SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA: THE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT

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Introduction

This paper undertakes a comparative study of Scotland and Catalonia with respect to their territorial rights for self-government within their respective British and Spanish frameworks. The subjects of this comparative study share a somewhat similar configuration as sub-state peripheral nations with analogous perceptions, interpretations and aspirations for home rule. Nonetheless, Scotland and Catalonia have not followed parallel processes over the last decades as far as the achievement of institutional forms of self-government is concerned.

During the last decades, the revival of ethnoterritorial political movements in the Western world has coincided with an increasing challenge to the legitimacy of the centralist model of the unitary state. Not surprisingly, both elements of decentralization and ethnic pluralism have been, and still are, major sources of political conflict in the national-multinational United Kingdom and Spain.

This paper focuses principally on the individual elements of territory and ethnicity which, together with class, are responsible for most of the division and cohesion in the contemporary world.\(^1\) It also acknowledges the decisive importance of the functional dimension in

\(^1\)According to Giddens (1979, p. 227), each of such divisions of class, ethnic differentiation and territorial claims, tends to be regionalized in time-space. Moreover, “regions within societies also often have cultural and ethnic significance, that can either cut across or can act to further class divisions”. 
all aspects of human organization and also assumes class stratification to be a necessary element in the analysis of any social formation. However, and contrary to the views of other social scientists, this article contends that ethnic and territorial differences are necessary, at least as much as class cleavages are, for an understanding of the functioning of the modern state and for the processes of social mobilization and social change which can take place in human societies. Accordingly, special emphasis is placed on the ethnoterritorial aspects of the two countries examined in this article.

1. Scotland and Catalonia: Affinities and Differences

In order to set out our analytical framework, it is first necessary to focus on the main affinities and differences between Scotland and Catalonia. These can be outlined following a basic four-fold criterion:

A. Historical

(A.1) Affinities. In pre-capitalist Europe, Scotland and Catalonia exercised significant political independence as ethnically structured territories. This continued until their personal dynastic unions with England and Castile, respectively (i.e., James I-VI in 1603 and the Catholic Kings in 1469). Nevertheless, both nations preserved their institutional forms of self-government until the coercive imposition of political standardization which occurred in the aftermath of military defeat (i.e., the failure of the Jacobites to reinstate the Stuarts in 1746 and the Catalans setback in their support for Archduke Charles in the Spanish War of Succession in 1714). These events inserted themselves in the origins of the process of national integration and state-building occurring in the United Kingdom and Spain during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

In Scotland and Catalonia, during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, there was a progressive reassertion of nationalist values with unfulfilled economic and social expectations, caused by the decline of the British Empire and the inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to achieve its
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revolution nationwide. These political movements eventually forced concessions from the centre which, in order to accommodate them, granted a degree of administrative devolution: viz., The Secretaryship for Scotland in 1885 and the Mancomunitat de Catalunya in 1914. The creation of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh in 1939, and the achievement of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, although different in political and institutional content, can be seen as outcomes of a similar political struggle for the gain of larger degrees of home rule.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with the progressive obsolescence of the centralist state apparatus in liberal Britain and despotic Spain, the peripheral nationalisms of Scotland and Catalonia challenged the political legitimation of the corporatist forms of uniformization imposed on them from the centre of their respective polities. With the 1979 Referenda in Scotland and Catalonia (see results in Tables 1 and 2), the desire for self-government of a majority of Scots and Catalans was expressed.

(A.2) Differences. While throughout the Middle Ages the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation was one of the leading Mediterranean powers, Scotland continually struggled to overcome the "natural" expansionist interests of England in the Wars of Independence.2 Both the outlooking Catalan and defensive Scottish psychosocial attitudes have somehow moulded the ancestral national character of the Catalans and Scots. More important for the purposes of this paper is the fact that, when the nationalist movements emerged defiantly in the 1960s and 1970s, the ancestral detachment of the respective compound identities—i.e., Scottish and Catalan, but at the British and Spanish too—reflected the assertive and reactive nature of their similar territorial aspirations for self-government.

The main historical dissimilarity between both political processes in Scotland and Catalonia in contemporary times is that, during the II

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2Catalans fought Castilian Spanish assimilation in revolts and wars of independence from 1640 to 1714 (the “War of Reapers” 1640-1652), which resulted in Catalonia’s loss of Rosello and Cerdanya to France in 1659 (Peace of Pyrenees); and the War of Succession, which ended with the surrender of the Catalans after the forces of Philip V entered Barcelona on September 11, 1714.
Spanish Republic, the Catalan achieved democratic institutions of self-government. The Statute of Autonomy and the Generalitat were later abolished by General Franco in 1939 at the end of the Spanish Civil War. The Scots have not had any analogous experience.

These divergent realities undoubtedly conditioned not only social mobilization in Scotland and Catalonia prior to the 1979 referendum but, more importantly, the form and content of the political response from the centre of both centralist states.

It is, however, important to note that if the "memory" of the Republican Catalan Government and Parliament has counted as an extraordinary asset in the centre-periphery negotiation in the transitional period after the demise of Franco’s dictatorship in Spain, the mere existence of an administrative Scottish Office since WWII, in combination with the civil institutions preserved by the 1707 Treaty of Union between England and Scotland, has also enhanced the subsequent salience of the Scottish dimension in British politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: The 1979 Devolution Referendum Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages on census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages on turnout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 2:
The 1979 Referendum Results—Catalan Statute of Autonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Census</th>
<th>Votes Yes</th>
<th>Votes No</th>
<th>Blank/Null</th>
<th>Abstentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>4,358,886</td>
<td>2,281,024</td>
<td>205,174</td>
<td>106,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages on census</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentages on turnout</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Spanish Ministerio del Interior, 1979

B. Political

(B.1) Affinities. Scotland and Catalonia have, in recent times, seen the rise of strong nationalist parties—the Scottish National Party and the coalition Convergencia y Unió—which have brought not only an element of heterogeneity to the British and Spanish electoral scenarios, but have also tested the adaptability of both liberal and post-despotic state apparatuses to profound institutional changes (see electoral results in Scotland and Catalonia in Tables 3 and 4).

