Westerly Wind
The Fulbright Program in Spain
Lorenzo Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla

The Fulbright Program was conceived as an initiative to promote intercultural education. It also aimed to increase other countries’ knowledge of the United States, as well as the American Nation’s knowledge of the rest of the world. Spain joined the program with somewhat of a delay in 1958. Now, half a century later, the program has become a channel for exchanges, playing a crucial role not only in expanding ties between the two societies, but also in developing Spain’s cultural and scientific human capital. This book analyzes that process by examining the broad outlines of its evolution as well as its salient features.

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Es una gran satisfacción celebrar el cincuentenario de la Comisión de Intercambio Cultural, Educativo y Científico entre España y Estados Unidos de América y hacerlo prologando la publicación que recoge la historia del programa más importante de intercambio cultural entre los dos países. El Programa Fulbright fue durante largo tiempo el único cauce por el que estudiantes y profesores españoles accedieron a las universidades más prestigiosas del mundo y conocieron de primera mano un país pujante, democrático y abierto. La importancia para España de aquellos primeros becarios – y de los actuales - ha sido enorme, como lo ha sido, también, la contribución extraordinaria de los estadounidenses que vinieron y vienen a estudiar, enseñar o investigar, y que vuelven a su país con el conocimiento, entre otras cosas, de la realidad española.

España ha cambiado mucho en las últimas décadas y es hoy un país plenamente integrado en la comunidad occidental, capaz política y económicamente de multiplicar los intercambios educativos con otros países y de desarrollar una importante labor de cooperación internacional. En el contexto actual, la relación con Estados Unidos es más importante que nunca y por eso, el Gobierno apoya y patrocina generosamente el Programa Fulbright, que ha dado tan buenos resultados, con el objetivo de que españoles y estadounidenses compartan experiencias y conocimientos, conozcan sus raíces comunes, y trabajen juntos en el logro de los retos que unen a nuestros países.

Este Programa sigue vigente por su gran prestigio, y porque ha sabido adaptarse a las necesidades actuales sin perder su esencia: servir para profundizar en el conocimiento mutuo de los dos países y

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Prologue
Letter from the Honorable Miguel Á. Moratinos
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
contribuir a la convivencia pacífica entre los pueblos y naciones del mundo. J. William Fulbright, con una gran visión de futuro, promovió los intercambios educativos de EEUU con otros países y tras medio siglo de fecunda actividad, nos encontramos con este gran ejemplo de diplomacia pública, firme base para las futuras relaciones culturales, educativas y científicas entre España y Estados Unidos.

Miguel Ángel Moratinos
Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación
Letter from The Honorable Eduardo Aguirre  
*Ambassador of the United States of America to Spain*

It’s a pleasure to provide a brief preface to this excellent publication. After serving three and a half years in Spain, my wife and I will return to the United States with a greater appreciation of the longstanding historic, cultural, social and economic ties that bind our two people. No program better exemplifies this deep and abiding relationship than the Fulbright Program and the work of the bilateral Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange between Spain and the United States. I am very proud to have served as the U.S. Honorary Co-Chairman of the Fulbright Commission and to have participated in the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Fulbright Program in Spain.

This survey of former Fulbright grantees in Spain clearly demonstrates the positive impact of academic exchanges, not only for the individual scholars and their families participating in the programs; but, also within Spanish society as a whole. Over the past 50 years, the Fulbright Program in Spain has served to fulfill the dream of Senator William Fulbright to «bring a little more knowledge, a little more reason, and a little more compassion into world affairs».

As a result, I am honored to present to you this study together with the history of the Fulbright Commission in Spain and an overview of US-Spanish relations during the past 50 years.

**Eduardo Aguirre**  
*United States Ambassador*  
*Spain and Andorra*
Foreword by María Jesús Pablos

Executive Director of the Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange between the United States of America and Spain

The first agreement for cultural, educational and scientific cooperation between the United States and Spain was signed in Madrid in 1958, creating a binational commission and permanent secretariat to administer grants that would soon be known by the name of their founder, J. William Fulbright. These scholarships have allowed more than 5,000 Spaniards and Americans to gain profound understanding of the other country while studying, researching, teaching or painting, as scientists and artists alike have participated in the exchanges sponsored by what is known as the Fulbright Commission.

In celebration of the 50th anniversary of the initial agreement, a study has been undertaken of the program’s impact as perceived by grantees themselves*. This work has now been completed with a history of the Commission as well as its earlier predecessors. Each reflects the institution’s interest in assessing a half-century of activity that has promoted the participants’ personal and professional development, and, through and for them, that of multiple academic and social networks, resulting in greater understanding of each country’s reality.

Lorenzo Delgado was the easy and logical choice to narrate this story. After working with the Commission archives for the past four years, he is extremely knowledgeable of them. His training as a historian is unquestionable, as proven by his prior publications and affiliation with the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (High Council for Scientific Research). The pages that follow will familiarize the reader with the Commission, but also with that part of Spain’s recent history affecting its relationship with the United States.

Program details are recorded in program plans, annual reports, and naturally, in the minutes of the Board of Directors meetings, which are today digitalized and easily accessible. However, the Commission’s history would not be complete without mentioning, at least in passing, the representatives from each government that decided which programs to implement and how to finance them. A very special mention must be made of Ramón Bela, Commission Executive Director for 27 years; Matilde Medina, its first Deputy Director; and, in more recent times, Deputy Directors Elizabeth (Liz) Anderson and Thomas Middleton. I would like to mention all those who have worked and currently work in the Commission, but since this is not possible, I would like to recognize in writing that, without the daily work and enthusiasm of each and every individual, the Fulbright Commission would not be what it is today and what it has been for a half-century.

María Jesús Pablos
Executive Director
Acknowledgements

The author of these pages is mindful of the numerous collaborations that have made this work possible. To a large degree, much like cultural and scientific exchange between the United States and Spain, one could say that this has been a collective undertaking.

It is only appropriate to start by thanking María Jesús Pablos (Executive Director of the Fulbright Commission) and Shelley Buckwalter (Deputy Director) for their constant interest and unwavering receptiveness towards this completed work. Their insightful observations have substantially improved it, and they have added an extraordinary human quality in their collaboration. Thanks are extended to all Commission staff for their effective work and the warm welcome they have always given me. I am especially grateful to Victoria Ruiz, with whom I had the initial contact that led to our lengthy collaboration; to Pilar Gómez, who helped me from the beginning with her kindness and efforts to facilitate arrangements; to Miguel Nieto, who handled the graphic design of the materials in the CD Rom included with this book; and lastly, to Laura Holland and Guy Vanover, who translated the text into English. I have rarely encountered individuals who are so clearly committed, and at the same time, sensitive to the task of promoting Spanish-American understanding and multicultural education.

I also extend my gratitude to the members of the research team that helped to create and design the Fulbright Commission Archives: Antonio Niño Rodríguez, María Jesús Álvarez-Coca, Patricia de la Hoz and Gloria Cabrejas. My work would have been impossible without this remarkable and competent group that has quite possibly created the basis to inspire future research in this field. I began to investigate the mechanisms and important players of Spanish-American exchange with Antonio Niño some
time ago. Our work continues and this book owes much to his abilities and friendship. Patricia de la Hoz has been an exceptional collaborator and much of the content in these pages rests on her efforts and intelligence.

Alfons Martinell, Josie Shumake, Marti Estell and Edward Loo, from their respective positions, supported the initiatives to improve knowledge and understanding between the two countries, the basis for this study. Guillem Iglesias Bolea, Director of the Institute for North American Studies in Barcelona, gave me his enthusiastic and selfless support. For some time now, thoughts and activities have been shared on the subject matter addressed here with María Dolores Elizalde, Nuria Puig, Sylvia L. Hilton, Elda González, Pilar Piñón, Pablo León, José Antonio Montero and Antonio López, whose suggestions have enriched the final product.

I am also grateful to the personnel of the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, and the Special Collections Department of the University of Arkansas (Vēra Ekechukwu, Fulbright Papers Research Assistant) for the advice and assistance in locating documentary sources. I also thank the Archivo General de la Administración (General Government Archive) for their assistance in moving documents to the Fulbright Commission Archive.

Several institutions have sponsored this study. In 2004-2005, the Dirección General de Investigación de la Comunidad de Madrid (General Directorate for Research of the Madrid regional government) funded a project on Intercambio cultural, educativo y científico hispano-norteamericano: organización y estudio del Archivo de la Comisión Fulbright 06/0078/2003 and 06/HSE/0392/2004) (Spanish-American Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange: Organization and Study of the Fulbright Commission Archive). The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (High Council for Scientific Research) also provided support and funding for short-term technical personnel, and allowed some of the materials from its photographic library to be published. By backing a project entitled Guerra fría y propaganda cultural. Análisis comparado de la diffusión del “modelo americano” en España, Francia, México y Brasil (HUM2007-66559) (Cold War and Cultural Propaganda: a Comparative Analysis of the Spread of the “American Model” in Spain, France, Mexico and Brazil), the Dirección
General de Investigación del Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (General Directorate for Research of the Ministry of Education and Science) gave continuity to prior initiatives.

Lastly, Esther Sánchez helped improve text throughout the writing process with her attentive reading and comments; her encouragement played an essential role in completing this project.
First JAE grantees on the way to New York, 1921
Distinguished Precedents

“Echoes from Another World”

At the dawn of the 21st century, we look back with a sense of distance on the half-century that has passed since the Fulbright program’s first appearance in Spain. From the earliest times, we hear reminding echoes of the Stabilization Plan, the “Regime” leader’s technocratic development, the comings and goings of Spanish emigrants and tourists, the birth of consumer society and the end of economic hardship during the long post-Civil War period.

For most Spaniards from that era, traveling abroad was adventurous whether seeking work or studying in other countries. Available knowledge on what was happening outside of Spanish borders was scarce. Incoming news was filtered by censors; and, contacts with the outside world were very limited. A half-century later, that Spain has become a vague memory with distant and bizarre outlines, far removed from today’s open and pluralist democratic society. It is as if we hear “echoes from another world” when we delve into that past. However, that other reality that many Spaniards lived and forged first-handedly is barely two generations away. Time is such a resilient concept in both physics and real life.

But, if instead of time, we look at space, a unique observation becomes evident. Among Spanish grantees that went to centers in the United States to further their academic and scientific knowledge in the 1960s and even the 1970s, they frequently felt like they were in “another world.” One person has even said, “that really seemed not to be another country, but another planet”, leading some to describe that educational experience as “an ‘interplanetary’ trip”. In short, Spaniards who crossed the Atlantic in the early decades of the Fulbright Program and introduced
to American society and its academic environment, witnessed an evident sense of displacement and distance similar to what is felt today when perceiving the Spain of those years. If remembering that era now requires a journey back in time, the experience of traveling to the United States back then must seem like a projection “into the future”.

In interviews, Spanish Fulbright grantees from the early decades of the program affirm that differences were “vast.” U.S. universities and research centers had more resources and magnificently equipped laboratories; well-stocked and accessible libraries; a streamlined approach to science; and, universities encouraging student participation with better trained and highly motivated professors and researchers. All of this resulted in receiving a higher level of education and scientific knowledge. Visiting the United States opened the door to this as well as other unexpected experiences: the exciting civil rights movement and Vietnam War protests; political and social debates; the exercise of liberty and democracy; and, contact with a society that embraced very different values from the ones instilled in the Spain of those times where tolerance for diversity, openness, competition and innovation were concerned.
Immersion into that “other world” was a very important career step for those who crossed the Atlantic on their way to U.S. universities and research centers. Moreover, there was a personal dimension for many individuals, causing them to adopt a more pluralistic, dynamic and enriching vision far removed from the authoritarian, monotone and prudish Spain of Francoism. Those awards “played a fundamental role because it was a unique opportunity for Spaniards to get out and see the world (...) it allowed young scientists who had been educated as well as possible in Spain’s mediocre scientific environment of the 1960s and 1970s to visit the United States (...) it was a huge window to the world.” At the same time, it introduced them to a very different society: “it made me realize that the world was bigger, of course, than the way I had seen it (...), inhabited by many races, religions, and cultures (...), Spain was a much more homogenous country then.” In short, in the early decades of the Fulbright program, that “leap into another world.” Starting in the 1980s, the Spanish panorama transformed rapidly, keeping pace with its political transition, economic growth, social change and opening up to the international scene. Without losing certain characteristics, those two worlds gradually drew closer and the “interplanetary trip” shortened. At the beginning of 2008, participants in a Fulbright Commission conference on cultural and scientific
cooperation between the United States and Spain concluded that the Program had made a major contribution to improving university education and research in Spain. It played an essential role in promoting the research culture in Spain, improving university teaching methodology and structuring doctoral degrees. Grantees who participated in the program had a multiplier effect on their academic surroundings that even extended to other areas of private activity, from the business world to artistic and cultural creation. Due to its transformational breadth, the Fulbright Program has been compared to the Junta para Ampliación de Estudios (JAE - Board for Furthering Education).4

The United States remains a reference point in the international academic community for the outstanding quality of its universities and scientific centers that offer cutting-edge knowledge, and its ability to spread these advances to the rest of the world. Maintaining and strengthening the Fulbright Program is thus a strategic bet on the future of Spanish R&D&I (research, development and innovation) with effects that often overflow from the academic realm and spill into other sectors of society.5

The material that fills the pages that follow deals with processes that created conditions to promote professional contacts, institutions that inspired and channelled them, and individuals who experienced exchanges. Their echoes give sense to this story; their experiences transcend it.

The Junta para Ampliación de Estudios (Board for Furthering Education) and the United States

The cultural and scientific exchange that the Fulbright Commission embarked upon half a century ago had some distinguished institutions as predecessors. There was no continuity between the actions of those institutions and Fulbright, but a common goal of forming closer ties between individuals and institutions from both countries. Moreover, at one moment or another, those who took action to promote this coming together had to overcome a number of obstacles, including the distrust felt by influential social sectors of each country towards their counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic.
At the beginning of the 20th century, the starting point to improve relations between the United States and Spain was not at a peak to favor bilateral exchange:

- The Spanish-American War in Cuba was recent and had rekindled resentments, leaving a taste of bitterness in the loser.

- Each country’s image of the other was founded on clichés and negative stereotypes: Spain - the imperial conqueror, a backward nation anchored to the past; the American republic - captive to moral and political corruption, and at the heart of a new imperialism that threatened the peoples of Latin America.

- The two countries symbolized different historical destinies. On the threshold of the 20th century, the myth of American “exceptionalism” was founded on a sense of historical success. In Spain, “exceptional” consciousness fed on a feeling of failure and pessimism. The United States was an emerging power; Spain, a country in decline.

The distance between the two countries was 6,000 km, two weeks by boat. There was no migratory flow to foster mutual acquaintance. They were two societies completely removed from each other.

This is the situation of two societies with more features to distance rather than unite them, and with unequal levels of development. At that time, the United States was one of the most dynamic and modern societies in the world. Spain was advancing at a slower, tiring pace. Only a few individuals from each society expressed any curiosity for the other country. Some Hispanists and travelers had become interested in Spanish culture from a fundamentally aesthetic perspective: they valued the “other culture” as a sensory experience, a source of images, values and creativity. Spain cast a more pragmatic eye on the United States. That society shined as a beacon of technological development, a country whose laboratories and companies were experimenting with formulas for the future. That practical interest did not extend to U.S. culture or politics. So where was the seed for bilateralism in this unlikely scenario?

Efforts to strengthen contacts and stimulate mutual knowledge did not stem from American Hispanists or Spanish admirers of the
technological and industrial society that the U.S. represented. The main players can be found in a small group of university students, cultural managers, and educators. This nucleus formed a network of agreements while promoting institutions for educational and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The foundations of these combined efforts were very modern for their time.

In the birth of this process, there were people affiliated with the *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios* (JAE - Board for Furthering Education) and various U.S. academic associations, motivated by shared reformist, liberal and philanthropic ideals. They shared a conviction that social progress came about through the development of scientific knowledge and international cooperation. Hence, they bet on a model requiring transnational scientific cooperation and advocated the creation of scientifically competent, cosmopolitan, intellectual leaders that would act as an engine for social modernization.

The network began to take shape with the visit to the United States of JAE Secretary José Castillejo between May and August of 1919 to visit women’s colleges on the East Coast, the most important universities and other research centers. In New York, he had the opportunity to visit the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and meet with some of its directors, getting a very favorable impression of its laboratories, resources, specialization and management. Castillejo took advantage of the contacts he made to begin a fruitful collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation, which led to several initiatives in scientific and health areas.

A short while later, through Federico de Onís, the network grew to include other organizations dedicated to promoting higher education. Acting as a delegate for the JAE and from his position at Columbia University, Onís knew how to garner enough support to create the *Instituto de las Españas* in New York. That event witnessed cooperation from the Spanish Embassy in Washington, the American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese, and the directors of the Institute of International Education, an organization promoted by the Carnegie Foundation to develop international university exchange as a path to world peace. The director of the Institute, Professor Stephen P. Duggan, organized the meeting in his home to found the *Instituto de las Españas*, which would
become the cornerstone of Hispanic-American cultural exchange. The relevance of this link is evidenced by the leading role the Institute of International Education played (and still plays) in the cultural relations of the United States with other countries.

From the outset, the bilateral connection drew inspiration from a “cooperation” model, sharing resources to meet mutually beneficial objectives. It was a visionary approach at a time when cultural relations between countries adhered to a “publicizing” model, involving cultural propaganda to make oneself known, working for national prestige and reaffirming one’s cultural identity. In this case, assistance was not provided, but rather an offer of collaboration.

U.S. centers would host young Spanish scientists who wanted to complete their education in laboratory sciences and applied research technology. They would become the building block to provide material and personnel to Spain’s recently created physics, chemistry and biology laboratories. JAE centers would correspond with their skills in modern philology and Spanish language teacher training. Thanks to the work of Menéndez Pidal and the Centro de Estudios Históricos, Spain became a world power in Spanish philology. The rapid growth of Hispanics in the United States and the growth of Spanish language teaching created a demand for teacher training that the JAE would help to satisfy. The idea was to offer Spanish professors prepared to teach their language, literature, art and history in exchange for scientific training and orientation. The gathering of like-minded individuals with similar attitudes, explains the extraordinary growth in channels for intercultural communication over a short period of time.

From 1912 onwards, the JAE organized courses on Spanish language and literature for foreign teachers and students in the Residencia de Estudiantes, taught by researchers from the Centro de Estudios Históricos. The majority of these students were from the United States. Meanwhile, through the Instituto de las Españas in New York, the spread of Spanish language instruction was encouraged and teaching assistants and language aides were sent to U.S. universities. Conferences were organized for prestigious Spanish professors, and in January 1928, the magazine Revista de Estudios Hispánicos in collaboration with the University of Puerto Rico was first published.
As a counter example, the Rockefeller Foundation created a system of exchange grants and assisted in Spain’s development in scientific and health fields. The Foundation sponsored U.S.-based training for 41 Spanish medical doctors between 1925 and 1936, in addition to sending experts to analyze Spain’s public health services and launch campaigns against malaria. It also helped build and fund the Instituto Nacional de Física y Química.

The U.S. contribution to the rebirth of Spanish science in the first third of the century was inferior to that of other major European countries. Between 1908 and 1934, the JAE sponsored U.S. study trips for a total of 110 students and researchers. Among their areas of specialization, medical sciences predominated, and to a lesser degree, physics and chemistry; language and literature; economics and business; biology and zoology; and art studies. While the percentage of American professors that carried out field work in JAE centers was less than the Spanish flow to the U.S., the same could not be said of those who attended Spanish language and literature courses which attracted a much larger group - 1,236 American students between 1912 and 1934.
In spite of the less important nature with respect to European scientific involvement, the bilateral collaboration between the U.S. and Spain was significant, especially in the wake of a recent military conflict and total absence of prior contact. Even more meaningful was the decision to establish an exchange paradigm based on cooperation and reciprocity.

By the 1930s, a network of personal and institutional contacts guaranteed a flow of cultural and scientific exchanges, with participants such as:

- the JAE, the Centro de Estudios Históricos and the Instituto de las Españas,
- the Institute of International Education and the Rockefeller Foundation,
- the Instituto Internacional de Señoritas de Madrid,
- the Hispanic Society,
- the Institución Cultural Española of New York,
- the American Association of Teachers of Spanish and Portuguese,
- the Fundación del Amo, etc.
A Clean Slate and Fresh Start

First, the Spanish Civil War, and then World War II, altered the course of events and ruined all previous collaborative achievements. Several factors suggested that reviving cultural contacts would be a slow and laborious task. Anti-Americanism fueled the nationalist group’s propaganda during and after the Spanish Civil War. Old images from the war in 1898 were joined by anti-liberal and traditionalist prejudices in combination with the growing ideological identification of the fascist powers. The Franco regime loathed the democratic and liberal values represented by the United States, which it viewed as an adversary in its aspirations to influence Latin America.

The main agent of prior cooperation, the JAE, was dissolved and replaced in 1940 by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC – High Council for Scientific Research), whose Catholic and conservative values stood in stark contrast to the former’s defense of intellectual diversity and scientific openness. Researchers and teachers linked to the JAE, advocates for the promotion of cultural relations, flocked into exile. A small group obtained teaching positions at U.S. universities, making use of contacts and collaborating institutions from the first few decades of the century. The Instituto de las Españas, Fundación del Amo and Institute of International Education mobilized the American public, achieving an
initial welcome that especially affected Spanish departments in U.S. university structures. The main beneficiaries worked in literary and philological disciplines, and especially included, members of the Centro de Estudios Históricos.¹²

Individuals who migrated to the United States – some establishing permanent residence there - included Ramón Menéndez Pidal, Américo Castro, Tomás Navarro Tomás, Homero Serís, Pedro Salinas, Jorge Guillén and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz. Some of them had played a key role in defining cultural exchange in the previous decades. After World War II, other Spanish professors managed to settle in the United States. Their professional merits helped Hispanic Studies flourish and rekindled the establishment of preexisting scientific links. However, nearly three decades went by before that stream of Spanish-American exchange, which was so active in the 1930s, was fully revived.

