, the SDP advocates the establishment of directly elected assemblies for Scotland and Wales, and also of regional assemblies in England. Nevertheless, the SDP has never postulated federal constitutional arrangements for Britain. Thus, "Britain must still remain a unitary state, though it would, of course, be far less unitary than it is at present" (28). According to this plan envisaged by the SDP party, the regional governments, for instance, would become responsible for the allocation of some 30 per cent of public expenditure.

Prior to the 1983 General Election, the SDP/Liberal Joint Programme for Government put forward the view that the Scottish Home Rule Act would provide the pattern for other assemblies in Wales and the English regions. Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament should receive 50 per cent of the North Sea Oil revenue together with a share of the United Kingdom taxation (29). This 50 per cent percentage is the highest figure ever considered by any "British" party as regards the economic powers to be enjoyed by a Scottish Assembly. In the period 1983-86, the North Sea oil revenue annually accrued by the British Exchequer accounted for £10-14 bn. If this, somehow arbitrarily chosen, 50% percentage of North Sea oil revenue is referred to the macroeconomic indicators of a country like Denmark, with a population of 5.122.000, very similar to that of Scotland, the illustrative conclusion is that the final figure could account for half the total exports of Denmark in 1981.
However such pre-electoral "generosity" for the finances of a future Scottish Parliament contrasts dramatically with the situation some months later, after the 1983 election, when a sizeable minority of the SDP Scottish annual assembly which shared the position held by Lord Taylor of Gryffe that "...the abolition of the office of Secretary of State for Scotland would leave Scotland without a presence in the Cabinet and consequently a voice in and influence on national and international affairs" (30). In doing so, they were not only implicitly supporting the block-grant system of financing regional expenditure outside the 50% percentage of economic autonomy for a future Scottish Assembly, but also questioning the entire proposals relating to Scottish Home Rule. This incident clearly exposes the centralist mentality of the SDP party which can put forward "radical" proposals elaborated by its "think-tank" in London but is nonetheless alien to the initiatives of its Scottish membership.

When the issue of Home Rule is analysed from the strategy concerning how to win and hold power in Westminster/Whitehall, the SDP/Liberal Alliance has also shown inconsistencies between ideological commitment/electoral promises and government action.

As said above, in 1983 a future Alliance Government was willing to promise to hand over 50 per cent of the North Sea oil revenue to a future Scottish Parliament. In 1983, too, the Scottish Liberals set the establishment of a Parliament for Scotland as the first priority for an Alliance government, although their England's counterparts did not agree upon such promise.

In September 1985, however, when the electoral fortunes of the Alliance were running high in the survey polls, the SDP leader, David Owen, "...refused to concede that a Scottish parliament would be an absolute prerequisite for coalition" in the event of a hung
Parliament. "I will not say that without it there is no deal" (31).

In factual terms, both federal Liberal and decentralist Social Democrats commit themselves to introducing immediate legislation in order to establish a Scottish Parliament within two years of a victory in a General Election, namely the same promise made by the devolutionist Labour pledge. The differences in the electoral approaches of both Labour and Alliance are, therefore, nil.

More important, as far as this dissertation is concerned, is the shift of the Alliance towards another "competitive" gesture of steering legislation on its own through Westminster Parliament. The previously held position in favour of a Constitutional Convention has evaporated.

The Scottish National Party.

The Scottish National Party is a political party which solely operates in Scotland although its MPs sit in the Westminster Parliament. The main objective of the SNP is the achievement of total independence through democratic-parliamentary- means. Its strategy was stated in the 1983 SNP Manifesto as follows: "When the SNP wins a majority of the Scottish seats in the UK Parliament, we will invite the other Scottish MPs to co-operate in negotiating the orderly transfer of power from Westminster to Scotland and the preparation of a (written) Constitution. This will be submitted to the Scottish people in referendum and, if approved, an election will take place for the new Scottish Parliament" (32). After secession from the rest of Britain, Scotland would become an independent state within the Commonwealth and, consequently, the Head of State would remain the Queen and successive heirs.

Although not opposed to a system of proportional representation, the strategy put forward by the SNP accepts the "first-past-the-
post" electoral system as the instrument for providing the means of secession. Following this line of argument, one could conclude that with less than a quarter of the registered electorate votes, the SNP could be in the position of being able to declare unilateral independence. In the 1983 General Election, Labour obtained a majority of the MPs elected in Scottish constituencies -41 out of 72- with 35.1 per cent of the popular vote. Taking into consideration the fact that the turnout was 72.7 per cent, the registered electorate which actively supported the Labour "majority" corresponded to 25.5 %. This speculation with figures and the distribution of votes also illustrates the influence of "British" political practices on a genuinely "Scottish" party which seeks a total break with the British political culture.

A second aspect to be underlined in the SNP strategy is one which is also common to the other British parties pursuing the implementation of institutional self-government in Scotland: the means of achieving an institutional order, which is the concern of a large majority of the Scots who desire Home Rule, are determined on an individual partisan basis.

Accordingly, the SNP commitment on winning the majority of "Scottish" seats in Westminster is merely to invite the co-operation of other "Scottish" MPs in the transfer of power from Westminster to Edinburgh. There is a significant absence of reference to the need or not to agree with other parties in Scotland about the process of setting up a new state separate from Britain.

However, a change of mind seems to have taken place in the SNP party about how to put forward its electoral strategy. The traditional target of winning 37 seats in the Scottish constituencies has been replaced by the use that can be made of seats in the wake of an hypothetical hung Parliament in Westminster (33). In this
situation, the SNP would hold the balance of power and, consequently, could bargain some political concessions from the British government -concessions which would not extend to Scotland becoming a separate state from the rest of Britain.

This dual approach by the SNP in the development of its tactics and strategic objectives shows the volatile nature of an "established" party in British politics which still has many of the characteristics of a political movement. Since the nationalist electoral upsurge in the 1960s, the SNP has fluctuated from being the most pro-devolutionist party, as in the Referendum campaign, to an "independence-nothing-less" stance which does not exclude negotiations with a British party in the event of their holding the balance of power in a hung Parliament.

The broad political composition of the SNP is another consequence of its vocation as a movement rather than as an electoral organisation. This is reflected in its internal structure. The basic unit is the branch which is usually formed when there are enough affiliates and activists in a given area. The usual pattern as far as other parties is concerned (eg. Labour) is that branches are set up according to electoral divisions. The Annual Conference attended by members of constituency delegates is the body which adopts party policies. The National Council composed of members largely chosen from the branches, usually meets four times per year and is concerned with policy between annual conferences. This is a common feature of other libertarian assembly-like organisations but rather uncommon in the structures of modern political parties. This National Council elects the NEC (National Executive Committee), but it is another body known as the National Assembly -also elected from the constituents- which debates policy matters. This latter aspect emphasizes the "Presbyterian" vocation of the Party which,
consequently, does not enhance the strength of party leadership.

In the 1980s the Party has adopted an "officially" left-to-centre political orientation, although clashes between the two main wings of the party - i.e. "fundamentalist" and "radical" - have been frequent. These two wings can be given the names of "centrist" and "socialist". "Fundamentalist-centrists" advocate an electoral fight whose aim is to capture the middle-ground votes, precisely those which the Alliance has so ably gained in the last three general elections (see Table 6.2.v.)


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SNP</th>
<th></th>
<th>Lib-Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>votes</td>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 74</td>
<td>30.6 %</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>17.3 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>11.7 %</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "radical-socialists" of the SNP, on the other hand, postulate that the SNP should try to gain the figure of 37 Scottish seats in Westminster. Accordingly, the only workable strategy for the SNP would "...depend on cracking the massive Labour vote in the West Central belt through...policies and priorities geared to the needs of working people" (34). Provided that the first and last aim of the SNP is to gain complete independence, this last "radical" strategy is the
most appropriate one according to the sustained support for Labour in Scotland during the last twenty years. The way to increase electoral support must come from the industrial and urban areas where the Labour strongholds are. However, the powerful criticism of this purely electoral approach by the centrists-traditionalists of the SNP can be reproduced as follows: "...why on earth should we expect people to change the voting habits of a lifetime if all we can offer them is a Mark II version of the Labour Party with a little tartan trimming" (35).

An alternative option to the radicals would be offered, therefore, by the "reasonable" prospects of regaining electoral support in the centre ground of the political spectrum: "The lurch of the two United Kingdom parties (ie. Conservative and Labour) to the extremes of left and right provides a first-class opportunity for a moderate, social democratic party like the SNP" (36).

Paradoxically, the most "separatist" views in the SNP are held by those who advocate a "centrist" approach, one which is incompatible with a challenge to the Labour-held seats in the Strathclyde, Central and Lothian regions. Likewise, the most "leftist" members of the SNP, who aim to seize electoral support from Labour, are the ones who are more inclined to put the equation 'self-government = creation of a Scottish state' in second place.

The day-to-day effects of this "fundamentalist"-"radical" divergence must be analysed in the light of some relevant events. For instance, despite the fact that SNP delegates in the 1984 Conference gave full backing to the miners' strike, which went on to the bitter end after one year of frontal confrontation with the Thatcher Government, only a few months later at the 1984 Conference, the leader of the SNP group in the Strathclyde Regional Council, Gordon Murray, and the president of the Party himself, Donald Stewart,
condemned the "official" support of the SNP to the strike. In March 1985, councillor Sam Coull, leader of the SNP group in the Grampian Regional Council and Iain MacKinnon, councillor on Banff and Buchan District Council resigned as SNP members because of the "growing" influence of the Left in the party: "Some are so far to the Left you almost need a compass to find them" (37). Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the two SNP councillors in the Edinburgh District Council voted together with the Tories against the Labour administration. This action paradoxically came immediately after the Labour victory in the 1983 Scottish District Elections when Gordon Wilson had, as leader of the Party, challenged Labour to stop an "English" Tory Government from imposing its will on Scotland. The two SNP councillors in Edinburgh voted, in any case, together with the Tories in a fight sustained by the Labour administration against George Younger, the Tory Secretary of State for Scotland (38).

This confusing pattern of electoral strategies and ideological volatility, intermingles with another serious political shortcoming for the electoral ventures of the SNP: the lack of charismatic leadership. This feature is universal to all the other parties operating in Scotland at least in the last twenty years—with the quasi-exception, perhaps of the cases of John Mackintosh, Jim Sillars and Winnie Ewing. This lack of leadership is an element which highly conditions the nature of social mobilisation for self-government in Scotland.

In this respect the "Billy Wolfe affair" can be cited as a very illustrative one. The fact that the Chairman of the SNP was "able" to alienate, with his comments in 1982, the important Catholic minority in a country where religious bigotry still runs high in some areas causes more than perplexity. In 1968, Billy Wolfe took over as Leader of the Party after the nationalists had had 5% of the popular
vote in Scotland in the 1966 general election. With him at the helm, the party achieved 21.9% in Feb 1974 and reached its peak at 30.4% with 11 MPs seven months later. In 1978, Billy Wolfe resigned as chairman in a move that was then seen as a classic piece of mistiming with the party in turmoil at Westminster. While holding the post of president of the Party in 1982, he first attacked, in the Kirk magazine "Life and Work", Britain's acceptance of the appointment of a Vatican ambassador and later, on the occasion of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, he stated concern at the prospect of the mainly Protestant Falkland islanders coming under the control of "...the cruel and ruthless Fascist dictatorship of a Roman Catholic state" (sic) (39).

If we take into account the fact that in 1978 the Kirk had just over a million members, but the Roman Catholic Church membership had reached 811,000 (40), the political carelessness of the SNP leader acquires unusual proportions and, more important, is highly indicative of very poor leadership in the nationalist party.

As far as these crucial four factors endogenous to the SNP are concerned, this thesis maintains the view that a democratic and participatory structure, combined with the strong commitment of the membership, can do very little to compensate for the absence of charismatic leadership and the tactics-strategies confusion over Party goals.

Outside the maximization of these four factors, the electoral threat of the SNP will only depend on its functionality within the British political system. This is to say that in the future the Scottish voters might put into practice again, after a period of high popular discontent with respect to centralist Governments in London, the SNP "secessionist" threat in order to show their electoral discontent. This electoral possibility would, undoubtedly, revive the
issue of self-government but, once again, the implementation of some form of devolution would greatly depend upon the subjective short-term interests of the British party/coalition in power.


Any prediction or exercise of prospectives of future political developments in Scotland must take into account the changing nature of unforeseen variables which can intervene in the course of events. Political scientists often tend to speculate on a small group of political variables and, subsequently, project their predictions of the future as a mechanical extension of the course of those variables together with certain theoretical and epistemological assumptions.

As pointed out earlier in this thesis, social phenomenology is incoherent per se to the same extent to which human beings are too. Only from this perspective can the Hegelian assessment "everything-real-is-rational" be assumed as a plausible embodiment of all postdictions and explanations of past phenomena. Nevertheless, few scientists have attempted to test their predictions retrospectively or, in other words, comparing their predictions with similar situations that had occurred in recent history. This thesis, for instance, holds the view that the Scottish people do not—and will not in the near future—aspire to the creation of an independent state. If this standpoint is tested "retrospectively" with the results of the SNP in the Oct 1974 General Election, the prediction of an "impossible" outcome for total political independence in Scotland can be highly questioned. In fact, the SNP with its 30.6 per cent (11 MPs) of the popular vote reached the desired percentage of popular votes which had it been distributed otherwise could have made the "unilateral" declaration of independence by the SNP representation in Westminster possible. However, no social scientist
actually predicted that only five years later the SNP political influence in the British politics was going to be marginal (17.3% of popular vote in Scotland and 2 MPs in 1979 Elections).

It follows that the task of putting forward a systematic pattern of predictions is factually inaccessible rather than methodologically problematical. This dissertation seeks to induce a political situation through which self-governance can be achieved and exercised in the foreseeable future. This prospective induction is the result of the observations and theoretical assumptions put forward in this dissertation and of those perceptions gained in the Weltanschauung of its author throughout his direct contact with the Scottish "issue" for over three years.

The prospect of political agreement between the different representative political parties operating in Scotland is unfamiliar to the competitive complexion of the British political system which, in this case, also applies to "genuine" Scottish politics.

However, some variables are considered to be highly important in any future development concerned with the Scottish self-governmenet. A simple distinction — ie. endogenous-exogenous to the British/Scottish political scene— serves the taxonomical purpose of this overview.

Endogenous variables.

1) SNP electoral revival. This is a "compelling" variable which could provoke an expedient response by the British parties to the rapid setting up of a Scottish Assembly or Parliament. This new hypothetical electoral upsurge of the SNP would need the concurrence of two other main sub-variables:

1, a) An increase in both the economic decline of Britain and in the sense of relative deprivation felt in Scotland.

In general, the trend of relative British economic decline in Britain has been very steady since the end of WWII. This decline has
taken place amidst a rapid increase in the economic expansion of other industrial countries (see Table 6.3.i).

Table 6.3.i: Some rates of growth of GDP (1961-72: annual percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>9.2 %</td>
<td>10.45 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>4.7 %</td>
<td>5.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td>4.4 %</td>
<td>6.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>3.9 %</td>
<td>4.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST GERMANY</td>
<td>3.6 %</td>
<td>4.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>3.0 %</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
<td>2.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1955, for instance, the United Kingdom was fifth in the world league of income per head. In 1981 the UK GNP per capita was $9,100, the 26th in the world behind countries like the FRG ($13,450 and 9th), France ($12,190 and 16th) or Japan ($10,080 and 25th). According to the World GNP ranking, the UK was the sixth country in the world in 1981 (See Table 6.3.ii). These figures dramatically contrast with the fact that by 1900 Britain controlled over one-fifth of the world's land surface and ruled one-quarter of the population of the world.

Table 6.3. ii: World GNP ranking (1981).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GNP ($)</th>
<th>% (World total)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 USA</td>
<td>2,946,020</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>229,807,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 USSR</td>
<td>1,212,030(*)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>267,967,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Japan</td>
<td>1,186,430</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>117,645,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FRG</td>
<td>829,600</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>61,666,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>657,560</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>53,963,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 UK</td>
<td>510,310</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>56,005,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Italy</td>
<td>391,440</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>56,223,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Spain</td>
<td>214,300</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>37,973,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) 1980 figures.

Some authors predict that if present trends continue, Britain will be overtaken by countries like Spain in mid-term future and that the British economy will not reach the present level of the national income in the Federal Republic of Germany until 2051 (41).

On the other hand, the sense of relative deprivation in Scotland with respect to the British core-areas of the South-East of England has grown acutely since the time when the Conservative Party took power in 1979. The big paradox of this situation is offered by the fact that around £12 bn of annual revenue from the industrial
extraction of North Sea oil and gas constitutes an important source of net income for the British Exchequer which, more significantly, has served the purpose not only of covering the deficit of English manufacturing industries but of slowing down the pace of acute decline of the British economy since WWII. Had it not been for the North Sea oil revenue flooding the Exchequer's archs since the mid-1970s, the 1973 oil crisis would have dramatically depressed the living standards of a country with a historical vocation for the manufacture and processing of cheap raw materials from Second and Third World countries.

The classical-liberal free market and supply-side monetarist policies developed by the Thatcher Governments have severely damaged the traditional "lameduck" heavy industries located in Scotland, but have served very appropriately the ethnocentrist -see section 2.6- interests of British capital based in the City. This financial industry has simply disregarded investments in the North of Britain and has concentrated mainly on speculative operations overseas -namely, US financial markets- or in investment ventures in the South East of England.

This sense of relative deprivation could certainly be channelled in electoral terms through an instrumentalist vote for the SNP, together with a wide support for Labour which also receives in Scotland a sizeable portion of the so-called "protest vote" articulated against the English Tory policies which are aimed at favouring the Conservative strongholds in the South-East of England.

1,b) An SNP effective strategy and charismatic leadership.

In its 1984 50th Conference the Party adopted -but by the slightest majority, 246 to 238 votes- the policy of campaigning for a Scottish constitutional convention as the strategy for gaining self-
government for Scotland. However, this strategy - inserted in the party's maximum programme as a step towards total independence - is far from being a wholehearted commitment for all the SNP activists. An important sector of "centrist-traditionalists" strongly believe that the convention would put off the debate on self-government for years. It would be a kind of "talking-shop" and would, consequently, jeopardise the party's target of independence. This view, firmly held by leading members of the party can be summarised as follows:

"No directly-elected Assembly, however powerless, will ever be offered to Scots unless it is offered in an attempt to head off the threat of the Scottish people voting for independence. It is the function of the SNP to pull that vote out" (42).

This "centrist-fundamentalist" approach has consistently failed to understand that the Scottish people will not be mobilised to total independence in one single political move. Only a complete fracture in the dual identification of the Scots (ie. Scottish and British) could justify the implementation of a separatist strategy for political mobilisation. Such a fracture cannot be forecast in the remaining years of this century.