During the 1970s a majority of Scots and Catalans were mobilized by similar political perceptions, interpretations and aspirations regarding home rule. Subsequently, and despite a diverse degree of intensity, both communities voted positively for the creation of self-governed institutions in the 1979 Referendum.

The lack of major political violence in these two nationalities is moreover highly significant. It indicates the absence both of strong intracommunal social cleavages, as is the case in Northern Ireland, and of a considerable section of the population being ready to support the fight, by whatever means possible, for self-determination as in the Basque Country. In any case, both forms of political nationalism shared the perception that political violence would undoubtedly jeopardize social mobilization and popular support for the cause of self-
government. Moreover, the reformist character of such nationalisms is antagonistic to radical change. Neither have the policies of repression by their centralist states or the internal social climate reached the level of suffocating oppression or civil war as happened in the Basque Country and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s.

(B.2) Differences. Setting aside electoral and institutional traditions, the stark difference between the Scottish and Catalan processes for the gain of home rule rests upon their antithetical strategic approaches. The Scottish political class has tended to defend, in an inert manner, a political territorial pattern which did not exist in post-Franco Catalonia and which has also been greatly influenced by the dialectics of partisan competition and self-interest characteristic of English-British politics. Thus, the achievement of home rule, which has been the concern of a majority of Scots, has always been subordinated to the priorities of each political party.

The Catalan political forces, on the contrary, not having to break a territorial pattern of institutional power in post-France Catalonia, have sought and negotiated the articulation of a common strategy to make the reestablishment of institutions of self-government possible. This pattern has followed the traditional inclination of the Catalan seny ("common sense") for negotiation and compromise, or "Pactism".3

C. Social and Cultural

(C.1) Affinities. The concept of dual nationality, or compound nationality, is a common element of identification for a majority of Scots and Catalans (see Tables 5 and 6 for national identification by Scots and Catalans). Both peripheral nations have preserved a national identity, or quasi-nationhood, a product of pre-Union times and have also assimilated a post-Union identity, a product of the process of

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3 Seny, a word without an English or Castilian equivalent, is similar to the French sagesse. It implies common sense, prudence and wisdom rather than intelligence. The opposite of seny is arrauxament, an ecstasy of violence. According to Alba (1975, pp. 10-11), these two words express the extremism of the Catalans: "The step from good sense to violence is taken when there is no way to defend sensibly what has been agreed on".
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malintegration in the British and Spanish state-building. Dual nationality has, thus, a changing nature because of the constant interplay between both pre- and post-Union intergrated loyalties.

A consequence of the pre-Union collective consciousness is the employment of both Scottish mythology and the Catalan language as the main sociocultural instruments in the forging of ethnical cohesiveness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>LIBERAL(*)</th>
<th>NATIONALISTS (SNP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Feb)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974(Oct)</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The 1983 and 1987 results correspond to the SDP-Liberal Alliance
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>PSC-PSOE</th>
<th>CiU</th>
<th>PSUC</th>
<th>ERC</th>
<th>CC-UCD-CDS</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977 (General)</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>16.8(a)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.8 (b)</td>
<td>3.5(c)</td>
<td>11.8 (d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (General)</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>3.6(e)</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 (Regional)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.3(f)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982 (General)</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>14.6(g)</td>
<td>6.0 (h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 (Regional)</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7.8(g)</td>
<td>5.3 (h)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 (General)</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.4(g)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 (Regional)</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>7.7(i)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PARTY ACRONYMS:**

PSC-PSOE, Catalan Socialist Party federated to Spanish PSOE, member of the Socialist International.

CiU, Nationalist electoral coalition which has brought together Christian-Democrats, Liberals and Social-Democrats, in a right-to-centre catch-all political force.

PSUC, Catalan Eurocommunist party.

ERC, Historic Republican nationalist party (centre-left).

AP, Spanish conservative party.

CC-UCD, Centrist electoral coalition which disappeared after 1982 General Election.

CDS, Centrist party which contested 1986 General Election and 1988 Regional Election.

**NOTES:**

(a) These results correspond to *Pacte Democratic de Catalunya*, a coalition into which *Convergència* integrated.

(b) These results correspond to the coalition UCD-UCC.

(c) These results were obtained by *Convivència Catalana* made up of AP and *Unió Catalana*.

(d) UCDCC, a coalition made up of centrists and Christian-Democrats, received 5.6% of the votes.

(e) These results correspond to a coalition made up of AP and *Partit Popular de Catalunya*.

(f) These results were obtained by *Solidaritat Catalana*, a conservative list with AP support.

(g) These results correspond to a coalition made up of AP, Christian Democrats and Liberals.

(h) PCC, a PSUC breakaway pro-Soviet Communist party received, in 1982 and 1984, 1.4% and 2.4% votes, respectively.