Losing the channel of dialogue with the United States was hardly worrisome to the regime that came into power after the Spanish Civil War. Neither its political interests nor its cultural projects looked to the U.S. as a reference point. The barely camouflaged attitude of hostility resulted in conduct that proved to be unfavorable to the dictatorship’s foreign policy and scientific development expectations.

The outbreak of World War II brought a new dimension to U.S./Spain relations due to Spain’s strategic geographic position and role as a neutral country, even though clearly leaning towards the Axis powers. As part of a campaign targeting neutral countries, a propaganda information and culture service was introduced that would last beyond the war itself.¹³ In the summer of 1942, U.S. authorities took the initiative to put into operation a cultural exchange program to support wartime propaganda efforts. They aimed to preserve Spain’s neutrality and counteract the widespread dominant pro-German sentiment among leaders. In 1943, an American binational center was founded in Madrid and a Cultural Affairs Officer was appointed to coordinate the Embassy’s cultural activities. Measures adopted included: distributing news to the Spanish press and radio stations; opening a lending library; and, promoting American movies. Likewise, reviving academic exchange between both countries was also pondered, but never got off the ground.
By the end of the war, the United States had managed to set up an efficient stronghold through the binational center. Well-organized activities included: distributing and translating news materials; operating the library; and, showing films. It had also stimulated the exchange of books and magazines between Spanish and U.S. centers. The demand for prestigious U.S. technical publications was high and growing in spite of barriers such as censorship, economic hardship, and copyrights. It was even more difficult to meet the demand for laboratory equipment and materials as well as scientific products for specialized studies. In any case, the United States’ war victory stimulated a more receptive attitude to its cultural activities.

Problems were rooted in the political nature of the Franco regime. Restrictions placed on the free circulation of people and trade affected cultural collaboration and did not favor exchange. Those responsible for U.S. cultural activities in Spain believed that the country had lost “for some time, and in some cases, permanently, a considerable portion of its cultural leaders.” A high percentage of influential liberal intellectuals had left the country, and those that returned, found limited possibilities to regain their
former positions. Meanwhile, cultural activities were corrupted by governmental control, favoritism, incompetent university teaching, lack of intellectual freedom and little motivation for scientific research. What interest could this panorama awaken in the United States?

As if that weren’t enough, Franco’s regime was viewed as a vestige of the fascist past. As such, Spain was ostracized after its bid to enter the U.N. was vetoed in 1945, and by the end of 1946, U.N. diplomatic sanctions were put into place. As the situation suggested, it was best to just sit and wait. Forming closer cultural relations with Franco’s Spain was far from being a priority for the U.S. government or its cultural and scientific organizations.

The Spanish viewpoint was quite different. Relations with the United States would acquire growing importance, to the point where anti-American verbal attacks from the mouthpieces of the Franco government were progressively muted. Spain hoped that American power would play a crucial role in Spain’s rejoining the post-war international order.

In this scenario, a cultural propaganda campaign was implemented that targeted Catholic media, conservative and anti-communist political sectors as well as economic groups with potential interest in the Spanish market. The CSIC picked up where the JAE left off and began sending grantees abroad. Between 1945 and 1948, several cultural missions visited the United States and one-third of
study grants awarded was for U.S. study (a total of 112, given mostly to medical doctors, biologists, physicists, chemists, and aeronautical and industrial engineers). For Spain, the United States became the most important destination for grantees, breaking the predominant trend earlier in the century favoring European countries. The exchange stream lost momentum in the following years, and the number of grants substantially reduced. The high cost of traveling and living in the United States was hard to meet with the lack of foreign currencies available to the struggling Spanish economy. However, the relaunching in Madrid in 1948 of summer courses for American teachers and students thanks to the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica was more successful.

At the same time, the Spanish Embassy in Washington worked hard to garner support in the upper spheres of American society, forming what came to be known as the “Spanish lobby.” It drew much of its funding from the slim cultural budget of the Spanish diplomatic contingent in the U.S. Meanwhile, approaching American universities became more difficult due to the political resentment harbored towards the Franco regime and the influence wielded by exiled professors in Spanish departments. As a result, any action taken had to “eliminate any factors that were not purely cultural or academic.”15

All of those efforts were in vain, at that time, and failed to inspire the U.S. government’s interest or collaboration. Evidence of this was Spain’s exclusion from the international cultural, educational and scientific exchange circles formed by the United States after World War II. Spain remained on the sidelines when the Fulbright Program and the International Information and Educational Exchange Program were launched. In fact, these programs were largely ignored by Spanish authorities, who were much more concerned with gaining admittance to the Marshall Plan, for which they were also not considered.

The birth of these aforementioned programs coincided with the period when Francoism reached it highest rejection and international isolation. Only the escalation of the Cold War and Spain’s strategic
importance to the United States would open the door to Spanish participation in cultural exchange. To better understand that process, it is helpful to revisit the milestones in the evolution of America’s cultural diplomacy.

Distinguished Precedents
President Kennedy receives Fulbright grantees at the White House, February 16, 1962
From Specific Initiatives to the Reaction towards Fascism

America’s academic exchange programs with foreign countries date back to the early 20th century. The first measures were taken in 1900, following the Spanish-American War. Following an initiative from Harvard University with government support, courses were offered to Cuban educators and teachers. In 1907, shortly after the Boxer Rebellion in China, the U.S. government decided to return a portion of its war reparations to their Chinese counterparts. These funds were channeled into educational programs and helped establish the China Foundation that sent several thousand students to the United States.

Another collaborative agreement set an interesting precedent for binational commissions prior to their creation through the Fulbright Act in 1946. Funds remaining in the treasury of the Committee for Relief in Belgium after World War I were used to create the Belgian American Educational Foundation, which became an educational exchange model for binational government and cooperation with the private sector. For more than 25 years, approximately 700 Belgian and American university student exchanges were financed.

In all of the aforementioned cases, private organizations managed cultural activities with minimal participation from government. Until the late 1930s, the United States did not have government agencies to oversee cultural relations with foreign countries, unlike France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the USSR and even Spain, and then later the United Kingdom.
Once the U.S. government became involved, it began to feel uneasy about the erosion of its influence in Latin America. On the one hand, there was a climate of distrust south of the Río Grande towards the expansionist and imperialist motives of their powerful northern neighbor. However, on the other hand, propaganda from Nazi Germany and fascist Italy was beginning to have visible effects in the region. To counteract both phenomena, President Franklin D. Roosevelt implemented a “Good Neighbor Policy” to encourage inter-American cooperation. Fostering cultural exchange on the continent was one of the consequences of the new policy, evidenced by the agreements reached at the Pan-American Conference held in Buenos Aires in 1936. At the time, French was the second foreign language in Latin America (after Spanish or Portuguese), few students from the region studied in the United States, and sales of U.S. books and magazines were surpassed by European imports.

In the beginning stages, the Department of State encouraged participation of non-governmental organizations in exchanges with Latin American countries. Shortly after, in 1938, the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation with the American Republics and the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State were founded. The following year, allocation of funds were approved for an exchange program for teachers, university professors, students and technicians; with the transfer of information in all fields, including science and technology, and the distribution of major U.S. intellectual and cultural works. Several departments and federal agencies participated as well as private bodies that had been committed to these exchanges for some time (Institute of International Education, American Library Association, American Council of Learned Societies, and the Carnegie, Guggenheim, and Rockefeller Foundations, etc.).

For the first time, the U.S. government designed foreign cultural programs driven by political considerations as interest in the area grew in proportion to rising international tensions. Nevertheless, actions were based on the principle of reciprocity, prioritizing education over propaganda and giving preference for long-term effects over immediate results.
When World War II broke out in Europe, it became even more urgent for the U. S. government to consolidate unity in the Western hemisphere. Latin America was a vital territory for U.S. security and an essential supply source for strategic raw materials, especially with war-time interruptions in the shipping trade. After completing the groundwork, collaborative projects were initiated for cooperation in economics and business; science and technology; social welfare and public health; and, culture and information. The common denominator was to align Latin America countries with the United States while alienating them from the influence of the Axis nations. Nelson A. Rockefeller was named Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs.

After the U.S. joined the war, these actions extended to other parts of the globe. The Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services, founded in June 1942, became the main players beyond the Latin American region. During those undertakings, culture played second fiddle to propaganda, yet acquiring a certain degree of relevance in several neutral countries: China, northern Africa and the Near and Middle East. U.S. participation was also fundamental in the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education in London in late 1943, from which sprang the creation of the UNESCO.17
Birth of the Fulbright Program

When the war ended, an intense debate arose in the U.S. Congress on maintaining or abandoning cultural exchange and information programs. The controversy regarding the use of information, which could quickly degenerate into propaganda, overshadowed cultural activities. The dispute confronted critics of the manipulations inherent in propaganda with advocates of a global information network. As for cultural relations, there were also conflicting positions on the need for governmental intervention or the recommendation of returning responsibility to private organizations. President Truman chose to transfer programs to the Department of State, creating a provisional Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs.

Meanwhile, the U.S. started “re-education” programs in two of the defeated nations ─ Germany and Japan ─ where vestiges of fascists regimes make it advisable to “open windows on democracy.” Run by officials of the occupying military forces, and independent of the Department of State, some 11,000 German students, professors and leaders from diverse fields and another 3,500 Japanese citizens carried out studies in the United States.

In the immediate postwar era, when there still existed a conviction that lasting peace could be maintained and a prime debate topic involved the best way to project America’s values to the rest of the world, one proposal received unanimous approval from politicians and academics. The U.S. government had a considerable sum of money in foreign currencies from its role as “arsenal of the democracies” during the war. Part of those funds could be invested in educational exchange with other countries. War debts would thus become investments in peace, and fund international cultural cooperation at no extra cost to the U.S. Treasury.

Senator J. William Fulbright proposed the idea in September 1945 through an amendment to the Surplus Property Act of 1944. Approved by President Truman in August 1946, that proposal was destined to become one of the most important channels for cultural exchange between the United States and the rest of the world.
The Fulbright Program, as it would be popularly known, was based on the conviction that isolationism was a thing of the past. After the war, the United States had a take on a bigger role in world affairs. America’s responsibility went beyond winning the war: it now symbolized economic progress and social welfare as the path to preventing international conflicts. Its leadership could not be based on force, despite its strong military and economic power. The “pax americana” had to be derived from emulating the U.S. cultural and socio-economic model. How could this be achieved without slipping into unilateral decision-making so characteristic of world superpower politics?

The key was to place emphasis on exchange as a mechanism to transcend the imbalance implicit in past behavior. To be convincing, it was necessary to concentrate efforts on becoming acquainted with others and becoming known by opening up to the outside world. Mutual understanding would become the foundation for peace. The world dollar shortage of that time would make it harder to establish contacts, giving the powerful U.S. the opportunity to take the initiative. The objective entailed having American society look to the world to understand it better, while projecting an image of the United States that would dispel mistaken ideas. In order be seen as an international social project, the program had to be perceived as an initiative without political
interference where cultural, educational and scientific cooperation were top priority.

The program’s founder was the key to its success. Senator Fulbright believed that a multicultural education based on the exchange of ideas and experiences was the backbone of international trust. In his opinion, familiarity inspired empathy. People immersed in foreign cultures and societies ended up adopting them as their own and became cultural and social mediators. Fulbright had firsthand knowledge of this. In the 1920s, he won a Rhodes scholarship to study in Oxford for four years. There, he was immersed in an atmosphere of international education that shaped his understanding of the world.19

These ideals coincided with advocates of U.S./Spain exchanges at the beginning of the century. Academic exchange fostered knowledge and relationships that would help build a more diversity conscious and tolerant world. The birth of the Fulbright program was inherently linked to exchange, knowledge, education, science, culture, empathy, and international understanding.

Several groups participated in the program’s creation. The fundamental player was the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), comprised of 10 volunteer members, appointed by the U.S. President. Distinguished professors, educators, cultural administrators, students and war veterans participated. The BFS supervised the Fulbright Program, approving candidates nominated by binational commissions.
and agencies contracted by the Department of State. It also ensured that the program would remain independent of political interests and untarnished by bureaucracy. The Department of State handled negotiations for bilateral agreements, and through the International Exchange Service, program administration and coordination as well as serving as a link between binational commissions and collaborating public and private agencies.

Binational commissions, founded in those countries that negotiated agreements, were comprised of American and foreign governmental, educational, cultural and business representatives. They supervised each country’s annual programs according to the policies established by the BFS. This involved administering and publicizing the program, selecting candidates, filing applications to contracted agencies for additional grant funding, and hosting U.S. grantees. The most important collaborating agencies were the U.S. Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare for teachers who participated in primary and secondary education programs; the Institute of International Education for university student programs; and, the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils for programs directed at researchers and university professors. Their tasks involved assessing credentials and host institutions for American and foreign candidates in several categories (teachers, students,
research scholars and university lecturers). Credentials were also evaluated by field-specific committees. In the selection process, different criteria were considered:

“A guiding principle in the selection of all candidates for grants under the Fulbright Act, in addition to professional qualifications, is that they possess the abilities and personal characteristics which will enable them to develop a true understanding of the people in the host country and, upon their return, to communicate the results of their experience to their fellow citizens. Candidates are favored who display a broad range of interests, who have participated actively in community life, and who give evidence of a capacity for leadership.”

China and Burma (presently, Myanmar) signed the first agreements to establish binational commissions in 1947, and in the following decades, numerous countries followed suit especially European countries, and to a lesser degree, Latin America, Africa and Asia. All of the binational commissions had equal representation. The Salzburg (Austria) Seminar for American Studies also began in 1947 and Fulbright grants were designated for it.

Funds in local currencies that belonged to the U.S. government were used for these grants, just as Senator Fulbright had proposed. Thanks to this formula, American grantees abroad were able to pay for travel, housing and living costs in the local currency. For grantees to the U.S., the program only covered travel expenses, and universities and private organizations paid for living expenses and tuition. While this restriction placed limitations on the program, it enabled U.S. academic institutions to participate in the selection of foreign grantees and assume a more active role in the program’s development.

The Cold War, Information and Culture

In 1946, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Congressman Karl E. Mundt launched a new proposal to authorize the use of dollars for a global exchange program. The measure encountered strong resistance in Congress, as it overstepped the Fulbright Program’s strictly cultural and educational bounds. Moreover, the plan would require an annual funding commitment.
The proposal reopened the debate on the limits of government action to spread information and propaganda during times of peace. While inevitable during war, maintaining such initiatives when conflicts were over was seen as contradictory to U.S. foreign policy tradition. Propaganda was viewed as “dirty business”, not unlike the ruses and falsehoods spread by fascist and totalitarian nations. However, American society and U.S. politicians were alarmed by international events and heightened tensions with the Soviet Union. Despite initial reluctance, the idea of negotiating legal guidelines and a budget for a global information service and culture program began to gain ground. Finally, the United States came to understand the importance of “public relations” efforts to spread information about Americans in foreign countries while transmitting a clear and accurate image of its foreign policy.

In March 1947, the President of the United States announced his decision to contain Soviet expansion (the Truman Doctrine). A few months later, at Harvard, Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a plan to come to the aid of European democracies, which were endangered by economic poverty and communism. That declaration marked the beginning of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and the Cold War quickly escalated.

American aid for reconstruction in Europe had an implicit political objective. Economic recovery was considered as a tactic to end social crises that created a ripe atmosphere for communist propaganda and became the latest tendency in formulating foreign policy. American products became easier to acquire without spending scarce and valuable dollars, while technical assistance was provided to standardize production and business methods on both sides of the Atlantic. The U.S. played an essential role in restoring European investors’ faith in the future. Meanwhile, U.S. government agencies and businessmen worked to open foreign markets to American exports, expanding financial networks and improving management methods.

While addressing economic hardships that could allow the communist seed to germinate, the United States had to combat ideological effects. Nearly half of U.S. Congress members traveled...
abroad between 1946 and 1947 and drew similar conclusions about the extensive misconceptions and deliberately distorted facts in circulation about the United States. A Congressional Committee that traveled to several European countries over a two-month period confirmed the same impressions.

At the beginning of 1948, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, better known as the Smith-Mundt Act, was approved. It allowed government to actively encourage a better understanding of the U.S. abroad by promoting contacts between American society and citizens of other nations. It authorized government to undertake actions on a global scale to spread information and cultural exchange, supported by annual budget allocations. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, named by the president, would oversee the initiative.

The Fulbright Program’s original framework had been significantly expanded. American experts in all fields would be sent abroad while foreign leaders and professionals would be invited to visit the United States. Upon returning to their home countries, favorable observations on America’s society and institutions would be forthcoming. Results were perceived almost immediately and lasted throughout the 1950s.

Reception centers were opened in the most important U.S. cities to welcome international visitors. The Conference Board of Associated
Research Councils became the most important cooperating agency in professor and researcher exchange. The National Association for Foreign Student Affairs was created and U.S. Information Libraries were founded throughout the world. The Information Media Guarantee Program was started to encourage U.S. distributors to accept payment for their publications and movies in foreign currencies, which could later be exchanged into dollars at a favorable rate. Agreements were signed to settle debts, sometimes dated back to World War I, to fund intercultural and educational exchange with the Philippines, Finland, Iran, China, Korea, India, Ireland, among other countries. New legislation was also passed to promote technical assistance programs. In addition, private agencies, including pioneers like the American Field Service or the National Catholic Welfare Conference, were greatly stimulated in 1956 when President Eisenhower called for more “people to people” activities. Dozens of new private sector committees helped sponsor international communication in a wide range of fields.
From that moment on, a new global mechanism was established to mobilize education, information and propagandistic resources in order to improve understanding of the United States around the world. The reciprocity principle continued to guide initiatives in cultural and educational exchange. But this was not the case where information activities were concerned. Foreign policy, economics and culture were all interconnected in the international Cold War scenario. The battle to win over minds was an aspect of the ideological clash with the Soviet Union and some even viewed this psychological welfare as an essential part of the defense program.24

Defending the West required the construction of free societies that were politically open and economically prosperous. Interest in cultural leaders became a priority in the quest to counteract the Soviet Union’s appeal in foreign intellectual media. But the spread of pop culture, which had unique relevance in U.S. society from the dawn of the 20th century, was also important. Through established channels, America’s jazz, rock and roll, detective novels, comic books, fiction, magazines, films and TV shows were exported in bulk. The American role model opened the door to the modern world, a consumer society, technological development and democratic ideals.

These large scale public relations efforts aimed to favor the Western block and U.S. foreign policy goals. The Marshall Plan...
Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy

and technical assistance missions helped reconstruct the European economy, impregnating it with American know-how. The exchange of teachers and students; the arrival of publications, magazines, movies and radio programs; and, binational centers became means to spread U.S. ideals - the American way of life.

Without a doubt, cultural and educational exchange maintained its purpose as an open via, a two-way street, to mutual understanding. In practice, however, the desire to teach others the virtues of U.S. cultural, social and scientific role models proved greater. Visiting professors and students were invited to emblematic centers, immersed in daily life and U.S. education, and integrated into academic and research environments. All U.S. presidents, regardless of their political leanings, understood and valued America’s role as a window to the world.

Foreign policy priorities and interests partly shaped decision-making. A generously funded program, the Campaign of Truth, was started in 1950. With the Korean War as a backdrop, it openly worked to counteract communist propaganda. This drift in a new direction reopened the debate on potential dangers when information and cultural activities overlap. As a preemptive measure, the government attempted to clearly define each concept. Information was unilateral by nature, prioritized the short-term and responded to political motives. Cultural activities emphasized bilateral interests, reciprocity, long-term and apolitical orientation. This distinction also marked how government became organized.
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In 1950, the Department of State established two divisions that would administer two different programs: the Office of International Information and the Office of Educational Exchange. Two years later, they were reorganized with the creation of the newly created International Information Administration and International Education Exchange Service. In 1953, responsibilities were relegated into the United States Information Agency (USIA) which was established and operated as an independent agency better-suited and responsible for information services, while overseeing libraries, book shipments and exhibitions.

With the exception of these areas, the Department of State maintained responsibilities for cultural exchange which were first transferred to the Bureau of Public Affairs and, after a few changes — the Bureau of International Cultural Relations established in 1958—, then later absorbed by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in 1960. Nevertheless, the separation of duties was much more obvious in the United States than abroad. USIA personnel in foreign countries helped run both information and cultural programs.
The Fulbright Program also benefited from additional dollar contributions from the Program of Information and Educational Exchange that enabled foreign grantees to study or research in the United States – a source of funding which was not considered in the original plan. Likewise in 1952, U.S.-owned foreign currencies from a range of different sources were authorized for use. In 1954, this included money raised from the sale of surplus American agricultural products abroad. Finally, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act - known as the Fulbright-Hays Act by its political supporters - was approved in 1961. It aimed to better coordinate the initiatives from the previous decade while making the program’s administration more flexible. The Fulbright Program began to draw funding from a much wider range of sources and stopped relying solely on leftover foreign currencies. Teacher and student exchanges were still priority, but other cultural activities were considered as the responsibilities of binational commissions grew.
While neutral in nature, the Fulbright Program was not completely immune from the Cold War climate that pervaded international relations. Despite the apparent paradox, its position under the Department of State’s wing helped save it, to a certain extent, from following other programs in their drifting towards belligerent conflict. The Fulbright Program was not spared from Joseph R. McCarthy’s attack on the Department of State for its supposed leftist connivances. In 1951, the Board of Foreign Scholarships had to circumvent attempts to investigate the loyalty of recommended grant candidates. In 1953, the offensive became even harsher, questioning the program’s independent nature and susceptibility to candidates with alleged communist origins. Senator Fulbright’s firm defense of the program helped to deflect criticism.25

In this context, Spain made a late debut in the exchange circles promoted by the United States. Its gradual integration into the U.S. cultural and informational axis was tied to the strategic importance it gained during the Cold War. The first cultural agreements were signed almost immediately prior to the bilateral pacts of 1953. Their objective was to educate specific sectors of Spanish society to help the United States reach its goals.
Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy

McCarthy Hits at Conduct Of U.S. Cultural Program

By the Associated Press

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R-Wis.) yesterday assailed the Fulbright international cultural exchange program as "a halfbright program."