As was said before, only the "imposition" of a withdrawal from the rest of the UK by a majority of SNP MPs -a possibility which can only be speculated on outside the factual responses which the English establishment could develop in such an eventuality- would lead to secession. It has to be borne in mind, however, that, due to the peculiarities of the British electoral system, a mere 20% of the Scottish registered electorate could result in a majority of SNP MPs. This "traditionalist" "wait-and-see" strategy does not pursue an active involvement in the working-out of any form of self-government acceptable to the majority of Scots. Furthermore, past nationalist allegations against the English imposition of the 40 per cent rule in the 1979 Referendum appear rather inconsistent when compared with a
"traditionalist" claim for complete independence which could be the result of the votes of some 20 per cent of Scots in a future General Election.

This thesis holds that a more active function of the SNP in the near future should be basically of a two-fold nature: a) to continue the political discussion for Scotland's total independence and, b) to assume the rejection of secession repeatedly expressed by the Scottish people and, consequently, to work together with the other parties in Scotland to compromise on a form of self-government widely acceptable to the majority of Scots.

The need for a new type of charismatic leadership is another crucial element for the mobilisation required in this political process. As this thesis has pointed out in the "Theoretical framework" (Fig. 2.1.) political mobilization alone can articulate the means of gaining the political aspirations of the Scots for Home-Rule. The passive attitude of the Scots might be galvanised by the presence of a charismatic Scottish political leadership. This factor is essential for the breaking of the ingrained attitude of political defeatism and institutional ins solidarity so characteristic of the Scots. Both these factors are very much the consequence of the calvinist concept of predestination which in politics can be easily translated into a philosophy of "wait-and-see" and, sometimes, hopelessness. Traditional values of competition, utility and self-interest have rooted deeply in the political attitudes of the Scots.

This thesis holds that a change in the type and uses of a leadership which could mobilise and "positively" adapt the political perceptions of the Scots is a decisive factor which greatly influences possible future developments in Scotland.

2) The "conversion" of Scottish Labour to self-government.
The Labour Party is a centralist party trying to implement on its own the decentralist policies of devolution in Scotland. This apparent contradiction must be overcome if there is to be a chance of a workable system of Home Rule in Scotland.

The absence of a whole-hearted Labour's enthusiasm for decentralisation is one in a series of inconsistencies and incoherence which have marked the policies of the Party in relation with the state, its territorial politics and the nature and location of its sovereign power. The reason for this confusion rests with Labour's emphasis on the instrumentalist uses of the state when deploying its political strategies. Thus,

"The lack of either a revolutionary tradition or a democratic foundation for the British state frustrated the development of a general set of principles by which the Labour Party could assess the institutions and practices of the state. The party's approach to the inter-connected issues of the state and political power has consequently tended to be piecemeal and guided by pragmatic considerations" (43).

Indeed, Labour only "gave in" to the demand for devolved assemblies in Scotland in the mid-1970s when the Scottish and Welsh voters scared the party by supporting the nationalist parties. Only then Labour became more "regional" in its economic policy, although the Fabian's ideals of achieving equality and efficiency trough a centralized state, with the provision of uniform social services all over the country from the centre, were still ingrained in the Party's political attitudes (44).

Labour never understood the democratic challenge posed by the political nationalism in the Celtic periphery of the UK against the oppressive nature of the state in those areas. The question, *hinc et nunc*, remains largely the same: is Labour prepared to continue the centralist myth of "statisation" developing its traditional central management of political reforms, or is it ready to assume the participatory values of industrial democracy and decentralised
decision-making?.

Labour has failed traditionally to assimilate the fact that political decentralisation mounts *per se* a democratic challenge to the structure of a capitalist state which, in the case of Britain, uses the practices of economic corporatism and political centralisation to maintain its capitalist supremacy.

Labour, on the other hand, can no longer hold the populist view of attacking the self-interest of the Welsh and Scottish nationalism while, at the same time, deploying the same kind of English-British nationalist self-interest to attack the CEE in the European Parliament.

It is against this background that the potential of the Scottish Labour activists is of the highest importance. The Scottish organisation of the Labour Party faces once again the dilemma of sacrificing principles of democratic socialism —ie. "give people a greater say in decisions which affect them" (45)— for the means of gaining institutional power at the centre of the capitalist British state.

The political initiative in the near future as regards Scottish Home Rule will principally remain with the Scottish membership of the Labour Party and, in particular, with its MPs. The alleged defensive mood of Scottish politics finds in the case of Labour the compliance of a political leadership very unwilling to deploy the uses of political mobilisation to pursue the democratic principle of self-government. In fact, the territorial interests represented by the Labour MPs in Scotland serve very frequently the purpose of lobbying for a percentage-share in the hierarchical core of the Party in London. As it was the case during the devolution debate in the 1970s, among the majority of the Labour Scottish MPs, ".. who spent the great bulk of their time on Scottish affairs and were content to do
so, there was probably some concern about job security" (46).

The retraction in 1984 by the Scottish Labour MPs on the issue of the legislative disruption against the Conservative "no mandate" of the Secretary of State for Scotland, showed the limits and unwillingness of Scottish Labour to operate in the realm of purely Scottish political matters.

However, Scottish Labour leaders would undoubtedly react in a very different mood in the eventuality of a third consecutive defeat of the Party in the next General Election. A new victory for the Tories would provoke a dramatic opposition from the Scottish Labour leadership, "unhappy" with the prospect of a period of 12 years without institutional power in London. Furthermore, this dramatic opposition to the Conservative "viceroy" - i.e. the Secretary of State for Scotland - would be highly influenced by an increasing sense of relative deprivation in Scotland which could threaten Labour with a new SNP electoral upsurge. Labour in Scotland, thus, would necessarily attempt to "instrumentalise" its electoral strength to gain political manoeuvrability from the Celtic periphery of the British state.

If the Alliance were the coalition to win the next General Election, the very existence of Labour as a major political force in British politics would be very much in doubt. Not only the left-wing of the Party would be more inclined to create a new neat leftist formation, but also a second wave of right-wing members would be very much tempted to join the victorious Alliance ranks. For Labour in Scotland, the only option which could maintain its territorial electoral supremacy would be to enhance drastically its "Scottishness".

Another situation likely to happen would be a "hung" Parliament. In the eventuality of a Labour-Alliance pact, the turning point would
be brought about by the negotiation on the issue of the proportional representation, whose implementation would change substantially the nature of British politics. In this situation, the percentage-share of institutional political power to be contested by the Scottish leadership of Labour would constitute the reference point for the intensity in the Scottish MPs' commitment to implement institutions of self-government in Scotland.

Finally, a Labour victory would prove, after two years of legislative action by a Labour Government, if devolution was an "accomplishable" promise, as stated by the Scottish MPs. Otherwise, it would be for them to solve, once again, the dilemma of another Labour failure over Scots' national aspirations for self-government.

In any case, in all the possible futures, the political fortunes of the issue of Scottish Home Rule would very much depend on the attitude of the Labour membership in Scotland and, as a result of this, on the willingness by Scottish Labour leaders to operate also in the Scottish dimension of the British politics, rather than aiming exclusively their territorial interests at gaining institutional power in London.

3) The transformation of the British State.

The issue of Scottish self-government is very closely related to the content and form of any future social transformation in the British state. The trend of political backwardness in Britain, which has encompassed the loss of the Empire and progressive economic decline, has seen an increased paternalist "statisation" in the last decades since WWII. This situation has been described as follows:

"We live in an archaic political society...The British state is to be define as an 'ancien régime', closer in the spirit to the monarchy overthrown in 1789 than to the republican constitutions which followed in France and elsewhere in Europe...The reason that the British economy does not work is that British institutions are in terminal decay" (47).
The outbreaks of racial violence in Britain in the 1980s (Handsworth, Toxteth, Brixton, etc.), and the tragic collective behaviour of the English supporters in Brussels on occasion of the 1984 European Cup Final, are samples of a social fracture which some authors explain only in purely "positivist" terms: ethnic discrimination—as a consequence of the lack of job opportunities—, urban deprivation, poor housing and so forth.

The economic and social model created by English utilitarianism is crumbling. Very often this model has confused technology with civilization, literacy levels with culture or intellectual élites with some kind of a rational—namely English—spirit.

The subjection of the human being to the machine created by the "rationale" of the Industrial Revolution has destroyed the democratic values that Liberalism was meant to achieve. The capitalist Protestant ethic—as much as the Catholic—has always advocated values of altruism and solidarity but the social, political and economic philosophy embraced by 19th century Imperial Britain incorporated the omnipresent pattern for competition, self-interest and aggression in its paramount code of conduct—the Civil law (48).

However, some British observers of social life in Britain argue that there will never be a real social transformation or revolution within the powerful British state: "Every gesture of rage at inequality is, given time, folded with humorous affection into the cosy mythology of the established order" (49). Furthermore, any attitude of defiance in Britain—punks, the inner cities young "unemployees", the political "entrists" organisations on both the Right and the Left, the corporatist Trade Unions, etc—has not expressed a genuine urge for social transformation. These "rebels" do not seek to replace the existing order with something new. They have merely snarled at the existing order, and such a snarl has frequently
been the expression of a deep, albeit sometimes not conscious, desire to be accepted by it.

"The decline occurs when a culture has become too rigid in its technologies, ideas or social organisation as to meet the challenge for the social change" (50). This thesis holds that the political backwardness and decline of Britain is intimately linked to the continuity of the corporatist and centralist forms of the British state. This thesis also assumes that the cultural problems which today face British society—similar to great extent with those in other Western European countries—cannot be "solved" through technical solutions. The values of competition, utility and self-interest no longer give coherence to the British civil society—this only partially occurred in Imperial times. British civil society is simply unable to create an image of its future or to introspect on the replacing values of a new rising culture. This results from a crisis of perception. In Britain, there still is an overwhelming tendency to apply an outdated world view—the mechanistic Cartesian-Newtonian view—to a reality which can no longer be understood in these terms, only (51).

The failure of the democratic parlamentarian system in the industrial state has been caused—amongst other factors—by its problems to function spatially in large communities (i.e. nation-state). The two trends which can be detected in any social subsystem (i.e. integrative, in order to cooperate with a wider system and independent, in order to preserve individual identities), and which also legitimize the equilibrium of the hierarchical social order, have also been neglected in Britain. The political identity of Scotland as a community differentiated from the rest of the other British nations has been systematically pushed under the carpet.

The fate of any social transformation within the British state
is closely related to the creation of geographical, political and cultural communities through which civil society can determine the mechanisms of control and the imperative supra regional coordination now centralised in London. This opposition to centralist corporatism, a common feature in other Western European states, cannot simply rely on the appearance of spontaneous "unhistorical" upsurges of social mobilisation (eg. May 68), but must rely on in the development of self-governed activities which reject the technocratic solutions and the tutelar role of the "paternalist" industrial state.

The trend towards political decentralisation is rooted in the participatory aspirations of the different-based communities which also runs parallel to the trend of creating -or re-defining- a new European culture in search of supranationals forms of institutional coordination. The latter constitutes the concern of the next section which will briefly examine the exogenous variable to the Scottish "issue" brought about by the europeanization of politics.

An exogenous variable: the European context.

In spite of the fact that a majority of British and Scots voted in favour of the UK to be a member of the EEC -64.5% and 58.4% of "Yes" votes with turn-outs of 64.5% and 61.7%, respectively-, the subsequent percentages of the European electoral turn-outs show that both Scots and British are, broadly speaking, the Europeans least interested in the idea of some institutionalised form of a Western European Union (see Table 6.2.viii). Furthermore, the British also question either the existence of the EEC in the form in which it has been operating in the last years or UK membership of the Common Market (see Table 6.2.ix).
Table 6.2.vii: Electoral turn-outs in the European elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1979 %</th>
<th>1984 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>88.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (1)</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2)</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Scotland)</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) 1981 results  
(2) Greenland included

Table 6.2.ix: British attitudes towards British membership in the EEC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FRG</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>4750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stay in</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: They are included only intending to vote


However, both the fact that the strong left-wing opposition in the Labour Party has withered away and that the SNP adopted at its
1983 Conference the policy of positively recommending the membership of an independent Scotland in the EEC, offer a different picture as concerns the EEC variable.

Britain has regarded the EEC from its traditional pragmatic approach. In 1961, for instance, the Labour Party, which in the early 1970s was the political and social force most determined to fight for British membership in the EEC, was sympathetic to the idea of a closer association with the Common Market. Labour and the trade unions, impressed by the economic advances and rising wages in the EEC member states, played down their "ideological" accusation of the EEC as a mere capitalist organisation. Later on, both the Labour Party and the Trade Unions were in the front line against British accession to the EEC. In March 1972, the Labour Shadow Cabinet opted for a popular referendum on the issue. The mood of the Party was against British accession. The constitutional argument over the loss of sovereignty was also mixed up with economic disadvantages, such as butter prices and New Zealand lamb. In the political background, the whole discussion had inserted itself deeply in the duality of still considering 19th Imperial Britain as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier"—and, thus, a junior partner of the 20th century Imperial USA—or, alternatively, building a new role for Europe together with the rest of the European countries.

This thesis shares the view that Europe will search and eventually find new cultural values, together with a new social and political role outside the dominance—intellectual, at least—of the two superpowers. Europe faces the challenge of balancing technology and humanism. The capitalist competition created in Europe can no longer be the pillar on which all kinds of human activities are based. Furthermore, Europe needs to replace the viewpoint that cultural problems and crises of values can simply be sorted out by
means of new solutions based on technology. Technology provides the means for the development of civilizations, not the ends. Europe could overcome its schizophrenia of both technological means and civilised ends only if a new European culture is achieved. In the process of achieving it, the resistance exerted by the European states will be challenged by the popular quest of the European peoples to coordinate themselves from above and to govern themselves from below.

This temptative picture might not bear any resemblance to the short-term political trends taking place on European soil. However, and as far as Scottish self-government is concerned, the forming of a new European culture will progressively "weaken" the centralist tradition of the British state and will, therefore, strengthen the Scots' demands for self-government.

The decline of economic, social and political Imperial values in Britain inserts itself into the midst of a trend towards the semi-peripherality of Western Europe with respect to the requirements of US financial centres. Outside the European institutionalisation, Britain and Scotland are left to play the role of mere branch economies within the USA's financial realm and its capital requirements.

The British tendency towards isolationism, however, indicates much more dramatically the lack of conviction in their own political and social system values. This is not only "unfamiliar" to the European general pattern (eg. the "outdated" first-past-the-post electoral system), but has not been followed as an institutional model by its former colonies (eg. absence of centralist models of government in federal India, Australia or Nigeria; dismissal of the concept of "unlimited" sovereignty, etc.).

Scottish Home-Rule is not alien to the trend of supra-
nationalization in Europe. The existence of any form of institutionalised European union can only be realized in the context of a new culture embraced by the different European communities - cities, regions, and nations.


As pointed out earlier the implementation of any form of Scottish Assembly/Parliament could "possibly" be achieved by the future legislative action of either a Labour or an Alliance Government, or by means of a legislative pact between them. The "probability" of such legislative actions occurring very much depends on an agenda of priorities which, in the case of both the Labour and Alliance cases, does not include devolution/home-rule as a first-priority.

This thesis will subsequently analyse the means by which the institutionalized form of self-government can be achieved from the point of view of its "desirability", a concept which takes into account two crucial premises:

1) The product of broadly agreed proposals of home-rule will inevitably respond to a broad desire for self-government expressed by the Scots.

2) The social mobilisation which would follow the political agreement reached by the political parties in Scotland on the form and content of the home-rule proposals would confer a character of irreversibility on the whole political process.

When transferred to the realm of politics, the traditional Anglo-Saxon values of self-interest, utility and competition provide little room for the articulation of broad negotiations in response to social demands such as the quest for self-government in Scotland. It is from
the territorial dimension of power that the issue of Scottish self-governance deploys itself as a major "Celtic" challenge to the referred to homogeneous Anglo-Saxon values which are incompatible, furthermore, with the multinational nature of Britain. With respect to the functional dimension of power, the powerful British state is better equipped to neutralize the sectorial social mobilisation which lacks the "comprehensive" support of the forces involved (eg. the failure of the 1983-84's Miners' Strike to ballot its whole membership and the subsequent boycott by the Nottinghamshire branch).

The consistent strength of the British state, together with the competitive nature of party politics even when no direct ideological confrontation is involved, leads political scientists to make statements like the following: "But neither public opinion nor the campaigning of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA), still less reason, will bring forth a (Scottish Assembly) Bill" (52). According to this view constitutional change in the arteriosclerotic tradition of British politics can only take place when the old system becomes politically unworkable. As far as the fortunes of Scottish home rule are concerned, this constitutional change could be provided by the need to find common legislative initiatives between Labour and the Alliance in a "hung" Parliament and their respective commitment to the establishment of a Scottish Assembly/Parliament. In the eventuality of this parliamentary situation occurring, a process of legislative agreement would be developed between these two political powers surely representing more than half of the Scottish voters.

However such a process of bilateral negotiation would be "dictated" by the need to form a British government rather than to respond to a mutual priority of implementing home-rule for its own sake. In this case the probability of Scotland achieving some form of self-government would be high, but the desirability of the outcome
The most desirable and workable form of self-government in Scotland is provided by the process of negotiation and agreement among those parties representing the broad majority of the Scottish electorate. A constitutional convention, encouraged by a cross-party organisation like the CSA — or another of similar characteristics — would provide the means for discussion and the kind of assembly/parliament the Scots aspire to could be agreed on.

The exclusion from this constitutional convention of any representative political force in Scotland (i.e. SNP), as would be the case in the case of a bilateral negotiation between Labour and Alliance in a "hung" Parliament, would be disastrous for the credibility of the institution subsequently created (NB. The same could apply to the Conservatives, if they were ready to embrace the cause for devolution).

Some Scots still believe that devolution has something to do with the total secession of Scotland from the rest of Britain. The constitutional convention would have the goal, among others, of debating publicly the different views of the different parties on the home-rule issue. Were the SNP to put forward the claim "independence nothing less" in the negotiations of the constitutional convention, the Scottish population at large would be able to distinguish more clearly between the arrangements for home rule and those for complete secession.

Outside the hypothetical Labour-Alliance negotiations to form a parliamentary majority in Westminster, the SNP could easily deploy its frontal opposition to "Westminster devolution" on the grounds of its having been forced expediently by the compromise reached between two "British" political forces in order to form a British Government. The nationalists could articulate, furthermore, a political discourse
of civil disobedience with the newly-created Scottish Assembly which would be highly disruptive to the work of the new institutions. The SNP could simply put forward the argument that an important sector of Scots represented by them had been neglected by the Labour-Alliance pact.

Although SNP participation, and the subsequent agreement achieved in the Scottish constitutional convention, would not mean its ideological acceptance of the proposals agreed by the inter-party consensus, it would tie such a "qualitatively" important party to the democratic process of discussion and subsequent institutionalisation of self-government.