(i) These results correspond to the coalition *Iniciativa per Catalunya* in which PSVC integrated.
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Table 5: National Identification by Scots (1986)

Question: We are interested to know how people living in Scotland see themselves in terms of their nationality. Which of the statements on this card best describes how you regard yourself?

\[
\begin{array}{lcc}
& \% \\
1) & Scottish, not British & 39 \\
2) & More Scottish than British & 30 \\
3) & Equally Scottish and British & 19 \\
4) & More British than Scottish & 4 \\
5) & British, not Scottish & 6 \\
(Don't know) & & 2 \\
\end{array}
\]

Those expressing a degree of “dual nationality”...... 53
Those expressing exclusive “single nationality” ...... 45

(*) Percentages have been rounded. “Don’t knows” have been ignored.
Sample: 965.


Table 6: National Identification by Catalans (1985)

Question: In which of these five categories do you include yourself?

\[
\begin{array}{lcc}
& \% \\
1) & I consider myself only Catalan & 08.6 \\
2) & I consider myself more Catalan than Spanish & 23.9 \\
3) & I consider myself as much Spanish as Catalan & 47.1 \\
4) & I consider myself more Spanish than Catalan & 7.7 \\
5) & I consider myself only Spanish & 12.2 \\
(Don't know) & & 0.5 \\
\end{array}
\]

Those expressing a degree of “dual nationality”...... 79
Those expressing exclusive “single nationality” ...... 21

(*) Percentages have been rounded. “Don’t knows” have been ignored.
Sample: 1316.

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(C.2) Differences. The diverse nature of sociocultural instruments has reinforced the assertive and reactive character of Scottish and Catalan nationalism. Not surprisingly, many of the Scottish myths for popular consumption deal with heroes like William Wallace or Robert the Bruce, or events like the battle of Bannockburn, rather than the egalitarian values developed in Scottish civil society since the Union with England. The former emphasises Scotland’s successful defense against the external English adversary and contribute, to feed, in turn, a certain sense of defensive “hopelessness” in national Scottish values vis-à-vis the “powerfulness” of the English ones.4

The Catalan language, on the other hand, provides the means for a permanent reassertion of Catalan ethnocultural distinctiveness. External adversary theory has also played, and continues to play, an important role in the articulation of political mobilization in Catalonia. However, the emergence in the last decades of new outward-looking cultural forms, not exclusively tied to pre-Union signs of identity, has brought about an active socio-cultural Catalan role in concurrence with other Spanish values.

D. Economic

(D.1) Affinities. The regional economies of Scotland and Catalonia have similar economic indicators as regards population (5.15 and 5.96 million, respectively), location (peripheral regions) and production (EEC GDP: 1.6% and 1.3%). They have traditionally perceived themselves as discriminated by core areas and political elites of their respective unitary states: i.e., the Scottish perception of relative deprivation and the Catalan sense of comparative grievance. In other words, while a large sector of Scottish society is of the opinion that the English, especially those living in the South, are economically better off than the Scots (see Table 7), the Catalans’ comparative grievance is based upon a feeling of being treated unfavorably by the centre, or receiving

4Authors like Paterson, L. (1981, p.71) argues that Tartan’s principal legacy is a “cancerous national inferiority complex: the quite unmistakable psychological end-product of two centuries of tawdry palliatives—of escaping from social problems into wishful fantasy”.
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less than they have given. These two popular perceptions have greatly fueled the territorial demands put forward by modern political nationalism in both peripheral nations.

(D.2) Differences. In relative terms, and taking into account both the British and the Spanish contexts, Scotland can be seen to be poorer and Catalonia richer. Growth of population, the simplest economic indicator of the well-being of a country, illustrates this point. Where as in 1931 the population of Scotland accounted for 12.1% of the UK total figures, in 1971 the percentage fell to 10.7%. Catalonia’s population, by contrast, climbed from 11.2% of the Spanish total in 1940 to 15.6% in 1974.

However, as far as natural resources are concerned, the contrast is spectacular. North sea oil, for example, provided £16 billion of the gross revenue of the UK Treasury in 1982, while the very few natural resources in Catalonia amount to no more than some salt mines, lignite mines and a very small oil extraction off the coast of Tarragona.

Although both countries have shared the recent experience of an increased penetration of multinational companies, their regional economies show dissimilarities with respect to their economic structures: specialized, in the case of Scotland, with large “uncompetitive” heavy industries which are in the gradual process of closure; and diversified in the case of Catalonia with production based on small firms and businesses. Paradoxically, the financial sector based in Edinburgh is very strong in comparison with the feebleness of Catalan local finances.

In general terms, the “productive” sector of the Scottish regional economy relies greatly upon the implementation of policies from above, basically through the provision of jobs and the creation of economic activities via British public expenditure. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial vocation developed by a petit bourgeois mentality makes the Catalan industrialists more likely to develop initiatives from below. These are on a smaller scale and are very adaptable to changing economic scenarios.
Table 7: Figures Concerning Sense of Relative Deprivation in Britain

Question A: “Compared with other parts of Britain, would you describe (region) as well-off financially?”

Question B: “In comparison to other parts of Britain, would you say that the government understands the need of (region) ... worse?”

% percentages answering yes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>NW</th>
<th>WM</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>EA</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>GL</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>SW</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>SCOTLAND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=North; Y=Yorkshire; NW=North West; WM=West Midlands; EM=East Midlands; EA=East Anglia; SE=South East; GL=Greater London; S=South; SW=South West; W=Wales.

Source: Commission on the Constitution, 1973b (Tables 36 and 37).