He said his thrust was aimed at the State Department's administration of the program for international exchange of teachers and students, and not at Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.), author of the plane.

He postponed questioning of Naibhtali Lewis, professor of classical languages at Brooklyn College, the scheduled leadoff witness, after her husband reported she was ill with virus grippe.

Terming Mrs. Lewis "a necessary witness," McCarthy said "we had planned on going into the Communist connections of Mr. Lewis is a typical teacher selected under the Fulbright or halfbright program."

McCarthy said Lewis has been chosen by the State Department to go to Italy in the fall for a year of teaching and research of ancient Greek manuscripts.

The Senator told Lewis he would not be questioned until Mrs. Lewis can be interrogated in the same session, since Mrs. Lewis has "refused to tell whether she was a member of the Communist Party or not (and) you refused to say whether you attended Communist meetings with her."

Lewis retorted that "I answered all questions concerning myself" but "I would not answer questions about my

Article on McCarthy and the Fulbright Program The Washington Post, June 11th, 1953
Poster announcing Fulbright grants for 1969-70 academic year
Fulbright Grants Arrive in Spain

Preparing the Groundwork

The United States set sights on Spain as a result of escalated international tensions caused by the Korean War. From the early 1950s, establishing military bases in Spanish territory had been considered. Geography came to the aid of Franco’s dictatorship, putting Spain on the global map again - or at least on the one used by American politicians and strategists. Bilateral negotiations led the Western superpower to ask itself whether its stance in Spain would assure the best possible support for its interests.

The information front was adequately covered with the bulletin Noticias de Actualidad (Current News), which circulated among the media, and other bulletins for more specific audiences (i.e. doctors and engineers). Programs on the Voice of America radio station and informative documentaries were broadcast in schools, hospitals and military centers. Educational and cultural activities were a different story. There was no systematic exchange of scientific and technical knowledge between the two countries. Spain was not
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included in the Fulbright Program, a factor that, together with the shortage of dollars, discouraged possible candidates from trying to study in the United States. Other challenges included Spaniards’ lack of English language proficiency and widespread ignorance about U.S. society beyond clichés and stereotypes.

The U.S. government set out to foster more favorable conditions for its foreign policy agenda and positive feelings towards its social and institutional role models. Everything was normal up until this point. But curiously enough, it found no need to neutralize communist propaganda in Spain, as the Franco regime already handled this with extreme rigor. Another factor that made Spain different in the European panorama was the need to fight Spaniards’ isolationism and mistrust of organizations created to protect the “free world.” In addition, the U.S. strived to demonstrate its power and the advantages of accepting its military presence in Spain. The support for democratic values, individual liberty and material welfare, another cover for American propaganda in Europe, was given secondary importance to avoid ruffling the feathers of Spanish authorities.
In like manner, a primary objective of the United States was to court the regime’s ruling elite, convince them of the value of American leadership, and convert them into a core support group for America’s interests. Other secondary goals were also forthcoming such as drenching the middle class with U.S. and Western Europe democratic values, and some steps were indeed taken in this direction.

In 1952, during the height of the military base negotiations, the Program for Informational and Educational Exchange was implemented. The U.S. had to prepare the ground among Spain’s leaders and general population so that its future military presence would be received positively. One of its first initiatives was inviting Spain to join the Foreign Leaders Program, which targeted relevant individuals who could help form public opinion in foreign countries that would favor the U.S. In short, the goal was to recruit advocates for the American cause.

That same year, grants offered to Spanish students and professors began to show a certain degree of public visibility, but on a small scale. A few institutions played a pioneering role: the International Institute of Education, American Field Service, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, American Home Economics Association, Bryn Mawr College, Stanford University and State Teacher’s College of Jacksonville. Before long, the ranks would swell with new participants, including the Good Samaritan Foundation, the del Amo (California) and Dr. Castroviejo (New York) Foundations, along with several U.S. universities. A Scholarship Advisory Committee coordinated grant announcements and the application process in Spain. The binational centers provided information on the grants and received applications. Educational and scientific cooperation between the two nations was alive once again mainly due to U.S. financing.
Military agreements between the United States and Spain were signed in 1953 and Spain became a part of the U.S. strategic complex in Europe\textsuperscript{26}. Meanwhile, several channels were opened to improve Spanish professional training, especially in areas that played a crucial role for the success of the signed agreements. Thus the Technical Exchange Program began in 1954 in order to strengthen the Spanish economy and provide defense support.

The purpose was to increase productivity and harness economic potential, putting Spanish businessmen and technical experts in contact with official centers, companies and methods in the United States. The program continued for a decade, during which a total of 2,222 technicians and high-level executives from Spanish centers and businesses were sent to the United States and other European countries. Hundreds of general and specialized courses, which attracted several thousand more professionals, were organized in Spain. The participants in these activities got a closer look at production conditions and the work rationale of Western capitalism. Meanwhile, economic aid served as a catalyst in business circles, which were well aware of the new opportunities presented by the loans and organizational methods of the American superpower\textsuperscript{27}.

The Military Assistance Training Program, part of the military aid program, also provided economic resources and technical training. Spanish soldiers trained in U.S. and European centers to become more familiar with weapons and prevailing defense methods of the Western block. At the same time, the program strived to “promote the U.S. orientation of these officers”\textsuperscript{28}. Several thousand soldiers received training, outnumbering the participants in other exchange programs.

Binational centers were created in the 1950s, and along with the launching of the United States Information Service, both managed to influence broader sectors of Spanish society. The Instituto de Estudios Norteamericanos in Barcelona was founded in 1951, the Asociación Cultural Hispano-Norteamericana in Madrid in 1953, the Centro de Estudios Norteamericanos in Valencia in 1957, and the Instituto Hispano-Norteamericano de Cultura in 1961.
These “public relations” initiatives were rather late in reaching Spain and operated on a smaller scale than efforts in other European countries. While working to attract the most promising military command to assure a welcoming attitude towards U.S. bases in Spain, America also lent technical support to promote sectors of the economy considered relevant within defense (industry, agriculture and transportation). Cultural and information exchange had an obvious political dimension:

“(1) to make the Spaniard feel confident in the ability of the United States to lead and defend the free world in the fight against communism by increasing his knowledge of its history, culture, economy and scientific techniques, and (2) to encourage the participation of Spain in the international activities being carried on by the free world to strengthen Europe.”

But beyond political factors, that strategy helped certain sectors of society open the door to the outside world. The exchange channels established by the United States offered more training opportunities to engineers, technicians, professors, scientists and students. The Fulbright Program played a starring role in this process.
Organizing and Launching the Fulbright Program

From the U.S. perspective, the agreements signed with Spain had to be founded on a firm belief in America’s leadership while opening the nation’s doors to the Western block. The educational exchange program set out in this direction, selecting grantees with future leadership potential in the educational, cultural, information, political, economic, technological, social, civil and religious fields. It was fundamentally important to strengthen the exchange of individuals and the channel for this was the Fulbright Program.

In 1956, the U.S. government urged Spain to join the Fulbright Program. The seemingly simple negotiations were drawn out over a two-year period due to the Spanish government’s resistance. Reasons included the differences of opinion on future grant recipients and supplementary costs. Spaniards were interested in training workers for the country’s economic and technological development. Americans considered that other programs were already addressing this, and that humanities and social sciences should be favored. Finally, the two parties reached a compromise, proving to the Spanish authorities that the U.S. had no intention of imposing a unilateral point of view. It was also important to assure them that the program would not cause Spain to lose money. Also, certain Spanish sectors were apparently concerned about the liberalizing effects that a stay at a U.S. institution could have on a researcher or professor.

Spain became a part of the Fulbright Program in October 1958. It hoped to see an increase in resources and balanced bilateral exchanges,
not almost exclusively from Spain to the United States, which had occurred up until then. Not surprisingly, the exchange program was considered to be “of tremendous and growing importance by the post.”

The modest, yet promising results, achieved thus far by the International Educational Exchange Program inspired further confidence in the Fulbright Program. With few exceptions, Spanish grantees returned with a more favorable image of the United States and its society. Generally, they were more impressed with its political, economic and social structures than with its education system. In the opinion of U.S. authorities, their American study experiences would result in a better understanding and appreciation of the ideals and institutions in other Western European nations, whose democratic systems and free societies stood in stark contrast to Spain under Franco’s dictatorship. In short, the program provided:

“the means for key leaders, intellectuals and students to understand and appreciate the cultural, social and economic achievements of the United States, thus contributing to overall United States policy objectives in Spain such as: (1) creating a favorable climate of opinion for United States bases in Spain; and (2) developing Spanish confidence in the United States as a friend and partner, worthy of leadership in the common struggle against communist aggression.”

Around half of the grants were awarded for studies in technology, science and medicine, acknowledging Spain’s needs in those fields. The Fulbright Program would also fund those areas to meet Spanish demand, but coordinated with the officials in the Technical Exchange Program to avoid doubling efforts. Meanwhile, American Studies, a previously neglected area, was given immediate priority.

The Fulbright Program was up and running in Spain by 1959. Its budget was the equivalent in pesetas of the $600,000 in counterpart funds from U.S. aid – more specifically, derived from the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement of 1955. Grants were available in several categories, just like in other countries. The program paid for all of the U.S. grantees’ travel and living expenses, but only covered travel costs for Spanish grantees. In order to pay for their stay in the United States, Spaniards had to apply for “dollar support” with funds provided by the
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Fundación Alias Ahuja, the Department of State’s educational exchange program, and several different universities and American private foundations. The International Institute of Education (IIE) administered applications for dollar support. Some students were also able to secure extra support directly from U.S. associations without IIE assistance.

The Commission for Cultural Exchange was established to oversee the program with five members from each country, including individuals from the U.S. Embassy, Spanish diplomats, journalists and American businessmen in Spain, along with representatives from universities, the Ministry of Education, and the CSIC. Jacob Canter (Cultural Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy) was named President, while José Miguel Ruiz Morales (Director General for Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was made Vice President and Harris Collins (Administrative Officer at the Embassy) became Treasurer. Ramón Bela Armada was appointed Executive Director and Matilde Medina as Deputy Director. The Commission first met in the CSIC offices, and later, was later assigned an office in the National Library.

The Commission carried out preselection of Spanish university professors, school teachers and researchers. Selection committees were formed in university districts for undergraduates. Candidate panels were sent to the Department of State to be forwarded to the collaborating agencies, which managed grant funding and tuition payments to universities and centers. After the Board of Foreign Scholarships approved the panel, the Commission was informed through the Embassy. American candidates were selected by academic authorities in the United States based on applications filed by Spanish universities and centers, as well as applications from students who wanted to come to Spain.

The program’s operation became more standardized over the first three years, thanks in part to visits from several top U.S. cultural service authorities. During that period, the initial budget was completely spent. By the end of 1960, the U.S. government willingly continued to sponsor exchange, committing a sum of $1.65 million for the four following academic years, 1962-1966. The annual allocation increased and remained around $400,000 per budget year.
At the same time, the 1958 agreement was revised to adapt it to the new U.S. legislation derived from the approval of the Fulbright-Hays Act in September 1961. The spending of all counterpart funds that were initially linked to the program lead to creating a more flexible financing scheme. Financing became diversified and participating exchange countries were encouraged to provide economic support. Possibilities to sponsor other cultural activities beyond scholarships were also allowed. An exchange of diplomatic notes in March 1964 made those modifications applicable in Spain.38
During the same period, the program missed an opportunity to acquire a much larger role as proposed by U.S. authorities. A report to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs in May 1962 advocated a substantial expansion of cultural programs in Spain. Due to Franco’s advanced age and economic changes, the nation was headed towards social and political transition in the years to come, which made it important to prepare the groundwork:

“First of all, CU (cultural) programs have to deal both with the present government and those Spaniards that may be part of the future government. In other words, the programs need also establish strong U. S. personal links with Spaniards, both in and out of the present government, who will have important technical or political roles in the next administration.”

This idea will be thoroughly explored later on. For the time being, it is enough to consider America’s interest in broadening the scope of its cultural activities with the Fulbright Program designated as priority.
Initially, authorities weighed the decision to allocate the equivalent in pesetas of $6.5 million in leftover counterpart funds for cultural programs. Those funds already belonged to the Spanish government, but their final use required U.S. consent. Precedents had been set in both Austria and Ireland, where surplus counterpart funds were reassigned to considerably expand educational exchange. The proposed distribution would allocate $5 million to the Fulbright Program, $1 million to the establishment of university chairs and seminars in the field of American Studies, and the remaining $500,000 to the creation of an American House built on the campus of the University of Madrid. The final amount proposed to the Spanish authorities was $6 million.

This initiative responded to the demand to broaden exchanges with the United States, especially Spanish technicians and scientists. It should not be forgotten that American aid provided in the 1953 agreements was about to be completely spent, meaning that Spain would no longer receive funding for technical assistance. The new proposal would compensate for the disappearance of the Technical Exchange Program. Moreover, the U.S. wanted to encourage the Spanish government to participate in program funding, following the example of other European countries. After all, those funds were originally provided by the U.S. and reassigning them would only strengthen relations between the two countries.

The Fulbright Commission-Spain argued in favor of the proposal, stressing that Spanish academic authorities, especially the Ministry of Education, were showing “tremendous interest in the program”, and “in view of the Development Plan, the lack of technicians and scientists in our country is well-known and clearly unable to meet current and projected needs.” It added that “countless Spanish companies require foreign technical assistance at a tremendous cost.” The Minister being quoted was Manuel Lora Tamayo, who at the time tried to vitalize Spain’s universities and scientists, preparing them to respond to the challenges of economic growth and social change occurring in the country. In fact, as part of the First Development Plan (1964-1968), a National Fund for the Development of Scientific and Technical Research was created to finance foreign research visits. The Spanish
Ambassador in Washington, Antonio Garrigues, also voiced his approval, considering that it represented an opportunity to “guarantee a very ambitious training program for Spanish technicians in the United States.”

The shortcoming was rooted in the fact that using leftover counterpart funds implied taking them away from other budget areas. In order to finance the continuation of educational exchange, Spain would have to forego funds previously assigned to economic development projects – water works, airports and public housing. The Spanish government wanted to increase training opportunities in the United States, but only if the U.S. financed them and did not require any concessions in other areas. Spain’s frustrated hopes in the renegotiation of the military treaties, which ended in September 1963 without substantial progress for its position, probably did not lead to a more receptive attitude in the country.\textsuperscript{42} The Ministry of Finance argued that the proposal was not viable, as it would require budgetary reductions in other essential sectors.\textsuperscript{43}

The Spanish government would not make an economic contribution to the Fulbright Program until years later. In the late 1960s, the U.S. government began to considerably reduce its economic contributions to exchange. This was partly due to cutbacks in cooperation programs due to American balance-of-payments problems, aggravated by the costs of the Vietnam War. This situation gave the Spanish government the nudge to commit financing for the program.

In academic year 1968-1969, the U.S. contribution fell to $280,000. Only then did the Ministry of Education begin to contribute a modest sum to the program — $75,000, later joined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1971 with an initial additional $25,000 contribution. This cofinancing was a practice that had been carried out for quite some time by other European governments with similar programs. During that time, a significant decrease in the average number of grants awarded was recorded. Throughout the 1960s, there was an annual average of 89 American and 65 Spanish grantees. The program shrunk more noticeably in Fulbright grants for U.S. citizens, which averaged no more than 30 per year until 1975. The Spanish program also experienced a slump until academic year 1973-1974, with an average of 49 annual grants. By that
time, however, the 1970 Executive Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation between the United States and Spain was in effect. It established two programs ─ cultural and educational cooperation; and, scientific and technical cooperation ─ and provided additional funding to revive the flow of Spanish grantees to the United States.

Agents of Exchange

When the Fulbright Commission-Spain began its activity, it defined a series of grant priority fields with guidelines that were barely modified throughout its first decade of existence. Study areas were outlined in May 1959 and the plan was implemented the following year:44

- Pure and Applied Sciences: including Medicine, Biology, Botany, Zoology, Physics, Chemistry, Geology and Engineering. The purpose was to spread U.S. scientific and technological advances by sending Spanish scientists to study in U.S. centers and hosting Americans who would teach courses or participate in research projects at Spanish institutions.

- Economics: aimed at improving the education of Spanish specialists through the transfer of U.S. advances. These actions would have an impact on Spain’s integration into international economic organizations and could be applied in the private sector.

- Education: geared towards spreading knowledge of the U.S. educational system and teaching methods. Few Spanish experts, up until that time, had studied in the United States. In this area, grants could also be supplemented with Teacher Education Grants.

- Humanities: included Art, Literature, History, and Philosophy, although the main interest was responding to the increasing importance of Spanish language and culture study in the United States; and, English language and American literature studies in Spain. Among the key areas for the program, it was decided that one-third of grants be allocated to these areas.

- Language Instruction: targeted Spanish and English teachers to perfect teaching methodology by studying in both countries.
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- Social Sciences: affiliated Spanish experts with their American counterparts to advance knowledge.

- Community Development and Social Welfare: focused on helping Spanish grantees learn from the example of the United States in the area of hospital administration.

Besides these study areas, the Commission also decided to set aside a number of open-field grants for promising candidates. The general objective was to use exchange to foster reciprocal understanding on “the respective systems of living, values and accomplishments of both countries.” By fields, the majority of grants were awarded in Pure and Applied Sciences, Humanities, Language Instruction, and open-field awards. Economics followed, but at a distance, and was trailed by the remaining three areas (Education; Social Sciences; and Community Development and Social Welfare).

When we move the spotlight to study areas of grantees from each country, exchanges reflect different interests. In Pure and Applied Sciences, the proportion of Spanish grantees was remarkably higher: a trend that was balanced out by the strong Humanities focus on the American side. In Language Instruction, the two sides were relatively equal with the exception of grants for the Summer Seminar for American Teachers of Spanish. The number of open-field grants was about the same for the Spanish and American programs; this was also the case in Social...
Sciences. Many more Spaniards received grants to study Economics as well as Education and Community Development.

In other words, from the onset, the Program reflected different roles for both countries. Spanish grantees came mainly from different areas of Engineering; Chemistry; Spanish Language and Literature; English Language and American Literature; Business Administration; and, Economics. U.S. grantees were selected largely from fields such as English Language and Teaching Methodology; History; U.S. Geography and Literature; and, Spanish and Latin American History. In Spain’s case, there were a relatively equal number of grantees in humanistic and scientific-technical fields, with a noticeable emphasis on Economics. As for the United States, awards in the humanities had an overwhelming predominance, especially English and Spanish language instruction. The relationship was therefore not balanced with regard to study areas, resembling the pattern initially established at the beginning of the century: U.S. science and technology exchanged for Spanish language and civilization.

Grantees’ integration in respective host countries and opportunities that the experience offered obviously depended on many different factors, starting with individual attitudes, adaptability and personal traits. However, grant holders from each country must have had very different impressions as they became immersed in societies that were vastly different in development, customs and cultural norms.

American grantees received an orientation course upon arriving in Spain that...
involved visits to cultural centers in Madrid and historic cities in the surrounding area. According to some participants, “grantees felt a mixture of amusement and annoyance towards the rehearsed, trite version of Spanish politics they received”, which usually reinforced their idea of Spain as “an exotic country (…) far removed from European trends.” The pre-arrival orientation sessions became more thorough later in the decade thanks to the help of Spanish Fulbright alumni. Likewise, the Commission provided American grantees with a support network in both Madrid and Barcelona – the principal destinations – which included academic information, and recommendation lists for housing, shopping and restaurants. It also organized social events to encourage contacts with the local cultural and academic community.

In terms of image, the program seemed to have more positive effects on Spanish grantees, who returned with a more favorable vision of the United States and its society. They valued the quality of U.S. education and its superb resources for research, especially because “in those years, Spanish science was in ruins.” The experience was a great opportunity, given that “in the scientific realm, there was a tremendous difference” and the United States was the reference point in a number of fields: “it felt like you were right there in the thick of things; it was like moving from the periphery to the heart of the scientific empire, and not only in terms of resources, but also of ideas.” America’s social, political and economic structures; respect for individual liberty; tolerance for diversity; high living standard; and, respect for life were important new concepts for Spanish grantees. Visiting the country gave them a deeper understanding and appreciation for ideas and institutions held by democracies and free societies, which were so different from Spain under the dictatorship. They were likely to maintain those positive feelings towards the United States when they returned to Spain, having a ripple effect that reached a broader spectrum of society and favor the founding of the Asociación Cultural Hispano-Norteamericana to bring together former grantees.