The setting-up of a Scottish Constitutional Convention would also result in creating more free parliamentary time for any "devolutionist" Government in London. Once the content and form of the proposals had been broadly discussed and agreed to in the Scottish convention, the legislative procedure in Westminster should be very brief. Otherwise, the situation would be one of internal fracture in the parties involved in the Scottish pledge—namely English MPs voting against decisions honoured by their party colleagues in the Scottish convention. Surely this is the point which draws on the biggest question: Would MPs at Westminster, with their "own" territorial constituencies, allow the Scots whatever they wanted?...

In such a situation, the role of the Scottish Labour MPs would be crucial. This thesis maintains that any form of Home-Rule to be achieved in Scotland very much depends on the "Scottishness" of the Labour MPs elected in the Scottish constituencies. Whether in the eventuality of Labour's getting a small majority in Westminster in a future General Election, or their being compelled to negotiate with the Alliance in a "hung" Parliament, the position of the Scottish
Labour MPs would be extremely decisive for the ventures of Scottish Home-Rule. In such an eventuality, would they be willing to claim their Scottishness or would they bow to the party's *raison d'état* of forming a British Government with no first-priority for devolution...? The answer to this question very much depends on the territorial interests of the Labour MPs in Scotland and their willingness or not to use—and, perhaps, sacrifice—their Scottishness in order to occupy senior posts in the British Government.

This pragmatic approach to either enhance or to play down the Scottish "issue" shows the fact that many Scottish Labour politicians are either uneasy with respect to the "national question", or simply instrumentalise their electoral centres of power in Scotland for political promotion in the wider British dimension.

**The proceedings of a Scottish Convention.**

This thesis is of the opinion that the political will among Scottish political representatives to discuss and, eventually, to agree on the form and contents of a Scottish Parliament is the indispensable *sine-qua-non* for beginning the proceedings of a constitutional convention.

The best-positioned body to call on for the commencement of political negotiations over the setting up of both a Scottish Assembly and an Executive would be a cross-party organisation. This point raises some procedural problems which are not trivial. In 1984 the Labour Party, for instance, published *the Green Paper on Devolution* as a "consultative document". That is to say that Labour MPs—the authors of the document—made a premise of its political attitude in the process of such public consultation. They placed themselves, very significantly, in the position of hearing and
debating the points of views produced by the publication of the document (53). Because it is the most voted Party in Scotland, Labour "felt" the need to take the initiative. In any case, and as far as the convention is concerned, this first round of political negotiations does not hinder any future proceedings carried out by a cross-party.

Once a cross-party organisation like the CSA was accepted as convener body by the representative parties in Scotland advocating Scottish self-government, the next step would be a constituent meeting with those members who were the political representatives of their respective parties. This aspect is not, once more, merely formal. In order to avoid pre-judgements about the way the Convention should operate, the constituent parties would be the ones who decided upon the working methodology to be adopted. The role of the convener would subsequently be that of being in charge of the provision of the material elements needed for the proceedings of the Convention and, consequently, would become the instrumental body which put into practice the decisions taken by consent by the Scottish Convention (54).

To say that the political parties should be the constituent parts of the Convention is not to deny their own autonomous prerogative to consider the inclusion or not in the Convention of other representative Scottish "voices" (e.g. Local Authorities, STUC, Chambers of Commerce and Industry and/or representatives of the major religious organisations). The parties, by the very expression of their political will, would accept the "operational" legitimacy of the Convention and so, the result of the negotiations would be one of tacit consensus assumed by the parties involved.

The goal of a Scottish Constitutional Convention can only be realized by the prior assumption made by the political parties that
an institutional form of self-government for Scotland can be achieved by consent and, in so doing, reflecting the electoral preferences of the Scots for those parties advocating Home-Rule for Scotland.

In the eventuality of a political agreement being reached which was widely embraced by the parties involved in the Convention, the next step should be constituted by the formal acceptance of the constitutional proposals by the Scottish Grand Committee —although only formed by those MPs elected in the Scottish constituencies. Finally, the subsequent legislation would be implemented by the Westminster Parliament.

In order to make the whole process not only workable, but irreversible, the political agreement reached within the Scottish constitutional convention should accomplish two other priority goals:

1) The proceedings of the Convention would begin after the parties involved had made explicit in their respective electoral manifestos the pledge to implement some form of home-rule in Scotland.

2) The constituent parties should agree not only on the content and form of the proposals, but would explicitly pursue social mobilisation in order to implement them. That is, a new popular referendum on the Act passed in Westminster containing the agreed proposals in the Scottish convention should be held before the implementation of such legislative provisions.
6.2. TOWARDS A FEDERAL-LIKE "ESTADO DE LAS AUTONOMÍAS"

If the political process which was initiated in Spain in 1975 with the objective of achieving an institutional democratic polity has in the main been accomplished, the same cannot be said for the revolutionary transformation of a despotic, centralised Spanish state into a decentralised, democratic, multinational, multilingual autonomic one. Further, if the democratic institutions in Spain have been fought for and experienced, at times dramatically, in the last two centuries, the achievement of an integrated territorial system of political convivence among Spaniards, in a nation of nations and regions, could well result in a profound revision of the concept of Spain as a political entity. Spain was first unified in the reign of the Catholic Kings during the last third of the 15th century, and later centralised by the first Spanish Bourbon King, Philip V d'Anjou, during the first third of the 18th century.

Thus, not only will the political values involved in this process of deep transformation have to be replaced but also the cultural, social and economic ones, if such an Estado de las Autonomías is to be realized. Only by establishing territorial institutions based upon these "new" values would it be possible to maintain a consensus which would, in turn, develop the democratic nature of the functional institutions of the state. In Spain, as in other multinational nations, the territorial dimension of political power is an element which must of necessity be taken into account both for the achievement of juridical mechanisms of participatory democracy and for the development of a dynamic cultural framework.

Such a "new" concept of Spain, as a community of diverse but at the same time integrated peoples, has brought about the political
challenge of overcoming what has traditionally been a centralist and uniformist Spanish nationalism. This reactionary Spanish nationalism, often linked to a distorted imperial past, could not be substituted by a "newly-created" democratic Spanish nationalism, which was also bureaucratic and centralist, if the present constitutional principles were to survive in the future.

This thesis postulates the need for the deepening of self-government in Catalonia within the framework of a federal-like Spanish Estado de las Autonomías. Argument for this is based mainly on the following points:

1) The existence in Catalonia of a national desire to exercise fully its political, economic and cultural autonomy within a framework of solidarity with the other peoples of a decentralised Spanish state.

2) The institutionalisation of the principle of political negotiation which was inaugurated with the 1978 Constitution and which fits the patterns of dual identity expressed by the majority of Catalans and at the same time provides the best instrument for resolving centre-periphery conflicts.

3) The consolidation of the Spanish democratic polity through the neutralization of centralist-despotic tendencies present in the machinery of the bureaucratic state, and the provision of a federal-like constitutional model of political, economic and cultural convivence which could harness the dynamism and potentials of Spain's nationalities and regions.

4) The trend towards supra-state unification—in the search for a new European culture—which seeks institutional coordination from above and democratic self-government from below (55).

Despite the fact that the actual implementation of the provisions for the Catalan and the Basque autonomy statutes began in 1979, and
that many of the other 17 Comunidades Autónomas have been gradually developing their autonomical policies since 1982, the outcome of the autonomical model cannot be predicted. In fact, the renovated centralist vocation of some democratic politicians, coupled with the ingrained attitude of those central bureaucrats "objectively" interested in perpetuating the institutions of the old state, are factors jeopardising the federalist philosophy of the 1978 Constitution.

In accordance with this analysis, later developed in section 6.2.1, the collision of two divergent territorial models—centralist and autonomical—could have two possible results. The least probable would be the dismantling of the institutions of self-govern ment in the Spanish nationalities and regions; a less likely possible outcome is the break-up of Spain. The option held by this dissertation as the most desirable is the coherent "federalisation" of the model set by the Estado de las Autonomías, which could eventually bring about a partial reform of the 1978 Constitution in a direction towards some form of cooperative federalism (56). As far as the future of Catalonia in particular is concerned, this political process would reinforce the self-governed institutions of the Generalitat and would put the emphasis on the development of new forms of Catalan culture together with the consolidation of bilingualism

6.2.1. The shaping of Autonomical Spain.

The wide political consensus which made the drawing up of the 1978 Constitution possible brought about as well no little ambiguity in the formulation of the Title VIII which concerns the territorial organization of the Spanish State. In fact two different conceptions of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were
negotiated. Subsequently, a *via media* between the two entrenched positions was attempted: on the one hand, the idea of an indivisible and solely Spanish nation was put forward; on the other, a concept of Spain as an ensemble of diverse peoples, historic nations and regions.

The formula finally agreed on was the result of a political compromise:

"The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right of autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity amongst them all" (Art. 2).

It is important to note that, together with the syntactical emphasis put on the "indissoluble" unity of the Spanish nation, the Constitution assumes a right to the autonomy of nationalities and regions which is prior to its own promulgation, given the fact that it "recognises" and "guarantees" such a right.

Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution reflects many of the tensions and political contradictions in existence at the time when such constitutional provisions were discussed. However, it also reflects the common desire to reach political agreement among all the constituent political parties involved in the process of negotiation (57). The result has, consequently, been an "open" model of territorial organisation for the democratic Spanish State:

"Title VIII makes possible the existence of one self-governed Comunidad Autónoma, three, all or none. It depends on the political will expressed by the inhabitants of each nationality or region, or by their political representatives. It also makes it possible for the degree of self-governement to be ample or restricted according to the wishes of the Comunidades Autónomas. The nationalities and regions can organize themselves either in an homogeneous or heterogeneous way and, finally, the possible political "mistakes" made during the process of decentralisation can also be rectified in time" (García Añoveros, J, 1984, p. 16) (58).

This "open" territorial model is, furthermore, based upon a generalising principle of autonomies:
"The State is organized territorially into municipalities, provinces and any Autonomous Communities that may be constituted. All these bodies shall enjoy self-government for the management of their respective interests" (Art. 137).

The new territorial organization of the Spanish State is finalist in its own nature: its premises and previews do not prejudice the ways and means by which the different spatial entities could, finally, articulate among themselves. Thus, an implicit desire was expressed by the "fathers" of the 1978 Constitution to provide the procedures and degrees of self-government to be pursued by the nationalities and regions with a high degree of flexibility and, consequently, to explicitly avoid the formulation of a clear division of powers based upon "orthodox" federal techniques.

In accordance with the principle of political negotiation, which embodied the constitutional text as a whole, Conservatives, Centrists, Nationalists, Socialists and Communists opted for an "open" model which would not jeopardise the delicate constitutional consensus in this issue, the "hottest" to be agreed upon in the constituent period. Hence, the accepted solution took the form of a non-written pledge to extend the mechanisms of political transaction into the future.

The formula subsequently followed in the making of the autonomy statutes for Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, was to proceed with political discussions among the political forces operating in the ambit of their respective nationalities. The other formula used was to achieve general agreement between the two main Spanish parties at the time (UCD and PSOE), in order to establish a political platform for the timing and forms of autonomical process for the remaining nationalities and regions. Both schemes were carried out in the same spirit of negotiation as the 1978 Constitution, the exception being the case of Andalusia, whose political leaders and population at large opted for the same procedure and degree of self-
government previously pursued by the three historical nationalities (59).

It is crucial to point out that the extension of political autonomy to the diverse Spanish nationalities and regions was not a mere decision taken by the hierarchies of the two main Spanish parties but a product, to a great extent, of the political pressure exercised by the local and regional branches of these parties. Social mobilization was, in many cases, the result of a sense of "ethnic competition" in search of equal access to the institutions of self-government, even in territories where a political demand for such political autonomy was a priori very feeble (see section 2.6). The early Catalan and Basque processes towards self-government sparked, indeed, a desire by the other Spanish nationalities and regions not to be left behind. In the summer of 1981, both UCD and PSOE attempted a harmonisation of the autonomical process following, to some extent, the "uniformizing" aspects of the federal model of the Federal Republic of Germany. This UCD-PSOE agreement sought the unilateral coordination of the autonomical process from the central administration. This overwhelming miscalculation brought about by the making of the LOAPA (60) was, above all, political. At the time when the legislative inception of the LOAPA was attempted (1981-1982), all the nationalist parties together with the Communists and, to a much lesser extent, the Conservatives, were fiercely opposed to it. Indeed, and despite the fact that some "technical" aspects of the LOAPA have later been supported by decisions taken by the Constitutional Court, the timing and content of such harmonizing policies from the centre, when the structure of the centralist Francoist State was still almost untouched, was grossly clumsy.

In fact, from a broader perspective, if the federal-like model of decentralisation were to succeed in Spain, the political gravity in
the centre-periphery political relationship could in no way be placed in the former, particularly in a country where all non-democratic regimes have been centralist and where the economically powerful periphery has traditionally been neglected in the process of political decision-making.

Once the first tour de force put forward by central plutocrats and centralist politicians was neutralized by the decision of Constitutional Court on the LOAPA, the transfer of powers, according to the respective statutes of autonomy, was accelerated and practically completed, although the process was not free of bureaucratic friction and interference. An UCD ex-Minister of Economy has graphically narrated the "prototypical" approach of tutelage put forward by top ministerial officials in the discussion with representatives of the Comunidades Autónomas about such transfer of powers"

"We (addressing, perhaps Catalan representatives) would certainly transfer to you this service and that, but according to other autonomy statutes we would have to do the same with Extremadura, Murcia and Andalusia, and you will agree with us that (because they are not prepared) it is just not possible, it would be a disaster..." (59).

Even now, after the accomplishment of the technical processes of power transfer, a variety of territorial issues are still being fiercely contested by the politicians and top bureaucrats of central governments with regard to autonomical administrations. In this respect the conclusion that some central positions have become more entrenched than others in the aftermath of the constitutional promulgation is not exaggerated. In fact, the path towards a federal-like model of State in Spain is far from being guided in such a direction. It may well be that the strategy of such central officials has as its aim not only the slowing down of the process, but also the "magnifying" of the consequential difficulties which such a deep
state transformation necessarily brings about. Indeed, this strategy could be highly disruptive for the democratic development of the political process as a whole after the demise of Franco's dictatorship. The hybrid which could result out of this interplay between centralist-bureaucratic and autonomist-constitutional forces, would make it impossible for the Spanish population at large to "correctly" evaluate this new territorial model which is a product of the process of democratic consensus in the transitional period.

Let us, consequently, review the main political challenges posed with respect to the "natural" development of the Estado de las Autonomías by a federal-like model.

**Future scenarios of the autonomical model.**

The ambiguity of the Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution, coupled with "day-to-day" discussions and conflicts inherent in the factual re-organisation of the Spanish state, has made Spanish statesmen and party hierarchies engage their political activities almost exclusively in the short-term. Hence, there is a widespread lack of vision of the future territorial model which could be the result of the democratic transformation of Spanish polity started in 1975.

The parties' positions in this respect are very significant. During the constitutional period (1977-79), the Conservatives of AP -subsequently the main Opposition coalition in 1982-86- expressed both their refusal of the autonomical model and the recognition of the concept of nationalities. They, furthermore, pledged that a future AP Government would change this model. In fact, this very issue was the main cause of several AP MPs voting against, or abstaining in, the 1978 Constitution in the parliamentary debate. However, when the Conservatives later won the Galician elections in
1982 and 1985, they were most willing to use the autonomical powers transferred to this historical nationality to oppose "centralist" policies put forward by the Socialist central government.

The PSOE is a party with an organic federal structure. The highest executive committee is denominated Comisión Ejecutiva Federal, and the Comité Federal is the superior policy-making body of the party between the celebration every three years of the Congreso Federal. The 1982-86 Socialist Governments, nonetheless, not only attempted to implement the LOAPA, rebuked in its main "harmonising" aspects by the Constitutional Court, but also applied restrictive criteria in the crucial issue of the autonomical financing of the Comunidades Autónomas. The PSOE regional leaders have openly advocated a federal Estado de las Autonomías (61). However, the Socialist Government publicly confessed in February 1984 that it could not foresee the final configuration of the Spanish state after the autonomical process of decentralisation was over (62).

There is a neocentralist school of thought which maintains that the whole process of decentralisation in Spain was put expeditiously under Spanish party interests in order to contest -and obtain- political power in the newly-created extra tier of government. According to this view, the national and regional aspirations of the different communities in Spain were "over-valued" and, subsequently, stirred in order to open a new track of access to institutional power. Moreover, this view maintains that in the process of the "fragmentation" of the Francoist State, some parties -namely, UCD and PSOE- implicitly agreed to the alternative pursuits of institutional power outside the central administration (63). Some of these neocentralist voices contrast dramatically with those autonomist and nationalist ones which also criticised the referred to parties, although from the viewpoint that these parties became progressively
less and less attached to the programme of political decentralisation the moment they seized power at the centre (i.e. UCD in 1979–82 and PSOE 1982–86).

In any case, both schools of thought share one common criticism: the malfunctioning of inter-governmental relations and the uncertainty over the institutional outcome of the automonical process. This sustains the view that such a process has reached the critical point of no-return. Consequently, the re-structuring of the state apparatus along the lines of the old centralist-Napoleonic model is politically unthinkable, if democracy is to survive in Spain. The options are two-fold: either an institutional intermingling between the old centralist state structure and some of the institutional arrangements brought about by the new State of Autonomies, or a federal-like model.

First option respondents to this dilemma would, in principle, advocate a coordinated model of federalism and would, thus, support the fully decentralized alternative. However, such a vocational federalism is, in fact, greatly watered down by the so-called "safeguard mechanisms" they themselves advocate for the coordination of the functions of all state institutions (64). In fact, the revision of the 1978 Constitution which these neo-centralists propose tends to "devolve" further powers of superior legitimacy to the Spanish Parliament and, consequently, plays down the arbitrary role of the Constitutional Court.

The federal-like vision of the Spanish polity held by this thesis postulates the maintenance of the principle of permanent political negotiation, between the constituent nationalities and regions of multinational Spain and the central Spanish institutions, as the main code of political behaviour for the institutional consolidation of the Estado de las Autonomías. It must, nonetheless, be stated that
prospective constitutional revisions are also envisaged as being crucial if the following shortcomings are to be overcome:

(a) Territorialization of the Senate.

The 1978 Constitution considers the Spanish Senate as a "House of territorial representation" (Art. 69); each Spanish province elects four senators by majority system, each of the 17 Autonomous Communities also nominates another Senator and, finally, one further Senator is nominated by the C.C.A.A. for each million inhabitants of their respective territories.

In actual fact, the Senate embodies in its outlook the cohabitation of the two State models of paracentralism and parafederalism which are present in the 1978 constitutional provisions. The Upper House has shown a very poor legislative performance since its creation and consequently has played a merely duplicated role of that carried out previously by the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House). In practical terms, its main instrumental value has been to provide the government and opposition parties with a "second opportunity" to reach agreements upon Bills previously passed in the Lower House. In any case, its legislative subordination to the Chamber of Deputies has left very little room for the development of any genuine "territorial" action related to the process of decentralisation and the *Estado de las Autonomías*.