2. Unitary States and Minority Nations: the Malintegration in Multinational Polities

Although both Britain and Spain might be included in the group of “unitary” states, their political and constitutional arrangements show considerable dissimilarity. In fact, the paramount role of the British Prime Minister, primus inter pares in the Cabinet, supported by one parliamentary group in a legislative body holding “unlimited” sovereignty, clearly underlines the absolute supremacy of one central source of political power in unitary Britain. In turn, the institutional safeguards for territorial autonomy and the role as arbiter of the Constitutional Court in conflicts between central, regional and local governments in Spain confers the Spanish “unitary” system with a distinctive quasi-federal qualification.

In a broader context, the three universal types of state models (i.e., Confederation, Federation and Unitary states) cannot be considered as a clearcut taxonomical paradigm for the analysis of the territorial distribution of state power. In fact, the actual configuration of the states
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in the Western World reflect some interesting peculiarities. For instance, although nominally confederal, Switzerland can be considered as a federal republic since the inception of the 1848 Constitution after the Sonderbundeskrieg and, with this, the factual disappearance of the myth of the canton sovereignty.

Jacobin France has steadily been cited as the foremost example of a unitary and centralized system. Nonetheless, functional regionalism put forward by the départements and prefectural system has been transformed into political regionalism with the establishment of directly elected regional councils.

The British case, on the contrary, has swung towards a pattern of local submission to the policies of the centre. In Scotland, for example, the Secretary of State (member of the central government) can order any district or regional council to cut its level of spending and reduce the rates (local taxes) if he/she considers its budget “excessive and unreasonable”.

As far as both Britain and Spain are concerned, the socioterritorial dimension of federalism is highly important in understanding the shortcomings of their respective unitary states and the late emergence of peripheral nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia.

Viewed through this paradigm, federalism is a response to the stimuli of the diversity or plurality of society, comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, religion, history or traditions which can also be reflected in the party system. Thus, states and societies like Britain and Spain, with marked territorial cleavages, incorporate plural qualities even though their political systems are not constitutionally federal. Furthermore, the existence of well-defined sub-state nations, as in the case of Scotland and Catalonia, bring into the discussion the issue of stateless (peripheral) minority nations.

Peripheral nationalist and regionalist movements are not comparable to those “all-embracing” nationalisms which sought their own state apparatuses in the last century (e.g., Germany and Italy) and which incorporated diverse territories in a wider polity. On the con-

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5 On this cf., for example, Livingston (1952), Davis (1978) and Wildasky (1967).
trary, minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia seek political autonomy for their own territories within an existing state.

The objectives of peripheral nationalism can range from minimal deconcentration (administrative devolution) to wide political autonomy. Thus, in Britain, after the results of the 1979 Referendum, the case of Wales would be situated in the lower strata of this referred to spectrum of objectives, whereas Scotland's demand would be situated in the upper zone. In Spain, referenda in the three "old" nationalities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, plus Andalusia, positively demanded a high degree of Home-Rule (see Table 8 for Referendum Results). Other "newly" created regions (e.g., Cantabria, La Rioja or Madrid which did not hold referenda) conformed to a lesser degree of regional autonomy.

This paper makes a distinction between peripheral nationalism, as applied to Scotland and Catalonia, and regionalism because of their pre-Union identities as self-governed territories prior to the configuration of both British and Spanish states. Territories where such nationalist movements occur are not in the political core areas of the state but in its periphery.

Accordingly, and in a wider context, movements in demand of territorial rights in, for example, the North East of England or Extremadura in Spain are in the regionalist category while those in Bavaria, Brittany, Occitanie, Flanders or Friuli can be included in the group of peripheral nationalisms.

As part of a more polemical proposition, territories like Sicily, Sardinia or Corsica can also be included in this group although they have not enjoyed in the past formal political independence or autonomy due to their continuous domination by foreign powers. In any case, the changing nature of such external political domination (Arabic, Catalan-Aragonese, Spanish, French, Vatican, Italian) has fostered pre-Union elements of sociocultural territorial identification.
Table 8: Referendum Results

SCOTLAND

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{% Majority} & \text{YES} & \text{NO} & \text{Abstention} \\
\text{% Electorate} & 52 & 48 & 30.4 & 31.7 & 0.4 \\
\end{array}
\]

WALES

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{% Majority} & \text{YES} & \text{NO} & \text{Abstention} \\
\text{% Electorate} & 20 & 80 & 46.5 & 41.5 & 0.2 \\
\end{array}
\]

CATALONIA

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{% Majority} & \text{YES} & \text{NO} & \text{Abstention} \\
\text{% Electorate} & 88 & 8 & 5 & 40.5 & 2.5 \\
\end{array}
\]

BASQUE COUNTRY

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{% Majority} & \text{YES} & \text{NO} & \text{Abstention} \\
\text{% Electorate} & 89 & 6 & 53 & 3 & 41 \\
\end{array}
\]

ANDALUSIA

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c}
\text{% Majority} & \text{YES} & \text{NO} & \text{Abstention} \\
\text{% Electorate} & 88 & 8 & 52 & 4.7 & 40.5 & 2.4 \\
\end{array}
\]

The task of distinguishing between regionalist and peripheral nationalist movements is, notwithstanding, rather difficult and sometimes purely "academic". The two types of movements can share the same long-term aims and both need the sequence expressed in Fig. 1: i.e., (a) territorial difference (centre-periphery dichotomy); (b) regional/national consciousness or identity and, (c) social mobilization and political organization.