The Fulbright Program-Spain had to face a series of challenges that were detected at an early stage. Among problems that affected Spanish students, perhaps the hardest one to solve was getting “dollar support” due to the large number of candidates in business administration, economics, engineering, agronomy and sociology, as well as medical laboratory research fields. It was also not easy to secure economic support for Spanish
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Postcards sent by Commission grantees from the United States
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researchers for short-term visits or professional objectives such as training in methodology and new technologies, which coincided with the interests of U.S. host institutions. Nor was it easier to select university professors who could teach or give conferences in U.S. centers of higher education as they had to be proficient in English, something that was rather uncommon at the time. The easiest individuals to place from the American side were specialists in Spanish literature, high school Spanish teachers and English language teachers.48

On the opposite side, there were very few American science professors who wanted to visit Spain. The country did not awaken much scientific interest, coupled with the lack of Spanish language proficiency. The language gap also hindered the effectiveness of those who did decide to visit Spain. Thanks to these U.S. professors, a series of changes were introduced to improve the program: their courses became mandatory; appropriate classroom materials – books and laboratory supplies - were expected; hands-on training was emphasized; and a higher level of research with better-equipped teams was demanded.49

It appears that some problems were not easy to solve in the following years, especially those affecting the declining number of Spanish candidates in certain scientific fields. However, U.S. universities maintained a high level of demand for Spanish language and literature specialists as reflected in the grant announcements for the Summer Seminar for U.S. Professors in Burgos. English language instruction in Spain was also making progress thanks to the priority given by the Program and the growing demand at Spanish universities. The American side always placed special importance on English language studies, as language skills were a basic instrument for any public relations policy or attempt to approach Spanish society.

In academic year 1963-1964, the Commission began an English Teaching Project in response to the measure making English a required second language in technical universities and Schools of Sciences. The following year, the Spanish Ministry of Education opened English language programs in the universities of Valladolid, La Laguna, Seville and Granada. Up until that point, English had only been offered at the University of Madrid. The objective was to teach American Studies to third-year students. The Fulbright Commission provided American professors to teach these
classes, while other universities taught these subjects as electives (Santiago de Compostela and Valencia). After 1966, the Ford Foundation Program in collaboration with Georgetown University and the University of Madrid assisted in improving English teacher training in Spain by providing language laboratories to universities. English language instruction grew at a rapid pace and some of the previously formed university English programs gradually evolved into full departments within the Schools of Philology. Moreover, the Fulbright Commission sponsored meetings for English and American Studies professors to share experiences and teaching methods as well as strengthen ties within this study area. Budget cuts at the end of the decade caused some initiatives to be suspended, such as the Burgos Seminar, but the U.S. maintained its strategic interest in training English teachers from Spain and promoting American Studies.

When all was said and done, there were few Fulbright grantees during that decade due to budget restraints. But the program was still a fundamental channel for the experiences it offered grantees, who later had an important multiplier effect at Spain’s universities and scientific centers by offering new viewpoints, contacts and information. In short, they served as “cultural interpreters” in the academic and scientific communities of both countries. Generally speaking, the program was more effective for Spanish grantees sent to the United States. The outcome of American graduate students who did research in Spain were rated as “in a middle position,” while American lecturers were less effective due to their “low achievements.”

“There is common agreement that Fulbright scholarships have permitted a group of extremely competent Spaniards to carry out graduate
studies in fields which are significant for continued growth in Spain. The development of capable professionals is rarely a waste of money.53

Throughout those years, the Fulbright Commission-Spain earned a reputation for “impartiality and integrity” in its selection process. In fact, the Program brought about a larger flow of Spanish students and researchers to the United States seeking further education with private financing.54 Meanwhile, U.S. university study abroad programs in Spain grew with students numbering in the thousands.55

However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Fulbright Program in Spain faced one of its hardest moments with a drastic decrease in funding leading to a reduction in the number of grants. In fact, the possible disappearance of the Program was considered if the situation did not improve in the near future.56 However, the climate changed due to the importance of Spain’s educational plans and political negotiations between both governments in renewing the bilateral military agreement.

Spanish Educational Reform and the 1970 Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation

The Fulbright Program did not start out on the right foot during the 1970s. Not only did its budget fall considerably, but the Elias Ahuja Scholarship Program whose “dollar support” contributions had been essential for Spanish grantees, was expected to end. A similar fate awaited the Ford Foundation program to promote English teaching, which ended in academic year 1969-1970. Budget cuts affected the administrative costs of the Commission, which could not reduce its staff forcing it to scale back its working hours by 25%.57 At the same time, there were two underlying processes underway that would soon converge.

On the one hand, plans for ambitious reforms in the Spanish educational system were gaining strength and hinted at with the publication in 1969 of the Libro blanco de la educación.58 Convinced that the country’s teaching and research communities needed substantial improvement, Spanish authorities again shifted their focus to sending individuals to leading centers abroad. The General Subdirectorate for Higher Education of the Ministry of Education and Science announced
grants for university graduates to further education in foreign countries – including the United States - in the fields of Architecture, Engineering, Agriculture, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Geology. The renewable one-year grant covered travel, tuition and a monthly living stipend.

On the other hand, Spain’s foreign policy leaders had been preparing revisions to the Spanish-American military agreements in order to rebalance the strong dependence on the United States. Spain presented its negotiation stance more firmly than it had in 1963, striving to reduce the excessive privileges of the U.S. Armed Forces while establishing a more balanced strategic relationship – be it through a mutual security treaty or Spain’s joining NATO. During the two years of negotiations, one of the subjects that arose was the receiving of non-military counterpart funds.

Spanish negotiators raised the question in March 1969, proposing a Joint Committee for Scientific and Educational Cooperation to address cooperation in three areas: “(1) ties between National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and its Spanish counterpart, INTA; (2) ties between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Spanish atomic energy Junta; and (3) educational exchange”59. This Committee would outline plans for a Spanish teacher training program at American universities that would require U.S. financial assistance. From the American point of view, it was unclear how this organization would promote closer ties between NASA and the AEC with their Spanish counterparts, since linkages were already developing very well with no need for middlemen. Regarding the third point of the proposal, Spanish negotiators linked this point to the government’s university reform plans, considering the U.S. contribution as “a part of the negotiations for extension of the 1953 Defense Agreement with Spain.” That agreement included the annual training of 200 teachers in the United States and 700 in Spain; and, professional development in the United States for 200 tenured and associate professors, including all administrative costs. The estimated annual budget was $8.4 million, bringing the total sum to $42 million over the five-year period of the treaty.

The proposal was apparently inspired by José Luis Villar Palasí, Minister of Education and Science since April 1968, who advocated the
reforms that led to the *Ley General de Educación de 1970*. These reforms aimed to synchronize Spain’s universities and research centers with its social and economic needs while introducing more modern and innovative teaching methods. The true novelty was not the reforms themselves, as they were adapted from experiences in other countries, but putting them into practice in Spain. In order to implement and develop them, Spain needed better trained university teachers and researchers. In this respect, negotiations with the United States turned out to be quite timely.

The U.S. was receptive to the training program. Helping to implement educational reforms “would certainly have a liberalizing effect on the Spanish cultural establishment” and U.S. authorities, like their Spanish counterparts, though not necessarily for the same reasons, saw it as “an opportunity we should not let pass.” Moreover, in their opinion, the reforms were “largely based on U.S. models.” The amount requested was too high to be covered by the cultural activities budget, but “the assistance to the educational reform program may be related to base negotiations as a possible *quid pro quo* for our future military presence in Spain. This is being considered at the National Security Council Review Group level.”

Negotiations stretched on until the summer of 1970 when Gregorio López Bravo replaced Fernando María Castiella at the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the change in ministers had no effect on the desire to sign a general cooperation agreement that went beyond military issues. The United States took steps to support Spain’s educational reform plan before the agreement was signed. It encouraged the World Bank to provide economic assistance to build and equip the *Institutos de Ciencias de la Educación* as provided for in the reform measures. It backed the participation of the United Nations Special Development Fund to pay for consultants in starting the *Centro Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo*. Likewise, contributions were received from the Ford Foundation to modernize the Autonomous Universities of Madrid and Barcelona.

Educational reform measures were also included early on in the activities of the Fulbright Program in Spain. Priority field for grants were changed to: Education (Teaching Methodology and Psychology); Pure
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Sciences (Mathematics and Physics); Applied Sciences (Construction Engineering – housing, city planning, architecture; and, Civil Engineering – Agriculture and Forestry); Economics and Sociology (Socio-economic Planning); Language and Literature; and, Humanities. The objective was to actively collaborate:

«1. By sending specialists in the planning of study curricula to aid in the application of new methods and techniques in teaching.
2. By sending professors for Institutes of Educational Sciences.
3. By sending professors to staff new university faculties.
4. By advising on the technical organization of university departments.»

Before finalizing the agreement, meetings took place to define the scope and content of non-military cooperation. In April 1970, López Bravo resumed negotiations on economic questions and cultural, scientific and technical cooperation during a round of talks in Washington. Spain’s expectations had been lowered and a training program for around 200 candidates annually was being considered. Between April and May, U.S. government officials traveled to Madrid to meet with education and diplomatic authorities, visit scientific centers and assess ways to encourage exchanges.
The Spanish research community found itself in a state of change, noticeably due to the lack of a national science policy in spite of the existence of potential requisites for modernization. As a result, centers and laboratories that could collaborate effectively with their U.S. counterparts were identified and a series of recommendations were made. The most promising fields for collaborative research on the Spanish side were: “1) Nuclear Energy; 2) Biological and Medical Sciences; 3) Agriculture; 4) Food Technology; and 5) Aerospace.” Other areas that the Spanish government highlighted included: “1) Oceanography; 2) Urban Environment and Pollution Control; 3) Education in Science and Technology at secondary and higher school levels; 4) Mineral Research.” More than a real scientific cooperation program, which the Spanish R + D community was not yet prepared to take advantage of, the proposed plan would provide technical help in selected fields. According to reports by U.S. experts, while Spanish government officials viewed this collaboration as “an important and integral component of the military base agreement”, scientists with whom they made contact “rarely referred to the military base negotiations (...), but invariably expressed a strong desire to expand their working relations and exchanges of scientists in areas of common interest”65.

The Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation was finally signed in August 1970. Spanish authorities made some advances in recovering sovereignty in certain areas, but were incapable of achieving a true bilateral defense treaty with reciprocal commitments or strategic equality through NATO membership. The agreement was presented as a way of transcending the strictly military nature of the 1953 treaties, helping to camouflage the concessions made to the United States once again66. The U.S. government, for different reasons, was also interested in highlighting this more cooperative and less belligerent version in its relationship with Spain. Moreover, it helped silence criticism of Senator Fulbright, then Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who was displeased that the bilateral negotiations had once again degenerated into a public debate on the U.S. government’s policies towards the Franco regime.

Either way, the new agreement revived the flow of exchange by providing several programs for cooperation in culture and education, science and technology, urban and environmental development,
agriculture, economics and the media, in addition to defense, on which, in the end, everything else was based. The program for cultural and educational cooperation – Chapter II – offered expanded exchange opportunities for professors, researchers, scientists, intellectuals and students in every field of study. It prioritized natural and applied sciences, economics, and the languages and cultures of both countries. The program for scientific and technical cooperation – Chapter III - was focused on the peaceful use of atomic energy, space exploration, marine sciences, medical and biological sciences, industrial technology, electronics and social sciences.

The annual budget for both programs, the non-military agreements (NMA), was $3 million: $2 million for scientific and technical cooperation and $1 million for cultural and educational cooperation. It was a large allocation, but noticeably less than the amount demanded. These funds would come from the U.S. Department of Defense budget. In November, the Spanish Minister of Development — Laureano López Rodó — met with U.S. authorities to inform them that Spain was about to launch its Third Development Plan. The August agreement for non-military cooperation was seen as a vital part of this plan. He also named a series of areas in which American assistance was needed. Before the end of the year, several meetings were held to coordinate programs in Spain and the United States. On the U.S. side, the Department of State delegated into the Fulbright Grants Arrive in Spain

General grant regulations, Program of Cultural Cooperation also known as “NMA”
National Science Foundation for program administration. On the Spanish side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would take the initiative after initial administration by the Ministry of Education and Science.

In January 1971, several Spanish organizations proposed projects for funding: the Ministry of Education and Science, the Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeroespacial (INTA - National Institute for Aerospace Technology), the Junta de Energía Nuclear (JEN - Nuclear Energy Board), the Patronato Juan de la Cierva (Juan de la Cierva Foundation), Instituto de Química-Física “Rocasolano” (Rocasolano Institute for Chemistry and Physics), the Instituto Químico de Sarriá (Sarriá Chemistry Institute), the Instituto de Biología Molecular (Institute for Molecular Biology) and the Universidad de Navarra (University of Navarre). The Ministry of Education and Science was the sole applicant for cultural and educational cooperation. Throughout the year, applications were evaluated and a list of projects was established for “1st Priority: University Administrators, English Teaching, National Scientific and Technical Information Service, Institute of Molecular Biology and Institute of Automation”, and another list of projects of “2nd Priority: Oceanographic Studies, Urban Affairs, Agricultural and Environmental Pollution.” Only the first two projects, proposed by the Ministry of Education and Science, corresponded to Chapter II – cultural and educational cooperation. University administrators were trained in collaboration with the Sterling Institute of Educational Technology, while English teacher training took place at Georgetown University.

Alongside those programs, the Spanish government reaffirmed its decision to continue contributing regularly to the Fulbright Program, whose importance had been underlined by the new agreement. Its horizons were expected to grow “substantially exceeding the simple framework of grantee exchange, which has been its main work thus far.” An Executive Committee was thus created to “map out a plan for the development of the Fulbright program and establish its main orientation.” Moreover, in 1971 Program Year, two preferred groups for the previously defined areas were established:

«I. Educational Development:

A. Education: preparation of specialists in education qualified to prepare teachers of the primary, secondary and university
levels; this implies support of the new Institutes of Educational Science as well as the developing fields of pedagogy and psychology.

B. Support for specific developing fields considered of vital importance: Mathematics, Physics, Economics, Sociology.

II. Technological Development: importation of specialists and formation of specialists in those fields of great importance to a developing country:

- Urbanism and Construction (Architecture and Civil Engineering)
- Infrastructure
- Agriculture and Forestry
- Techniques of socio-economic planning and evaluation.\(^7\)

The work of the Fulbright Commission would focus on supporting educational reform and technological development programs, sending Spanish grantees to the United States to be educated or continue their training in these subjects. Most grants during the first half of the 1970s were awarded in the area of Language and Literature. That action, without a doubt, contributed to the fact that English became the most important foreign language after the educational reforms, which created a growing demand for qualified professors. By then, American – or Anglo-American Studies, had been included in the English Departments of the universities of Madrid, La Laguna, Valladolid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, Salamanca, Santiago de Compostela, Granada, Seville and Oviedo. Fewer grants were awarded in Economics and Sociology, followed by Applied Sciences, Pure Sciences, Education and Humanities.\(^7\)

Meanwhile, American advisers were selected to train teachers in fields that needed improvement, especially Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Economics and Sociology. They also helped to implement modern techniques and methodologies in the Institutos de Ciencias de la Educación in Madrid, Barcelona and Santiago de Compostela, and assist in curricular development in the School of Economics of the Autonomous University of Madrid (Lasuén Project); the School of Political Sciences and Sociology of the Complutense University of
Madrid; the School of Telecommunications of Madrid; and, the Polytechnic Institutes of Madrid and Barcelona.

In late 1972, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Embassy decided to delegate the cultural and educational cooperation program to the Fulbright Commission. In the following years, the Commission managed its own program and the newly assigned one, yet handled them differently. In January 1973, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to oversee the Spanish program for cultural and educational cooperation. A Supervisory Committee was established to plan the steps to follow in this cooperation while a National Advisory Committee was founded. In academic years 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, $800,000 in funding was received annually, and for the following two academic years, funds grew to $1 million annually. The agreement was in force until academic year 1976-1977, with a grand total of $3.6 million allocated to this program.

Most of available funds were used to finance a grant program for visits to the United States. The objective was to respond to a “pressing need of Spanish educational centers for qualified professors, produced largely by increases in student enrollments.” As a result, grantees were “department chairs or tenured adjunct professors from Spanish universities interested in updating knowledge or learning new techniques in their area of expertise (…), young tenured or untenured professors …who needed to further their education …or finish their doctoral thesis (…); and researchers from the CSIS - High Council for Scientific Research to become better prepared in their field, techniques or methods.” Four regional selection com-
mittees in Barcelona, Bilbao, Madrid and Seville chose candidates. During the first two years of the program, 133 grants were awarded. By field of study, Chemistry and Medicine received the most grants, followed by Biology and Physics, and to a lesser degree, Political Science and Sociology, Economics, and Geology.

Remaining funds were assigned to projects. Over the next two years, the following were funded: a commemorative project celebrating the bicentennial of U.S. independence; the promotion of American Studies at the University of Salamanca — where an American Studies Seminar in December 1975 addressed the establishment of the Spanish Association for Anglo-American Studies; the Department Chair-Menéndez Pidal Seminar between the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and the University of California on the “Romancero Judeo-Español”; and, an exchange project between the Maxwell School of Public Administration of Syracuse University and the School of Political Sciences and Sociology of the Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Nearly all of these projects received supplementary funding from outside sources.

Thanks to the collaboration of the Fulbright Commission with its specialized and competent staff, the program developed. Its work was recognized in a report from the Spanish diplomatic service, which said, “in the opinion of the Department of State, and reiterated by the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, it is one of best run Commissions in the world.”

Fulbright grants were in existence at the same time as the scholarships awarded by the Program for Cultural and Educational Cooperation. Also, during that time, financing from both governments for the Fulbright Program modestly increased. From 1986 on the Program for Scientific and Technical cooperation was administered independently.

What impact did these measures have on the Spanish university and scientific community during these years of intense changes? Obviously, they contributed to educational reform and increased skills among professors and researchers, especially in targeted areas. They also created a climate of confidence that encouraged collaboration from outstanding Spanish scientists who were working in the United States, either in exile or by choice, such as Severo Ochoa, Nicolás Cabrera, Juan Oró, José M.
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Rodríguez Delgado and Francisco Grande Covían. Only Cabrera agreed to return to Spain after Franco’s death, but all of them helped to energize the level of scientific knowledge in Spain by forming closer ties with their colleagues back home and hosting grantees that traveled to the United States. Efforts to train Spanish technicians and scientists in areas such as aeronautics and nuclear energy were also welcomed. Both the Instituto Nacional de Técnica Aeronáutica (INTA) and the Junta de Energía Nuclear (JEN) had been cultivating links with their U.S. equivalents for some time. These exchanges would have an important outcome in the years to come, although their scope could only be determined by a more in-depth and interdisciplinary study.76

Spain’s newly transformed university and scientific policies faced structural problems due to insufficient public funding, tenured faculty stagnation, and the lack of methods for evaluating performance and awarding incentives. The increasingly vocal academic and scientific communities were not always receptive to subjecting initial government reform planning to the logic of economic development. An increase in resources and a larger role in scientific policy-making were demanded, with government support for basic high quality research as opposed to subsidizing private companies with funds and technology. After the 1973 oil crisis, prospects for economic growth were reduced. Investment in R + D remained fixed at around 0.3% of GDP, among the lowest of OECD countries. Grantees educated abroad were human capital that could become mismanaged if they lacked funds to continue their research. American financial assistance tried to meet the needs of the Spanish government, but also increased expectations of

Salzburg Seminar headquarters, Austria
certain sectors not included in the development policies advocated by technocrats.

Between 1959 and 1975, the Spanish Fulbright Commission received a total of $4,552,500 - by government contributions, $3,895,793 from the U.S.; and, $656,707 from Spain. Likewise, the Fulbright Commission administered an additional $1.6 million from the first two years of the Program for Cultural and Educational Cooperation, reaching a $6,152,500 total endowment for bilateral exchange. An additional $925,848 was provided by the Program for Educational Exchange (the Smith-Mundt Act or PL-402) which partially covered “dollar support.” This amount was earmarked for Spain prior to the establishment of the Fulbright Program. As such, the overall endowment surpassed $7 million.

These resources funded 1,081 grants for Spanish postgraduates, professors, and researchers who traveled to the United States – including 60 grants for the Salzburg Seminar. Simultaneously, 927 grants were awarded to U.S. citizens who came to Spain, of which 219 attended the Burgos Seminar. If we also factor in the funds pumped into the technical and military assistance programs, along with the Program for Scientific
and Technological Cooperation, the United States contribution would reach a proportionally high level in the cost calculation for the training of Spanish human capital abroad during that period.

**Beyond Francoism**

The cooperation and training programs established in the 1970 Agreement coincided with U.S. government strategy, implemented in the late 1950s and continuing into the next decade. The objective was to maintain a good relationship with the Franco regime for the sake of stability in order to ensure easy access and use of military bases. Nevertheless, the United States wanted to avoid being associated with the dictatorship; paving the road to a more representative and democratic government in line with the rest of Europe. In any case, the U.S. strived to form closer ties with groups and individuals inside and outside of the regime who could lead the future transition process while favoring U.S. interests. This position remained contradictory, and the practical need to guarantee the availability of military bases became the top priority above all other considerations.

Senator Fulbright, in fact, had reservations about these objectives and did not support the deployment of military bases in Franco’s Spain. In 1957, when the bases were under construction, he met with officials from the United States Information Service (USIS) -Madrid while privately vacationing in the south of Spain. He expressed interest in the negotiations to include Spain in the Fulbright Program, as he was convinced that “an exchange of persons program is
basic to successful USIS activities.” However, he was far less receptive to the efforts used to explain America’s military objectives to the Spanish public and opposed “strongly to blatant ‘propaganda’ campaigns, and to the idea that USIS could ‘put out fires’.”

Despite these precautions, assistance programs maintained an underlying objective to influence those sectors of Spanish society favorable to preserving the U.S. military presence. These plans were outlined in late 1959 in the Mutual Security Plan for Spain and the report from the Operations Coordinating Board, the principal agency linking U.S. officials responsible for Spanish policy-making. The fundamental interest of the U.S. was to strengthen Spain’s participation in the Western defense movement. Collaborating with the dictatorship was inevitable if it wanted to maintain this aim; but on the other hand, it also had to protect its interests for the future by downplaying the association between U.S. aid and the Franco regime.