Very illustrative in this respect is the reluctance of the majority Socialist parliamentary group in the Senate, during the early months of 1986, to support the celebration of a belated debate on the State of the Autonomies and, even, to allow their 17 territorial parliamentary speakers to participate in such a debate (65).

The factor which clearly distorts the territorial composition of
the Senate is the electoral (over-) representation given to the provinces instead of strengthening the role of the Comunidades Autónomas. Without the latter configuration, it is, therefore, rather inappropriate to speak of a House of territorial representation in accordance with the autonomical principles embodied in the 1978 Constitution.

(b) Re-definition of the political roles of the provinces.

The provinces, as administrative units, were created in Spain in 1833, after the territorial model designed by Javier de Burgos and based upon the Napoleonic départements. In fact, the province was born with the centralising aim of coordinating the peripheral organisation of the state and, more importantly, of breaking the regional Spanish mould of traditional kingdoms and distinctive regions (Castile, Aragón, Catalonia, Andalusia, Galicia, Asturias, Basque Country, Navarre, etc.). Subsequently, the notion of the province changed from being considered a circumscription for the peripheral administration of the state to becoming a territorial unit of government with its own legal personality.

The 1978 Constitution maintains the character of the province as a local entity, determined by the grouping of municipalities and by territorial division, "...in order to carry out the activities of the state" (Art. 141) (66).

The territorial overlapping CC.AA. provinces has brought about an element of political "discrimination" since 7 of the 17 Autonomous Communities are uniprovinciales and, thus, only comprise the territory of one province. These regions have been able to merge both autonomical and provincial administration very naturally and, consequently, in such territories there is de facto a three-tier system of government -i.e. local, regional and central. The same
cannot be said of the remaining 10 Comunidades Autónomas whose situation is aggravated by the fact that the provincial tier of government is felt to be both "artificial" and centrally imposed in nationalities like Catalonia. In another CC.AA., namely the Basque Country, the provinces under the denomination of "Historical Territories" constitute a peculiar model of internal territorial confederation.

A re-definition of the province should be much in line with the 1873 Spanish Federal Constitution which granted autonomy to the regions in order to maintain, modify or eliminate the provincial administration. Furthermore, the functions of the provincial Diputaciones (provincial councils) could be re-allocated as peripheral administrations of the CC.AA., whose governments are always tempted to take over the rationale of "efficiency" and adopt a centralist attitude within each Comunidad Autónoma. This option should confront the hot issue of eliminating the provincial elections for the Diputaciones and re-adapting the autonómical representation of such provincial territories. Otherwise, the future electoral situation in Spain could be one of political exhaustion with local, provincial, autonómical, national and European election, -plus popular referenda from time to time-, taking place every four years. This thesis does not view such electoral proliferation as undesirable per se, an exception made in the case of that of provincial and autonómical representatives within the Autonomous Communities.

(c) Division of powers and peripheral administration of the State.

This third set of issues can be developed within the scope envisaged by the 1978 Magna Carta and in line with the federal-like model postulated by this dissertation. Nevertheless, the initiatives
to be pursued in this respect fall more appropriately within the realm of the political rather than that of the juridical. However, the eventual political achievements related to such initiatives would make a future revision of the constitution highly desirable. This would undoubtedly consolidate the "new" autonomical model of the Spanish polity and would, thus, eliminate factors of uncertainty and provisionality in the political understanding and application of the principle of permanent political negotiation concerning inter-goverment relations.

There is little doubt about the fact that the 1978 Constitution provides a federal framework of power division between central and regional administration:

"The distribution of powers between central government and Autonomous Communities, the autonomy statutes, the so-called 'constitutional bloc' comprising the complementary laws...together with the flexibility of the system, based upon the principle of central-regional negotiation, the ultimate arbitrary role of the Constitutional Court and the open provisions of Art. 150 of the Constitution (67), provide enough scope to establish a central government/Autonomous Communities relationship very identical to that existent in the formal federal states" (Solé Tura, J, 1985, p. 165).

The federal technique for the distribution of political powers and financial resources, together with the general objective of reconciling both the highest level of decentralisation and the necessary inter-govermental coordination, appear as a consequential outcome in the building of the Spanish State of Autonomies. But, unlike the traditional "deductive" philosophy which has patterned the making of federal states (USA, RFA, Switzerland, Australia, etc), the Spanish autonomical model will require a long process of power delimitation in the three-tier system of government before the federal-like arrangements are realised. Only then will the generalising principle of autonomies put forward by the 1978 Constitution eventually reach the point where political arrangements between the three levels of government will be politically "stable"
(68). Once this situation has been achieved, a constitutional revision should functionally incorporate these technical arrangements, avoiding the great political difficulties which would occur, if had the process developed inversely. In fact, the attempt to pursue this latter process through the awkward implementation of the LOAPA showed the political inconsistency of the above coordination in the early stages of the political process of widespread territorial autonomies.

Another challenge to deal with in this political process regards the gradual reduction in size of the peripheral administration of the state, namely that of central government in the Autonomous Communities. Once again, the assumption of political principles is prior to the working out of technical arrangements. The rationale which should preside over future processes views local and regional governments as genuine representatives of the state in their respective territorial ambits and, in doing so, puts forward the principle of indirect administration (69). In other words, not only would the Spanish State implement their regional and local policies through regional and local councils, but a hypothetical European Federation too. Consequently, executive functions would not be duplicated and carried out at the same time by both peripheral state administration and regional governments.

This process in Spain should, at the same time, be encompassed by the articulation of horizontal decision-making at the centre of polity and, thus, strengthen institutions like the Council for Fiscal and Financial Policy, as well as re-define the Senate as the territorial House for legislative matters with specific autonómica contents.

The federalising process of decentralisation in Spain will inevitably bring about administrative reform. In any case, it faces
the challenge of simplifying and coordinating better the desirable three-tier system of inter-governmental relations. However, this thesis considers that a negative perception by the general public formed as a consequence of a hypothetical intermingling of bureaucratic frictions between the various administrations, together with neo-centralist attitudes put forward by state officials, is the Achilles' heel for the consolidation of a federal-like Estado de las Autonomías in Spain.

6.2.1. The deepening of autonomy in Catalonia.

The political process of negotiation involved in the achievement of self-government in Catalonia, initiated at the same time as the transitional process towards democracy in Spain, has accomplished important goals despite the fact that the final autonómica model has not yet been worked out. Indeed, most of the powers envisaged in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy have already been transferred from the centre and the self-governed institutions of the Generalitat have, consequently, been carrying out autonomous policies in a wide range of areas since the election of the first Catalan Parliament and Government in 1980. But, there are still important areas such as the judiciary or security forces, in which the Generalitat has a notable say, which have undergone relatively little political development. The political fitting into the Catalan autonómica scenario of Organic Laws -complementary to the 1978 Constitution- such as those passed in the Spanish Parliament dealing with the Judiciary Power and the Security Forces, will require a slow delicate process of negotiation and "technical" implementation.

The main future challenge facing the Catalan community surely concerns the development of cultural values within the framework of a multinational democratic Spain. In the past, the struggle for
autochthonous forms of Catalan culture and the recovery of oppressed cultural traditions greatly fuelled the appearance of a strong political nationalism (eg. La Reinaxença in the mid-19th century and the Nova Cançó in the 1960s and 1970s).

This thesis holds that the "instrumentalist" character of the Catalan culture, which manifested itself in the late Francoist decades and was tightly linked to the political struggle for self-government, will eventually have to give way to new cultural values not exclusively engaged in the inward vision of some traditional Catalan values. These emerging cultural values, born in a political conjuncture of democratic quasi-federalism, are already coming into contact with other emerging forms of cultural expression being developed in other nationalities and regions of Spain. The result of such a cultural shake-up will necessarily shape the political understanding and popular image of the Estado de las Autonomías. In the end, only the image held by the Spanish peoples at large of an autonomical Spain, product of such cultural dynamism could determine the institutional structure inaugurated by the 1978 Constitution.

The linguistic normalization of the use of Catalan is a policy which is supported by the majority of Catalan parties. This normalization will undoubtedly face both theoretical and practical problems. Even modern sociolinguistic theory observes that the implementation of such linguistic normalization will cause some difficulties. On the other hand, there are groups of adult immigrants who are reluctant to adapt themselves to the new situation, although this is rapidly changing (70).

Such inevitable "normalization" will run parallel to the achievement of complete bi-lingualism by future generations of Catalans. The prospect of a mono-lingual Catalonia, as some independent voices hint at pursuing does not match the view,
previously expressed in this thesis, of the achievement of new outlooking cultural values, following the pattern of the Catalans' dual identity. Neither would the majority of Catalans be ready to renounce the language used by more than 300 millions of Castilian-speakers.

The provision of a new financial system for the Generalitat based upon the principles of sufficiency, solidarity and autonomy, is probably the toughest issue to be negotiated in the short-term political agenda. However, there should be no misunderstanding over the intricate nature of intergovernmental finances. This issue has the same conflicting elements in the Spanish context as in any other political system with a federal or quasi-federal form of government. Furthermore, since the 1978 Constitution entitles the central government to provide the diverse CC.AA. with budgetary resources directly in order to guarantee a minimum level of basic public services throughout the Spanish territory, there is bound to be inter-governmental friction between those Autonomous Communities which are wealthier than the average of Spanish Comunidades and the central administration (71). In this respect, a political challenge is posed on the issue of how to arrange political processes of horizontal consultation and decision-making which will provide the criteria and policies necessary for the accomplishment of an equalising minimum level of public services for all 17 rationalities and regions as indicated in the 1978 Constitution (Art. 158, 1).

Much in the line of the Australian federal system, during the development of the Estado de las Autonomías in the first stage, or the so-called "provisional" period, the pattern has been one of a functionally federal but financially unitary system—with the exception made in the foral arrangements for the Basque Country and Navarre. Thus, the Autonomous Communities have been responsible for
the provision of services such as Education, Health, Culture, Public works and so forth, but yet have mainly depended upon the transfer of funds from the centre in order to finance them. The prospective pattern viewed by this thesis is one of necessary horizontal intergovernmental cooperation for the criteria of the allocation of resources, in accordance with the constitutional principle of solidarity in the re-distribution of financial resources to be met, as well as the introduction of a deeper degree of financial autonomy with an increase in regional taxation and the instrumental use of the recourse to public debt (72).

Negotiation and transaction, the genuine paramount principles embraced by the most representative "regime" and "opposition" political parties after the demise of Franco's dictatorship, always carry the intrinsic options of conflict and dissent. This federalist "open" dimension is fully present in the complexion and inner mechanisms of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías. Centre-periphery relations are, thus, exposed to conjunctural political discussions and debates of an ethnoterritorial nature.

This thesis considers that such a "federalising" dimension in Spanish inter-govermental relations should bring about new cultural political values which will forge economic and social understanding among the different Spanish peoples and which will, more importantly, re-activate a regional creativity smothered by centuries of centralist uniformization and lingering institutional degradation.

Having said this, the fact that party political nationalism in Catalonia—principally CiU much in the same line as the PNV in the Basque Country—will always attempt to make the most of the political issues involved in foreplay negotiation with the central government "conflictiive", does not escape the formulation of such future vision. In such prior stages to the finding of transactional compromises,
the "interest" of Catalonia will invariably be put before the public by the nationalist administrations as being "victimised" by the state centre. This dialectical approach is highly profitable in expedient electoral terms as the CiU strategy in the period 1980-1985 has clearly showed. According to this political discourse, the embodiment of "Madrid" as the external adversary giving cohesion to all party political nationalism in Catalonia is a powerful instrument for the achievement of the electoral interests of the CiU (73).

In any case, such inter-class populism as put forward by the CiU faces shortcomings in the uses of external adversary dialectics. First of all, it faces the lack of policy coherence produced by the diverse ways in which their institutional representatives vote on the same legislative issues either in the Spanish or Catalan Parliaments. In 1985, for instance, CiU MPs voted in Madrid in favour of the Anti-Terrorist Law, the 1985 Spanish general Budget and the Bases Law for Local Administration. CiU diputats voted in Barcelona, however, for an appeal to the Constitutional Court on the grounds of the alleged unconstitutionality of the same three pieces of legislation (74). The CiU has been able to play skillfully the political ambiguity of both the "independist" option for the electoral purposes within Catalonia and the pragmatic approach of a party with a Spanish vocation or, in other words, with the objective interest of winning power at the centre of the Spanish state.

Indeed, the calculated exercises of flirtation with the issue of self-determination for Catalonia have to be seen as no more than a testimonial attitude to gain "respectability" before the minority separatist groups in Catalonia. As a matter of fact, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, following the trail of the old Lliga, aspires to have a greater say in Spanish affairs and, consequently, aims at the gaining of power in "Madrid", the geographical expression
of its external adversary, but the accepted source of power statewide. It is from this perspective that the creation of the Partido Reformista, by CiU's number two, Miquel Roca i Junyent, acquires its fullest meaning. After the electoral disaster of UCD, it has aimed at re-grouping the Spanish forces of the political centre and centre-right, with no Francoist involvement and seeks to articulate regional groups and the divided liberals under a federally structured formation.

The CiU coalition, which relies upon a charismatic leadership, —the Achilles' heel of the Catalan Left—, has comfortably carried out its policies in the absence of a strong opposition from the Left, very much in disarray because of the political difficulties in the organic relationship and different strategies between the local PSC and the central PSOE, and the dramatic "eurocommunist-leninist-prosoviet" struggle in the PSUC. Preeminent Catalan figures of the PSC, also greatly influenced by the political idearium of the II Liga leader, Prat de la Riba, have managed to achieve a strong position in the Spanish Socialist Cabinet in the period 1982-86 (75). Consequently, they have factually accomplished their objectives of holding highly influential sources of political power at the centre of the Spanish state. Nevertheless, some gross neo-centralist miscalculations by the Socialist Cabinet as a whole —eg. the LOAPA issue— have somehow tarnished the electoral credibility of the PSC as a Catalan national party.

The electoral figures are very illustrative in this respect and clearly show a progressive decline in the "nationalist" appeal of the PSC as compared with their results in Spanish Elections. In the 1982 General Election and the 1983 local election the PSC/PSOE in Catalonia received 45.2% and 41.9%, respectively. These figures contrast with 22.2% and 23.1% achieved by the CiU in the same
electoral contests. However, in the 1984 Catalan election, although the PSC managed to come second with 30% of the popular vote, the CiU climbed spectacularly to an stunning 46.6% of the popular vote and gained an absolute majority of seats in the Parliament. Such figures contrast dramatically with the unchallenged electoral supremacy of the Left in the second half of the 1970s. In the 1977 General Election, for instance, the aggregate of both the PSC and the PSUC accounted for 46.6% of the popular vote which was increased to 47.0% in the 1979 local election (NB. the nationalist coalition received 16.8% and 18.6% of the vote, respectively).

Furthermore, the different political perception by the Catalans of some Spanish affairs, compared with other regions or nationalities, has brought about an element of heterogeneity in the running of political affairs in Spain which seriously handicaps, in turn, the Catalan PSOE federation – the PSC. Outside its main meaning, the issue of the NATO Referendum showed, among other factors, the different approach and understanding of a majority section of the Catalan population as regards the U-turn adopted by the Socialist Party on the issue of the Spanish membership of the Western military bloc.

If the Spanish figures indicated a majority position for the "Yes" vote (52.5% as compared to 40% "No" and 7.5% of both Blank and Null and void votes), the results in Catalonia showed a marginal but also clear attitude against the Spanish membership of NATO (ie. 50.6% "No" votes, 43.6% "Yes" votes and 5.8% Blank and Null and void votes) (76).

Despite the fact that the leaders of the PSC were reluctant to campaign in Catalonia for the "official" PSOE position in favour of remaining in NATO and were also aware of the costs of such an operation, the final outcome was one of political submission to the decision taken by the Federal Commission of the Party.
In a wider context, the great inconsistency of the Catalan Left has been its inability to capitalise its hegemonic position during the 1977-79 constituent period. If the lack of a strong charismatic Socialist candidate for the Presidency of the Generalitat in the first 1980 Catalan elections can be counted as a decisive factor for the then marginal victory of CiU, the subsequent impotence of the Left to challenge the inter-class populist appeal of the CiU nationalists has remained the usual invariable pattern in the period 1980-85.

Surely, and in full coherence with the Spanish constitutional principle of the geographical distribution of political power and generalising system of autonomías, the Left must also seize power in any of the three historical nationalities in order to test the federalising nature of the Estado de las Autonomías. Accordingly, the same argument can be applied, by extension, to the rest of the CCAA where the institutional "monopoly" of the socialists could bring about elements of interference in the formation of a future image of a federal-like State of Autonomies by the Spanish peoples.
NOTES


8. See Anderson, M, "Tactical voting and the threat to Tory rule" in The Scotsman, 12.1.84.

9. Nicholas Fairbairn, Conservative MP for Perth and Kinross, The Scotsman, 27.2.84.


14. This legislative disruption device was used during the Heath Government by the Labour MP for Berwick and East Lothian, John Mackintosh.

15. The Scotsman, 9.3.84. On this issue see also ibid, 7.12.83, 30.1.84, 15.2.84, 16.5.84 and 11.6.84.

16. ibid, 9.3.84.


Glasgow.


20. The Scotsman, 13.2.84.

21. ibid, 11.6.84.

22. ibid, 6.3.85.

23. George Foulkes in The Scotsman, 3.2.84.


25. See statement by George Foulkes, Labour's front-bench spokesman on foreign affairs and member of Labour's NEC in The Scotsman, 9.3.85. Also see ibid, 20.2.84, 1.3.84 and 19.6.85.

26. For example, in a survey poll conducted in Scotland on September 9 and 10, 1985, the Alliance had overtaken the Tories for the second post in the electoral preferences of the Scots. The results were as follows: Labour, 42 %; Alliance, 24 %; Conservative, 21 % and SNP, 13 %.


30. The Scotsman, 20.2.84.

31. ibid, 19.9.85.


33. The Scotsman, 30.9.85.

34. Ron Wyllie, executive vice-chairman of the SNP, in The Scotsman, 20.4.85.

35. Bayne, I. in The Scotsman, 10.12.84.

36. See Gordon Wilson's first speech to the National Council (October 13, 1979, mimeograph).

37. See The Scotsman, 13 and 14.3.85.

38. See The Scotsman, 15, 17 and 18 6.85.

39. See Glasgow Herald, 7.5.82.


42. Jim Fairlie, executive vice-chairman of the SNP, in The Scotsman, 7.3.85.


44. See, for instance, Drucker, H; 1979, p. 110.


52. Bernard Crick, former Professor of Politics at Birbeck College (London), in The Scotsman, 14.10.85.


54. On the issue of the Scottish constitutional convention see the CSA documents, Blueprint for Scotland and The Scottish Constitutional Convention.

55. This point is common to the future Scottish context envisaged in alternative no. 4 postulated by this dissertation in section 6.1.