The case of Occitania in France offers an interesting instance of the distinction between regionalism and peripheral nationalism. Although Occitania could not have been considered as forming one single "political" territory in the early Middle Ages, the "political"/cultural solidarity between the different Occitan cities and areas was beyond any doubt, in the wake of the Albigensian Crusades (French occupation) in the thirteenth century. Furthermore, the culture of the troubadors and the written language undoubtedly fostered a powerful Occitan
territorial identity before its assimilation by the Kingdom of France. Occitanie, nevertheless, is considered by some to have a politically less significant peripheral nationalism, whereas others argue it is an example of regionalism. This paper sustains the view that Occitanie offers an example of peripheral nationalism according to the distinction already made. Another matter is that the Occitan nationalist movement of the last twenty years can be labelled as a political failure.⁶

As a general principle, this paper considers that the earlier the occupation/assimilation of a peripheral territory by the forces which, later on, constituted the core areas in the subsequent industrial state is, the less politically salient the sense of its pre-Union identity is and, therefore, the more problematic it is to implement social mobilization by the peripheral nationalist movement involved.

The relatively recent historic loss of their political autonomy/self-government by Scotland and Catalonia (i.e., 1707-1714), together with the preservation of elements fostering their respective pre-Union identities (e.g., Scottish Kirk, law and education, and Catalan language), have provided sound bases for the political “revival” of peripheral nationalism in the last decades.

This sense of pre-Union identity needs to be based on two main characteristics:

1. **Ethnic/cultural identification** in a given territory which has enjoyed some degree of political independence in the past. Alsace or Friesland, for instance, have had areas within their respective territories with some tradition of political autonomy and independence, but the same cannot be said of the whole of those territories.

2. **Exercise of political autonomy.** In the Middle Ages, the Basque Country, for instance, came to an agreement with the Castile Crown that it would collect all taxes produced in its territory and would, subsequently, transfer a stipulated share to the Castile Treasury. This _fuero_ has been maintained as regards the Spanish Treasury except during some absolutist/dictatorial historical periods.

In explaining the phenomena of regionalist/peripheral nationalism in Western Europe, an analysis of the process of state-building

⁶ See, for example, Keating (1985).
and national integration is crucial. The former, accelerated by the development of industrial capitalism in Europe in the nineteenth century, meant the enforcement of central authority upon the peripheral regions or subordinated political groups, often socially and culturally different. The latter, on the other hand, has been referred to as the process by which communities, which are socially and culturally different, transfer their loyalty to a wider state political system. Let us, subsequently, review the two main conceptual approaches to these two concepts: diffusionist/functionalist and Marxism.

The diffusionist/functionalist paradigm has been accepted by many academics as explaining the processes of national integration and state-building in the last two centuries. It holds the view that the diffusion of cultural and social structural values, together with modernization and economic development, necessarily provoked a progressive cultural, political and economic integration and so territorial cleavages came to be replaced by a set of functional and economic conflicts, namely conflicts between classes. The upsurge of peripheral nationalism and regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s, however, invalidated the interpretation of emergency given by the functionalists, who considered it a merely transitional issue.

The Marxist paradigm has tended, in general, to confuse nation and nationalist movements with the state and state-building. Engels, following the Hegelian distinction between "historic" and "non-historic" nations, dismissed the peripheral nationalism of Scots and Catalans as remnants of nations representative of counter-revolution which should be exterminated or denationalized. "Classical" Marxism agreed that nation and nation-state are essentially bourgeois phenomena indissolubly linked with the rise of modern capitalism. Academic Marxism in the Western world tends to take, more or less explicitly, a "functionalist" view of nationalism. Both the American School of Comparative Politics and academic Marxists stress the fact that, with the spread of a money economy a movement from the rural (peripheral) communities to urban environments (core) produced a

8 See Almond and Powell (1966).
blurring of the adscriptive identities in favor of associative ties which cut across traditional castes and ethnic divisions.9

Only Otto Bauer, the main representative of the “centrist” Austromarxists, developed a general Marxist analysis of the national question that was historical, psychological and sociological. He argued that socialism, far from aiming to produce an international socialist culture, would enhance the differentiation and diversities between national cultural communities. Bauer’s approach rejected a separate statehood for each nation and asserted a cultural autonomy and constitutional arrangements to secure such autonomy.10

In any case, and in contrast with the views of functionalists and “mainstream” Marxists, the unquestionable point is that the persistence of peripheral nationalism in Britain and Spain constitutes evidence of the malintegration of their respective states. The lack of a wholeheartedly shared common national identity by minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia, or rather their dual and overlapping identities, shows that the problem of national integration is not only exclusive to countries which have recently achieved independence but has rather been a feature fluctuating in its salience throughout their respective historical processes. This “unstable” sharing of a common (state) national identity exposes the failure in the process of national integration in Britain and Spain, and provides a key element in understanding the nature of state-building experiences in both countries.

In a broader context, too, in the last decades a rise in the number of nationalist/regionalist movements, under the epithet of “peripheral”, has developed in a wide variety of circumstances: in liberal unitary states (Scotland, Wales and Brittany in Britain and France, respectively), in despotic unitary states (the Basque Country and Catalonia, in Franco’s times), poor and wealthy areas (Corsica and South Tyrol, respectively), as well as federal states (Québec).

10 On the nationalist ideas put forward by the “centrist” Austromarxists, see the works of Bauer (1924), Renner (1918) and the studies by Agnelli (1969), and Bottomore and García-Pelayo (1979). For a review of the Marxist approaches to nationalism, see Lowy (1972), Cahn and Fiser (1978, vol. I, pp. 7-116), Tiveu (1981) and Jenkins and Minnerup (1984, pp. 42-85).
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Consequently, three theoretical propositions can be derived as follows:

(a) Western territorial claims associated to peripheral nationalism are linked to cultural factors (i.e., language, religion, tradition and customs).