To solve this difficult equation, the U.S. military was encouraged to cultivate personal and business connections with their Spanish counterparts in order to “encourage the attendance of Spanish officers of all three services at U.S. training facilities both in this country and in Western Europe so as to facilitate the acceptance of U.S. operational, logistics and training methods and techniques, and promote the U.S. orientation of these officers”, which would lead to increasing “the influence of the U.S. among groups from which national leadership could emerge.” Meanwhile, information and cultural programs, individual exchange and technical cooperation offered opportunities to “familiarize key Spaniards with American life and institutions and to expose them to outside thought and influence.” Through those circles, intentions were to encourage Spanish participation in international organizations, reduce the country’s isolationism, and “to maintain broad contacts with the various influential opinion groups of the Spanish population in order to present our presence and programs in Spain in terms of their benefit to the Spanish people.” All in all, the goal was to attract key opinion makers sympathetic to U.S. objectives:

“The chief purpose of an educational exchange program with Spain is, as with other countries, to contribute to the creation of a climate of opinion favorable to the United States and its policies,
through an increase in understanding of our society and culture. The strategic position of Spain and our considerable military and economic investment and interest there only serve to accentuate the importance to us of public opinion in that country. In expending United States funds to bring carefully selected Spanish teachers, students, leaders and specialists to the United States, the International Exchange Service (IES) is confident that those grantees will return to their homes with a better understanding and appreciation of American social, political, economic and cultural achievements. There has been ample evidence that returned grantees are far more inclined to be sympathetic with United States policies and actions than if they had not had the opportunity to see and become acquainted with American people and institutions at first hand. This desirable result is further amplified by the fact that returned grantees frequently become opinion makers in their communities —indeed, that potentiality is one of the criteria in the choice of grantees. Conversely, American grantees in Spain are in a position to influence large groups of people in political, cultural, technical and academic fields."

The quote is a bit long, but very illustrative. Efforts were perceived as an instrument to strengthen U.S. influence beyond the political situation at that time, incorporating influential members of Spanish society into the U.S. international leadership arena. Cooperation and training programs had to reach current and future leaders with a world view favoring American power.

The change from the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower to the Democratic one of John F. Kennedy did not significantly change objectives. Throughout the 1960s, the idea of maintaining present supporters without alienating future backers gained momentum, while nudging the Spanish ship towards a democratic course without forcing the pace of the voyage. U.S. Ambassador John Davis Lodge expressed it with a unique clarity in a memo to the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs of the Department of State81. The dilemma was: "(a) that we not lose the useful relationship we have gained with the Franco regime (...); and (b) that the regime which succeeds Franco shall be, if possible, no less friendly to us than the Franco regime has been." In other words, the plan was “to continue to enjoy the valuable cooperation of the Franco regime and at the same
time to prepare as well as we can for the best possible cooperation with
the eventual post-Franco regime.” Obviously, this would not be easy to
achieve.

It would be necessary to continue encouraging progressive
economic and political liberalization, integrating Spain into the
“Western family” while maintaining financial assistance to boost the
country’s standard of living. It was also important to foster
understanding between moderates, either within the Franco regime or in
opposition groups, in order to discredit extreme rightists and leftists.
Any attempt to induce Franco to begin a democratizing process was
doomed to failure, so the only solution was to prepare Spanish society
to face the post-Franco era: “Our job can probably be at best only to
nudge the Spanish ship in the right direction and even this must be done
with great care lest it be wrecked or carried away on an errant tide.” So
what was the correct direction? The answer lied in opening the country
to stimulate contact with other societies, favor other ways of thinking
and learn new forms of government. The rest remained in the hands of
the Spaniards themselves.

In short, rather than directly intervening, the U.S. tried to create
conditions so that the transition would progress in “the evolutionary
rather than revolutionary way.” Therefore, without renouncing a chance
to maintain “harmonious relations” with the Franco regime, it was a
good idea to accompany them with the “maintenance, and extension as
possible, of discreet and productive relations with internal elements both
within and outside the regime, which might assume power and/or
influence in the post-Franco period, in order to encourage evolution
toward more democratic political processes.” The intended outcome
consisted in encouraging “a nonviolent evolution to a more
representative, democratically-based form of government friendly to
the United States.” Sooner or later, it was thought, Franco’s advanced
age or the growth of opposition movements would ignite a transitional
stage towards another political system. When that moment arrived, the
United States had to be prepared and could count on solid support for
its interests in Spain.

During the Democratic presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, there
were few policy changes. The United States could offer its experience
to encourage the development “of a stable, popularly-based system of government in post-Franco Spain and its full integration into the European and Atlantic Communities.” It aimed to downplay U.S. association with the Franco regime, which could be detrimental to long-term interests, although it was also advisable to take into account the attitudes of leading moderate elements with the regime towards modernization efforts. When the time for change arrived, the challenge was convincing those who could lead the process, be they pro- or anti-Francoists, to “forget the bitter past and concentrate upon the future.” In short, Spanish-American relations needed to be determined “by practical considerations.” However, fostering understanding with the dictatorship to ensure the preservation of military bases while preparing an orderly transition to a more democratic system were not easy questions to reconcile. If we consider that the paramount objective was always strategic, it is easy to deduce where the weakness lay in this complicated political equation.

In fact, as domestic anti-Franco opposition became more radical, anti-Americanism also grew as a cohesive force among opposition groups. From the late 1960s onward, the Vietnam War and racial violence in several U.S. cities made a lasting impact on the anti-Franco groups, obviously damaging American’s image. As reported by the U.S. Embassy in Spain, student protests against the regime usually contained slogans such as “‘No more bases’ and ‘Out of Vietnam’.” The resentment stirred by the renegotiation of military treaties with the Franco regime leaders only aggravated matters.

Cultural and scientific programs had to play an important role in counteracting criticism and establishing a channel of mutual understanding beyond political differences, allowing the U.S. “to deal both with the present government and those Spaniards that may be part of the future government.” In other words, it helped to consolidate ties with Spaniards “both in and out of the present government, who will have important technical or political roles in the next administration.” Potential leaders of the process seemed “confused, inexperienced and fearful of democratic procedures. They are searching for viable political, economic, and social systems which will best serve Spain’s needs in the future. In this situation U.S. influence is of particular significance.”
It was more feasible to focus U.S. collaboration, without jeopardizing military interests, “in information and cultural fields.” It was thus advisable to form closer relationships with Spaniards “both official and non-official, working to better the lot of the Spanish people in the fields of health, housing, education, scientific research, social security, land reform, agricultural modernization, reforestation, and modern managerial and business practices.” By the early 1970s, “Priority 1” in the field of educational and cultural exchange was “Liberalization” in combination with the intention to “assist Spain’s adjustment into a liberal Western community.”

The Republicans’ return to power with the presidency of Richard M. Nixon had no effect on previous objectives. Along with maintaining military facilities and friendly bilateral relations, the political state of affairs continued to “encourage closer Spanish relations and identification with economic and political organizations of Western Europe and the Atlantic community, including NATO, in order to influence economic, social and political liberalization in Spain.” Therefore, the U.S. would persevere with prudent policies tailored to its interests, which implied “(a) for the short term, preserve productive relations with the current Spanish Government; and (b) for the long run, and to the extent possible without jeopardizing our current position, develop discreet relations with groups and individuals within and outside the government who could have a voice in shaping future policies and who could influence a democratic evolution in Spain.”

Support for Prince Juan Carlos was a trump card for a peaceful and controlled political transition and the choice that implied fewer risks to the country’s stability, and therefore, maintained the inroads of past U.S. achievements. There was confidence that understanding would come about between the most open and pragmatic segment of the Francoist political class and the moderate opposition, avoiding future uncertainties. Near the end of the dictatorship, links with opposition groups weakened due to the “royalist” politics of the Republican administration inspired by Henry A. Kissinger — Security Adviser, and later Secretary of State. Western European governments showed active support for a transition to democracy. Meanwhile, the US would adjust its position “to avoid involvement, but maintain sufficient flexibility to protect our interests.”
Signing the 1970 Agreement allowed complementary efforts to be carried out through public diplomacy. In addition to the designated cooperation programs, several eminent American educators worked as consultants in the making of the educational reform law. Moreover, some key Spanish players had a close relationship with the U.S.:

“The group of Spanish educational experts in charge of the preparation of the educational reform bill was led by former leader grantee and Minister of Education, José Luis Villar Palasí. The principal architect of the law, Under Secretary of Education Ricardo Díez Hochleitner, is a former Columbia University student and U.N. education expert. Many other important contributors studied in or visited the United States under U.S. Government or private auspices.”

It was an indirect influence that, in any case, permeated certain sectors that were no less important. This course of action responded to an earlier strategy. From the U.S. Embassy in Madrid collaboration in educational reform was conceived as an excellent opportunity to influence “the future structure of Spanish society.” Cooperation programs coincided perfectly with the political flexibility required to defend U.S. interests. These actions made it easier to avoid uncomfortable political commitments that could question the extent to which the U.S. sympathized with the dictatorship or supported the return to democracy in Spain. They allowed close contact to be developed with a wide range of social groups that could back its positions beyond the political sphere. This option shored up the shaky grounds that could affect the conditions for using the military bases, which were subject to periodic negotiations with regime leaders.

Scientific and cultural cooperation was an investment in the future geared towards “longer-range, lower-profile improvement of the educational system” - nothing to arouse suspicion and a show of U.S. solidarity with the progress and well-being of Spanish society. But it was also a strong playing card to use in conversations with national leaders in the Franco or post-Franco era. In fact, prior to the renewal of the 1975 bilateral agreements, instructions issued by Kissinger to the U.S. Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey specified the absolute necessity for cooperation in non-military areas, especially education, science,
technology and agriculture. Such interest was not expressed in any of the other negotiable talking points as the U.S. aimed to maintain the status quo of its presence in Spain. The idea was to “try to project an image of attaching importance to our non-military, as well as our defense, cooperation with Spain.”

Keeping doors open to the future without closing them in the present: was it a viable position in such a delicate situation? At what cost? Judging by the amount of money the U.S. spent on cooperation programs at the time, it clearly was not interested in over-spending, although it did substantially increase its investment with respect to previous years. Resources spent turned out to be insufficient in preventing a deteriorating image of the United States resulting from its affiliation with the dictatorship and the priority given to military bases. In spite of this, betting on a low profile and long-term results had evident effects on Spanish science and the educational system.

Spanish authorities showed enormous interest in exchange and hoped to amend the shortcomings of university professors, technicians and researchers in order to meet the objectives of Development Plans. Moreover, from the Spanish viewpoint, helping to improve human capital resources to reform scientific-technical and educational systems was considered a byproduct of military collaboration with the United States, especially when economic aid associated with the 1953 treaties ceased.

This type of training provided significant assistance, as the rest of foreign study grant programs were rather reduced until the end of the
Westery Wind

1960s. Fulbright grants and cooperation programs made the United States the main destination for Spanish teachers and students from the end of the 1950s. In the absence of in-depth studies on the effects on Spanish culture and science, surveys carried out tend to value highly the “dissemination effect” resulting from the contributions made by individuals who continued their education in the United States. Their “multiplier effect”, as previously highlighted, should not be underrated.

Along with the altruistic aspect, U.S. training programs resulted in an additional political benefit. On one hand, they brought Spanish leaders into contact with the political, economic, social and cultural framework of the Western world, fostering their cohesion with American leadership. On the other hand, they projected a U.S. image of commitment to the development of Spain, regardless of its political regime, which buffered the negative impact caused from the presence of military bases. Lastly, they would be a profitable investment in the short-term future, as they wove a network of friendships and sympathies in influential sectors of Spanish society that reached beyond the groups that supported Franco. The U.S. could play a pivotal role when the time of political transition arrived.

In years to come, Spain’s relationship with the United States was interpreted in terms of domestic rather than foreign policy. The image of the United States was weighted down by the recent past. Its complacency towards the Franco regime, without distancing itself when there was still time, was a difficult legacy. As U.S. reports acknowledged, the two-decade military presence in Spanish territory rested on an asymmetrical bilateral agreement that did not include an assurance of defense, and “has long been the cause of resentment in some Spanish political and press circles.” The idea that bilateral agreements were riskier than protective measures began to take shape and spread throughout public opinion. In this context, cultural and scientific exchange programs continued to provide a margin of trust and means for closeness and collaboration.
Fulbright Grants Arrive in Spain

Drawing by Robert Bastian published in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1966

“Of course I'm in charge—I think.”

1988 Mid-year Meeting in Toledo for American grantees
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Seeking a Balance in Bilateral Relations

How did the political transition in Spain after General Franco’s death affect cultural and scientific exchange with the United States? Did the ups and downs in bilateral relations affect them? Did those factors have noticeable repercussions on the Fulbright Program in Spain? Before answering these questions, it is helpful to explore the main aspects of Spanish-American relations at that time in order to offer a more precise analysis.

Spain’s transition took the course foreseen by U.S. authorities, without abrupt breaks with the past or revolutionary upheavals. The country ended up becoming a member of NATO and the European community. The desire for peaceful, yet profound change, accepted by Spanish society at large, was key to the process, although the international scenario influenced the transition’s success. The United States strongly supported this position, a sentiment that was sometimes eclipsed by unfortunate remarks from some of its political leaders — such as the well known statement made by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., who deemed the failed coupe d’état on February 23, 1981 as an “internal Spanish affair.” America’s collaboration with Francoism cast a shadow at a later stage, and broad sectors of Spanish society had the impression that the U.S. government was more concerned with its short-term interests rather than the future of the young democracy. In any case, Spain’s democratic leaders never questioned the strategic link with the United States, but did work to revise its conditions, causing some bilateral friction.93
The U.S. hoped that the reformist faction of the Francoist political class would take charge of the process with King Juan Carlos I acting as referee. Kissinger’s advice to José María Areilza — the first Minister of Foreign Affairs during the restored monarchy — was to move forward slowly but surely, controlling the pace of the transition and organizing elections only when a political party was certain to win. This sequence also guaranteed the availability of U.S. bases.

The monarchy’s backing for the first government was reflected in the January 1976 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, which included complementary agreements for science and technology, and education and culture. Most of that text was negotiated during the Franco regime, but its elevation to treaty status — something that the previous regime had never achieved — was a show of U.S. support for the emerging democracy. King Juan Carlos I took his first trip abroad to the United States in June 1976. In a speech before a joint session of the Congress and Senate, he pledged to promote the democratic evolution of the country. The visit also ended by obtaining an advantageous economic loan. With opposition forces, a more moderate position was taken: maintaining contact without making
commitments and persevering with a strategy to attract selective elements through cultural and information policies.

For the Spanish government, harmonious relations with the United States meant major international support for the transition while helping to consolidate the process domestically. Conceived as a provisional solution, the 1976 Treaty did not introduce changes to underlying issues—except for the departure of the Poseidon submarines from the Rota military base along with the nuclear weapons they carried. As head of Spanish diplomacy, both Areilza as well as his successor Marcelino Oreja believed that membership in NATO would rebalance the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Spain. The problem was that this initiative awakened little public enthusiasm, especially among opposition parties. However, the European option was met with widespread approval. As establishing the new democratic regime was a priority, Spain opted for “consensus by omission”; in other words, avoiding potentially conflictive international issues so as not to erode domestic agreements. The country thus moved towards integration into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the subject of NATO did not resurface until it was time to renegotiate treaties with the United States, but the door was slammed on this process with the attempted February 23 coup d’état.
The change in government, when Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo replaced Adolfo Suárez as President, was accompanied by a referendum to join NATO in May 1982. In the opinion of Spanish leaders at the time, NATO membership was crucial to correcting the imbalance that began in 1953, deemphasizing the importance of bilateral military relations by placing them in a multilateral context. In fact, the new Agreement for Friendship, Defense and Cooperation signed in 1982, was subordinate to the Treaty of Washington. It immediately allowed for tighter control over U.S. military activities in Spain. Complementary agreements were signed for authorizing military missions in Spanish territory; supplying materials and training Spanish armed forces; and, promoting economic development and scientific, technological, cultural and educational cooperation.

The prospect of joining NATO was met by a wave of disapproval by the Spanish public. Most people believed that the disintegrating governing party, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD – Democratic Center Union), had broken a previous consensus by attempting to join a U.S.-controlled military alliance. In a country that had not debated foreign policy alternatives in decades and whose population had no access to accurate information, the idea was spread that Spain would be positioning itself on the front lines of a bipolar conflict. Opposition parties united behind supposedly traditional Spanish neutrality, a very popular, yet historically inconsistent, idea that was incompatible with the real situation in the country. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE - Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party) together with other leftist political forces took the opportunity to strike against a weakened government, leading the protest against NATO membership as a way to speed up the need for elections.

In October 1982, the PSOE won the elections, paralyzing Spain’s entrance into NATO and subjecting permanent membership to a referendum. But the presence of U.S. bases was not questioned when ratifying the bilateral agreement signed a few months earlier. Bilateral military relations were disconnected from the question of joining NATO — as per the Protocol of February 1983. Since 1981, the socialists’ rise to power and the anti-NATO attacks from certain party leaders bred
mistrust within the Republican-led U.S. government under Ronald Reagan. Hesitations on both sides were partly smoothed over when Spanish President Felipe González visited the United States in June 1983. His approval of deploying American missiles in Western Europe tempered the reservations of U.S. officials. But the NATO issue continued to loom over bilateral relations and caused divergent opinions within the PSOE.

In October 1984, González presented in Congress the government’s official position on security policy — a document known as “the decalogue” — whose most important points were: a willingness not to leave NATO, but without joining its military structure; membership in the Western European Union; a declaration designating Spain as a non-nuclear territory; and, a reduction in the U.S. military presence. A preference was stressed in Spanish foreign policy for Europeanization in defense matters. Spain’s entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1986 further confirmed this trend. Shortly after, in March of the same year, the NATO referendum took place. The majority vote supported remaining (52.5% in favor, 39.8% against) with conditions: to remain outside of the integrated military structure; to refrain from installing, storing or deploying nuclear weapons in Spanish territory; and, the progressive withdrawal of U.S. forces.98

The U.S. government breathed easier, but was displeased about efforts to reduce its military presence, which could have a domino effect in other parts of Europe. The ensuing negotiations lasted two years, until 1988. The Reagan administration had reached a critical moment with the Soviet Union, and any vulnerability in its bargaining position in Spain could be viewed as a sign of weakness. Spanish negotiators wanted to straighten out, once and for all, the crooked path that dated back to 1953, and this was very important to the two socialist Foreign Affairs Ministers under whom bilateral talks were held — Fernando Morán and Francisco Fernández Ordóñez. Besides the promise of a referendum, the government held an absolute majority position, strengthened by its entrance into the EEC. Likewise, the military agreement was separated from the existing civilian aspects of the 1970 agreements to prevent bargaining over counterpart funds.
An eight-year Agreement for Defense and Cooperation was signed in September 1988. The United States accepted a substantial reduction in troops — nearly 40% of its forces, and above all, the withdrawal of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing in Torrejón, which settled an old score for Spain. Meanwhile, tighter controls were established over the use and authorization of the bases. The widespread public support, together with Spain’s membership in NATO and the European Union, provided the necessary breathing room to rectify a decades-long imbalance.

Multiplying Contacts and the Road to Mutual Understanding

Political disagreements, despite their consequences on public opinion, did not interfere with the continuity and deepening of mutual understanding and bilateral cultural relations. Moreover, the advent of democracy brought spectacular progress in this area.

The Spanish transition captured the interest of America’s media and academic and political circles. For the first time since the Spanish Civil War, Spain was making headlines and inspiring debate. Political analysts, sociologists, historians and economists toiled to explain to Americans what was happening in Spain, a country which had emerged from a long dictatorship with a strong desire to overcome the traumas of its recent past. At universities such as Columbia, Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Tufts and Yale, seminars and conferences were organized, and in two of them — Georgetown and Tufts — ad hoc chairs in Spanish affairs were created (Prince of Asturias Chairs). New York University founded the King Juan Carlos I of Spain Center. Some of the most prestigious American think-tanks became involved in the analysis of the political process — Carnegie Endowment, Council for Foreign Relations, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Hoover Institution and Wilson Center — while the Ford, Rockefeller and Tinker Foundations added Spain to their programs. Something similar happened with the media. Publications like the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, Time magazine, Newsweek or Chicago Daily News took notice of Spain’s evolution, which also made it to
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America’s airwaves and television screens. Another U.S. institution, the Spanish Institute of New York, was a constant platform for spreading Spanish thought, culture and art.

In response to this interest, media in Spain paid close attention to current events in the United States because of their global relevance. Cultural and academic initiatives were more delayed and mostly incapable of filling the Spanish public’s void in knowledge about the United States.

In late 1976, the Spanish Association for Anglo-North American Studies (AEDEAN) was created to promote language and literature studies. During the 1980s, several seminars provided an opportunity to reflect on guidelines for these studies. More recently, in 1992, the Spanish Association for American Studies (SAAS) was formed to focus on the United States. Between the births of these two associations, the Center for American Studies of the University of Alcalá de Henares (CENUA) was founded in 1986, renamed the University Institute for Research in American Studies in 2001. Groundbreaking and interdisciplinary in nature, this Institution is geared towards exploring American culture, society, economics and politics while organizing graduate student programs with a U.S.-inspired teaching methodology.101

During the 1990s, the Cervantes Institute also began to develop its activities in the United States. It currently has branches in New York, Chicago and Albuquerque, and classrooms in Calgary (Canada) and Seattle. Since 1997, the U.S.-Spain Council, with the participation of government and business leaders, has fostered commercial, financial, educational and cultural links between both countries.

In the same decade, Spain became the third most popular study abroad destination for U.S. university students — after the U.K. and Italy — hosting more than 20,000 students in academic year 2004-2005. Likewise, the number of Spanish students in U.S. universities has increased at a growing pace, reaching seventh place among European countries. Meanwhile, Spanish is the most popular foreign language in U.S. high schools and universities. Students enrolled in Spanish classes
outnumber those of all other languages combined — 70% in high schools, 53.4% in higher education. The majority of students are not of Hispanic origin, and Spanish has been the most popular foreign language since the 1970s, even before the Hispanic community became the largest ethnic minority.102

In the meantime, what happened with the Fulbright Program and the bilateral cooperation programs that spanned nearly two decades? Let’s consider some enlightening facts before offering a more thorough evaluation. Today, the Fulbright Program in Spain is the third largest in the world in terms of budget and number of students — only Germany and Japan outrank it.