56. See conceptualization of the concepts "possible", "probable" and "desirable" in the introduction of Part VI.

57. There is now little doubt about how disruptive the absence of representatives from the Basque Nationalist Party in the Constitutional Committee in charge of the drafting of the 1978 Constitution, was. Such absence has proved to be a great handicap in the articulation of alternatives for the political dialogue in the Basque Country.

58. Jaime García Añoveros was Minister of Economy in the last UCD Governments before the Socialist landslide in the 1982 General
Election. For an interpretation of the concepts of nationalities and regions adopted by each of the 17 Autonomous Communities, see Prats i Català, J (1985).

59. A useful chronicle of the Andalusian "rebellion" is provided by Clavero Arévalo, 1983, pp. 121-147. See also Elorriaga, G (1983).

60. The "Organic Law for the Harmonization of the Autonomical Process", implemented according to the "autonomical" agreement between UCD and PSOE, was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on August 5, 1983 (see Decision numbered 0015045-0022909). On the "juridicalisation" of the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías see, for instance, Morodo (1985).

61. Jose Rodríguez de la Borbolla, on occasion of his being elected President of the Andalusian regional government (El País, 8.iv.84).

62. El País, 15.ii.84.

63. See, for example, Burgos, J. de, 1983, pp. 33-40.

64. Ibid, pp. 195-200.

65. El País, 4.iv.86. The leader of the Socialist parliamentary group in the Senate went as far as to state that there were "...no issues important enough make the celebration of such a debate necessary".

66. A further decision of the Constitutional Court on July 28, 1981 ruled that the provinces could not be supressed due to the fact that their existence is guaranteed by the 1978 Constitution.

67. Art 150.2 reads as follows: "The State may transfer or delegate to the Autonomous Communities, through an organic law, powers appertaining to it..."

68. Very illustrative was the refusal in 1984 by the Regional Parliament of Aragon to demand the transfer of powers concerning Education from the central administration. The decision, however, was stated as "provisional". Such powers would be "received" when other Aragonese autonomical priorities were accomplished (see El País, 3.ix.84).


71. Jordi Pujol, for example, expressed his concerns for the resolution adopted by the PSOE in its 30th Federal Conference, in order to commit the central government to apply re-distributive criteria to all "regional" public investment and not only that.
regarding the monies of the Compensation Inter-territorial Fund. These equilising criteria would take into account the different income levels of the Autonomous Communities (El País, 24.xii.84).

72. For the Australian case see, for instance, Holmes, J & Sherman, C, 1977, pp. 135-165.


74. ibid, p. 179.

75. At the beginning of 1986, for example, PSC members held the ministerial posts of Defense, Health and Social Security and Industry in the Spanish central cabinet.

76. The other rationalities and regions with a "No" majority in the NATO Referendum were the Basque Country (65.2%), Navarre (52.7%) and the Canary Islands (50.5%).
APPENDICES
Appendix 2: Survey polls in Scotland and Catalonia on national identification (Technical notes).

SCOTLAND (1986)
(System Three Scotland, 16, York Place, Edinburgh)

A. BACKGROUND AND METHOD

A poll was requested to investigate how the Scots perceived themselves in respect of their nationality - Scottish or British.

A sample of 965 adults aged 18 and over was interviewed in-home in 39 sampling points throughout Scotland over the period 26 June - 1 July 1986.

To ensure that the sample was representative of the adult population in terms of age, sex and class, it was weighted to match JICNARS population estimates from the National Readership Survey of January - December 1983. The sample profile, both unweighted and weighted, is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N = 965 (%)</th>
<th>Unweighted</th>
<th>Weighted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 24</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>25 - 34</td>
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<td>55 - 64</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>35</td>
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A copy of the questionnaire used in the survey is appended.
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<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
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<th>CLASS</th>
<th>AREA</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>25-39</td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>50-59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (unwtd.) (wtd.)</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish not British (+2)</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More Scottish than British (+1)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equally Scottish and British</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More British than Scottish (-1)</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>British not Scottish (-2)</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.01</td>
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<td>.99</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scottish Opinion Survey
JUNE 19
B. FINDINGS

Respondents were shown a prompt card listing 5 alternatives and asked to select the one which best described how they regarded themselves in terms of their nationality. Results were:

Scottish, not British 39
More Scottish than British 30
Equally Scottish and British 19
More British than Scottish 4
British, not Scottish 6

A comfortable majority of the population (7 out of 10) thus regard themselves as Scottish first and foremost, with over half of these - almost 40% of the total sample - stating this as their nationality, as opposed to British. This extreme view was held more strongly in the East and North than in the West, and increasingly so down-market. AB's were more inclined to acknowledge the British connection than any others. It was also interesting to note that the younger respondents (aged 18 - 24) showed a higher propensity to regard themselves as equally Scottish and British than any other, which may indicate a more balanced and less parochial point of view among the up-and-coming generations.

A. SHOW CARD
We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this card best describes how you regard yourself?

Scottish, not British (16) 1
More Scottish than British 2
Equally Scottish and British 3
More British than Scottish 4
British, not Scottish 5
(Don't know) Y
1707 Union of the Scottish and English Parliaments.

1746 Defeat of the Jacobites by the English Army in an attempt to reinstate the Stuarts on the Scottish throne in an independent Scotland.

1885 Secretaryship for Scotland with responsibility for education, health, poor law, local government, fisheries, police, prisons, roads and public works, established. (Secretary for Scotland Act).

1896 Formation of Scottish Home Rule Association ("Home-Rule-all-Round"). It operates until the First World War as a political and parliamentary pressure group mainly within the Liberal Party.

1894 Liberal majority in House of Commons supports a Scottish parliament.

1897 Scottish Trades Union Congress founded.

1912 Scottish Board of Agriculture founded.

1913 Scottish Home Rule Bill passed in the Second Reading by 204 votes to 159 (Scottish MPs 45 to 8).

1919 Scottish Board of Health founded, with Parliamentary Under-Secretary.

1926 Scottish Secretary becomes full Secretary of State within British Cabinet.

1934 Scottish National Party formed by the merging of the National Party of Scotland (1928) with the Scottish Party (1933).

1937 Gilmour Committee on Scottish Administration.

1939 Scottish departments (Agriculture, Education, Fisheries, Health, Prisons) vested directly in the Secretary of State.

St. Andrew's House, headquarters of the Scottish Office, opened in Edinburgh.

1945 Motherwell parliamentary seat won by SNP (Robert McIntyre)

Scottish Office takes over Forestry but loses National Insurance.

1946 Scottish Council (Development & Industry) formed.

1947
Scottish Convention Movement ("Self-government or Ruin") attracts two million signatures for a Scottish Parliament in Scotland.

1954 Balfour Commission report on Scottish Affairs.

Electricity transferred to Scottish Office.


1956 Roads and Bridges transferred.

1961 Bridgeton by-election, 16th November. SNP wins 18.7% of votes.

1962 West Lothian by-election, 14th June. SNP wins 23.3% of votes.

Scottish departments reorganised. Scottish Development Department formed.

1965 Highlands and Islands Development Board "quango" formed.

1966 Plaid Cymru wins Carmarthen by-election in Wales.

1967 Pollok by-election, 9th March. SNP wins 20.2% of votes.

Hamilton by-election, 2nd November. SNP wins seat with 46.1% of the votes.

1968 May, Major SNP gains in local elections. They win 37.2% of vote in Glasgow.

May. "Declaration of Perth" - The Prime Minister, Edward Heath, announces the establishment of the Douglas-Home Committee on devolution.

Passenger road transport and sea transport transferred: Scottish Transport Group founded.

December. Crowther Royal Commission on Constitution appointed.


Gorbals by-election, 30th October. SNP wins 25% of vote.

1970 Ayrshire South by-election, 19th. SNP wins 20.4% of vote.

General Election. SNP contests 65 seats out of 71 and wins 11.4% of vote. Loses Hamilton but gains Western Isles.

Douglas-Home Committee reports, recommending elected Scottish Assembly.


Stirling and Falkirk by-election, 16th September. SNP wins 34.6% of vote.
1973 Scottish Economic Planning Department formed in the Scottish Office.

Dundee East by-election, 1st March. SNP wins 30.2% of the votes.


Govan by-election, 8th November. SNP wins with 41.9% of vote.

1974 February 28th. General Election. SNP contest 70 seats, wins 21.9% of vote, loses Govan but gains Argyll, Banff, Aberdeenshire East, Dundee East, Moray and Nairn, Stirlingshire East and Clackmannan.

March. Queen's Speech: Government "will initiate discussions in Scotland and Wales on the Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (Kilbrandon) and will bring forward proposals for consideration". Lord Crowther-Hunt appointed Minister of State, Privy Council Office with responsibility for devolution.

May. First elections to Scottish regions and districts following some recommendations of the Wheatley Commission Report.

June. White Paper "Devolution within the United Kingdom": some alternatives for discussion" published.

June 22nd. Scottish Executive of the Labour Party rejects devolution proposals.

September. Special Scottish Labour Conference overrules Executive decision.

October 10th. General Election. SNP wins 30.4% of vote, gains Argus South, Dumbartonshire East, Galloway, Perth and East Perthshire (in total 11 MPs in Westminster).

1975 Scottish Development Agency ("quango") founded.

Industry powers transferred to Scottish Office.

November 27th. Devolution White Paper, "Our Changing Democracy".


Main charges: at least two Assembly seats for all constituencies; Assembly alone to nominate Chief Executive; U.K. Government to be able to object to Assembly Bills only if causing "unacceptable repercussions" on non-devolved matters but unable to withdraw devolved powers; judicial review of Assembly legislation to be allowed; Assembly power to surcharge rates dropped; SDA operations, administration of the courts, private law, regulation of teaching and legal professions to be devolved.

November 29th. Scotland and Wales Bill published.
December 9th. "Devolution - the English dimension" published.

December 16th. Bill given second reading and passed by 292-247 votes after Government concedes referenda once Bill is enacted.

1977 January 13th - February 15th. Committee stage of Bill on floor of House of Commons: three clauses and referendum clause approved. Only amendment agreed: Orkney and Shetland to have one Assembly member each.

February 22nd. Motion to guillotine proceedings defeated by 312-283.

April. Manpower Services transferred to Scottish Office.

July 26th. Lord President's statement in Commons: separate bills for Scotland and Wales in next session; head of Executive retitled "First Secretary"; premature dissolution of Assembly to be possible on vote of two-thirds of members; legislation on maladministration, teachers' pay and rent regulation to be devolved; block grant to be fixed for "a number of years" by percentage formula; "Independent advisory board" on devolution financing; "Joint Council" between Government and Executive proposed.

"Devolution - Financing the Devolved Services" published.

November 4th. Scotland Bill published.

November 14th. Bill given second reading and passed by 307-263 votes.

November 16th. Guillotine motion carried by 313-287 votes.

November 22nd. Committee state begins. Clause I (declaration on unity of United Kingdom) removed by 199-184 votes.

December 7th. Clause 40 (National Pay Policy) removed by 290-107 votes.

1978 January 25th. Cunningham amendment that "if it appears to the Secretary of State (for Scotland) that less than 40 % of the persons entitled to vote in the referendum have voted "Yes"...he shall lay before Parliament the draft of an Order in Council for the repeal of this Act" carried by 168-142 votes.

Grimmond amendment that if Orkney or Shetland vote "No" in referendum "the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament the draft of an Order in Council providing that the Act shall not apply to them, and providing also for the establishment of a commission to recommend such changes in the government of that area or those areas as may be desirable, carried by 204-118 votes.

February 14th. During report stage, Dalyell's new clause stipulating that if Parliament is dissolved before the referendum is held, it must be deferred until three months after the polling day, approved by 242-223 votes.

Canavan amendment to remove "40 % rule" defeated by 298-248 votes.
February 22nd. Bill given third reading and passed by 297-257 votes.

March 15th. Bill given unopposed second reading in the House of Lords.

April 4th. During committee stage. Lords vote 155-64 for electoral additional member voting system.

May 17th. Lords' committee stage ends, after Lords vote to withdraw Assembly responsibility on abortion, aerodromes, forestry and afforestation, inland waterways and road passenger service licensing.

June 7th. Lords report Stage of Scotland Bill begins. Main amendment inserted: Assembly committees required to reflect party balance; purchase grants for libraries, museums and art galleries reserved; requirement for fourteen days' interval followed by second vote if Bill not affecting Scotland carried by Commons only because of votes of Scottish MPs ("West Lothian Question"); new Government clause on Orkney and Shetland to replace "Grimmond amendment".

June 20th. Report Stage concluded.

June 29th. Unopposed third reading.

July 4th. Commons timetable motion for consideration of Lords amendments.

July 6th. Consideration begins. Electoral alternative member voting system defeated.

July 26th. Consideration concluded. Government defeated on committee balance, second vote in Commons and reservation of forestry.

July 27th. Lords accepts Commons amendments.

July 31st. Royal Assent.

November 1st. Referendum date announced.

1979 March 1st. Referendum held. Results: of those who vote, 51.8% vote "Yes"; 48.4% vote "No". Of the total electorate, 32.9% vote "Yes", 30.8% vote "No" and 36.3% abstain.

March 22nd. Statement to House of Commons by Prime Minister Callaghan, declining to set date for vote on order to repeal Scotland Act and calling for all-party consultations. Motion of no-confidence put down by SNP.


May. General Election held. Conservatives back to power.

June 20th. House of Commons passes repeal order for the 1978 Scotland Act by 301 votes to 206. Of the Scottish MPs, forty-three vote against repeal, nineteen in favour and nine are absent. George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland, offered all-
party talks to consider "the scope for improving the handling of
Scottish business in Parliament".

(*) Partially reproduced from the Scottish Government Yearbook 1979
(pp. 204-207) and the Scottish Government Yearbook 1980 (p.230).

CHRONOLOGY OF CATALAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

1714 The Catalans, supporters of the Austrian Archiduke Charles, are
defeated in the Spanish War of Succession.

1716 The new Bourbon King, Philip V d'Anjou, abolishes the Catalan
institutions of self-government.

1873 I Spanish (Federal) Republic.

1900 Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya formed.

1914 April 6th. Creation of Mancomunitat de Catalunya, under the
presidency of the nationalist Prat de la Riba, as an
administrative regional institution for Catalonia. First Catalan
governmental institution since 1714.

1925 July. The Mancomunitat is suppressed by the dictator, Primo de
Rivera.

1931 July 14th, (Noon). Macià proclaims the Catalan Republic, as "a
member state of the Iberian Federation". Madrid (afternoon).
Proclamation of II Spanish Republic.

July 17th. Macià renounces establishment of Catalan Republic
and accepts the devolution of powers to the historic Generalitat.

2nd August. "Nuria" draft of Statute of Autonomy for
Catalonia is approved in referendum (99 % of turn-out). Abstention
accounts for 25 % of registered electorate in Catalonia.

9th December. Spanish Republican Constitution is put into
effect.

1932 May. Reading of the "Nuria" Statute of Autonomy Bill begins in
the Spanish Parliament.

September. Bill is passed by Spanish Parliament.

November 20th. Elections in Catalonia to elect the Catalan
Parliament and Executive. Macià, and his Left republican nationalist
ERC, wins the majority of seats.

1934 October. After the victory of the Right in the Second
Republican General Elections, the revolutionary Left (socialists and
communists) start the "October Revolution" which is concentrated in
Asturies.

6th October. Companys, president of Generalitat after the
death of Macià, proclaims the Catalan State within the Spanish
Federal Republic. The palace of the Generalitat is bombed and the Government of Companys gives in. Self-governed institutions in Catalonia are suspended by the Central Government.


March. 1932 Statute of Autonomy is put into effect again. Companys reassumes the presidency of the Generalitat.

18th July. Military rebellion against the Second Republic. Franco one of the three leaders of the coup d'État.

20th July. Upurge in Barcelona squashed. The Spanish Civil War has started.

1938 5th April. Franco, after entering Lleida with his troops, signs a decree abolishing the 1932 Statute of Autonomy and the Generalitat.

1939 9th February. The battle of Catalonia is over. 400,000 people cross the border to France.

1940 15th October. After having been handed over by the Gestapo to Francoist authorities, Lluis Companys, president of the Generalitat, is executed by shooting at Montjuïc in Barcelona.

1945 Josep Irla president in exile of the Generalitat. Consell Nacional de la Democràcia Catalana created (*).

1948 The Irla Government in exile dissolves.

1952 The Consell Nacional de la Democràcia Catalana ceases its activities. The Comité Ametlla is established (*).

1954 7th August. Josep Tarradellas elected President of the Generalitat by nine members of the Republican Parliament of Catalonia and 24 delegated votes deposited at the Embassy of Spain in Mexico.

1966 Establishment of the Taula Rodona after the repressive action taken by the police against the SDEUB (Sindicat Democràtic d'Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona (*).

1968 Comité Admetlla dissolves.

1969 December. The Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques (* created.


1973 December. The President of the Spanish Government, Admiral Carrero Blanco, is assassinated in Madrid by ETA.

1975 20th November. Franco dies.

22nd November. Juan Carlos I, King of Spain.

29th December. Creation of the Consell de Forces Polítiques (*).
1976 20th February. The constitution of a committee to explore administrative regionalisation in Catalonia decreed. The Catalan Opposition boycotts its activities.

July. Adolfo Suárez appointed new President of the Spanish Government.

August. Suárez's first meeting with Catalan Opposition leaders (ie. Reventós, Pujol, Pallach and Barrera).

11th September. First semi-legal celebration of the Catalan National Day, the "Diada", in Sant Boi de Llobregat. Around 100,000 attended.

15th December. Political Reform Act approved in Referendum and initiates the constitutional return to democracy in Spain. In Catalonia the turn-out is 74 %, of which 93.3% are "Yes" votes, 2.1% "No" votes and 4.2% blank votes.

20th December. In Barcelona Suárez receives the report of an appointed committee on Catalan regionalization which advocates the setting up of a Consell General de Catalunya. This council would be granted some administrative powers from the Central government and would concentrate the powers of the four Diputaciones, provincial councils in Catalonia. The Opposition parties boycott the report.

1977 12th and 13th February. Tarradellas, exiled President of the Generalitat meets 23 delegates of the Catalan parties and trade unions in Sant Cebrià de Roselló (France). It is agreed that negotiations with the Spanish Government will be led by Tarradellas with the consent of the Catalan parties. These commit themselves to include the re-establishment of Home-Rule and the return of the exiled President in their electoral programmes before the General Elections of June 15. A consultative council (Organisme Consultiu) of the Presidency of the Generalitat is created.

2nd March. Formal establishment of the Organisme Consultiu de la Generalitat at Sant Cebria de Rosello.

28th May. Organisme Consultiu holds its first meeting. It ratifies Tarradellas as the legitimate representative of the Catalan Generalitat and rejects the Consell General proposed by the Central Government.