(b) Western territorial claims associated to peripheral nationalism are linked to economic factors (i.e., uneven development, internal colonialism, ethnocentrism or sense of relative deprivation).

(c) Western territorial claims associated to peripheral nationalism (regionalism) are linked to a political mobilization against dependency from the centre or centralization.

Obviously, this third category is not independent of the first two. Let us, accordingly, explore the commensurability of the centre-periphery paradigm and its full application to the cases of Scotland and Catalonia.

3. Centre and Periphery: the Relations of Interdependence.

Centre-periphery analysis is essential to the comprehension of territorial politics in Britain and Spain. Many social scientists11 have used this formulation which not only refers to single societies but extends to the international level too. An early "diffusionist" definition of "societal centre" can be reproduced as follows:

Society has a center. There is a central zone in the structure of society. This central zone impinges in various ways on those who live within the ecological domain in which the society exists. Membership in the society, in more than the ecological sense of being located in a bounded territory and of adapting to an environment affected or made up by other persons located in the same territory, is constituted by relationship to this central zone (Shils, 1975, p. 2).12


12 For another functionalist definition of societal centre see Rokkan and Urwin (1983), pp 2-18.
Figure 1: Elements of sub-state regionalism and peripheral nationalism

Regional Consciousness

Political Organization
Social Mobilization

ASPIRATIONS
INTERPRETATIONS
PERCEPTIONS

Regional Inequalities

Inter-regional Inequalities

Reinforcement Pre-Union Identity

Spatial Differences

Cultural
Economic
Political

Regional Competition
Relative Deprivation Comparative Grievance

REGIONALISM

PERIPHERAL NATIONALISM

Required Process
Possibly Existing Though Not Required

Note: Based on an idea of Lopez Aranguren’s, 1983, p.59
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Centre and periphery have also been considered in terms of subordination of the latter to the former at the same time that a double dimension between horizontal and vertical relationships has been drawn when referring either to the strict geographical relationship or to a system of functional interaction. In the latter, the centre is formed by a set of key decision-making powers and the periphery is composed of that set of participants in the interaction system, "who have the least influence upon the central group and upon the making of decisions". 13 Consequently, the relations of dominance and dependence are not restricted to their political forms, but can also affect economic and social dimensions.

After the de facto refutation of the diffusionist/functionalist theory—more plausible in the case of the “melting pot” integration in the USA—by the reemergence of peripheral nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia, other theories and models have tried to explain the centre-periphery dichotomy. Let us, briefly, review the most relevant ones.

(3a) Internal colonialism and reactive ethnic change.

Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups (Gonzalez Casanova, 1965, p. 33). 14

The theory of reactive ethnic change and the internal colonial model notes that the centre exploits and dominates the periphery both economically and politically. Therefore, such a relationship of dependency cannot reduce the economic differences between them as the diffusionist/functionalist model maintains.

There is crystallization of the unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The su-

13 Ibid., p. 3.
14 Other authors who have used an “internal colonialism” paradigm, in line with the model developed by Gonzalez Casanova (1965) and Hecter (1975, 1978), Dos Santos (1970) and Galtung (1971) works on dependency and “metropolis-satellite polarisation” are also valuable. An “updated” critique of the internal colonial thesis is provided by Wyn Williams (1983).
perordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labour, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups (Hechter, 1975, p. 9).

According to this argument, industries in the periphery are highly specialized and basically perform an export function. Compared to the core area with its diversified industrial structure, the periphery is sensitive to price fluctuation and, principally, to international penetration and competition. Hence, when the national or international economy is in crisis, the periphery is affected the most.

Likewise, the existence of this relationship of dependency and dominance produces a "reactive" movement for territorial claims, heightening cultural/ethnic distinctiveness in both core and periphery. The prototype for the discussion of the internal colonial development is the Republic of Ireland:

The origins of the southern Irish cultural division of labour were to be found in the Cromwellian Settlement of 1642, which expropriated all Catholic landowners and distributed their property to Protestant Englishmen. Had enterprising Catholics any ideas of reclaiming their lands, the Dublin government enacted a set of Penal Laws making such Catholic competition with the Protestants illegal; these were not repealed until 1828. Essentially, this strategy was a precursor of apartheid (Hechter, 1983, p. 31).

The internal colonial thesis is also applicable to the case of Scotland, and explains convincingly, albeit only partially, the presence of peripheral nationalism in Britain despite the strong structural differentiation—or modernization—which has taken place in the last two centuries. However, Hechter himself has noted that the Scottish case corresponded least well to the internal colonial model:

I had failed to draw the proper conclusion from this observation. If anything, Lowland Scotland had been an overdeveloped peripheral region, not an underdeveloped one. The Scots had long been innovators in the British context in education, finance, technology, and the
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physical and social sciences. These are hardly the accomplishments of colonies—whether internal or external. . . . Lest Scotland be considered unique, Catalonia could be offered as an example of an economically advanced peripheral region which none the less had developed strong nationalist sentiments (Hechter, 1983, p. 33).