Grants for Spaniards stopped being limited to only travel expenses and began to cover all costs. Along with grant programs, other initiatives were launched to expand exchange, including institutional grants for research projects or for spreading Spanish culture in the United States. Even more importantly, the United States relinquished its position as the program’s top financial sponsor to Spanish public and private entities. In short, the program broadened the range of its activities while the Spanish side assumed a more active role in funding and defining objectives, while maintaining bilateralism as a trademark.

Cooperation programs associated with military treaties were a considerable incentive for strengthening transatlantic exchange due to the resources and opportunities they offered at a crucial time for Spain, which was tackling university reform and defining scientific policy. In both areas, one of the most basic issues was improving human resources. These programs continued until the mid-1990s, but after the 1988 agreement, they remained separate from the defense-related agreements. Full independence came in October 1994 with the signing of the Agreement for Educational, Cultural and Scientific Cooperation, creating the Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange — the new institutional name for the Fulbright Commission-Spain. That agreement has been in effect without interruption until today.

Overall figures are quite illustrative. Considering only Fulbright program grants and those from collaborative agreements between the
Commission and several Spanish ministries and private institutions, between 1959 and 2008, 4,070 Spaniards and 1,700 Americans received awards for a total of 5,770 grantees. The proportion between Americans and Spaniards changed significantly after the democratic transition. In the past, numbers of each remained almost equal, but after 1973, awards for Spaniards began to outnumber those for Americans. Likewise, funds allocated to the program leave no room for doubt. Between 1959 and 1975, slightly more than 6 million dollars were received, mostly from the United States. In the 1976 to 1991 period of the early years of democracy, the amount surpassed 47 million dollars with Spain as the main contributor. Currently, the total amount budgeted to the program throughout its existence surpasses 152 million dollars.

Dynamism of the Fulbright Program

The arrival of democracy took some time to have significant effects on the Fulbright Program. In the beginning, the Commission reaffirmed its desire to collaborate with government measures, including the IV Development Plan while it was in effect, and the new priorities
established once the Plan ended. It continued its work in promoting American Studies; fostering institutional exchange between universities in both countries; assisting the *Institutos de Ciencias de la Educación* (Education Institutes); improving teacher training — in the fields of Mathematics, Physics, Economics, Sociology and Chemistry — and spreading awareness of Spain’s language and culture in the United States.104 In November 1976, the Commission moved its offices to the street - Cartagena, 83-85.105

The Commission continued to manage the cultural and educational cooperation program (NMA, Non-Military Agreement) until 1977. During its four-year existence, more than half of the grants were awarded in Sciences, followed at a distance by Health Sciences.106 Projects also continued to receive funding. Of four that began in 1973, only the Chair for the Menéndez Pidal Seminar lasted the entire period: the other three ended in academic year 1975-1976. During the last two years, another 10 new projects were approved. One noteworthy project was led by the International Institute of Music, which organized Summer Programs for Chamber Music in Spain.107 Other initiatives included projects for educational reform and faculty training; economic techniques for marketing, resource management, business management and technology; and, some university exchanges.

The final program report on that program declared that it had attempted to “intensify human resource potential of both countries”, yet acknowledged that it was fundamentally aimed at “strengthening the academia, cultural and administrative structures of higher education, especially within Spain.” Most grant holders were Spanish professors and students, who gained knowledge of new techniques and methods in the United States. A survey on the program’s effectiveness showed highly satisfactory results. A high percentage - 95% - of surveyed grantees rated their scientific experience as very positive, 74% maintained contact with U.S. colleagues, 61% published results in the
U.S., 71% worked at a university and 19% at the CSIC (High Council for Scientific Research). In short, they believed that the grant had improved their professional expectations (78%).

But before the funds assigned to each Committee could promote bilateral exchange, the Commission had to overcome some moments of uncertainty. From its birth, the annual allocation had nearly always surpassed $300,000, but it fell below this sum between 1969 and 1973. The 2 million dollars in funds contributed by the Non-Military Agreement (NMA) between 1975 and 1977 helped to weather the storm. The average number of Spanish grantees rose again over the program’s four-year duration, rising to 129 per year. This was not the case for American grantees with a barely noticeable increase. However, when the NMA ended, the Fulbright Commission’s modest budget could only cover a limited number of grants.

The situation changed in 1979 thanks to the sponsorship of the Banco de Bilbao, a leading Spanish bank, which continued until 1985. Fundraising from the private sector revitalized the Fulbright Program. Adding to this trend, an important contribution was made by another bank, la Caixa, whose collaboration lasted from 1983 to 1992. Before the end of the 1980s, the Fundación Centro de Estudios Comerciales (CECO - Center for Commercial Studies Foundation) and the Fundación de la Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE – Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations Foundation) joined the group of sponsors, but with smaller contributions. Without a doubt, the support of these private institutions was a clear sign in recognizing the value of educating
Spaniards in the United States. Since the 1960s, the U.S. government had promoted the involvement of private foundations in exchange programs as a way of manifesting its “People’s Diplomacy.” In Spanish-American relations, this aspect had precedents in the aid received from the Ford, del Amo and Elías Ahuja Foundations, among others, but had never reached the magnitude that was achieved after the return to democracy.

Another outstanding moment in the history of the Fulbright Program in Spain occurred around the same time period. In 1981, the Ministry of Education and Science (MEC) decided to sponsor a grant program for the United States managed by the Commission. The Fulbright-MEC grants were unequivocal proof of the Spanish public authorities’ interest in fostering Spanish-American ties. After 1982, the funds assigned to the program surpassed one million dollars and grew continuously throughout the decade. The initiative was implemented under the administration of the UCD (Democratic Center Union) political party. With the political change that brought the PSOE (Spanish Worker’s Socialist Party) into power, there was an increase in funding for program development. The Ministry of Education and Science then became the principal financing source for the program. The budgetary increase was even larger after the cultural and scientific aspects became independent of military negotiations.

Before the end of the decade, other public agencies confided in the Fulbright Commission, setting aside specific funds for new unilateral education and training programs on the other side of the Atlantic — the Ministries of Health and Consumer Affairs (MSC), Public Administration (MAP), Economics and Finance (MEH), and Labor and Social Affairs (MTAS). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) maintained its contribution which increased throughout the decade. These contributions allowed for unprecedented growth and diversification in transatlantic exchange. The U.S. government also boosted economic contributions to the Fulbright Program, although to a lesser degree than the financing received from the Spanish side.

As a result, a record number of scholarships - 1,636 - were awarded to Spaniards in the 1980s. The same was not true for
Americans, whose numbers were much smaller - 193 grantees. The difference in financial resources contributed by each country, along with the pursuit of different objectives, tipped the scales strongly toward the Spanish side. New economic contributions were aimed almost exclusively to financing Spanish students, professors and researchers in the United States.

This reaffirmed a trend already observed in the previous decade. While from 1959-1969, 653 grants for Spaniards were awarded and 775 to Americans, during 1970-1979, 822 grants were for Spaniards and 265 for Americans. The ratio only favored U.S. grantees during the early stages of the program – largely due to scholarships for the Burgos Seminar. After the 1990s, the imbalance in numbers was slightened, although noticeable differences remain.

New funding sources often stated specific objectives in grant announcements. Programs established by agreements with the United States also put forth priorities in allocating resources. The Fulbright Commission struggled to incorporate these requirements into its activities, seeking as much complicity as possible.

Grants administered by the Fulbright Commission for Spaniards had common provisions: roundtrip travel; tuition costs when necessary; room and board or a monthly stipend; in addition to services offered by collaborating U.S. institutions (paid for by the U.S. government) such as health and accident insurance; application fees; placement in universities or research centers; and general support services. Some grants also included English language and pre-academic courses; a book and excess luggage allowance; or a one-time annual payment for research-related expenses. Grant periods varied, but most lasted a full academic year — from 9 to 12 months.

Grants usually targeted undergraduates, although the Fulbright/MEC program favored postdoctoral researchers. All required a high level of English proficiency and a study proposal or research project. The selection process was held in accordance with Fulbright Program norms. The Commission’s activity was supported in the United States by the Institute of International Education (IIE), which managed
student placement; and the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), which handled postdoctoral researchers.

In accordance with program sponsors, grants had different characteristics. The Fulbright/Banco de Bilbao scholarships favored business-related study areas — Economics and Business Administration, Sociology, Social Sciences and Politics, etc. Applicants for the Fulbright/la Caixa grants had to be graduates of universities in Catalonia and the Balearic Islands. When selecting postdoctoral candidates for the Fulbright/MEC awards, priority was given to Sciences. Lastly, Fulbright/MSC scholarships targeted Public Health professionals.

The involvement of sponsors, the evolution in bilateral relations, and above all, the changes taking place in Spain’s university and scientific communities helped to define the Fulbright Commission’s activities. By the late 1970s, preference was still given to Political and Social Sciences, American Studies, Art and Humanities, and Language and Linguistics — basically teaching English in Spain and Spanish in the United States. After 1982, however, the Fulbright/MEC program significantly increased the number of grants awarded to candidates in Pure and Applied Sciences. Next on the priority list were Social and Political Sciences, including Economics. Both areas were responsible for much of the growth witnessed in grantee numbers. At that time, Spain’s economy showed worrisome signs of instability, with growing inflation and a depreciation of the peseta’s value against the dollar, which led to an increase in funds budgeted for travel and living costs in the United States.

Towards the middle of the decade, study areas were readjusted and classified into four main groups. Science and Technology held the priority position, in accordance with MEC guidelines, which had “consistently manifested interest” in this area. The country’s opening to the international community and new challenges justified “this trend in an increasing need for specialized scientific and technological preparation as Spain approaches integration into the Western European and Atlantic communities.” Social and Political Sciences also remained a priority. Economics and Business Administration fields came to the forefront due to the interest of some private sponsors. Arts and Humanities became the least-represented group with the smallest percentage of grantees.
In October 1983, in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the Fulbright Commission-Spain, the University of Alcalá de Henares granted a Doctor Honoris Causa to former Senator J. William Fulbright. In 1985, the Commission moved its offices to the street - Paseo del Prado, 28. A year later, Ramón Bela retired as Executive Director of the Fulbright Commission after nearly three decades. His successor, named in April 1986, was María Jesús Pablos, who had proven experience in cultural exchange.

Timing of events took on major importance. The University Reform Law was passed in August 1983, and then in April 1986, the Law for Development and General Coordination of Scientific and Technical Research (better known as the Science Law). Democratic Spain began to worry about endowing coherence and continuity to those measures that improved the country’s university and scientific abilities. Several studies analyzed the situation and future possibilities. A magazine (Política Científica, published between 1985 and 1997) provided status reports and outlined solutions, while serving as a forum for collective scientific reflection. Various organizations were created to coordinate and monitor activities (the Inter-Ministry Commission for Science and Technology - CICYT, the National Evaluation and Review Agency – ANEP, and the National Evaluating Commission for Research Activity - CNEAI). In 1988, the National R+D Plans were implemented on a four-year basis, and after 2000, renamed the National R+D+I Plans (Research, Development and Technological Innovation Plans). Within this framework, international exchange was again perceived as an essential tool for revitalizing the university and scientific communities; as a key component for training and renewing the workforce that the country needed for its modernization.

After joining the European Community in 1986, there was an increase in university and scientific linkages and opportunities from surrounding neighboring countries. Joining Europe created new resources, an open space for collaboration and possibilities to compete for EC financing – a grounding that has been consolidated over the past two decades. In spite of this, Spain’s public and private institutions did not lose faith in the excellence of U.S. science and technology as proven by their support for increasing exchange.
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Official opening of Commission headquarters, Paseo del Prado, October 1985. From left to right: Ramón Bela, Executive Director; U.S. Ambassador Thomas Enders; Luis Yañez-Barnuevo, Secretary of State for International Cooperation, and Joaquín Arango, Undersecretary of Education

Elizabeth Anderson, Deputy Director of the Fulbright Commission; Thomas Middleton, Deputy Director of the Joint Committee for Cultural and Educational Cooperation, and Matilde Medina, first Deputy Director of the Commission
Universities and research centers in the United States were seen as models and necessary reference points by a broad sector of Spain’s academic and scientific communities. Several indications marked the significant role that the United States continued to play in the realm of scientific collaboration. On one hand, postdoctoral researchers and mid-career professionals continued training and studying in the U.S., at levels similar to other European Union countries. On another hand, the relationship between the scientific communities of both countries became even closer due to the growth in joint research projects, seminars and meetings. Another clear example of this closeness was the significant increase in Americans and Spaniards co-authoring scientific publications.118

At the same time, the number of Spanish students, on their own initiative, who flowed to U.S. centers continued to grow. English had become the most important foreign language in the country. Universities had gained greater independence to restructure departments and reorganize staff, and several of them (the universities of Alcalá, Málaga, Complutense de Madrid and Central de Barcelona) requested American experts for assistance.119
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In the meantime, the Commission had become “an umbrella organization for a variety of exchange programs.” Spain’s growing interest in the transfer of knowledge from the United States and the corresponding growth in the number of Spanish grantees who went there for training caused an exchange imbalance. The Commission responded by striving to shift its activities “towards a true ‘binational’ exchange.”

In 1988, the Agreement for Defense and Cooperation was signed, and as previously mentioned, represented considerable progress towards balanced bilateral relations. From that point on, the structure of U.S.-Spain relations revolved around the principle that both nations shared fundamental values and interests that made them equal participants in every aspect of collaboration. Proof of this was the considerable growth in Spain’s financial contribution to exchange programs, which boosted the Commission’s annual budget that year to nearly $4.5 million. Spain also awakened a growing interest in the United States for its contribution to Western history, which would be commemorated in the upcoming celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the Discovery of America, and for the newly created expectations due to the country’s recent political and social evolution.

The activities planned by the Commission at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s outlined different recommendations and proposals to continue bringing Spain and the United States closer together. Without ignoring science and technology as essential fields for future grants, emphasis was placed on areas “that can best encourage understanding, such as economics, social and political sciences, and arts and humanities.” At the same time, a call was made to go beyond establishing strong individual bonds to combining them with the “strengthening of institutional relationships within the academic world and the Administration,” which were likely to cause a “multiplier effect.” In combination with this, it was also a good idea to “broaden horizons” and “attract the creativity of the private sector, which, while not directly connected to the university world, is definitively involved in the everyday task of formulating ideas and making them a national reality.”
Grant announcements attempted to address these interests and were expanded to include Spanish government employees in different areas of public administration. New private sponsorship was also achieved. Through the CEOE Foundation, companies like the major department store - El Corte Inglés - and the Coca-Cola Foundation, Spain funded grants for graduate study in journalism. The CECO Foundation sponsored two new programs, one in conjunction with the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and another aimed at promoting more U.S. participation in exchanges. The American program was reactivated with an increase in grant announcements and numbers, along with a budget increase from USIA. For good reason, recovering the bilateral aspect of exchange flows brought the Fulbright Program back to its original purpose: “to help build bridges of understanding between our two societies.”
Compensation for a Military Presence: Cooperation Agreements

While bilateral agreements had revolved around core military issues since 1953, the path first attempted in 1970 to place the relationship between the two countries within a wider framework was reattempted and progressed throughout the democratic period. Starting with the 1976 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and in the subsequent agreements, scientific and technological as well as educational and cultural cooperation were highlighted.

The 1976 text provided for the creation of a Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (Complementary Agreement No. 3), whose activities would be geared “mainly towards the fields of applied research and technological development.” The selected areas were: “energy, industrialization, urban and environmental studies, agriculture and natural resources.” Another Joint Committee for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Complementary Agreement No. 4) was established in order to broaden the Spanish-American exchange program “to all branches of teaching, especially natural and applied sciences, economics and the languages and cultures of both countries.” The growth of the Spanish educational system was again identified as a preferred field for collaboration in which the United States would lend support “in the areas of research and development, and specialized training for professors and other teaching staff.” It would also provide for supplying “equipment and material to research and teaching laboratories as well as libraries to meet the needs of universities and other centers of higher learning.”

Both programs were administered by a Joint Administrative Staff, which began to operate in July 1977 on the premises of the Fulbright Commission. The Executive Director of the Commission was also Executive Secretary of both Committees. Each program set its priorities and made its plans independently of the Fulbright Program, although in both cases the Commission lent support as “a focal point for binational cultural relations on academic and non-academic levels.” Its prior collaboration in the development of the NMA was considered “highly satisfactory”, a positive assessment that also applied to its personnel: “bilingual and highly knowledgeable of the education
systems in Spain and the United States, with experience in the inherent details necessary for the program to operate, who have proven their dedication to work for some time.”

The agreements were extended for one more year than originally planned, lasting from 1977 to 1982. In that six-year period, $27,717,684 was received for science and technology; and, $14,400,000 for culture and education. Funds for science and technology were mainly awarded for joint research, postdoctoral grants and short-term visits. Joint research received most of the funding. As for culture and education, priority was given to cooperative research grants and awards to further postgraduate study, along with institutional cooperation grants and awards for the dissemination of Spanish culture in the U.S.. According to Spanish authorities, this cooperation played “an extraordinarily important role for our university system, in the training and specialization of our educational and research staff, and in spreading our art in the number-one world market.” This position was held when renegotiating the bilateral agreement:

“a larger financial contribution to this cooperation would not only strengthen it, but also from a political perspective, convert future agreements with the United States into true agreements for friendship and cooperation, rather than becoming only military treaties, which only symbolically… added on complementary agreements for scientific, cultural and educational cooperation.”

The 1982 Agreement for Friendship, Defense and Cooperation reflected these sentiments, reinforcing bilateral relations on both sides. Complementary Agreement Seven addressed cooperation geared towards “economic modernization and social welfare” along with “mutual understanding between both countries.” In terms of areas and actions, it was quite similar to the previous agreement. Two Joint Committees ─ Scientific and Technological Cooperation; and, Cultural and Educational Cooperation ─ would again outline program operations. The Fulbright-Hays program was specifically supported again.

Funding was considerably increased. According to data, during the 1983-1988 period, science and technology received $37,772,593. These
funds mainly financed joint projects in applied and basic sciences. If contributions from the previous six-year period are included, the total sum reached $65,490,277. Cultural and educational cooperation received $23,118,000, allocated in the same fashion as the previous period: grants to individuals, institutions, and for the dissemination of Spanish culture in the United States. Including previous funds, the total reached $37,518,000. During the 11-year period of agreements corresponding to Spain’s democratic era, the United States contributed a total of $103 million to cultural and scientific cooperation.

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The objectives and measures outlined by the Joint Committees barely changed from one period to the next. Overall, it was a repertoire of measures geared towards boosting educational, scientific and technological development. Institutional grants helped renew universities, research centers, museums and libraries through the acquisition of equipment and materials or exchange of scientific and technological information. Joint research forged closer bonds between research groups. Grants improved training and specialization of teaching and research staff. Subsidies to promote the arts gave visibility to different areas of cultural creation.
“Ditirambo” theater company on tour of U.S. universities to promote new Spanish theater in 1978

Poster for play *La Celestina*, performed by “Teatro del Aire” in 1981
Some activities prompted more notoriety and public recognition. Examples include the sophisticated equipment provided to the Ministry of Culture to preserve the prehistoric Altamira cave paintings; the equipment supplied to improve the conservation of paintings in the Prado Museum; the American Studies collection sent to the English Department at the University of Salamanca, or the aid given to the Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo of the CSIC to offset losses in bibliographic funds caused by a fire at its facilities. The spread of art gained extraordinary importance thanks to painting and sculpture exhibits — Goya, Calder, Still, Halley, Miró, Sorolla, Chillida, etc. —; music recitals by the Spanish National Choir, Spanish National Youth Orchestra and the Donostiarra Choral Society; tours by the National Ballet, the Paul Taylor Dance Company and theater companies such as Els Joglars and Els Comediants; film festivals organized by the National Film Library and the American Film Institute; or a tribute to the Spanish film director García Berlanga. For several years, a radio program — “La Hora de España” — was produced by Spain’s National Radio Station for the Spanish-speaking audience in the United States.

Science and technology projects received a large part of available resources. Some initiatives had immediate social and economic effects, such as the oceanographic study of the Rías Baixas of Galicia to analyze the flow of nutritive substances that influenced mussel cultivation. Another project explored the potential use of alternative energy through the construction of a solar energy tower in the Almería province. Among those that were more relevant for their medical implications, the progress in...
facing cancer by a team of researchers led by Mariano Barbacid stood out. Likewise, special attention was given to teaching English and Spanish as second languages in both countries — without overlooking other official languages in Spain, as demonstrated by funding for the creation of an English-Catalan dictionary. Joint research projects brought leading U.S. professors and experts to Spain, including two Nobel Prize winners in Economics - Lawrence R. Klein and James M. Buchanan. All this occurred while the number of grants and exchanges rose to unprecedented levels.
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Catalogs of exhibits sponsored by the U.S.-Spain Joint Committee for Cultural and Educational Cooperation between 1988 and 1989
The Joint Committees continued their work until 1989, when the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation ceased to exist. In June of the same year, an Agreement for Cultural and Educational Cooperation allowed the other Committee to continue temporarily, financed with leftover funds. Financing ran out after the grant announcement for academic year 1993-1994, and with it, the organization ended. A new agreement signed in June 1994 revived the Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation so that the $3,000,000 in leftover funds could be spent. Beginning in 1998, the Fulbright Commission oversaw the Committee for a three-year period, until funds were spent. Cooperation among universities, research centers, government bodies, institutions and companies was promoted.