15th June. First General Elections in Spain since the II Republic. In Catalonia the socialists come first (880,539 votes, 28.4% and 15 MPs for the Congress of the Deputies). Second are the Communists (PSUC) (564,574 votes, 18.2%, but only 8 MPs). The nationalists of Pacte Democratic per Catalunya (CDC, EDC, PSC(r) and FNC) (522,060, 16.8% and 11 MPs) come third. Fourth is UCD (521,419, 16.8 and 9 MPs). Fifth is UCDCC (174,077, 5.6% and 2 MPs). Sixth, the coalition Esquerra de Catalunya ERC and PTE (141,959 votes, 4.5% and 1 MP) and, finally, Convivencia Catalana (AP and UC) (108,677, 3.5% and 1 MP). 80 per cent of all MPs and all but one of the candidates elected for the Senate advocate the immediate re-establishment of the Generalitat.

25th June. First meeting of the elected members to the Spanish Parliament in Catalonia, ie. Assemblea de Parlamentaris. The Assembly
unanimously demands both the re-establishment of the Generalitat, and of the "principles and institutions stated in the 1932 Statute of Autonomy", as well as the return of its exiled President.

27th June. Tarradellas travels from Paris to Madrid and starts negotiations with President Suárez.

2nd July. The communiqué released in Madrid and Barcelona after the Suárez-Tarradellas negotiations, "recognises the right to political autonomy." for Catalonia.

8th July. Meeting in Paris between Tarradellas and the Permanent Committee of the Assembly of Catalan Parliamentarians (Comissió Permanent de l'Assemblea de Parlamentaris). A strategy for the, "development in common agreement of negotiations with the Central Government" is devised.


29th September. Spanish Government decrees re-establishment of the "provisional Generalitat" following the negotiations between the Catalan parties and the Central Government.

30th September. Decree-law creating Joint Committees to deal with transfer of administrative powers to the Generalitat.

18th October. Publication in the BOE (Spanish Official Gazette) of the nomination of Tarradellas as President of the provisional Generalitat.

22nd October. Tarradellas meets Suárez and King Juan Carlos in Madrid.

23rd October. Tarradellas in the Palau of the Generalitat in Barcelona: "Ja sóc aquí!" ("Here I am, at last!").

27th October. Pactos de la Moncloa signed by all the representative parliamentary groups, including the Catalan parties.

3rd and 5th December. Tarradellas appoints the Executive Council of the Generalitat (Consell Executiu) made up of twelve members who represent the Catalan parties which received the most votes in the June General Elections. Also the fifteen Catalan members in the Joint Committee for the transfer of powers are appointed. The publication of the Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya is resumed.


17th February. Entesa del Catalans, the Catalan parliamentarians in the Senate, begin the campaign, "Guanyem la Constitució; Guanyem l'Estatut"

15th April. Suárez-Tarradellas pledge to speed up the transfer of administrative powers to the Generalitat.

May. Draft of new democratic Spanish Constitution finished.
15th June. First meeting of the Catalan parliamentarians to begin work on the wording of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia.

23rd June. First administrative powers transferred to the provisional Generalitat. Decree-law incorporating the Catalan language in the educational system of Catalonia.

3rd July. Establishment of the Comissió dels Vint in charge of writing of the first draft of the Statute of Autonomy. All parliamentary Catalan parties are involved: Socialists, Communists, CDC, UCD, ERC, UDCCC, AP and the senatorial coalition, "Entesa dels Catalans").

1st August. First working meeting of the "Comissio dels Vint" in Barcelona.

12th-15th September. First articles of the Statute draft completed in Sau (Girona).

31st October. The Spanish Constitution is passed in both Houses of Parliament. Its article 2, "...recognises the right of autonomy of nationalities and regions and the solidarity amongst them all".

3rd-5th November. The preliminary draft of the bill for the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia is concluded by the "Comissio dels Vint" in Sau (Girona).

22nd November. Deadline for the Catalan parliamentarians to present amendments to the preliminary draft of the Autonomy Statute.

30th November. First session of the Catalan parliamentarians for the final wording of draft of the Statute.

6th December. The Constitution approved by referendum by the Spanish people. The turn-out in Catalonia is 67.7% of the registered electorate of which 90.4% are "yes" votes, 4.2% are "No" votes and 4.6%, blank votes.

16th December. The wording of the draft for the bill of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia is finalized.

29th December. The 1978 Spanish Constitution comes into being.

Draft of Bill of Autonomy Statute approved by Catalan parliamentarians in a formal meeting with Taradellas.

President Suárez goes to the country.

1979 1st March. General Elections held. UCD wins a minor majority in the Spanish Congress of the Deputies (168 MPs, +3) with the Socialists as the main Opposition party (121 MPs, +2). In Catalonia, "Socialistes de Catalunya" increases its electoral support (17 MPs, +2) followed by CC-UCD (12 MPs, +3), PSUC (8 MPs, =) and CiU (8 MPs, =-3, if compared with the results of the Pacte Democràtic in 1977).

3rd April. First democratic Local Elections since II Republic. The Socialists control the four main city council in
Catalonia (ie. Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona). PSUC and, to a lesser extent, CiU also obtain good results due to the Pacte de Progrés, a post-electoral pact made by the three of them.

22nd April. Diada de Sant Jordi. Massive demonstration in Barcelona in demand of the Autonomy Statute —one quarter of a million participants— called by PSC-PSOE and PSUC, and supported by CiU and ERC.


13th August. Wording of the Catalan Statute bill approved by the Constitutional Committee of the Congress of the Deputies (34 votes in favour, 1 against and 1 abstention) and the Assembly of Catalan parliamentarians (20 votes in favour and 1 abstention). The draft is ready for popular referendum.

25th October. The Referendum for the Autonomy Statute takes place in Catalonia. Out of an electoral census of 4,421,965 voters, the turn-out is 2,639,951, ie. 59.7%. The "Yes" votes account for 88.14% of the turn-out (52.62% of the registered electorate); the "No" votes are 7.76% (4.63, registered electorate); the blank votes 3.55% and the spoiled votes, 0.47%.

30th November. The Statute Bill is ratified by the Congress of Deputies (317 in favour, 1 against and 13 abstentions).

12th December. The Statute Bill is ratified by the Senate (168 in favour, 1 against and 3 abstentions).

22nd December. The Royal Assent is published in the BOE.


20th March. First elections for Parliament of Catalonia since 1937. The centre-right nationalist coalition of CiU (CDC and UDC) gets 27.6% of the votes (47 MPs) and forms a minority Government with the parliamentary support of ERC (8.8% and 14 MPs) and the support/abstention of CC-UCD (10.5% and 18 MPs). The Socialists (22.3% and 33 MPs) and the Communists (18.6% and 25 MPs), are in opposition. The Andalusian PSA gain two seats.
Appendix 3.2.i: Chronology of political inter-party coordination and political unifications in Catalonia after the Spanish Civil War

1939 Front Nacional de Catalunya:

* ERC
* Estat Català
* Individual nationalists.

Front de la Llibertat.

* POUM

Both "Fronts" merge in Solidaritat Catalana.

Conseil Nacional de Catalunya
Set up by Company in Paris, and re-established in London in 1940. In theory it creates the FNC which operates inside Catalonia. Dissolved in 1945.

1942 Unión Nacional Española
Catalan branch of the political body promoted by PCE and dissolved in 1945.

1944 Comité de Coordinación

* Acció Catalana
* Unió Socialista de Catalunya
* ERC
* UDC

Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas
Catalan branch of the alliance promoted by,

* PSOE
* UGT
* CNT
* POUM
* PCE – PSUC (incorporated in 1945)

1945 Aliança de Partits Republicans Catalans

Moviment Socialista de Catalunya (MSC). Formed by diverse socialist groups and breakaway groups from PSUC and POUM.

Conseil Nacional de la Democràcia Catalana:

* ERC
* MSC
* UDC
* FNC
* Acció Catalana
* Estat Català
* Partit Republicà d'Esquerra
* Unió de Rabassaires.

Disappears in 1952,

1953 Comitè Admetlla. Committee for the coordination of the Catalan political forces which is in existence until 1968. (PCE-PSUC and FNC are excluded).

The Consell Nacional de Catalunya re-created by the federalists in Mexico. In 1968 it moves its headquarters to London.

1959 Associació Democràtica Popular de Catalunya (ADPC). Federated to the Spanish Liberation Front (FLP).

Comitè de Coordinación Universitaria, created after the Primera Assemblea Llibre d'Estudiants celebrated in the University of Barcelona, and promoted by,

* ADPC
* PSUC
* MSC
* Comunitat Catalana (former Crist Catalunya)

1962 ADPC is renamed Front Obrer de Catalunya (FOC).

1964 Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO.) created as a unitary body for the coordination of:

- ASO, which leaves CC.OO. in 1965 and is formed by:
  * UGT
  * CNT
  * SOC (First, "Solidaritat d'Obrers Cristians" and later, "Solidaritat d'Obrers de Catalunya")

- OSO ("Oposición Sindical Obrera". Created in 1960 by PCE-PSUC).
- JOC ("Juventud Obrera Católica").
- FORÇA SOCIALISTA FEDERAL, from "Comunitat Catalana".
- FOC
- USO ("Unión Sindical Obrera". Created to be an autonomous trade union with no party control. It leaves CC.OO. in 1968).

1966 Sindicat Democratic d'Estudiants de la Universitat de Barcelona (SDEUB). Student union which also incorporates many academics and lectures of the University of Barcelona. After a strong repressive action by the police (ie. 82 lectures expelled from the University) the Taula Rodona, a civic association, is subsequently created.

1969 Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques:

* ERC
* UDC
* FNC
* MSC
* PSUC
1971 Assemblea de Catalunya. Strong assembly of opposition to Franco's regime. An aggregate not only of political parties and trade unions, but of cultural and social groups, urban communities associations, neighbourhood association movements, civic institutions, etc.

Its aims are:

(1) Attainment of political general amnesty.

(2) Implementation of basic democratic rights.

(3) Provisional restoration of institutions of Generalitat, according to provisions of 1932 Statute of Autonomy.

(4) Coordination with the rest of the Opposition parties in Spain in the process towards the return of democracy.

These four points are popularly summarized in the slogan: "Llibertat, Amnistia i Estatut d'Autonomia".

In 1977 the Assemblea becomes integrated in the Organisme Consultiu.

1975 Consell de Forces Politiques de Catalunya. Established with the programme of "ruptura democrática" with the regime, after the death of Franco (20.XI.75). Founding members:

* CDC
* EDC (which joins CDC in 1977)
* ERC
* PNC
* UDC
* PSAN
* PCC ("Partit Carlí Català")
* PSUC

* GSC

* Partit Popular

* PSC(r)

* PSC (c)  

[...]* PSC (c)

[...]* PSC-PSOE (1978)

The Consell complements the more popular but less articulated vindications of the Assemblea de Catalunya. Its programme includes:

(a) Creation of a Provisional Government of the Generalitat with powers based upon the 1932 Statute of Autonomy.

(b) General political amnesty.

(c) Implementation of democratic rights (Freedoms of Expression, Association, Assembly, the Press and freedom to demonstrate. Elections by universal suffrage, etc.)
(d) Free trade unions and the right to strike.

(e) Establishment of a Provisional Spanish Government with the aim of calling General Elections to form a Constituent Parliament.

1976 Comissió dels 10. Set up to follow the model of the Spanish Opposition "Comisión de los Nueve" which, formed in December 1976, negotiates with the Spanish Government during the transition period. The "Comisión de los Nueve" is composed of the following members: 1 Christian Democrat, 1 Liberal, 1 Social Democrat, 2 Socialists, 1 Communist and, significantly, 3 representatives of the Catalan, Basque and Galician parties. Its main claims are: a) suppression of the Francoist Public Order Courts; b) legalization of all the political parties and trade unions; and c) establishment of a democratic Electoral Law which paves the way for the General Elections (subsequently held on June 15). The Catalan "Comissió dels 10" established to negotiate with the Spanish Government issues mainly concerned with self-government in Catalonia. It is composed of,

* CDC
* EDC
* UDC
* CC
* PSUC
* FSC (PSOE)
* PSC (c)
* Lliga de Catalunya
* PSDC
* UGT
* COCCO

1977 January. Comissió dels 23. Established to prepare the political interview between the Catalan Opposition forces and the exiled President of the Generalitat. 25 political parties, 5 trade unions and representatives of the "Assemblea de Catalunya" agree to coordinate their action and, after the interview with the exiled President, decide to set up the "Organisme Consultiu de la Generalitat".

1977 March. Organisme Consultiu de la Generalitat. Constituted as a political organisation in which the main Catalan political forces are represented. It is composed of 76 members, two from each Catalan political party and trade union, with one vote per each delegation, and 4 members from the "Assemblea de Catalunya", although the later with one vote only. The "Organisme" appoints a Comissió Permanent presided over by a delegate of the exiled President of the Generalitat. It plays a leading role within the "Comissió" in the negotiation with the Spanish Government of the timing of the re-establishment of the Generalitat.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full denomination</th>
<th>Political spectrum(*)</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Alianza Apostólica Anticomunista</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>Twin group of Argentinian terrorist para-military organisation (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Acción Comunista</td>
<td>Extreme Left</td>
<td>Breakaway group from PFL (POC) in 1965 (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADE</td>
<td>Acción Democrática Española</td>
<td>Conservative Right</td>
<td>Breakaway group from UDE Francoist origin (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGF</td>
<td>Alianza Nacional &quot;Guardia de Franco&quot;</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>Francoist para-military group (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Alianza Popular</td>
<td>Conservative Right</td>
<td>Created in March 1977. It integrated ARC, DS, ADE, RDC, UDPE, UNE, USP and &quot;Grup Zero&quot;. In 1982 became the main party within the &quot;Coalición Popular&quot;, the main opposition group in Spanish Parliament. CP came third force in the 1984 Catalan elect. (7.88% votes; 11 MPs). Francoist origins (2) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>Acció Regional Catalana</td>
<td>Conservative Right</td>
<td>Integrated since 1977 in AP. Characterised by its Catalan regionalism. Francoist origins (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Bloc Català de Treballadors</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
<td>Leftist organisation advocating independence of Catalonia. It asked for the abstention in the 1979 Statute Referendum (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAN</td>
<td>Bloc d'Esquerra d'Alliberament Nacional</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
<td>Left secessionist group which advocated abstention in the 1979 Statute Referendum. (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOC</td>
<td>Bloc Obrer i Camperol dels Països Catalans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Historical nationalists advocating socialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Political Position</td>
<td>Notes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC (UCD)</td>
<td>Centre Català</td>
<td>Centre-Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for the whole of the Paísos Catalans (i.e. French Roussillon, principality of Catalonia, Valencia and Balearic Islands) (1) (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Collectiu Combat</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In coalition with the Spanish UCD achieved 2nd and 3rd place in 1977 and 1979 Elections. After 1980 many of its members joined CiU (1) (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cc</td>
<td>Concòrdia Catalana</td>
<td>Moderate Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Francoist origins (1) (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA (AP)</td>
<td>Convivència Catalana</td>
<td>Conservative Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral coalition made up of AP and UC (3.5% votes - 1 MP in the 1977 General Elections) (1) (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Collectiu Comunista</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d'Alliberament</td>
<td></td>
<td>Breaway group from PSAN advocating the state of the Paísos Catalans (1) (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCOO</td>
<td>Comisiones Obreras</td>
<td>Trade union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main opposition Trade Union during the clandestine 60s and 70s. Second largest TU in Spain and first in Catalonia. Hierarchically linked with PSUC (PCE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-UCD</td>
<td>Centre Català-Unió de Centre Democràtic de Catalunya (Centristes de Catalunya)</td>
<td>Centre-Right</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral coalition which had previously grouped together UCC and some independent Christian-Democrats and was second in the 1979 General Elections (19% votes and 12 MPs) (1) (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Led by Jordi Pujol since its creation in 1974, it has brought together Catholics, Liberals and Social-democrats, in a centrist catch-all party united around the goal of Home-Rule for the Catalan nation. It defines itself</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as a nationalist party. In coalition with UDC (CiU) it has been the first force in the 1980 and 1984 Catalan Elections. In the latter, CiU obtained the absolute parliamentary majority with 72 seats out of 135 (5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Centro Democrático y Social Centre</td>
<td>Party founded by Suárez before the 1982 General Elections. It could not contest the 1984 Catalan Elections, but supported CiU (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDADE</td>
<td>Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa Extreme Right</td>
<td>Fascist/Nazi group (1) (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEUE</td>
<td>Central d'Acció per la Unitat d'Espanya) Extreme Right</td>
<td>Fascist organisation (1) (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Cruz Ibérica Extreme Right</td>
<td>Fascist organisation (1)(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNC</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional de Combatientes Extreme Right</td>
<td>Fascist organisation made up of Franco's troops in the Civil War (1) (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNT</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores Trade Union</td>
<td>Historical anarchist trade union which was most powerful in Catalonia in the II Republic and the Civil War. Internal divisions and the preeminence of COCT and UGT place it in a secondary role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-PFC</td>
<td>Cataluña, Partit Polític Catala Moderate Right</td>
<td>Liberal ideological background (1) (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Coalición Popular Conservative Right</td>
<td>Electoral coalition made up of AP, PDP and UL. In the 1984 Cata. Elections came third (7.8% and 11 MPs)(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>Convergencia Socialista de Catalunya Refomist Left</td>
<td>Founding group of PSC(c) first and, later on, of PSC (PSOE). It was the result of the merging of MSC, POC, MAS, PPC(FNC), and RS. (1) (5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSUT</td>
<td>Confederació de Sindicats Unitaris de Treballadors Trade Union</td>
<td>Active Trade Union in the late 1970s, closely linked to PTC-PTE. (1) (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>Short Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democracia Social</td>
<td>Conservative Right</td>
<td>Francoist origins (1) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Estat Català</td>
<td>Centre Left</td>
<td>Historic party pursuing the independence of the Països Catalans. It campaigned for the abstention in the 1979 Statute Referendum (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EdC</td>
<td>Entesa dels Catalans</td>
<td></td>
<td>Electoral coalition formed in 1977 by PSC(c), ERC and PTE, and also supported by the EC, PSUC and Assemblea de Catalunya. Its 12 candidates were all elected for the Senate in the 1977 General Elections. (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Esquerra Democràtica de Catalunya</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Member of the Liberal International which later merged with CDC (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFC</td>
<td>Entesa d l'Esquerra Catalana</td>
<td>Reformist Left</td>
<td>Electoral coalition made up of &quot;Renovadors d'Esquerra&quot; and &quot;Independents per la Esquerra Nacional&quot; and Nacionalistes d'Esquerra&quot; which received 1.3% votes in the 1984 Elections (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EN</td>
<td>Esquerra Nacional</td>
<td>Reformist Left</td>
<td>Catalan socialists which failed to integrate the Left nationalist groups in Catalonia (1) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya</td>
<td>Centre Left</td>
<td>Historic Left-nationalist party. All the presidents of the Generalitat since its inception during the II Republic until 1980, were members of ERC. Fifth party in Catalan elections held in 1980 and 1984 (14 and 5 MPs) (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE</td>
<td>Falange Española (JONS) de las JONS</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>Ideological point d'appui for Franco after the Civil War. Following the end of the IIWW its influence declined (1) (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FE (A)</td>
<td>Falange Española (Autentica)</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
<td>Breakaway group from FE (JONS) claiming the purity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