Probably the most interesting criticism of internal colonialism is that it fails to consider both ethnic mobilization and peripheral nationalism based not only on cultural factors (i.e., cultural division of labour), but also on the conflicts of social classes. As can be argued in the case of Catalonia during the second half of the nineteenth century, it is precisely class struggle in the periphery which is the element that forced the local-bourgeoisie to use and stimulate the creation of a cultural opposition to the dominant centre, in an attempt to dilute the intraregional enmity of the working class.15

Inherent to the premise of uneven development put forward by the internal colonial model is the concept of relative deprivation which accounts decisively for the explanation of the fuelling of regional consciousness in demand of territorial rights for self-government. The perception and belief that centralization and central control is against the peripheral region’s economic well-being, underlies the feelings a majority of the population have of relative deprivation, as compared with “better off” core areas. It is essential at this point to realize the fact that, due to the revenues from North Sea oil, a completely independent Scotland would potentially be a more affluent country than it is at present. Putting aside the quantitative aspects of this issue, the factor which truly accounts for the sense of relative deprivation felt in Scotland is the psychosocial attitude of a majority of Scots of being not well-off as compared with other areas of Britain (see Table 7).16

As far as Catalonia is concerned, the paradigm of relative economic deprivation does not apply. Neither is the internal colonialism

15 Cf., for example, Sole Tura (1967) and Ragin (1977).
16 Authors like Schwarz (1970), Webb and Hall (1978) and Hall (1972) find little plausibility in the relative deprivation argument in the Scottish context. Brand (1978) and the Kilbrandon Report (Commission on the Constitution 1973) offer a different view.
paradigm applicable because if it could be argued that Catalonia has been “exploited” politically by the Spanish core, the economic exploitation could in no way be deduced. A different matter is the sense of comparative grievance in relation to other areas, principally plutocratic Madrid, as a result of the disproportion of public revenue raised in Catalonia and the public expenditure allocated there.

Comparative grievance is based upon a sense of being treated unfavourably or of receiving less than one has given. The crucial difference between this concept and that of relative deprivation lies in the fact that the sub-state involved can, in fact, be economically better off than the rest of the substate territories (i.e., Catalonia). However, the “waste” in the past of a large part of Catalan taxes by inefficient state machinery and other regional oligarchies in the political core spurred the Catalan sense of comparative grievance and enhanced, therefore, their national/regional aspirations. A different, but no less important, point concerns the financial destination of private savings, generated in the poorer regions of Spain, and their use by the financial sector to inject capital into industrial projects in profitable areas like Catalonia.17 In any case, this last element does much to explain the rise of regionalist feelings and regional senses of relative deprivation in other territories in Spain which have been systematically pauperized by the oligarchic classes. Obviously, this issue transcends the scope of this paper.

(3b) Core areas, ethnic competition and ethnocentrism.

If both internal colonial and relative deprivation theses can fit the Scottish case, Catalonia, as said above, offers a stark difference as regards the Spanish context. A partial—although essential—explanation of the “peripheralism” of the Catalan case has to be found in the character of the territorial variations in the distribution of political and

17 Garcia Javaloyes (1978) has shown that the Spanish poorer regions are financing the richer ones. Guided only by profitability criteria, the financial intermediaries (banks, trusts companies, savings banks, etc.) transfer the savings accrued in the less developed Spanish areas to the industrial regions.
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economic powers within the Spanish state. In general, some propositions have tended to categorize the salience of peripheral nationalism in relation to a core area in the state. These can be formulated as follows:

(1) Where both political leadership and economic dynamism take place in the same region (i.e., where the two types of “core” coincide), peripheral nationalism is weak. Ethnically distinct regions that occupy peripheral positions politically and economically in relation to the center acquiesce in the national union in it.

(2) Where the above activities take place in different regions, one of which has ethnic potential, the latter region is likely to develop strong, politically relevant, nationalism. This may occur if the original economic or political core falters; that is, if it stops promoting economic growth or providing political leadership for the whole country. Or the noncongruence may occur if the peripheral region improves its economic position relative to the original center through the development or the plausible prospect of this development of some resource of newly acquired geographical advantage.

(3) If there is no “ethnic potential” in the region, even noncongruence of this type will not produce ethnically based politics, though it may produce regional politics (Gouveritch, 1979, p. 306).18

If the first proposition, reproduced above, clearly fits pre-1945 Britain, the second “noncongruence” has remained a fixed pattern in Spain since the political union of the Catholic Kings. Thus, Catalonia and the Basque Country, the two peripheral Spanish territories with full “ethnic/cultural potential”, were the first to industrialize and remain as two of the three economically dynamic areas of Spain, together with “Greater” Madrid. It is undeniable that peripheral nationalism has maintained its salience in Catalonia since the industrialization and cultural “Reinaxença” (Renaissance) due basically to the noncongruence between political leadership and economic puissance within the Spanish state.

18 On the core area model see, also, Gouveritch’s (1980) model, Pounds and Ball (1964) and Friedmann’s (1979) formulation of “downward” and “upward” transitional areas.
The theory of “ethnic competition” can fit in with the realization of peripheral nationalism and regional movements in Spain.\(^{19}\) It views ethnic mobilization as a consequence of competition between the diverse ethnic/cultural groups and interests within the state all objectively pursuing the share of political, economic and social power. The ethnic conflict can also appear in the centre-periphery dichotomy when the economic and political yields are not considered as “equitable” by the groups involved. According to this paradigm, the process of modernization offers new opportunities in competing for occupational roles without following the strict pattern of merely geographical ascriptive criteria. Having said this, activities of production and cultural differences ought to come together (but with the blurring of the “cultural division of labour” characteristic of the internal colonial paradigm). Consequently, different ethnic groups compete for the same occupational roles and, as a prerequisite, the peripheral ethnic groups need to organize themselves politically to be able to compete with core areas.