The cycle of Agreements ended in October 1994 with the Agreement for Educational, Cultural and Scientific Cooperation, which has been renewed up until today. This legal action updated exchange activities after more than three decades of existence. It also reflected the considerable transformation in Spanish-American relations after the 1988 Treaty for Defense Cooperation which questioned maintaining scientific cooperation programs with the United States. It should be remembered that the First National Research and Technological Development Plan had just been approved, and was well-funded so that assistance from other countries was unnecessary. In response to this consideration, it was the:
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"unanimous opinion of surveyed Spanish organizations and institutions that the importance of the United States as a source of scientific knowledge demands that Spain continue fostering a bilateral relationship that has been so obviously effective in the recent past"\textsuperscript{135}.

The new scheme of bilateral relations separated cultural and scientific aspects from strategic considerations, thus ending the link between compensation for the U.S. military presence in Spain. The 1994 Agreement made the Fulbright Commission, which then changed its official name to the Commission for Cultural, Educational and Scientific Exchange, the reference point for exchange.

Recognized as a binational organization, its existence was guaranteed by a core fund provided by both governments, in equivalent proportions if possible. Although the Spanish contribution remained higher, the U.S. government doubled its allocation to the Commission beginning in the 1990s. Funds from other sources were also received; a practice that had been used in the past, but that was not specified in previous regulations. Funding would be used to finance "study,
research, teaching and other educational, cultural and scientific activities” for citizens of both countries; ”visits and exchanges… of qualified individuals, especially students, university interns, researchers, teachers, instructors, professors, administrators, artists and professionals” along with “any other kind of educational and cultural programs.” Finally, the Commission would act serve as an information center in Spain on the U.S. educational system and study opportunities136.

A Half Century of Experience

During the 1990s, bilateral relations calmed following the difficulties surrounding the NATO referendum and negotiation of a defense agreement that would satisfy both sides. Spain proved to be a reliable ally during the first Gulf War in 1991, providing logistical support and allowing the U.S. Air Force to use its bases. When Spain held the EU Presidency in 1995, the country also adopted a favorable attitude and fostered cooperation between the United States and Europe through the Transatlantic Agenda. That same year, socialist leader and former minister Javier Solana became NATO Secretary General with U.S. consent.

The trend towards more harmonious relations between two allies, united by strong and diverse political, economic and cultural bonds as well as obvious strategic ones, impacted public opinion. Opposition to the American military presence in Spain and its global leadership slowly and gradually faded. An undercurrent of anti-Americanism remained, but weakened as perceptions of a bilateral relationship based on subordination to U.S. power disappeared.137
With the Popular Party electoral victory in 1996, political changes prompted Spain to seek a closer relationship with the United States. When the party renewed its mandate in 2000 with an absolute majority, a Joint Political Declaration was issued in January 2001. Both governments expressed the intention to establish a stronger political dialogue by institutionalizing ongoing meetings. Areas of bilateral interest, including scientific and cultural cooperation, were also assessed with special reference to strengthening exchange programs of the Fulbright Commission.

Spanish-American relations became even stronger in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States and the shared anti-terrorism concerns of both Presidents George W. Bush and José María Aznar. The war on terror became a point of understanding between Spanish and American leaders which culminated in March 2003 with the Spanish government’s support for the American invasion of Iraq. This decision, which seconded the U.S. government’s unilateral policies, had a high price in terms of public opinion. The Iraq War rekindled the flames of anti-Americanism in Spanish society, which became one of the most critical in Europe regarding U.S. politics. The past ghost of becoming a U.S. satellite reemerged as critics called for the government to exchange its Atlantic allegiances for Europeanism. Both viewpoints had coexisted peacefully in the past, but politicians and the media began to cast them into opposing factions.

The March 11, 2004 terrorist attack in Madrid, just a few days before the general elections, revived the debate in Spanish society about the unnecessary strategic risks that Spain was taking with the United States. Amidst the commotion, the PSOE Socialist Party won the elections. One of the new administration’s first decisions was to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq as promised in their electoral platform. That sudden decision, leaving no room for negotiating a gradual withdrawal as well as several unfriendly gestures towards the United States cooled bilateral relations. Reconciliatory efforts were made over the next few years, and now differences seem to have been almost completely overcome.

In any case, political disagreements were mitigated thanks to the diversity of existing common interests between both countries, which have
formed closer and more pluralistic bonds. The Fulbright Commission’s outstanding role as a cultural mediator is an example of the depth of bilateral relations. Over the past half-century, it has served as an anchor for knowledge between the two countries, sheltered from occasional differences in the conduct of their respective governments. The successful workings of the program have been borne out by its success in securing public and private funding, in its concern for maintaining links between universities and research centers, without forgetting the assistance provided to the U.S. – Spain Joint Committees. In all these areas, it has displayed a remarkable ability to capitalize on human and logistical resources within its reach, emerging as a first-class bilateral negotiator.

Public recognition of the Fulbright Commission took place in 1993 at the 35th anniversary of its founding. The first alumni directory, which served as a tool to identify exchange participants, was published and distributed. In May of that year, an international conference on “Precision Journalism: Database Research” brought several American Pulitzer Prize winners to Madrid to discuss cutting-edge U.S. journalism methods that were barely known in Spain. Shortly thereafter, the Prince of Spain was named an honorary grantee of the Fulbright Commission just before he left for the United States to pursue graduate studies. This honorary grant, awarded for the first time, symbolized the Fulbright Program’s established roots in Spain and future prospects.

On that occasion, the Minister of Public Works and Transportation, José Borrell—a Fulbright alumnus—emphasized the Spanish govern-
ment’s commitment to maintaining the program and alluded to negotiations underway for a new agreement, which, “unlike previous formulas associating agreements with military cooperation, the future is based on completely normal relations between two countries that not only understand each other, but also help each other to move forward.” The program’s advantages were enumerated by another former grantee, the eminent Hispanist Edward Malefakis:

“First and foremost, it gives to an important sector of the Spanish intellectual elites access to the American university system, which is still, despite its many defects, the finest in the world. (...) Second, the program provides a human support system that helps the grantee adapt to the new style of life he or she will encounter. (...) Third, by being Fulbrighters, Spanish students enter a network that encompasses people from all countries of the world. (...) Fourth, by getting to know intimately a country and a language that promise to remain the world’s leaders for long as we can foresee, the Spanish grantee gains a stronger hold on the future. Fifth, since the U.S. is and promises to remain the world’s most diversified nation, both because of its ethnic heterogeneity and its absence of rigid structures, a year living there can be an enormously broadening experience, teaching one lessons that are often more important than those learned in his professional training. (...) Last but by no means least, the Fulbright program permits a significant core of America’s intellectual elite to get to know Spain, and by so doing to be able to explain and defend it to other Americans, thus lessening the neglect of Spanish culture that has long characterized the United States.”

The following year, the 1994 agreement was signed which in some measure recaptured the Fulbright Program’s original spirit. First and foremost, it emphasized a bilateral exchange that would be as balanced as possible, thus revitalizing the diminished ranks of American grantees to Spain. Although the balance was not entirely restored, it did improve. Between 1990 and 1999, 1,517 grants for Spaniards and 569 for Americans were awarded. Between 2000 and 2008, 1,195 Spaniards and 584 Americans received scholarships. Meanwhile, the spotlight returned to the Fulbright Commission’s core program: grants for
Spaniards to carry out postgraduate study in the United States, together with grants for U.S. pre-doctoral candidates to study or research in Spain. The program had practically disappeared to make room for the MEC-sponsored program. A guarantee of sustained bilateral funding thanks to an increase in annual U.S. allocations cleared up any doubts on the future viability of the core program.

In the early 1990s, the Fulbright Commission moved its offices to the street - General Martínez Campos, 24 - its current location. It had to face the combined effects of expiring general agreements between the United States and Spain — that included funding for cultural and scientific cooperation — and the impact of the 1992 Spanish economic crisis. With USIA’s support, it managed to double its U.S. funding allocation for the 1992-1993 fiscal year, just at the time when Spanish funding was affected by budgetary adjustments. From then on, increases in U.S. contributions underlined an interest in maintaining joint responsibility for the program.

Democracy and Strengthening Transatlantic Relations

Presentation of honorary Fulbright grant H.R.H. Prince Felipe at the Casa de América, Madrid, May 6, 1993 during the Commission’s 35th Anniversary celebration. From left to right: José Borrell, Minister of Public Works and Transportation; H.R.H. Prince Felipe; Charles Dunne, President of the Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board; Leonard L. Baldyga, Director, Office of European Affairs, United States Information Agency; and, María Jesús Pablos, Executive Director of the Commission.
Faced with the expiration of U.S.-financed cooperation agreements, the Ministry of Education and Culture boosted the number of grants for graduate study, maintaining science and technology and certain areas of political and social sciences, economics, and humanities as priority fields. Up until 1995, it funded the largest grant program for graduate study that the Fulbright Commission has ever administered. After that date, the postdoctoral research scholarship program remained, and a program for study in the arts sponsored by the Secretariat of State for Culture. Contributions from other Spanish ministries have continued with only slight variations. In 1996, the Ministry of Public Works and Urbanism became a sponsor. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation has maintained its uninterrupted support up until the present day. As the economy began to improve, Spain’s financing increased once again.144

Public sector support was also obtained from Spain’s regional governments as they began to acquire authority to supervise cultural activities. In 1999, the Catalonian regional government signed an agreement with the Fulbright Commission to offer postdoctoral grants...
for graduates of the universities located in their region as well as partial funding for U.S. professors to teach in Catalonian universities. In 2004, the Madrid regional government delegated into the Commission to administer a graduate student grant program for U.S. study and the Andalusian regional government followed suit in 2006. Other regional governments – those of Castille-La Mancha, Murcia and Navarre - co-financed exchange programs for secondary school teachers.

Once again, the Commission stood out for its ability to garner support from both countries, as reflected by a significant number of annual grants. Fundraising from the private sector continued and new sponsors replaced previous ones. The Banco Central Hispano — currently Santander bank — became a contributor in 1994. In 1996, the Fundación Ramón Areces joined the list of sponsors along with several regional savings banks. Contributions continued from the CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations) Foundation, the Coca-Cola España Foundation and the department store chain - El Corte Inglés. The Instituto de Empresa, the International Institute in Spain, the Sociedad General de Autores y Editores, and the Spanish Association for American Studies also joined the group of private sponsors.
The Commission currently is funded by contributions from both governments, from various governmental agencies, companies and other private institutions. Its budget has grown continuously since 2000, surpassing the $10,000,000 mark for the first time in history in fiscal year 2007-2008, when it sponsored 181 Spanish and 97 American grantees. Its Board of Directors maintains equal representation from both countries under the co-presidency of the Director General for Cultural and Scientific Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, and the Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy. In the United States, the J. William Fulbright Scholarship Board oversees the Fulbright Commission in Spain.

Since the 1990s, the “Fulbright Core Program”, targeting graduate students from both countries, has remained a priority along with an objective to reach gradually a balanced number of grantees. Transatlantic exchange has shown no signs of weakening. The significance of the Spanish-American connection in Spain’s cultural and scientific development is unquestionable, considering that U.S.
centers are ideal destinations for furthering the education of academic, scientific and professional leaders. Democratic Spain has recognized the Commission’s worth as a cultural mediator and role as “the epicenter for cultural, educational and scientific activities between the United States and Spain.”

Moreover, the Commission in Spain has become a pioneer in Europe in searching for new ways to promote transnational and transatlantic relations. In November 2005, this was evidenced at the European Fulbright Symposium organized in Toledo, Spain on “Diversity in Educational and Cultural Exchange.” The conference sessions addressed recent social changes, the challenges of a significant Muslim immigration to the European continent, and eventual measures to assure that European program participation include “more, younger participants from underrepresented social groups.” In short, the goal was to renew the commitment for multicultural education present at the birth of the Fulbright Program in order to foster international understanding.

Reflections on the future must be based on past experiences, especially when the road already traveled offers a half-century perspective. With this idea in mind, the Spanish Fulbright Commission began to prepare its 50th Anniversary a few years ago. This milestone provided an opportunity to assess past accomplishments and outline a course of action for the future.
The first step was to identify major program features: funding sources and priority study fields. Graphs provided in the appendix contain updated data. Diversity in funding sources and variations in grantee numbers from each country can be observed. Figures also show how the arrival of democracy in Spain resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of grants for Spanish citizens, and how the imbalance in numbers between Spanish and American grantees has been reduced since the mid-1990s.

From the beginning of the program up until the present, total figures show that the Spanish program has a far more balanced distribution of grants by study area. Around half of the grants for Spaniards were in Social and Legal Sciences (30.48%) and Arts and Humanities (20.12%). The other half were awarded to grantees in Sciences (25.15%), Engineering and Architecture (12.45%) and Health Sciences (11.80%). In the American program, the vast majority of grants were in Arts and Humanities (62.98%) and Social and Legal Sciences (23.07%), with far lower percentages in Sciences (6.93%), Engineering and Architecture (4.04%) and Health Sciences (2.98%). Upon examining specializations within these areas, a similar, yet more specific, imbalance appears:
How has this flow of people and ideas affected mutual understanding, personal impressions, and specific scientific areas? In order to evaluate accurately the effects of the “westerly wind” from the United States, it is essential to conduct an in-depth study that reconstructs the paths of individuals and groups that have infused Spanish society with knowledge gained from their American experiences. In the meantime, the Metroscopia study offers some interesting conclusions:

- On an individual level, the program has been a success; the educational experience outstanding, with a major impact on subsequent professional development. A high degree of satisfaction has been noted with regard to U.S. university and scientific systems (resources, quality and attention from professors, research facilities, methodology, etc.). The experience was also very enriching from a personal perspective, with integration into a foreign society and culture leading to a positive impression of U.S. society.

- Nevertheless, brilliant individual findings have not had an equivalent correlation on a collective level where there were a
far less noticeable number of institutional linkages that lead to the implementation of university exchange programs, joint research projects, etc. It was pointed out that the U.S. educational experience is difficult to transfer to the workings of the Spanish R + D system due to a lack of follow-up, availability of information, and grantee support upon returning to their home country. Lastly, the grantees’ positive impression has not been projected to Spanish society as a whole.148

In short, while the program achieves exceptional results on a personal level, it has been less successful in creating an integrated niche for understanding or bringing the two societies closer together. At least, this is the impression that emerged from the grantee surveys.

For a deeper and more thorough evaluation, it was necessary to weed out data, become familiar with the times and key moments over a half-century of cultural and scientific exchange, and reconstruct central themes. A fundamental starting point was an analysis of the records at the Fulbright Commission, an outstanding advocate of transatlantic dialogue. One setback was that the Commission’s administrative records did not have the cataloging and data storage system necessary for a historical archive, and therefore lacked a means for easy and thorough consultation. There
was another complication: almost all records prior to 1982 had been transferred to the Archivo General de la Administración (General Government Archive) in Alcalá de Henares.

With the approval of the Commission’s Board, a project was undertaken to create a historical archive and organize records. The objective was to make Commission documentation, regardless of its location, accessible to the public, given its relevance in studying Spanish-American cultural and scientific exchange. The archive was designed by researchers and archivists from the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC - High Council for Scientific Research), the Complutense University of Madrid, and the Archivo Histórico Nacional (National Historic Archive), with the collaboration of Commission personnel. The regional government of Madrid and CSIC helped fund the project between 2004 and 2005.\textsuperscript{149}

The Archivo de la Comisión Fulbright-España (ACFE - Fulbright Commission-Spain Archive) is now a reality, and has expanded to include records from the Joint Committees.\textsuperscript{150} The organization and analysis of this documentation, along with research carried out in other Spanish, and above all, American archives, form the basis of the history of the Fulbright Commission offered in these pages.
Meanwhile, the Commission’s 50th Anniversary was viewed as a time to reflect on achievements and proposed improvements; explore contrasting opinions from participants; and, expand the program’s visibility in Spain. If furthering the education of several thousand students, teachers and scientists had been its main asset, then how should it face the immediate future? Should it consider other means to strengthen cultural, educational and scientific bonds between the two societies? What initiatives would be most effective to foster mutual understanding?

These questions were the starting point for a meeting in January 2008 on “Cultural and Scientific Exchange between the United States and Spain through the Fulbright Commission:
Outcome and Future Challenges.” The session brought together several dozen former Fulbright grantees and other experts from the university, scientific and business communities in both countries. Roundtable discussions were organized within work groups that presented proposals to define the program in the face of new developments and challenges after a half-century of existence.151

The resulting proceedings from that forum marked the beginning of the Fulbright Commission-Spain’s 50th Anniversary celebration. Since then, there have been several occasions recognizing past achievements. In February, the spotlight moved to the United States. The Orchestra of New Spain offered two Spanish baroque music concerts honoring the Commission at the Latino Cultural Center of Dallas and the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. Both the Spanish Embassy in Washington, D.C. and the Department of State gave receptions in the Commission’s honor.

Over the course of the year, media in both countries have highlighted the importance and breadth of its accomplishments. The Commission has been featured in the Washington Post, the International Herald Tribune, La Gaceta de los Negocios, Cinco Días, El País, El Mundo, by the EFE press agency and in other regional and university-related publications. It has also reached the airwaves of Radio Nacional de España (Spanish National Radio) in the United States. In July, the Complutense University of Madrid

Participants in January 2008 conference at the International Institute
explored the program’s contribution in a summer course in El Escorial called “The Fulbright Program: A Half Century of Cultural and Scientific Exchange with the United States.”

From the distant perspective of time past, it can be seen that those “echoes from another world” have been replaced by an unprecedented closeness between the two countries. Grantees that cross the Atlantic in either direction no longer experience the strangeness felt in other eras. Although the physical space between the two countries has not changed, the feeling of distance belongs to the past. The Fulbright Commission has operated as a channel for knowledge and experience, weaving a web of thousands of individuals who have made gradual closeness possible, and serving as an invaluable agent in the relations between the United States and Spain.
CURSOS DE VERANO
2008

SEMANA DEL 21 AL 25 DE JULIO

EL PROGRAMA FULBRIGHT: MEDIO SIGLO DE INTERCAMBIOS CULTURALES Y CIENTÍFICOS CON EE.UU.

Director: Lorenzo Delgado, CSIC

Participantes: Mª Luz Pérez, Dir. Comisión Fulbright; Patricia de la Hué; Comisión Fulbright; Antonio Nito, Univ. Complutense; Isabel Gómez, Univ. Complutense; Joan Guinovart, Inst. IBE-BIOMEDICA Barcelona; Federico G. Moliner; físico; José Manuel Fierro, Inst. Salud Carlos III; Sergio Vile-Sanjuán, La Vanguardia; Miguel Cruz, Globoespí, Guillermo Fesser, Benassap, Juan Antonio Zuñica, IBM; Ramón Parra, General Electric; Clara Eugenia Nuñez, Dir. Ger. Univ. Complutense.

Patrocinadores: Comisión Fulbright, CSIC

El Escorial
www.ucm.es/cursosverano
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE
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1 Javier Solana uses the latter expression in his “Prologue” to Estudio socio-
lógico sobre los ex-becarios del Programa Fulbright en España, prepared
in September 2007 for the Fulbright Commission-Spain by Metroscopia.
The former quote is an excerpt from a May 2007 interview of José Borrell
for this study.

2 Interview with Santos Julia (April 2007).

3 Quotes taken from interviews with Joan Guinovart, Agustín Maravall and
Mariano Barbacid (May 2007).

4 Interview with José Álvarez Junco (May 2007).

5 La cooperación cultural y científica entre España y Estados Unidos a tra-
vés de la Comisión Fulbright. Balance y retos de futuro, Work document,

6 The facts and considerations in this epigraph are based on the works of A.
NIÑO, and particularly his article “Las relaciones culturales como punto
de reencuentro hispano-estadounidense”, in L. DELGADO and Mª. D.
ELIZALDE (eds.): España y Estados Unidos en el siglo XX, Madrid, CSIC,
2005, p. 57-94. See this text for a thorough analysis.

7 Additional information is available in C. NARANJO, Mª. D. LUQUE and
M. A. PUIG-SAMPER, Los lazos de la cultura. El Centro de Estudios His-
tóricos de Madrid y la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1916-1939, Madrid,
CSIC, 2002.

8 Teaching assistants included Dámaso Alonso and Samuel Gili y Gaya; lec-
turers included Salvador de Madariaga, Américo Castro, Antonio García
Solalinde, Fernando de los Ríos and Tomás Navarro Tomá.

9 E. RODRÍGUEZ OCAÑA; J. BERNABEU MESTRE and J. L. BARONA,
“La Fundación Rockefeller y España, 1914-1936. Un acuerdo para la mo-
dernización científica y sanitaria”, in J. L. GARCÍA, J. M. MORENO and
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Recipients included Severo Ochoa, Ramón Castrovido, Ramón Pérez de Ayala, Federico de Onís, Jose Pijoan, Nicanor Zabaleta and María de Maeztu. There were 55 financial aid recipients—who received government funding for visits between 6 and 24 months—, 40 JAE-affiliated students—who traveled with their own funds but obtained the JAE’s recognition for their studies—, and 31 grantees—who received aid to spend one academic year at a U.S. college. A. NIÑO, “La aportación norteamericana al desarrollo científico español en el primer tercio del siglo XX”, an unpublished text presented at the interdisciplinary seminar La americanización en España: 50 años de influencia económica y social. Madrid, September 12th and 13th, 2002.

For more information on these aid recipients, their areas of expertise and the JAE’s courses for foreigners, see J. FORMENTÍN and M. J. VILLEGAS, Relaciones culturales entre España y América: La Junta para Ampliación de Estudios (1907-1936), Madrid, Mapfre, 1992, p. 191 and ss.


This was due to the active role these organizations had played in disseminating knowledge of the region and in forming links on different levels. See R.D. SALVATORE, Imágenes de un imperio. Estados Unidos y las formas de representación de América Latina, Buenos Aires, Ed. Sudamericana, 2006.