461
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Group</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Fuerza Nueva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNC</td>
<td>Front Nacional de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOC</td>
<td>Front Obrer de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSC</td>
<td>Federació Socialista PSOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSR</td>
<td>Frente Sindicalista Revolucionario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAS</td>
<td>Grupo de Acción Sindicista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCR</td>
<td>Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>Grupo de Occidente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAPO</td>
<td>Grupos Antifascistas Primero de Octubre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>Liga Comunista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCR</td>
<td>Lliga Comunista Revolucionaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Lliga de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Moviment d'Autogestió i Socialisme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Moviment Comunista de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCRD</td>
<td>Moviment Català Republicà i Democràtic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Moviment Socialista de Catalunya</td>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>Nacionalistes d'Esquerra</td>
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<td>NE</td>
<td>Nova Entesa</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCE(BR)</td>
<td>Organización Comunista de España (Barclera Roja)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OICE</td>
<td>Organización de Izquierda Comunista de España</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORT</td>
<td>Organización Revolucionaria de</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabajadores</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC Partit Carlí de Catalunya</td>
<td>Centre Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC Partit Comunista Catalana</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC Partit dels Comunistes de Catalunya</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE(i) Partido Comunista de España(internacional)</td>
<td>Extreme Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE(m-1) Partido Comunista de España(marxista-leninista)</td>
<td>Extreme Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE(r) Partido Comunista de España(reconstituido)</td>
<td>Extreme Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCJA Partido &quot;Círculos Jose Antonio&quot;</td>
<td>Extreme Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POCO Partit Comunista Obrer de Catalunya</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCU Partido Comunista de Unificación</td>
<td>Orthodox Left</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDLC Partit Democràtic Liberal Català</td>
<td>Moderate Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Partido Demócrata Popular</td>
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<tr>
<td>PENS</td>
<td>Partido Español Nacional Socialista</td>
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<td>PORE</td>
<td>Partido Obrero Revolucionario de España</td>
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<td>POSI</td>
<td>Partit Obrer Socialista Internacionalista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POUM</td>
<td>Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>Partit Popular de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Andaluz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAN</td>
<td>Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSAN-P</td>
<td>Partit Socialista d'Alliberament Nacional (provisional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC(c)</td>
<td>Partit Socialista de Catalunya (congrés)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Name</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Partit Socialista de Catalunya-PSOE</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC(r)</td>
<td>Partit Socialista de Catalunya (reagrupament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDC</td>
<td>Partit Social Demòcrata de Catalunya</td>
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<td>Partit Socialista Popular Català</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Partido Social Regionalista</td>
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<td>PST</td>
<td>Partit Socialista del Treballadors</td>
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<td>PSUC</td>
<td>Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Partit del Treball de Catalunya</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Reforma Democrática Catalana (Catalan Right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Reconstrucción Socialista</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSC</td>
<td>Reforma Social Catalana</td>
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<td>SC</td>
<td>Solidaritat Catalana</td>
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<td>Solidaritat d'Obrers de Catalunya</td>
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<td>Sindicato Unitario</td>
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<td>Terra Llíure</td>
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<td>UC</td>
<td>Unió Catalana</td>
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<td>UCC</td>
<td>Unió del Centre de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCD</td>
<td>Unión de Centro Democratico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCDCC</td>
<td>Unió del Centre i la Democràcia Cristiana de Catalunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCL</td>
<td>Unión Comunista de Liberación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Unió Democràtica de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDPE</td>
<td>Francoist origins and &quot;bridge&quot;-party for the making of UCD (1) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGT</td>
<td>First largest Trade Union in Spain and second in Catalonia. Closely linked to the PSC-PSOE. Founded in Barcelona in 1888.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UL</td>
<td>One the member parties of &quot;Coalición Popular&quot; which became the leading opposition group after the 1982 General Elections (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNE</td>
<td>Francoist group (1) (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Founded in Catalonia in 1974 independently from the parties. Its membership is formed by farmers, small and middle owners, sharecroppers, and tenants and favours co-operativism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USO</td>
<td>Active during the 70s. Advocating self-managed socialism, independent of the political parties. Many of its members joined UGT.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Due to the schematic nature of this Appendix, the criteria used for the description of the political colouring of each party is rather "conventional".

(1) Disappeared or with a residual activity
(2) Spanish organisation
(3) Catalan "succursal" branch of a Spanish organisation
(4) Catalan group with links with a Spanish organisation
(5) Exclusive involvement in Catalonia
Appendix 3.2.iii: Parties' positions in the drawing up of the Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia.

1. Exclusive powers for the Generalitat

CDC
* Organization of its institutions of self-governments
* Agriculture, livestock and fishing in inland waters
* Civil Law
* Culture, research and cultural heritage
* Public works
* Sports and Entertainment
* Industry and Trade
* Territorial planning and environment
* Savings banks
* Stock Exchange, Chambers of Commerce and Industry
* Co-operatives
* Gaming and betting
* Local government
* Promotion of women's rights
* Education
* Professional associations
* Tourism
* Youth guardianship

PSC
* Organization of its institutions of self-governments
* Agriculture, livestock and fishing in inland waters
* Public works
* Territorial policy and planning
* Local government
* Environment
* Trade and Industry
* Culture and cultural heritage. Research.
* Co-operatives
* Public order
* Tourism
* Sports
* Justice
* Education
* Catalan Civil Law
* Transport

UDC
* Organization of its institutions of self-governments
* Agriculture, livestock and fishing in inland waters. Hunting
* Savings banks, assurance and trust companies
* Catalan Civil Law  
* Public works

* Regional Police  
* Territorial and urban planning

* Housing and environment  
* Woodlands and forestry resources

* Hydraulic projects  
* Co-operatives and mutual benefit societies

* Education and research  
* Tourism

* Sports and leisure  
* Mass Media

* Social work  
* Cultural, artistic, historic and archeological heritage

---

**UCD-UCC** - The same powers included in the draft of the 1978 Spanish Constitution plus exclusive jurisdiction on the following matters:

* Consumer protection, Safeguard of the market and defense of the system of competition

* Special Catalan Civil Law

* Promotion of employment  
* Control of the Catalan Savings banks.

---

**ERC**

* Education  
* Cultural heritage

* Local government  
* Territorial organisation

* Some Civil Law  
* Courts of Justice

* Public works  
* Internal Health

* Mass Media  
* Regional and local police

* Co-operatives  
* Stock Exchange

* Treasury of the Generalitat

---

**PSUC**

* Organization of its institutions of self-government

* Agriculture and livestock in accordance with general economy

* Catalan Civil Law  
* Promotion of Catalan language

* Culture and research  
* Artistic, monumental and cultural heritage

* Railways and roads  
* Territorial and urban planning, Housing.

* Airports and sporting ports  
* Public works and hydraulic projects

* Environment  
* Organisation of commerce, consumer protection and fairs

* Gaming and lotteries  
* Sports and leisure
* Social work, Hygiene

* Plans of industrial restructuring, Industrial incentives and planning

AP  * Not put forward

DRAFT OF THE BILL (agreed by the Catalan parties)

* Organization of its institutions of self-government

* Procedural rules and administrative procedures concerning the Generalitat

* Catalan Civil Law

* Culture

* Research, Research institutions

* Gaming and betting

* Territorial and urban planning, Housing, Real Estate Chambers

* Environment

* Sports and leisure, Entertainment

* Archives, libraries, museums, Music conservatories and Fine Arts services.

* Historic, artistic, monumental, archeological and scientific heritage

* Railways and roads within Catalonia

* Public works, hydraulic projects and production of electricity in Catalonia.

* Ports and airports of no general interest to the State

* Education (observing the principles set down in the Constitution)

* Handicraft

* Tourism

* Planning of centres for dealings in merchandise and stocks

* Co-operatives and public granaries

* Professional Associations

* Those matters which are transferred to Generalitat by the State by means of Organic Laws

2. Legislative and executive powers within the framework of the basic legislation of the State (concurrent powers).

CDC  * Planning of credit, banking and insurance

* Internal Health and Social Security
* Communications * Woodlands and mountain areas
* Mass Media * Mining and organization of energy
* Legal regime of the public administration and statute of the civil servants of the Generalitat

---

**PSC**
* Internal Health and Social Security
* Local regime of the public administration and civil servants of the Generalitat
* Mining and organization of energy
* Mass Media * Credit, banking and insurance
* Woodlands and mountain areas

---

**UDC**
* Health, hygiene and Social Security
* Mining and organization of energy
* Planning of economic activity

---

**UCD**
*The Generalitat may develop all the delegated legislation in the Basic Laws passed by the Spanish Parliament*

---

**ERC**
*Power of the Generalitat to legislate on matters exclusively reserved for the State, until the Spanish Parliament implements its own legislation.*

---

**PSUC**
* Organization of industry, mining and energy
* Mass Media * Control of prices
* Internal Health and pharmaceutical planning, except for pharmaceutical products.
* Social Security, excluding * Catalan savings banks its financial running
* Education, excluding the expenditure of degrees
* Forestry resources and mountain areas.
*Priority and reserve of financial resources and essential services to the public sector. Power of intervention in companies.

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**AP**
*Powers of the Generalitat on education according to the Constitution
*Participation of the Generalitat in the organization of the
judicial demarcations in Catalonia

DRAFT OF THE BILL (agreed by the Catalan parties)

* Exercise of the Constitutional rights and duties
* Planning of credit, banking and insurance
* Administrative contracts and concessions
* System of liability of the administration of the Generalitat
* Communications
* Protection of the natural environment
* Woodlands, mountain areas, forestry exploitation and resources
* Organization of mining and energy
* Livestock, trails and pastures
* Planning of the fishing sector in Catalonia
* Legislative development and executive implementation of the basic State legislation on matters of Social Security and preventive, curative and rehabilitating health.
* Mass Media
* Local planning of the administration of the Generalitat

- In accordance with the bases and planning of the general economic activity of the State, exclusive powers in the following areas:

* Planning of economic activity in Catalonia
* Industry
* Agriculture and livestock
* Internal trade
* Saving and Savings Banks
* Public sector of the Generalitat

3. Executive powers to implement the legislation of the State.

CDC
* Labour Law
* Mercantile, Penal and Prison Law
* Compulsory expropriation
* Public sector of the State
* Internal services of the forces of public order and the police. Setting up of a Joint Security Committee with the Spanish Police

* Collection of all taxes in Catalonia, as well as Social Security payments.

PSC

* Implementation by the Generalitat of the legislation of the State—basically Labour law, pharmaceutical products and compulsory expropriation.

* Collection of all State taxes in Catalonia, as well as some local taxes

UDC

* Implementation of all functions and services of the State except:
  - Adoption of measures to guarantee the equality of all Spaniards.
  - Defense and Armed Forces.
  - Administration of Justice.
  - External Trade and Customs.
  - Public order.
  - Official State records and statistics.

* Collection of all State taxes, except fiscal monopolies and custom and excise.

UCD-UCC

* Labour Law
* Mass Media

* Autonomous Police
* Education

* Social Security services

ERC

* Penal, Mercantile, Labour, Procedural and some Civil Law

* Public works of general interest

* Control and exploitation of sources of energy

* Insurance
* Collection of taxes

* Mining and fishing
* Copyright and patents

* Entertainment
* Weights and measures. Precious metals

* Expropriation

PSUC

* Weights and measures
* Copyright and patents

* Compulsory expropriation
* Industrial inspection

* Inspection and planning of credit, banking and insurance

* Economic planning of the Social Security

474
* Health and pharmaceutical products

* Collection of all State taxes in Catalonia

* Autonomous police. Joint Security Committee with the Spanish Police

---

AP (Not put forward)

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DRAFT OF THE BILL (agreed by the Catalan parties)

* Mercantile, Penal and Prison legislation

* Labour legislation

* Copyright and patents

* Weights and measures

* Compulsory expropriation

* Public sector of the State

* Organization of registration and public documents. Certificates of registration

* State museums, archives and libraries

* International fairs in Catalonia

* Executive powers of all police services, except immigration, customs and extradition

* Implementation of external health and pharmaceutical products

* Other matters which may be transferred by the State by means of Organic Laws

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CDC * Treasury of the Generalitat made up of:

* Yield of some taxes handed over by the State

* Surcharges on State taxes

* Proceeds of taxes established by the Generalitat

* Transfers from the Spanish Inter-territorial Clearing Fund

* Income from the property of the Generalitat

---
* Proceeds from the public debt and credit operations

*Special allocations of moneys funded by the State General Budget

*Percentage share of the total tax collection of the State in Catalonia. The total collection of taxes to be distributed as follows:
  a) Percentage to cover the cost of services provided by the State in Catalonia
  b) Percentage for the Inter-territorial Clearing Fund
  c) Remaining percentage for the Generalitat (no less than 40 per cent of the total)

PSC - Treasury of the Generalitat made up of:

* Income from the property of the Generalitat

* Proceeds of taxes established by the Generalitat

*Taxes handed over by the State, either totally (Gift and inheritance tax, tax on wealth, tax on transfer of wealth and some special taxes – Sugar, alcohol, beverages, etc) or by a percentage share of the total State tax collection (NB. This percentage should be based upon the real cost of the devolved powers). In any case the yield of taxes would be in relation to the coefficients of population and tax burden in Catalonia.

* Moneys from the Inter-territorial Clearing Fund

* Bonds of public debt

* Grants from the State

UDC - From all the taxes collected in Catalonia the State would keep the percentage which is equivalent to the Catalan Income in relation to the rest of the State. The rest would be handed over to the Generalitat (NB. Except custom duties and fiscal monopolies)

UCD-UCC - Treasury of the Generalitat made up of:

* Taxes established by the Generalitat

*Yield of taxes handed over by the State (ie. taxes on territorial property, livestock and mining activities, taxes on water, phone, gas and electricity consumption, taxes on industrial and professional activities; gift and inheritance tax, tax on transfer of wealth and tax on patrimony of corporations) (NB. The first two taxes to be shared with the local councils)

* Surcharges (up to 10%) on some State taxes

*A share of the total taxes collection by the State, which should be directly proportional to the Catalan population
and the fiscal burden, and inversely proportional to the rent per capita in Catalonia.

**ERC**  
(The only direct reference made by this party is to the executive power assumed by the Generalitat to collect all State taxes)

**PSUC**  
-Treasury of the Generalitat made up of:

* Yield of some taxes handed over by the State (i.e., tax on transfer of wealth, inheritance tax, fiscal charges of the devolved powers, share of the yield from the tax on wealth; Corporation tax, luxury goods tax and inter-company trade tax collected in Catalonia)

* Regional taxes established by the Generalitat

* Recourse to credit

**DRAFT OF THE BILL** (agreed by the Catalan parties)

-Treasury of the Generalitat made up of:

* Regional taxes established by the Generalitat

* Yield of taxes handed over by the State:
  a) Gift and inheritance tax
  b) Tax on wealth
  c) Tax on transfers of wealth and documented juridical acts
  d) Special taxes
  e) Taxes turned over by the State in the future

* A percentage share in the total State revenue from:
  a) Income tax
  b) Corporation tax
  c) Luxury goods tax
  d) VAT (when established after Spain's entry in the EEC)
  e) Fiscal monopolies
  f) Taxes not turned over to the Generalitat and which could be introduced in the future

This percentage should take into account the average of the coefficients of population and tax collection/burden in Catalonia, deducting the proportional costs of the services not devolved to the Generalitat. (NB. Finally, in this formula the tax collection/burden was substituted by the Catalan Income).

5. **General provisions. Miscellaneous.**

**CDC**  
* Immigrants to Catalonia should maintain their former residence

* Coordination of the Savings Banks to guarantee their
investment in Catalonia

* Catalan Public Sector to which the State Public Sector should be merged

* Catalans should fulfil their military service in Catalonia

* One representative of the Generalitat in the "Banco de España" (Central Bank)

* Catalan Supreme Court of Justice as the last jurisdictional court of appeal in Catalonia

* All Civil Servants working in Catalonia should know and use the Catalan language

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PSC

* The same political status for all residents in Catalonia

* The Generalitat institutions made up of Government, Parliament and (executive) Presidency

* Creation of the Ombudsman ("Síndic de Greuges")

* System of proportional representation to elect the Catalan Parliament

* Catalan and Castilian, co-official languages

* Right of popular legislative initiative

* Political integration of trade unions, local authorities and representative civic associations in the decision-making of the Generalitat

* Representation of the Generalitat in all the economic committees and public companies of the State

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UDC

* Catalan and Castilian, co-official languages in Catalonia

* Preservation of the characteristic dialect in the Vall d'Aran

* The Catalan Supreme Court of Justice should be the second jurisdictional court of appeal in all matters concerning Civil and Penal Law and the final court of appeal for other legal matters in Catalonia

* Territorial organisation by the Generalitat of the Administration of Justice. The Generalitat would provide the posts under the legislation of the State. Special merit for those knowing and using the Catalan language

* The Generalitat should participate in those international treaties which have a subsequent and direct implication in Catalonia

* Along with the Statute of Autonomy, Organic Laws, which would allow full transfer, should be passed by the Spanish
Parliament. Once the Statute of Autonomy and the Organic Laws are approved, they should constitute an inseparable whole which could only be modified comprehensively.

UCD
- UCC
* Bicameral Parliament
* All Catalan rights and obligations to be applied to all residents in Catalonia
* Catalan and Castilian, co-official languages in Catalonia
* Delegate of the Spanish Government in Catalonia
* Catalan Supreme Court of Justice
* Territorial adaptation of the Administration of Justice to the territorial organisation made by the Generalitat
* Finances of the Generalitat controlled by the State Comptroller Committee
* Perpetual status as MP in the Parliament of Catalonia for all the former Presidents of the Generalitat

ERC
* Generalitat composed of Parliament, President, Executive Council and the High Court of Justice in Catalonia
* Parliament of Catalonia elected every 4 years, by direct and secret universal suffrage, and by all Catalans of 18 years of age and over

PSUC
* Catalan and Castilian, co-official languages
* Generalitat made up of a Government (with a First Secretary), Parliament and a Presidency (merely representative)
* Catalan Supreme Court of Justice
* Special preference given to those joining the Civil Service in Catalonia who know and use the Catalan language
* Planning of the territorial organisation of the Administration of Justice in Catalonia
* Appointment of Notaries Public by the Generalitat in Catalonia

DRAFT OF THE BILL (agreed by the Catalan parties)
* Catalan and Castilian, co-official languages in Catalonia
* Same political status for all residents in Catalonia
* Sole jurisdiction, in accordance with the general monetary policy set by the State, over institutions of corporate,
public and territorial credit and Savings Banks

* Right to popular legislative initiative

* Executive powers as regards all internal police services

* High Court of Justice in Catalonia, with jurisdiction in all instances concerning matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Generalitat

* Generalitat made up of Government, Parliament and Presidency (executive)

* Creation of the Ombudsman ("Síndic de Greuges") and the Audit Office ("Tribunal de Comptes")

* Strict proportional representation to elect the Catalan Parliament within each of the nine circumscription ("veguerias"). Each MP elected with 40,000 votes or fraction

* Compulsory knowledge of the Catalan language for those candidates wishing to fill vacancies for Magistrates, Judges, Judicial Secretaries, Notaries Public, Real State and Commercial Registrars (NB. these last three to be appointed by the Generalitat)

* Catalan representatives in economic agencies, financial institutions and companies of the Public Sector and whose jurisdiction includes the Catalan territory appointed by the Generalitat

* The Generalitat may set up its own Public Sector. The Public Sector of the State in Catalonia should be merged to that set up by the Generalitat

* Establishment of the boundaries of the territorial division to the jurisdictional agencies

* Special protection of the dialect in the Vall d'Aran

* Inviolability of the Catalan Parliament and its members

* "The laws of the Generalitat shall be exempt from administrative law appeals and subject to control in respect to their constitutionality only by the Constitutional Court"

* The right to initiate amendments to the Statute of Autonomy should lie with the Government of the Generalitat, the Parliament of Catalonia under the proposal of one fifth of its members, the Spanish Parliament or by popular initiative. The amendment proposal should require in any case, the approval of the Parliament of Catalonia by two-thirds majority, the positive response of the Catalan electorate in a popular referendum and the approval of the Spanish Parliament by means of an Organic Law

* All the services of the Provincial Councils ("Diputacions") should be assumed by the Generalitat. In a
maximum period of two years the transfer of services from the "Diputacions" should be handed over to the Generalitat.