There is also an “ethnocentrist” paradigm which questions the cultural nature of uneven development in the internal colonialism model and replaces it by one of a purely material nature. According to this view, the capitalist class in the state’s centre “inertially” disregards the economic development and possibilities which the periphery offers and invests mainly in the territorial core of the state. Accordingly, a purely economic model can explain the development of the railway in Victorian Britain in England, Scotland and Wales with a meaningful ethnocentrist criteria.

The latter paradigm “comfortably” fits the situation in Scotland, as the ratio of industrial density in Britain easily shows too. This ethnocentrist model is coupled with the principal central use of the periphery for “resource extraction”. In the last decades the fruits of North Sea oil provide—opportunely—the most illustrative support for this ethnocentrist paradigm. In the Scottish case these extractive industries not only allow the British core—the Southeast of England—to maintain a

\(^{19}\) See Cohn (1982). For a critique of the internal colonial model applied to Wales—which, however, does not take into account the mechanism of ethnocentrism—see Lovering (1978).
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diversified industrial base, but also provide the moneys to cover the international trading deficits of the core’s traditional manufacturing industries.

The theory of ethnic competition, however, is hardly applicable to Britain. Scotland, since the 1707 Union, has never articulated a collective response to compete ethnically with England in the sharing of occupational roles. This has rather been done on an individual basis or has simply not existed. Furthermore, the idea of a partnership in Imperial Britain did not require such ethnic competition. Even when the relationship with the core has not developed as favorably as expected, the response of the Scots has been emigration.20 This trend has “overlapped” in the last decades with the “voice” option of political mobilization in the form of electoral support to the SNP.

As far as the models analyzed in this section are concerned, their plausibility in the explanation of the upsurge of territorial movements in demand of self-government in Scotland and Catalonia is at times partial, contradictory or unconnected. Notwithstanding, and for the purposes of this paper, their systematic reference to the cases of Britain and Spain have framed the nature and characteristics of the two cases involved. It can be summarized that the centre-periphery dichotomy is a characteristic pattern of the territorial conflicts produced by cultural, economic and/or political differences in Scotland and Catalonia within the British and Spanish states.

Scotland and Catalonia offer examples of the problem of malintegration in multinational states. Ethnic competition in Spain and ethnocentrism in Britain are theories which explain, albeit partially, the nature of centre-periphery dichotomy in both states. As a consequence of this interdependence, political decentralization seeks to “accommodate” or, rather, to amend such malintegration in states like the British and the Spanish.

(3c) Decentralization and power concentration.

There are global trends to decentralization in the Western World. In fact, the centralization/decentralization debate has usually remained isolated on the political fringe of the discussion of the efficiency versus inefficiency of state institutions in the provision of public goods. Such minimal treatment underestimates the comprehensive study of intergovernmental relations, the crisis of the legitimacy of political institutions (e.g., Parliament and representative democracy) and the impact of the internationalization of capital in the "post-industrial" state.

Indeed, the distribution/dispersion of power or centres of decision-making should be observed from two perspectives: who wields the power and where the power is located within a territory. In actual fact, power has an inherent territorial dimension. It cannot be abstracted from its geographical component. The development of industrial society inevitably involved a reallocation of the spatial division of power. Since the Industrial Revolution, and due mainly to a marked increase in the volume and scope of governmental activity, power has been progressively allocated according to meaningful territorial criteria. As a consequence, the issues "dispersion-concentration", "central-local relations" and "national homogenization-regional diversity" have become crucial to both the configuration of modern polity institutions and the social transformation which can take place within the boundaries of the national state.

4. Conclusion

In Scotland and Catalonia, the setting-up of decentralized political institutions is based on an expressed desire for self-government. Such institutions can not only preserve local identities and territorial rights, but can also project the social aspirations of such communities.

The political process of negotiation in the achievement of self-government in Catalonia has accomplished important goals. Indeed, most of the powers envisaged in the Catalan Statute of Autonomy have already been transferred from the centre and the self-governed
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Institutions of the Catalan Generalitat are carrying out autonomous policies in a wide range of areas. The same cannot be said as far as the case of Scotland is concerned. Following its stunning electoral success in 1979, the incoming Thatcher Government declined to implement the 1978 Scotland Act despite the fact that 49 out of 71 MPs elected in Scottish constituencies were in favour of devolution. The “better” scheme of devolution for Scotland, which the ex-Premier Alec Douglas-Home had promised, rapidly withered. The axis Unionism-Centralization was, subsequently, given renewed emphasis.

As is the case with Catalonia, this paper postulates non-secessionist self-government in Scotland basing its argument mainly on the following:

(a) The Scottish cultural, economic and political differences with the rest of Britain, marked by an increased centre-periphery dichotomy in Britain.

(b) Scottish dual nationality: one being the result of a reinforcement of the pre-Union identity, and the other being the product of the national integration brought about by British state-building after 1707.

(c) A desire for democratic political decentralization related to a sense of national/Regional consciousness.

Having said that, it is simplistic to believe that historical events and processes can be attempted in the same way and with the same results in Scotland as in Catalonia. However, it would also be unrealistic to deny outright a similar result in their respective paths to home rule.

The diverse economic, cultural and political trends followed by Western countries are leading to the recognition of pluralist centres of decision making. In this respect, Scotland and Catalonia may represent the future of decentralized political structures.

In conclusion, decentralization in Britain and Spain, as regards Scottish and Catalan self-government, needs to provide a deepening of democracy by means of a more effective access of civil society to political decision-making, something which in the case of minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia overlaps with their ethnic/cultural/economic differential dimension.
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