Fulbright’s original speech can be found in the Congressional Record, vol. 91 (September 27, 1945), p. 9044.


Regarding the main points of the controversy and its effects on cultural exchange, see C. A. THOMSON and W. H. C. LAVES, Cultural Relations..., p. 63 and ss.

This organization represented four national research councils: American Council of Education, American Council of Learned Societies, National Research Council and Social Science Research Council.

In addition to the cited works, to reconstruct the climate that strengthened America’s information and culture programs, see P. COOMBS, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs, New York, Harper & Row, 1964; C. FRANKEL, The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad, Washington D.C., 1966; R. PELLS, Not Like Us. How Europeans Have Loved, Hated,
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The effects of the Cold War on the Fulbright Program in W. JOHNSON and F. COLLIGAN, The Fulbright Program . . . , p. 68-104.

Regarding the negotiations and impact of those military agreements, see A. VIÑAS, En las garras del águila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945-1995), Barcelona, Crítica, 2003.


“Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de España y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América para financiar ciertos programas de Intercambio Cultural (Acuerdo Fulbright)”, 16-X-1958. BOE, 3-XII-1958.


The other Commission members were: Ralph Forte (Spanish correspondent for the New York Daily News), Ross A. Ross (Director, Motocar S.A. and President of the American Club), Robert Waid (Director, Maquinaria S.A.), Antonio Tena Artigas (Technical Secretary General, Ministry of Education), José María Albareda (Secretary General, High Council for Scientific

Ramón Bela earned a law degree at the University of Madrid and was employed by the government in 1949 at the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, which had a United States division. There, he was head of the Exchange and Information Departments and became director of the aforementioned division in 1951. Matilde Medina taught prior to the Spanish Civil War in the Department of Spanish and English Literature at the Hollywood School for Girls, and then studied Library Science at the International Institute of Madrid. She became a librarian at the Museo Naval in 1933 and regularly collaborated with the American binational center and the American Women’s Club in Madrid, where she gave conferences. She also wrote about Spain for the U.S. media and taught language classes to aspiring diplomats. “Ramon Bela bio data”, 7-II-1970. General Archives of the Administration-Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 54/10570. “Matilde Medina a José Miguel Ruiz Morales”, 7-I-1959; “Director adjunto de Comisión Fulbright”, 11-VIII-1959. AMAE, R-9541/3.

For information on the Fulbright Program’s initial operations in Spain, see “Memorandum presentado por la Comisión de Intercambio Cultural entre España y los Estados Unidos de América, al Sr. Embajador de España en Washington”, 13-V-1963. Archivo General de la Administración-Comisión Fulbright (AGA-CF), 54/10552

Ultimately, the amount allocated was a bit lower than expected: $1,550,438.


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The summer seminar began in Burgos in 1961, and continued until 1967-1968, when it was suspended due to budget cuts. Classes were given in Spanish Language, Literature, History and Art. The sessions ended with trips to tourist sites in Spain. More details on its creation are available in “Acta de la Comisión Fulbright”, 10-IV and 16-V-1961. ACFE, Box 1/22 and 23.


46 These quotes are taken from interviews with Federico García Moliner (July 2007), Antonio García Bellido (June 2007) and Joan Guinovart (May 2007) for the Metroscopia study.

47 Spanish Language and Literature professors in the United States also had the opportunity to share opinions and work methods in several courses and seminars sponsored by the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica.


“Ramón Bela a Ilene E. Avery”, 4-II-1969. AGA-CF, 54/10568. In the 1969-1970 academic year, the Fulbright Program received only $145,000 in Spanish and American contributions; the previous year it had raised $355,000. The number of grants decreased from 148 in 1968-1969 to 66 the following year. In 1970-1971, both figures slightly improved to $175,000 and 77 scholarships.


Villar Palasí had participated in the Spanish-American exchange programs as a Leader Grantee in 1956. He was then Secretary General of the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

J. GRACIA and M. A. RUIZ CARNICER, La España de Franco..., pp. 325-329.
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“U.S.-Spain Science Cooperation”, 5-VI-1970; “A Preliminary Report on Spanish Science and Technology with a View Toward Possible U.S.—Spain Cooperation”, 21-VIII-1970. NARA, RG 59, 1970-73, Spain, Box 2936. The Spanish government spent an estimated 50-60 million dollars on R+D at the time, and in order to ensure that U.S. assistance would have a noticeable impact, a contribution of 10% of that sum was needed.


On the American side, John Richardson, Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, coordinated the non-military programs from the Department of State. Herman Pollack, Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, advised on the development of scientific, technical and environmental programs. Allen V. Astin, former Director of the National Bureau Standards, who played an identical role in the exchange framework between the United States and France, was the general coordinator in these areas. Lastly, the responsibility in the field fell on Public Affairs Officer Albert Harkness. “Executive Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation”, 28-IX-1970; “U.S.-Spanish Scientific and Technological Cooperation Under the Executive Agreement for Friendship and Cooperation”, 16-XI-1970. NARA, RG 59, 1970-73, Spain, Box 2600. On Spain’s side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also tried to establish a unified framework for coordination, placing several of its directors in charge of it. This approach caused some disagreements with the Ministry of Science and Education. Reports and notes on this issue are available in AMAE, R-12486/14.


That Committee was comprised of the Director of Cultural Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (José Pérez del Arco), Technical Secretary
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General of the Ministry of Education and Science (Pedro Segú), and the Public Affairs Officer (Albert Harkness) and Cultural Affairs Officer (Millard L. Johnson) of the U.S. Embassy. “Notas para el señor Ministro (de Asuntos Exteriores)”, 8-VI and 23-IX-1970. AMAE, R-12486/14.


The number of scholarships awarded in each area: Language and Literature (172, including American Studies); Economics and Sociology (92); Applied Sciences (78); Pure Sciences (52); Educational Sciences (50), and Humanities (33). “Annual Program Proposal. Program Year 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 and 1975.” CU, Group III, Box 123. A commentary on the state of American Studies at the end of Francoism in J. COY, “American Studies in Spain”, in American Studies Abroad, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1975, p. 70-76.

Although the regulations established in the BFS Policy Statements and the Manual for Binational Commissions were applied to both.

The Supervisory Committee, which was sometimes referred to as the Tripartite Commission, was comprised of the Director General for Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Director of International Cooperation of the Ministry of Education and Science, and the Cultural Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy. The Advisory Committee would be comprised of “important figures in Arts and Sciences” such as: Carlos Asensio, Juan Díez Nicolas, Alberto Dou, Manuel Gala, Federico García Moliner, Luis González Seara, Rafael Lapesa, Manuel Medina, Juan Pérez de Tudela, José Luis Pinillos, José Ignacio Fernández Alonso, Diego Figuera, Peter Fraenkel, Ubaldo Martinez and Julio Rodríguez Villanueva. More details on the evolution of that program are available in “Educational Exchanges with Spain Under the ‘Bases Agreement Program’”, IV-1973. CU, CIES, Box 431. “Programa de Cooperación Cultural entre España y EE.UU. 1973/1976”, 30-VI-1976; “Informe del Programa de Cooperación Cultural entre España y los Estados Unidos de América”, 4-XI-1976. ACFE, Boxes 92/6 and 7.


Due to lack of data, the sum does not include contributions from U.S. universities and private foundations, which also helped to fund transatlantic exchange.


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91 M. GALA MUÑOZ, “Estudio sociométrico de los becarios españoles”, in *Influencia norteamericana en el desarrollo científico español...*, p. 27-29.


These figures correspond to Fulbright Program grantees and recipients of the cultural and educational cooperation program (NMA), which the Commission directly administered. They do not reflect renewals or grantees who obtained more than one scholarship. The total number of grants, which was used for the calculation by periods because the previous data was not broken down, was much higher: 5,823 for Spaniards and 2,386 for Americans.

Most grants were awarded in the areas of Language and Literature, American Studies and Social Sciences. Pure and Applied Sciences were considered covered by other sources of funding.

Exchanges took place between the Indiana University and \textit{Universidad Autónoma de Madrid}, the University of North Carolina and \textit{Universidad de Sevilla}, and University of Illinois and \textit{Universidad de Barcelona}. The \textit{Instituto de Ciencias de la Educación} in Santiago de Compostela was also assisted during a five-year Project to organize and evaluate centers for \textit{Educación General Básica} and \textit{Bachillerato Unificado Polivalente}.

139 grants were awarded in the second and last biennial. Throughout the NMA's duration, the distribution of scholarships by fields was the following: Sciences (149), Health Sciences (47), Social and Juridical Sciences (26), Arts and Humanities (18), and Engineering and Architecture (10). By specializations, the most funding was awarded in: Chemistry (40), Biological Sciences (37), Medicine (35), Biochemistry (24), Physics (16), Mathematics (14) and Economics (13). “Becas para españoles del Programa NMA.” Document provided by the Fulbright Commission-Spain.

106 The first was held in Santander between August and September, 1975, the second took place in Cambrils between May and June, 1976.


108 Banco de Bilbao contributed a total of $4,550,120 to the program; La Caixa contributed $6,612,081.

109 These grants were first announced in the BOE, 23-IX-1980.

110 Pure and Applied Sciences, along with Economics and Economic Development, were ranked lowest in priority for scholarships. Emphasis was placed on students with “advanced degree objectives (M.A., M.S., and Ph. D. degrees), and the education and training of future secondary teachers and university professors.”

111 Environmental Studies and Spanish Studies were also briefly added. More detailed information is available in the “Annual Program Proposal. Program Year” from 1978-79 to 1983-84. CU, Group III, Box 123.

112 “Program Plan”, 1984-85 and 1985-86. ACFE, Box 24/5 and 6. The Science and Technology project included “Agrarian Sciences; Allied Health Sciences (Public Health); Chemistry; Communication Sciences (computers and telecommunication); Earth, Atmospheric and Environmental Sciences; Engineering and other Technological Sciences; Life Sciences (Biology); Mathematics; Medical Sciences (primarily non-clinical); and Physics.” Social Sciences and Political Sciences included: “American Studies, Anthropology; Demography; Education; Geography; History; Journalism; Law; Political Science; Psychology; Social Work and Sociology.” Arts and Humanities included: “Architecture, Art and History; Fine and Performing Arts; Literature; Linguistics; Philosophy and Ethics.”

113 More information on the events organized to commemorate that anniversary in AMAE, R-31188.

114 She earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy and Letters, was Director of the American Field Service and a founding member of the European Asso-
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ciation for Intercultural Learning. She also played a key role in the creation of Youth for Understanding —Yforum—, in Spain prior to becoming Executive Director of the Fulbright Commission.


“Program Plan”, 1986-87 and 1987-88. ACFE, Boxes 24/7 and 25/1.


Tratado de Amistad y Cooperación..., p. 13-21. The complementary agreements had the same validity period as the treaty, five years. The funding stipulated was different in each case. The annual allocation for scientific and technological cooperation was $4,600,000, while education and culture had a $2,400,000 budget. Each committee was comprised exclusively of representatives of both governments.

That service’s structure is detailed in “Sección Administrativa de la Secretaría Conjunta para los Programas tres y cuatro.” ACFE, Box 32/28. Acting in collaboration with Ramón Bela, Thomas Middleton was Deputy Director. The management and personnel of each committee was separated in 1979.

Awards distributed as follows: cooperative research (197 with renewals), postdoctoral grants (168), short-term visits (102), research in Spain (43), institutional aid (35), and science frontiers (10).

The areas of activity were: grants for further study and training of research personnel and graduate study (608), institutional aid (131), aid for spreading Spanish culture in the United States (73), aid for research in Spain (67), aid for cooperative research (45) and travel grants (71). The activity proposals of the Joint Committee for Cultural and Educational Affairs were drafted by the Evaluation Committee for the Advisory Commission on Scientific and Technical Research (CAICYT), on which the CAICYT itself, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and the U.S. Embassy were represented. Data on the activities of both Joint Committees was provided by the ACFE personnel. See also “Comité Conjunto Hispano-Norteamericano para la Cooperación Científica y Tecnológica (Acuerdo complementario nº. 3). Comité Conjunto Hispano-Norteamericano para Asuntos Educativos y Culturales (Acuerdo complementario nº. 4)”, 27-I-1982. ACFE, Box 88/1.


The only exception was the inclusion of health as a priority field. The first committee would be co-chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Department of State, the second by the same Ministry and the U.S. International Communication Agency. Convenio de Amistad, Defensa y Cooperación..., p. 127-135. Both Committees were run by binational Government Boards. The Director General for Scientific Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Scientific Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy presided over the science and technology committee; the Director General for Cultural Relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy oversaw the committee for culture and education. The Fulbright Commission continued to advise both committees and house their administrative offices.

The agreement initially designated 7 million dollars a year to scientific and technological cooperation and 5 million for culture and education.

The funded activities included: joint projects in applied (132) and basic (86) sciences, and to a lesser degree, grants (214, including short and long-term) and seminars (30). “Comité Conjunto Hispano-Norteamericano para la Cooperación Científica y Tecnológica. Memorando”, 21-I-1988. ACFE, Box 410.

The distribution by category was: institutional aid (131), aid for spreading Spanish culture in the United States (129), aid for institutional cooperation (102), aid for cooperative research (41), along with grants for postdoctoral research and graduate study, and travel grants. The decrease in the initially
stipulated sum for cultural and educational cooperation was due to the budgetary restrictions of the U.S. government, which only contributed $4,785,000 in the program’s fourth year and $3,333,000 in the fifth and last year. The Agencia Nacional de Evaluación then took over the job previously handled by the CAICYT.


“Acuerdo entre el Reino de España y los Estados Unidos de América en materia de Cooperación Educativa, Cultural y Científica”, 27-X-1994. BOE, 19-V-1995. The new regulation specified that the Commission would have an Executive Director, a figure that had already existed de facto for some time. The Board of Directors would now be comprised of 12 members instead of 10, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and U.S. Embassy playing a central role. The agreement was signed by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana Madariaga—a former Fulbright grantee—and the U.S. Ambassador in Spain, Richard N. Gardner.

In 1999, Spain’s membership in the military structure of NATO was decided (with favorable votes from the PSOE), in a clear gesture of pro-U.S. sentiment. After the period established by the 1988 Agreement ended, it was renewed annually and almost automatically. In April 2002, the Agreement for Defense Cooperation was signed. W. CHISLETT, España y Estados Unidos...., p. 41-54.


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137 In 1999, Spain’s membership in the military structure of NATO was decided (with favorable votes from the PSOE), in a clear gesture of pro-U.S. sentiment. After the period established by the 1988 Agreement ended, it was renewed annually and almost automatically. In April 2002, the Agreement for Defense Cooperation was signed. W. CHISLETT, España y Estados Unidos...., p. 41-54.


140 Directorio de antiguos becarios de la Comisión Fulbright y del Comité Conjunto Hispano-Norteamericano para la Cooperación Cultural y Educativa, Madrid, Fulbright Commission, 1993.


143 While the Ministry of Economy and Finance made stable contributions, the Ministry of Public Administration was more irregular with its funding. Other contributions only lasted until mid-decade, including the ones made by the Ministries of Public Works, the Environment, Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Culture, Labor and Social Welfare (Instituto de la Mujer) and the Instituto de Salud Carlos III. “Annual Program Plan”, from 1994 to 1999. ACFE, Boxes 26/4, 28/1-4 and 29/1.


Calculations are limited to grants under the Fulbright Program, and omit scholarships awarded by the Joint Committees.

*Estudio sociológico sobre los ex-becarios...*

The project had the following stages: 1) Analysis of the Fulbright Commission’s historic records, design of a classification system and instruments for description and consultation; 2) Selection and adaptation of an information management program to meet the needs of the record holdings and their future growth; 3) Inventory and cataloguing of existing records at the Fulbright Commission and the *Archivo General de la Administración*; 4) Consultation and selective reproduction of records of other archives that provide additional information, mainly from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Historical Collection, located in the Special Collections Department of the University of Arkansas in Fayetteville. For the records, a database was designed in Access where the data extracted from each file was recorded according to the General International Standard Archival Description ISAD(G). The database was designed to facilitate the automatic transfer of information from the management database updated by the Fulbright Commission grantees so that selected data would directly become part of the historic archives.

One of the archivists hired for the project, Patricia de la Hoz, stayed on to manage and maintain the archives and continue organizing the records from Joint Committees 4 (Educational and Cultural Affairs) and 3 (Scientific and Technological Cooperation).

Information on participants and conclusions reached by work groups and participants in general are available in *La cooperación cultural y científica...*

Updated and complete information on the activities to commemorate the Fulbright Commission’s 50th Anniversary as well as the grant programs it administers can be found on its website ([www.fulbright.es](http://www.fulbright.es)).
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“La aportación norteamericana al desarrollo científico español en el primer tercio del siglo XX.” Unpublished text presented at an interdisciplinary seminar on *La americanización en España: 50 años de influencia económica y social*, Madrid, September 12-13th, 2002.


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## Appendix

### Members of the Fulbright Commission Board of Directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Commission Position</th>
<th>Public Office</th>
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<tr>
<td>Canter, Jacob</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ruiz Morales, José Miguel</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Vice Chair</td>
<td>Director General for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, Harris</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy</td>
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<td>Phillips, Richard B.</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Treasurer</td>
<td>Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>Chair</td>
<td>Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serna, Alfonso de la</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Vice Chair</td>
<td>Director General for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Moody, George T.</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Chair</td>
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<td>1964</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>Chair</td>
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**Di Tommaso, Philip**
Chair
1966
Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Mattos, Edward H.**
Chair
1967
Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Campbell, John R.**
Treasurer
1967
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Poch y Gutrez. de Caviedes Antonio**
Vice Chair
1968
Special Delegate for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Johnson, Millard Lee**
Treasurer
1969
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Harkness, Albert**
Chair
1970
Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Pérez del Arco, José**
Vice Chair
1970
Director General for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Amerson, Robert C.**
Chair
1971
Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Thomas de Carranza, Enrique**
Vice Chair
1972
Director General for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Messía y Jiménez, José Luis.**
Chair and Vice Chair
Marqués de Busianos
1972
Director General for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Amerson, Robert C.**
Vice Chair
1972
Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Johnson, Millard Lee**
Chair and Vice Chair
1972
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**Ortiz Armengol, Pedro**
Treasurer
1973
Deputy Director for Cultural Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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<td>Chair and Vice Chair</td>
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<td>Serna, Alfonso de la</td>
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<td>Meyer, Charles R.</td>
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<td>Vaca de Osma, José Ant.</td>
<td>Vice Chair</td>
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<td>Alonso Burón, Mariano</td>
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SENILLOSA, ANTONIO DE  
1985

Chair and Vice Chair
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

EARLE, ROBERT L.  
1986

Co-chair
Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

SENILLOSA, ANTONIO DE  
1986

Co-chair
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

HARAN, THOMAS F.  
1986

Treasurer
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

ARIAS ESTÉVEZ, MIGUEL  
1987

Co-chair
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MCBRIDE, EDWARD C.  
1989

Acting Co-chair
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

GILLESPIE, JACOB  
1989

Co-chair
Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

BENAVIDES SALAS, CARLOS MANUEL DE  
1989

Treasurer
Deputy Director for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

SCHLOEDER, KATHLEEN  
1990

Treasurer
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

PÉREZ MARTÍNEZ, ARTURO  
1990

Treasurer
Deputy Director for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

COLOMÉ, DELFÍN  
1991

Co-chair
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

LEARY, THOMAS M.  
1992

Co-treasurer
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy
Appendix

**CARLSON, BRIAN**
Co-chair
1994
Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

**RODRÍGUEZ PANTOJA, TOMÁS**
Co-treasurer
1994
Deputy Director for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**CABANAS, SANTIAGO**
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1996
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**SIEKERT, MAGDA S.**
Co-treasurer
1996
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

**COREY-ARCHER, PAMELA**
Co-chair
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Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

**NUÑEZ GARCÍA-SAÚCO, ANTONIO**
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Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**SOBREDO GALANES, JORGE**
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1998
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**RODRÍGUEZ-PONGA, RAFAEL**
Co-chair
2000
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**BARBARO, ANNE**
Co-treasurer
2000
Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

**SILVA FERNÁNDEZ, JESÚS**
Co-chair
2001
Director General for Cultural Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**NEALON, JAMES D.**
Co-chair
2002
Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Embassy

**LOO, EDWARD**
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Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy
Westerly Wind

**MARTINELL SEMPERE, ALFONS**  
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Director General for Cultural and Scientific Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**SHUMAKE, JOSIE**  
Co-chair  
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Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**FEMENÍA GUARDIOLA, CONSUELO**  
Co-treasurer  
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Deputy Director for Cultural and Scientific Programs and Agreements, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation

**ESTELL, MARTI**  
Co-treasurer  
2006  
Cultural Affairs Officer, U.S. Embassy

**GENTON, THOMAS**  
Co-chair  
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**NICOLA U MARTÍ, ANTONIO**  
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**BARBARÁ GÓMEZ, PABLO**  
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Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia
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- Janssen-Cilag, S.A.  
- Lilly, S.A.  
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- Sanitas, S.A.  
- Schering-Plough, S.A.  
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Fundación Autor y Soc. General de Autores y Editores  
Fundación Bancaixa  
Fundación Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa  
Fundación Caja Madrid  
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Fundación CEOE:  
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- Fundación Coca-Cola España
- Grupo Esabe
- IBM España
- McDonald’s España, Inc.
- R.J. Reynolds Iberia, S.l. (Winston)
- Fundación Instituto de Empresa
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- Fundación Sevillana de Electricidad
- Goldman Sachs Internacional
- Grupo Endesa
- Grupo Prisa
- Ibercaja
- Iberdrola
- Instituto Internacional
- La Caixa
- Spanish Association for American Studies (SAAS)
- Unicaja
- University of Maryland, Baltimore County