*The jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in Catalonia should extend:

a) In all cases dealing with Administrative Law, to all instances and degrees in matters where legislation is the exclusive responsibility of the Generalitat.

b) To appeals concerning the classification of documents referring to specific Catalan Law. The authorities should have access to the Real Estate Registers.

c) To questions of jurisdiction among the judicial organs in Catalonia.

d) In other matters, appeals may be lodged, when appropriate, with the Spanish Supreme Court.
Appendix 3.2.iv: Modifications in the draft of the Statute of Autonomy during the debate of the Bill in the Spanish Parliament.

1. Exclusive powers for the Generalitat.

* Art. 9.4: "Culture" instead of "Cultural and Arts policies. Cultural Foundations. Policy on books".

* Art. 9.5: Dropped "Landscape heritage"

* Art. 9.7: Added: "...Academies whose seat is in Catalonia"

* Art. 9.9: Dropped: "...protected natural parks and lands"

* Art. 9.10: Added: "Woodlands, forestry resources and services, livestock trails and pastures"

* Art. 9.11: Roads and highways..."whose routes are entirely contained within the territory of Catalonia"

* Art 9.15: Railway, transport by land, sea, river and cable; ports, heliports, airports and the Meteorological Service in Catalonia, but taking into account some Constitutional provisions.

* Art. 9.16: Hydraulic projects, canals and irrigation works but whenever the waters flow "entirely" within the territory of Catalonia

* Art. 9.19 in the draft): Dropped, "Consumer protection"

* Art. 9.23: "Professional Associations and the exercise of degree professions", observing constitutional provisions (arts. 36 and 139)

* Art. 9.24: "Foundations and associations of an educational, cultural, artistic, charitable, welfare or similar nature, whose activities are carried on chiefly in Catalonia"

* Art. 9.35 in the draft): Dropped, "Regulation and execution of referenda...."

2. Concurrent powers. Powers under the framework of State legislation

* Art. 10.2: Added: "Compulsory expropriation..."

* Art. 10 (.6 in the draft): Dropped, "Communications"

* Art. 10 (.9): Dropped, "Woodlands, forestry resources, etc" and included in art. 9.10 (Exclusive powers for the Generalitat)

* Art. 12: "In accordance with the bases and planning of the general economic activity and the monetary policy of the State:
   ...2) Industry... The power to authorize transfers of foreign technology lies solely with the State
   3) The development and implementation in Catalonia of
plans drawn up by the State for the restructuring of industrial sectors
5) Internal trade protection of the consumer and user..."Appellations d'origine"...
6) Institutions of corporate, public and territorial credit and Savings Banks

*Art 13: Power for the setting up of an Autonomous Police Force in the framework of an Organic State Law. Dropped: the executive powers of the Generalitat as regards all internal police forces and services which are reserved exclusively for the State.

*Art 16: Media: "The Generalitat may develop and implement legislation on Radio and TV, observing the provisions of the Legal Statute of Radio and TV. Within the framework of the basic rules of the State, the Generalitat may develop and implement legislation on the Press and, in general, that of all the social communications media"

*Art 17: Power to develop legislation and implement the basic legislation of the State in internal health matters and Social Security, except rules dealing with its economic planning. Implementation of basic legislation on pharmaceutical products."The State shall reserve the inspection facilities for itself...". Management by the Generalitat of the economic planning of the Social Security. External health matters excluded

*Art 21: "The President of the High Court of Justice of Catalonia shall be appointed by the King at the proposal of the General Council of the Judiciary" and "The appointment of Magistrates, Judges and Secretaries of the High Court of Justice shall be provided for in the Organic Law of the Judiciary and of the General Council of the Judiciary". In the draft of the Bill both powers were under the jurisdiction of the Generalitat, "...observing the legal procedures"

*Art 15: Education. In the draft exclusive power was given to the Generalitat. The Bill recognises the"full" jurisdiction of the Generalitat "...to regulate and administer education in all its forms, levels, degrees, kinds and specialities, but without prejudice to provisions of the Organic Laws involved in this area; the powers assigned to the State to regulate and inspect the obtaining, issuing and standardization of academic degrees, professional qualifications and basic rules..."


*Art. 11 (.5 in the draft): Dropped "Public testimony (fó pública) and organisation of registers and public instruments

* Art.11.2: "Labour affairs" ("...without prejudice of the State's powers of inspection")

* Art.11.4: Added, "Appointment of bill brokers, stockbrokers and commercial brokers..."

* Art.11.8: "Museums, archives and libraries in State ownership "...when the State does not reserve their management for itself"

483
* Art.11.9: Added, "Ports and airports of general interest, "...whenever the State does not reserve their direct management for itself"

*Art.11.10: Added, "Rescue work at sea and dumping of industrial waste and pollutants in State territorial waters off the Catalan seaboard"


* Arts. 44 and 45: Treasury of the Generalitat: Gift and Inheritance tax and Luxury good taxes levied on the consumer, are added in the Bill to the section "yield of taxes handed over by the State". A percentage share in the "total State revenue from direct and indirect taxes, including fiscal monopolies". This annual percentage share should take into account the coefficients of population and "tax burden" (NB. in the draft, the Catalan Income was used instead)

* Arts 46 & 48: The management, collection and implementation by the Generalitat of its own taxes and those whose yields have been turned over by the State. In the draft those powers referred to all taxes, either established by the Generalitat or by the State.

*Art.48.2:It is the responsibility of the Local Councils in Catalonia to manage, collect, implement and inspect their own taxes...without prejudicing their option to delegate these powers to the Generalitat. In the draft this power was entirely incumbent on the Generalitat. "By means of a State Law, a system of collaboration shall be established between the local Agencies, the Generalitat and the State for the management, collection, settlement and inspection of taxes.". In the draft the Generalitat, by means of a Catalan Law, "...would establish the fiscal and financial regime of the local authorities in Catalonia".

* Art 51: "1. The Generalitat, through a parliamentary decision, may issue public debt to finance investment expenditure; 2. The size and characteristics of issues shall be established in accordance with the general planning of credit policy and in co-ordination with the State..."

5. General provisions. Miscellaneous

*Art. 1.1: Replacement of the expression "national reality" by "nationality", as refers to Catalonia

*Art. 1.3: "The powers of the Generalitat emanate from the Constitution, the present Statute and the people", instead of the original, "The powers of the Generalitat emanate from the people"

* Art. 5.4: New inclusion of the following text: "The stipulations of the foregoing paragraphs (Art. 5) shall be interpreted without prejudice to the organization of the province as a local agency and as a territorial division for the carrying out of the activities of the State, in accordance with the provisions of arts. 137 and 141 of the Constitution"
* Arts.23,24: In competitions, examinations and appointments to fill vacancies in Catalonia for Magistrates, Judges, judicial Secretaries and other staff, as well as Notaries Public, Real Estate and Commercial registrars, specialized knowledge of Catalan law shall be a special merit. It was originally drafted as a compulsory requirement. Dropped the requirement for Prosecutors to know Catalan (art 23.2 in the draft).

* Art.25.3: In the exercising of its executive powers, the Generalitat will be subject to the rules and regulations issued by the State in developing its legislation. In the original draft rules and regulations were included together with the executive powers.

* Art. 20: The jurisdiction of the judicial authorities in Catalonia extend: a) In civil matters, to all instances and degrees, including appeals for review and high court appeals in matters of Catalan Civil Law; b) In penal and social cases, to all instances and degrees, with the exception of high court appeal and appeals for review; c) the same as originally drafted [ss.a),b),c), d) and e)]

* Art.54: The Generalitat may set up public companies, but with no jurisdiction over the State Public Sector as written in the draft

* Arts. 56 and 57: The order in the process to amend the Statute of Autonomy is changed. In the Bill, the approval of the amendment by the Parliament of Catalonia by a two-thirds majority is first, the approval of the Spanish Parliament through an Organic Law, second and the positive response of the Catalan electorate in referendum, last.

* Transitory provision Fourth: D'Hondt system of proportional representation in four electoral circumscriptions. Barcelona shall elect one deputy per 50,000 inhabitants, with a maximum of 85; Girona, Lleida and Tarragona shall elect a minimum of six deputies plus one per 40,000 inhabitants, there being allocated to each 17, 15 and 18 respectively. In total the Parliament of Catalonia shall consist of 135 seats.

* Transitory provision Sixth: "...7. The Provincial Council ("Diputacions") of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona may transfer or delegate to the Generalitat all those services which by their very nature require co-ordinated planning, and may retain for themselves, the implementation and management of such services"

1889  Scottish Home Rule Motion by Dr. Clark. 
Defeated by 200 to 79. Scottish vote 19 to 22 against.

1890  Dr. Clark's Amendment to Address 
Defeated by 181 to 141. Scottish MPs, 25 to 17 in favour.

1891  Federal Home Rule Motion by Dr. Clark. 
Counted out.

1892  Federal Home Rule Motion by Dr. Clark. 
Defeated by 74 to 54. Scottish vote 14 to 10 in favour.

1893  Scottish Home Rule Motion by Dr. Clark. 
Defeated by 168 to 150. Scotland's MPs 37 to 22 in favour.

1894  Scottish Home Rule Motion by Sir Henry Dalziel. 
Carried by 180 to 170. Scottish vote 35 to 21 in favour. 
Never implemented.

1895  Federated Home Rule Motion by Sir Henry Dalziel. 
Carried by 128 to 102. Scottish MPs 29 to 15 in favour. 
Never implemented.

1908  Scottish Home Rule Bill, introduced by D.V. Pirie. 
Carried on First Reading by 257 to 102. Scottish MPs 44 to 9 for. 
Never given a second reading.

1911  Scottish Home Rule Bill introduced by Sir Henry Dalziel. 
Carried on First Reading by 172 to 73. Scottish vote 31 to 4 for. 
Never given a second reading.

1912  Scottish Home Rule Motion by Dr. Chapple. 
Carried by 226 to 128. Scottish MPs 43 to 6 in favour. 
Never implemented.

1912  Federal Home Rule Bill introduced by A.M. Scott. 
Carried on First Reading by 264 to 212. Scottish MPs 43 to 7 for. 
Never given a second reading.

1913  Scottish Home Rule Bill introduced by Sir W.H. Cowan. 
Carried by 204 to 159 on Second Reading. Scots MPs 45 to 8 for. 
Never taken further.

1914  Scottish Home Rule Bill introduced by Ian MacPherson. 
Achieved Second Reading. 
Adjourned and not resumed.

Achieved Second Reading. 
Counted out.

1919  Devolution Motion by Major Wood
Carried by 187 to 34. Scottish vote 35 to 1 in favour. Never implemented.

1920 Scottish Home Rule Bill introduced by Joseph Johnstone. Closure carried by 65 to 52. Scottish vote 38 to 9 in favour.


1924 Government of Scotland Bill. Second Reading moved by George Buchanan. Closure refused. Talked out by J. Leng Sturrock


Appendix 5.1.i: The Scottish Rate Support Grant System (1981-82).

£m 1980 prices.

A. Composition of relevant expenditure

Education, libraries and museums 1,154.7
Social work services 225.1
Law, order and protective services 252.2
Roads and transport 268.0
Water, sewerage and environmental services 230.1
Planning services 44.5
Technical services 85.4
Miscellaneous 104.6
Central administration 103.9
Interest receipts -10.0

TOTAL RELEVANT EXPENDITURE 2,458.5

B. Grants

Aggregate amount of grants at 66 % of the relevant expenditure 1,639.8

Specific grants: police 136.7
list D schools 98.7
urban programme 0.4
civil defence 9.0
city development 1.0
urban development 5.5
housing improvement 14.4
clean air 0.1
sewerage 1.2
sheltered workshops 1.0
countryside and port 1.1
health
town development 0.8
additional teachers 0.1
in urban areas of deprivation 2.7
community service facilities 0.7
hostels for adult offenders 0.1

1,503.1 (5.5 %)

1,503.1 (61.14 %)
C. Elements of RSG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic element</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources element</td>
<td>148.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs element (extraordinary expenses portion)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs element (general portion)</td>
<td>1,329.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,503.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Appendix 5.1.ii: Sources of Scottish Local Authority Income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975-76 revenue</th>
<th>1976-77 revenue</th>
<th>1977-78 revenue</th>
<th>1978-79 revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capital</td>
<td>capital</td>
<td>capital</td>
<td>capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. RSG</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>1,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(43.4%)</td>
<td>(43.4%)</td>
<td>(42.2%)</td>
<td>(40.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Speci.</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grants</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
<td>(12.7%)</td>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; subsidies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANTS</td>
<td>(55.6%)</td>
<td>(2.1%)</td>
<td>(56.1%)</td>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rates</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.9%)</td>
<td>(23.3%)</td>
<td>(24.6%)</td>
<td>(24.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fees</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>charges</td>
<td>(4.4%)</td>
<td>(4.3%)</td>
<td>(4.5%)</td>
<td>(6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sales</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td>(0.6%)</td>
<td>(1.1%)</td>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. New</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>borrow.</td>
<td>(94.3%)</td>
<td>(93.5%)</td>
<td>(92.8%)</td>
<td>(89.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.5%)</td>
<td>(3.0%)</td>
<td>(15.2%)</td>
<td>(3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESOURCES</td>
<td>(44.4%)</td>
<td>(9.7%)</td>
<td>(43.9%)</td>
<td>(98.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46.9%)</td>
<td>(97.3%)</td>
<td>(48.5%)</td>
<td>(96.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,573</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 5.1.iii: Nationalised industries and public corporations in Scotland.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCOTTISH NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Scotland Electricity Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Transport Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES IN SCOTLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The British National Oil Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Coal Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Gas Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Shipbuild.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Steel Corp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Post Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Telecom(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Airways(*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Airports Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Railways Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Transport Docks Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Waterways Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OTHER PUBLIC CORPORATIONS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Atomic Energy Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Broadcasting Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Both nationalised industries were privatised in 1985.

Appendix 5.1.iv: Structure and functions of the Scottish Development Agency

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chairman

Deputy Chairman

Chief executive

Ten members

SENIOR STAFF

Chief Executive

*Finance and Industry Services
  - Industry Services:
    Interface with larger Scottish companies; investment support and monitoring; advisory services; accounting and industrial relations.
  - Internal Accountancy:
    Agency accounting and financial control; computer services, internal audit and management of funds.

*Small Business and Electronics
  - Small Business:
    Financial assistance and commercial, marketing and technical advice to small businessmen; trade promotion in UK and overseas for small firms, grants and promotional and marketing services to craftsmen.
  - Electronics Division:
    Implementation and co-ordination of Agency programme for the Scottish electronics industry.

*Area Development
  Co-ordination and management of area projects: integrated projects, Task Forces, self help initiatives, Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal Projects; preparation of financial programmes and development studies; identification and development of economic initiative; promotion of private development; programme and performance review.

*Planning and Projects
  - Corporate Planning:
    Corporate Plan and evaluation of operations
  - Economic Services:
    Provision of economic advice and information
  - Industrial Programme Development:
    Formulation of industrial development programmes
  - Area Programme Development:
    Formulation of area based programmes including integrated area projects
  - Industrial Development projects:
    Implementation of industrial projects including the expansion of research and product development
Health Care and Biotechnology Industries:
Implementation and co-ordination of Agency programme for
the Scottish health care industry

*Property and Environment*
- Factory Policy Division:
  Property development and marketing; valuation and estate
  management
- Building Division:
  New building, civil engineering and estate development;
  development of St. Enoch's complex.
- Property Services Division:
  Derelict land and environmental enhancement

*Investment (Scottish Development Finance Limited)*
Policy on industrial investment, evaluation of projects,
pot investment relationships, advice to invested
companies; encouraging private sector involvement.

*Marketing*
Advertising; press and public relations; information
services; industrial promotion; special projects.

*Aberdeen Office*
 Provision of a full Agency service in the Grampian Region
including small business assistance, investment property,
management and development; oil-related services and
projects; new industry; area projects and technology
projects.

*Secretariat*
Board servicing; legal services; staff relations
administration; office services.

*Associate: Locate in Scotland*
Attraction of industry to Scotland from overseas and from
other parts of the United Kingdom; associated Industry Act
incentives; monitoring existing overseas investment in
Scotland.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position at 31 March</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>£000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amounts Invested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments(at cost) in Participating Equity</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments(at cost) in Preference Shares</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>6,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to companies</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>8,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Small Business in Urban Areas</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Small Business in Rural Areas</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>3,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to Local Authorities</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>3,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans to companies for purchase of Agency factories</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5,722</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Provisions established and outstanding against future possible losses and diminutions in value of equity and Preference Shares | 4,016 | 5,200 |

Portafolio valuation at 31 March | 29,988 | 37,259 |

Investments committed but not taken up by 31st March | 74    | 2,740 | 87    | 9,311 |

SDA's Summary of Financial Position 1983 and 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>As at 31 March 83</th>
<th>As at 31 March 1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£000</td>
<td>£000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>259,517</td>
<td>281,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land held for development</td>
<td>26,246</td>
<td>26,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial and Commercial property</td>
<td>230,912</td>
<td>251,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and Equipment</td>
<td>2,359</td>
<td>3,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>29,988</td>
<td>37,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares and loans</td>
<td>21,238</td>
<td>28,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Loans on property sold  
5,722  
Loans to Local Authorities  
3,028

Current Assets  
less Creditors  
(1,228)  
119

Net Assets Employed  
288,277  
318,790

Number of employees  
(excluding temporary  
clerical assistance)  
746  
733

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